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Foreword 
The germ of this report might, perhaps, be found in discussions leading to the Council's 
annual 'forward look' meeting in May 2011. Some time in 2010, with typical foresight and 
perspicacity, the Council identified a bundle of emerging issues to do with the application of 
information technology and data science to health records and biological information that had 
the potential to generate substantial public hopes and concerns. The discussion in May 2011 
persuaded the Council that significant and under-explored ethical questions were at stake 
and that a Council report could offer a useful and timely contribution to debate. 
I doubt that many of those who, like me, attended the Council's initial scoping workshop in 
February 2012 would have predicted the shape this report would take or could have 
imagined just how wide-ranging, complex and passionate the debate would be. Recalling 
that the project began life under the rubric 'Genomics, Health Records, Database Linkage 
and Privacy' may shed light on the some of the preoccupations underlying the report that 
resurfaced repeatedly as it emerged. But when the Working Party set to work in March 2013, 
with the tide of enthusiasm for 'big data' reaching a high water mark, it seemed that the 
issues we had to consider were much more general than the use of particular 'kinds' of data 
or the linking of particular 'kinds' of records. This was confirmed when we began to gather 
evidence at a number of fact-finding meetings. It was further confirmed by the extraordinary 
richness of responses to our open consultation.  
Our task was complicated by the fact that we built on shifting sands. The negotiations around 
the new European Data Protection Regulation, the well-publicised vicissitudes of the 
'care.data' programme and the expectations built around the '100,000 Genomes' project: all 
these unfolded during our deliberations and remain largely unresolved as we go to press. 
Although the report addresses these and other examples explicitly, and will no doubt be read 
differently in the light of further developments, the reader should remember that our principal 
concerns are moral questions, not contingent questions of law and practice. We have tried to 
produce a report that adds insight to these but is not diminished by the fact that they may 
unfold in one way rather than another. We intend and expect, in other words, that readers will 
continue to find value in our report as initiatives, methodologies, and indeed laws, come and 
go. 
Some of the matters that we have had to address – the challenging complexity of health 
service and research practices, the technical sophistication of data science, for example – 
were new to many of us and we relied heavily on our colleagues' expertise to bring these 
unfamiliar concepts into our common grasp. Nevertheless, we could not have reached our 
objective without the contribution of every member of the Working Party to our deliberations, 
since each brought a perspective that at times enriched, at others challenged, and often 
enriched through challenging, the understanding that developed among us. I should here 
express my gratitude to those colleagues for their hard work and commitment to our 
objective, and, though we have had some robust debates, for demonstrating a belief in the 
centripetal potential to produce something of value over the centrifugal force of our 
differences. Although, for purely contingent reasons, not all of the original Working Party 
were able to see the project to completion, the imprint of earlier contributions remains on the 
final document. As a group we are deeply indebted to the Nuffield Council and especially to 
the subgroup of Council members who reviewed and commented on our output at various 
stages of the project for their intellectual engagement, wise counsel and moral support 
throughout. Beyond these we have benefitted considerably from the contributions of 
numerous others, among them those who responded to our open consultation. Though we 
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have not engaged with specific responses explicitly in the report, these have been 
immensely valuable in informing our thinking, providing a common wealth of knowledge and 
questions for a diverse working party such as ours to draw on, to discuss and to pursue. We 
benefitted greatly from the contributions of those who attended our early fact finding 
meetings, who gave generously of their considerable knowledge and patiently addressed our 
questions, and of the authors of two independent commissioned reports. Our initial drafts 
were improved immeasurably thanks to our external reviewers who saw an early draft of this 
document and commented more in the spirit of collaborators than critics. Though we have 
not been able to reflect the totality of their advice in a single document, it has enriched and 
informed the report beyond anything that we might otherwise have achieved; any 
shortcomings that remain are, of course, our responsibility rather than theirs.  
Finally, I should thank the members of the Nuffield Council Secretariat who supported our 
work. Peter Mills, not only organised the whole project, but also undertook the lengthy and 
arduous task of drafting and editing the report. Without his expertise, patience, and his 
dedication beyond the call of duty, our work would not have reached a successful conclusion. 
Peter was ably supported by our research officers, Tom Finnegan (to the end of 2013) and 
Bettina Schmietow (from March 2014) who also deserve our gratitude.  
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Terms of reference 
1. To identify developments in the collection, linking, use and exploitation of human 
biological and health data arising from advances in knowledge, technology, 
organisation and governance. 
2. To identify, define and examine significant ethical questions raised by these 
developments.  
3. To consider, in particular, the implications (including possible benefits and possible 
harms) of these developments, having regard to: 
a the meaning, importance and the practical exercise of privacy, autonomy, 
anonymity, identity, altruism, solidarity and citizenship; 
b ownership, control and interest in data, and the exercise of these via 
measures such as consent, authorisation, donation and sale; 
c the interaction between the interests of the individual data subject, other 
individuals, the public interest and commercial interests, particularly in cases 
in which these are not aligned; 
d the moral and legal duties of those involved in the collection,  linking, use and 
exploitation of data; 
e the appeal to autonomy, rights, human dignity and common interest as 
justifications for processing data in different contexts. 
4. To report on these matters and to make recommendations, as appropriate, for 
research, information governance and policy. 
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Executive summary 
Key findings and recommendations 
1. There is a growing accumulation of data, of increasing variety, about human biology, 
health, disease and functioning, derived ultimately from the study of people. Advances in 
information technology and data science provide more ways, and more powerful ways, 
to collect, manage, combine, analyse and derive insight from these data. The result is 
that data are now seen as a valuable resource with an indefinite range of potential uses.  
2. There is a public interest in the responsible use of data to support advances in scientific 
knowledge, innovative treatments and improvements in health services. However, there 
is also a public interest in protecting the privacy of individuals: privacy is fundamentally 
important to individuals (and groups) in the establishment and maintenance of their 
identity, their relationships and their sense of personal well-being. In biomedical 
research and health care data initiatives, which link and re-use data, public and private 
interests are entangled in complex ways. Such data initiatives must address the 
following question:  
■ what is the set of morally reasonable expectations about the use of data and what 
conditions are required to give sufficient confidence that those expectations will be 
satisfied? 
3. Compliance with the law cannot guarantee that a use of data is morally acceptable. 
Faced with contemporary data science and the richness of the data environment, 
protection of privacy cannot reliably be secured merely by anonymisation of data or by 
using data in accordance with the consent from ‘data subjects’. Effective governance of 
the use of data is indispensable.  
4. A set of morally reasonable expectations about the governance and use of data should 
be determined in accordance with four principles: 
■ the principle of respect for persons 
■ the principle of respect for established human rights 
■ the principle of participation of those with morally relevant interests 
■ the principle of accounting for decisions 
5. Taking into account the current state of knowledge and practice, and the likely direction 
and pace of developments, and considering a number of specific data initiatives in 
biomedical research and health care, we recommend: 
■ support for needed research into the potential harms associated with abuse of 
biological and health data, as well as the benefits of responsible data use 
■ comprehensive mapping of UK health and research data use and the norms relevant 
to it 
■ mandatory reporting of privacy breaches affecting individuals to the individuals 
affected 
■ review of anti-blagging measures to protect data in health care systems and 
promulgation of best practice 
■ criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for the deliberate misuse of data  
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■ a public statement of expectations about who may be given access to health data and 
for what purposes, for each data initiative 
■ publication of all Health and Social Care Information Centre data sharing agreements 
and results of independent audits of compliance 
■ maintenance of an auditable record of all people given access to data held by the 
Health and Social Care Information Centre, that can be given to affected individuals  
■ a review of the appropriateness of public-private partnerships to secure public benefit 
from the research use of National Health Service records 
■ increased subject participation in design and governance of research projects  
■ wider use of explicit and flexible ethics and governance frameworks for research 
projects, including for international collaborative research 
■ restriction of access to research data to researchers (including international 
collaborators) who are subject to institutional oversight and effective sanction 
■ publication of policies on the use of cloud services by national bodies 
■ ethical and scientific appraisal to maximise the contribution of participant-led research 
to science while ensuring adequate protection of participants  
■ collaboration among all members of the research community to promote a more 
robust, explicit and candid foundation for extending access to data for research in the 
public interest.  
Summary of the report 
6. This report takes as its starting point the massive accumulation of data in biomedical 
research and health care, and the increasing power of data science to extract value by 
linking and re-using that data, for example in further health or population research. It 
examines the scientific, policy and economic drivers to exploit these opportunities, and 
the concerns and potential risks associated with doing so. The faltering ability of 
conventional information governance measures to keep pace with these developments 
is identified as a significant problem.  The report therefore poses and addresses the 
following question:  
■ how can we define a set of morally reasonable expectations about the use of data in 
any given data initiative and what conditions are required to give sufficient confidence 
that those expectations will be satisfied? 
7. The report sets out a number of general recommendations, including four guiding 
principles for ethical design and governance of data initiatives. These help to identify 
specific examples of existing good practice and to make recommendations for improved 
practice in the use of data in the fields of health care (re-use of NHS records, clinical 
research, etc.) and population research (biobanks, epidemiological studies, etc.). 
Data (c hapter 1)  
8. Data provide the raw materials for reasoning and calculation. The informational value of 
data arises from the context in which they are placed, and how they relate to other data. 
The meaning, utility and value of data may be transformed as they appear within 
different contexts such as health care, research and public policy. Digitisation has 
allowed an escalating accumulation of data in health care and biomedical research 
settings, including: 
■ clinical care data (e.g. primary care and hospital records) 
■ data from clinical trials and observational studies  
■ patient-generated data (e.g. from ‘life logging’ or consumer genetic testing)  
■ laboratory data (e.g. from imaging, genome sequencing and other ‘omics’) 
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■ administrative data or metadata  
9. Advances in information technology (faster information storage, retrieval and 
processing) and data science (more powerful statistical techniques and algorithms) have 
created novel opportunities to derive insights from the analysis of big datasets, and 
particularly through the combination or linking of datasets. While these developments 
are not specific to biomedical research and health care, they are having a significant 
impact in these fields, with morally significant implications. They have led to the 
emergence of a new attitude towards data that sees them as exploitable raw materials, 
which can be put to use for a variety of purposes beyond those for which they were 
originally collected. 
10. ‘Data initiatives’ involve the re-use of data in novel contexts and linking them with data 
from other sources.  However, inconsistent data quality and peculiarities arising from the 
context of data collection can present technical difficulties in exploiting these 
opportunities.  Furthermore, legal and ethical limitations placed on the re-use of data for 
secondary purposes limit the re-use of existing data sets.  
Opportunities  and threats  (c hapter 2) 
11. The combination of advances in information technologies and in data science have 
generated considerable opportunities for economic activity. Given the UK’s strong 
research base in the biomedical sciences and the unique resource and infrastructure of 
the UK’s national health services, the use of health data has become a strategic focus. 
12. There is a clear public interest in the responsible use of data to improve well-being 
through improved health advice, treatment and care, as well as through increasing 
economic prosperity more generally. This objective is being pursued in three main ways: 
■ increasing efficiency and transforming service delivery through better informed 
decisions about resource allocation and greater involvement of patients through e-
health care  
■ generating improvements in medical treatment by building a stronger evidence base 
for prediction, prevention and treatment, and by using data to personalise treatment 
and care, linking phenotype and genotype data with lifestyle, environmental and 
social data 
■ generating economic growth from the life sciences by using existing data in health 
systems with increased technological capacity and skills to invigorate the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.  
13. To achieve these outcomes a number of policy orientations have been set in the UK and 
elsewhere, such as: 
■ increasing IT intensity and introducing new infrastructure in health systems  
■ establishing partnerships between the public and private sectors to promote resource 
exploitation and innovation  
■ centralising data resources to facilitate analysis of linked data 
■ promoting ‘open data’ and ‘data sharing’ to encourage the widest possible use of 
resources 
■ promoting ‘big data’ and investing in the knowledge economy to foster development 
of new tools, methodologies and infrastructures. 
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14. However, the pursuit of opportunities must take account of the need to manage a 
number of threats to welfare.  These threats take a number of forms, for example: 
■ misuse of data leading to harms to individuals and institutions (ranging from detriment 
to health, loss of privacy, financial loss, reputational damage, stigmatisation and 
psychological distress) 
■ discriminatory treatment, ranging from targeted advertising to differential pricing that 
compounds social disadvantage, to discrimination in insurance and employment 
■ state surveillance of citizens, particularly in the light of revelations about the US 
National Security Agency, which is greatly facilitated by large databases and linked 
information systems  
15. Independent research commissioned to inform our work found that the negative impacts 
of data misuse are potentially much wider than are those recognised by legal and 
regulatory systems. Furthermore, the nature of privacy harms and of the judicial and 
regulatory systems means that they are likely to be under-reported by the victims and 
obtaining redress is difficult.  
Recommendations 
1 Relevant bodies, including public and private research funders and UK health 
departments, should ensure that there is continued research into the potential harms 
associated with abuse of biological and health data, as well as its benefits. This 
research should be sustained as available data and data technologies evolve, 
maintaining vigilance for new harms that may emerge. Appropriate research that 
challenges current policy orientations should be particularly encouraged in order to 
identify and test the robustness of institutional assumptions. 
2 The Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel and the Health Research 
Authority should supervise, respectively, the maintenance of comprehensive maps 
of UK health and research data flows, and they should actively support both 
prospective and continuing evaluation of the risks or benefits of any policies, 
standards, or laws governing data used in biomedical research and health care. 
3 The Government should make enforceable provisions to ensure that privacy 
breaches involving individual-level data that occur in health services and biomedical 
research projects are reported in a timely and appropriate fashion to the individual or 
individuals affected. 
4 The Health and Social Care Information Centre should maintain prospective 
assessments to inform the most effective methods for preventing the inadvertent or 
fraudulent accessing of personal healthcare data by unauthorised individuals. 
5 The UK government should legislate to introduce criminal penalties, comparable to 
those applicable for offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, for deliberate 
misuse of data whether or not it results in demonstrable harm to individuals. 
 
Moral values  and interes ts  (c hapter 3) 
16. The concept of privacy and the distinction between public and private have evolved 
throughout history. Individual privacy is important in the formation of identity and the 
maintenance of personhood but privacy can also be attributed to families, and wider 
groups. Norms of information disclosure are important in the formation and maintenance 
of identities and relationships between individuals and groups, and different norms apply 
to different relationships. 
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17. An important class of privacy norms is enshrined in the rules and practices of 
confidentiality. These may exist as informal conventions among individuals but may be 
more formalised in professional relationships, contracts and laws. Medical confidentiality 
allows information sharing that might otherwise infringe privacy norms to take place for 
specific professional purposes.  
18. At the same time consent provides a mechanism to make controlled exceptions to an 
existing privacy norm for specific purposes (for example, to permit a medical diagnosis 
or referral) without abolishing the underlying norm. However, consent does not itself 
ensure that all of the interests of the person giving consent are protected nor does it set 
aside the moral duty of care owed to that person by others who are given access to the 
information. On its own, consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethical extensions 
of data access.  
19. While individuals have privacy interests in the use of data, they also share group 
interests in the wider use of data for health research. This broader public interest, which 
consists in securing objectives that are valued by society, may come into conflict with 
individual privacy. But the relationship between privacy and public interest in data is not 
simply one of opposition. The two are mutually implicated in each other: there are 
private interests in the achievement of common goals and a public interest in the 
protection of privacy that encourages cooperation. This complex relationship leads to a 
need to reconcile the articulation of the private within the public and the public within the 
private.  A fundamental moral question facing data initiatives is therefore:  
■ how may we define a set of morally reasonable expectations about how data will be 
used in a data initiative, giving proper attention to the morally relevant interests at 
stake? 
20. Three sorts of considerations will be relevant to formulating an answer: 
■ the norms of privacy and disclosure applicable among those who participate in a data 
initiative 
■ the ways in which individual freedoms are respected, for example, the freedom to 
modify these norms by consent 
■ the form of governance that will give acceptable assurance that the expectations will 
be met  
L aw, governanc e and s ec urity (c hapter 4) 
21. A number of overlapping legal measures exist to protect privacy, principally: formal 
privacy rights, which guarantee freedom from interference, albeit that they may be 
qualified by certain public interest considerations; rules of data protection, which control 
the ‘processing’ of various kinds of ‘personal data’; and duties of confidentiality, which 
protect against unauthorised or unreasonable breaches of confidence.  
22. A number of technical measures may be applied to prevent the identification of individual 
subjects and reduce the risk of privacy infringements: 
■ aggregation of data makes it harder to distinguish individual cases, although it is not 
wholly secure in the face of modern statistical techniques; it also makes further linking 
of data difficult 
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■ anonymisation by the removal of identifiers also makes individuals difficult to re-
identify, although re-identification may still be possible depending on what other data 
or information are available  
■ pseudonymisation, the replacement of identifiers with a code, enables linking of data 
where the correspondence between the code and the case is known, although data 
may still be vulnerable to inferential re-identification 
23. While de-identification measures may help to protect privacy, re-identification may not 
be impossible and the risk of re-identification is both difficult to quantify and may become 
greater over time. To protect the privacy of data subjects, de-identification should 
therefore be combined with further controls on the access to and uses of data. 
24. A standard control is to limit access to data in accordance with the consent of the ‘data 
subject’. Broad consent allows data subjects to set certain parameters for the use of the 
data that are morally salient for them but the often far-reaching implications of data use 
may be obscure, and the scope of consent given when data are collected may become 
unclear, particularly in changing circumstances and in relation to novel uses of data. 
This is especially likely when data are held for long periods of time. Continuing 
involvement of subjects through ‘dynamic’ forms of consent can address this but is 
potentially demanding.  
25. While seeking consent respects rights that individuals may have to make decisions 
about matters that may affect their interests, it cannot protect them from potentially 
harmful consequences of data use. Merely acting in accordance with consent cannot 
excuse data users from their moral duties towards data subjects, indeed towards all 
those who have a morally relevant interest the data initiative, whether they are people 
from whom the data were initially collected or others who stand to be affected by their 
use. 
26. As neither anonymisation nor compliance with consent offer sufficient privacy 
protections in data initiatives, additional controls on the use of data – on who is 
permitted to access them, for what purposes, and how they must conduct themselves – 
are therefore required. These have administrative aspects (e.g. data access committees 
and agreements) and technical aspects (e.g. safe havens).  
27. The need to meet two contradictory requirements at the same time places data 
initiatives in a double bind. In other words, they are required:  
■ to generate, use and extend access to data (because doing so is expected to 
advance research and make public services more efficient); and, at the same time 
■ to protect privacy as this is a similarly strong imperative, and a requirement of human 
rights law (and the more access is extended the greater the risks of abuse). 
28. In order to meet this challenge the use of measures such as anonymisation, the 
mechanisms for respecting individuals’ rights and interests (such as consent 
procedures), and the forms of governance that guide the conduct of professionals in the 
public interest need to be established coherently. These measures should be 
determined in relation to the underlying moral norms and values, and in relation to an 
agreed understanding of the hazards, benefits and uncertainties of data use in the 
context of particular data initiatives. 
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E thic al governanc e of data initiatives  (c hapter 5) 
29. Data initiatives are practical activities that involve a number of actors (who might be 
individuals, groups, institutions, etc.) some of whom stand to benefit or lose from the 
outcomes. Tensions and potential conflicts between values and interests can arise at the 
level of the individual, of professions or of the public. The ethical formation of a data 
initiative is a matter of reconciling these values and interests in a coherent set of morally 
reasonable expectations.  
30. A morally reasonable set of expectations should embody four principles.  
Ethical principles for data initiatives 
The use of data in biomedical research and health care should be in accordance with a 
publicly statable set of morally reasonable expectations and subject to appropriate 
governance.  
■ The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should be 
grounded in the principle of respect for persons. This includes recognition of a 
person’s profound moral interest in controlling others’ access to and disclosure of 
information relating to them held in circumstances they regard as confidential.   
■  The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should 
be determined with regard to established human rights. This will include limitations 
on the power of states and others to interfere with the privacy of individual citizens in 
the public interest (including to protect the interests of others). 
■ The set of expectations about how data will be used (or re-used) in a data 
initiative, and the appropriate measures and procedures for ensuring that those 
expectations are met, should be determined with the participation of people with 
morally relevant interests. This participation should involve giving and receiving 
public account of the reasons for establishing, conducting and participating in the 
initiative in a form that is accepted as reasonable by all. Where it is not feasible to 
engage all those with relevant interests – which will often be the case in practice – the 
full range of values and interests should be fairly represented.  
■ A data initiative should be subject to effective systems of governance and 
accountability that are themselves morally justified. This should include both 
structures of accountability that invoke legitimate judicial and political authority, and 
social accountability arising from engagement of people in a society. Maintaining 
effective accountability must include effective measures for communicating 
expectations and failures of governance, execution and control to people affected and 
to the society more widely.  
 
31. The principle of respect for persons does not mean that individuals’ interests may never 
be overridden, but that they may only be overridden where there is a legitimate reason 
to do so. As a principle of design of data initiatives, the principle of respect for human 
rights seeks to avoid potential rights conflicts and violations rather than leaving them to 
be dealt with retrospectively through judicial processes. The participation of people with 
morally relevant interests in the design and governance of data initiatives allows the 
identification of relevant privacy norms and the development of governance measures 
(such as design of consent and authorisation procedures) in relation to these norms; it 
allows preferences and interests to be expressed and transformed through practical 
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reasoning, and account to be given of how these interests are respected in decision 
making, helping to foster trust and cooperation. The principle of accounting for decisions 
ensures that expectations, as well as failures of governance and control, are 
communicated to people affected and to others more widely. It also ensures that data 
initiatives remain in touch with changing social norms. 
Data initiatives  in health s ys tems  (c hapter 6) 
32. Health-care IT systems were originally introduced to facilitate basic administrative tasks, 
such as managing patient records, issuing repeat prescriptions and tracking patients 
through different encounters with health care professionals. However, they developed to 
provide business intelligence for service improvement and support for observational 
research.  These come together in the concept of a ‘learning health system’ which is 
seen as an inevitable response to increasing pressures on health services and the 
demand for new treatments. 
33. These functions, together with the need to manage reimbursement and the appetite for 
data to inform health policy, combined to push data systems in the English NHS towards 
a centralised approach with electronic health records at its heart. The central collection 
of health care data in England is now managed by the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC). The HSCIC’s model involves holding linked data centrally, 
publishing aggregate data and disclosing certain individual-level ‘pseudonymised’ data 
in controlled conditions. Debate around the ‘care.data’ programme to extract primary 
care data to the HSCIC focused attention on the assumptions made about the 
relationship between privacy norms relevant to NHS patients and the legal norms under 
which HSCIC operates. It highlighted the absence of governance arrangements to 
negotiate this difference, and raised questions about how the rights of individuals were 
respected. Failure to attend to these prospectively led to ad hoc policy changes and a 
damaging loss of public and professional trust.   
34. The Scottish Informatics Programme to develop a research platform for health data 
involved initial public consultation to identify relevant social norms. On the basis of this it 
developed a model whereby data linkages are performed for specific purposes using a 
trusted third party, with analysis carried out on linked, pseudonymised datasets in a 
controlled environment. Data are not warehoused centrally and no individual-level data 
may be released from the safe haven. Direct access to the data is not available to 
commercial researchers. In addition to the role of the data custodians, authorisation for 
data use is provided by a risk-based, proportionate governance system that takes into 
account both privacy risk and public benefit, and refers to an explicit, potentially 
revisable, statement of guiding principles and best practices. The model demonstrates a 
number of features of good practice in relation both to its development and form that are 
consistent with the principles set out in this report.  
35. The 100,000 Genomes project involves linking data from genome sequencing with 
individuals’ NHS records for the investigation of cancers, rare diseases and some 
infectious diseases. Broad consent is obtained from individual subject participants (who 
do not expect direct therapeutic benefit). In operation the project will have an ethics 
committee and an explicit data access policy. Authorised researchers from all sectors 
may access a firewall-protected, pseudonymised dataset administered by a 
Government-owned company, Genomics England Ltd. No individual-level data may be 
released from this environment. The claimed public interest lies explicitly in securing 
economic as well as scientific and therapeutic benefits, by stimulating the commercial 
sector.  
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 Recommendations 
6 An independent, broadly representative group of participants should be convened to 
develop a public statement about how data held by the HSCIC should be used, to 
complement the Code of Practice on confidential information. This should clearly set 
out and justify what can reasonably be expected by those from whom data originate 
and be able to demonstrate that these expectations have been developed with the 
participation of people who have morally legitimate interests in the data held by the 
HSCIC, including data subjects, clinical professionals and public servants. 
7 In addition to implementing the recommendations of Sir Nick Partridge’s review, all 
Data Sharing Agreements held by the HSCIC should be published, along with the 
findings of a periodic independent audit of compliance those agreements. 
8 HSCIC Data Sharing Agreements should include a requirement to maintain an 
auditable record of all individuals or other legal entities who have been given access 
to the data and of the purposes to which they are to be put; this should be made 
available to all data subjects or relevant authorities in a timely fashion on request. 
9 Broader public consideration should be given to whether Genomics England Ltd 
provides the most appropriate model for the ethical use of genomic information 
generated in health services for public benefit before it becomes the de facto 
infrastructure for future projects. 
 
P opulation res earc h (c hapter 7) 
36. Biobanks are major resources of tissues and data that may be used for a variety of 
research purposes. They support the trend in life sciences research towards broader 
collaboration, larger datasets and greater varieties of data. UK Biobank is a large 
population biobank established to support the investigation of a range of common 
diseases occurring in the UK. Subject participants give broad consent to the use of data 
collected at recruitment, from their medical records and through supplementary data 
collections (e.g. the imaging study). The resource has a published Ethics and 
Governance Framework, compliance with which is overseen by an independent Ethics 
and Governance Council. Its design was foreshadowed by meaningful public 
engagement but the intention to establish a participant panel was not followed through. 
Subject participants’ influence over the use of the data is limited to possible withdrawal 
from the resource on the basis of information published or communicated by the 
organisation. Pseudonymised data are released to researchers from recognised 
institutions for research that meets public interest criteria, and results are returned and 
published to support further research. There may be some need to review the set of 
expectations underlying the operation of UK Biobank in the light of changing 
circumstances (the evolving data environment, revaluation of data, etc.) One such area 
is feedback of information to subject participants; another is expectations about 
commercial access to the resource. Renewed engagement with public and participants 
is desirable in this context. 
37. The UK10K Rare Genetic Variants in Health and Disease project was established to use 
existing research samples to characterise the genetic bases of rare diseases through 
comparison of genotypes of affected individuals with deeply phenotyped groups from 
cohort studies. This confronts the problem of controlled disclosure of highly specific 
individual-level data among different groups of researchers working on distinct studies. It 
is achieved through a common ethical framework of policies and guidelines developed 
with some patient interests represented. It places considerable reliance on ensuring that 
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only appropriately qualified researchers, bound by enforceable agreements, have 
access to data and on the role of principal investigators as data custodians. 
38. International collaborative research initiatives such as the International Cancer Genome 
Consortium and the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium also rely on a common ethical 
framework operating across different research contexts. These need to accommodate 
differing local practices (e.g. different policies regarding the return of findings to subject 
participants, different standards of security, varying institutional sanctions) and tackle 
complex consent issues to do with re-use and international transfer of data. The use of 
cloud-based storage and processing services is becoming increasingly important but it 
raises issues such as third party access (for example, by security services).  
39. The wide availability of information technology and social networking platforms have 
facilitated participant-led research, allowing individuals to group together to address 
research questions of interest to them and complement institutional research. The norms 
and social dynamics of patient-led research are different to more formal institutional 
research owing to the online medium, self-organising dynamics and the absence of 
formal review or oversight structures. They present different challenges of ensuring the 
protection of individual interests, of integration with institutional research, and of 
translation of findings into clinical products and practice. 
40. Good practice is emerging in many population research initiatives but more needs to be 
done to protect the privacy interests of subject participants in order to secure the trust of 
current and future generations. 
 Recommendations 
10 Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to allow governance arrangements 
to evolve during the life of an initiative, through deliberation with morally relevant 
stakeholders including participants, the public, funders and the research community.  
Arrangements may include, e.g., representation of relevant stakeholder groups in 
the governance of the biobank; regular review of a public ethics and governance 
framework document legitimated through deliberation with interested parties that 
sets out the relationships of a biobank with participants, the research community, 
individual researchers, funders and the wider society.  This may serve as an 
instrument to maintain alignment of the public interest in research with the privacy 
and other interests of the participants. Governance arrangements should, among 
other matters, outline policies for maintaining data security, the feedback of health-
related findings to participants and for research access to the resource. In large 
scale and complex initiatives detailed diagrams of data flows should be available to 
support good governance. The responsibility to ensure appropriate governance 
arrangements are in place rests with funders. 
11 Where broad consent is sought for the use of data additional, adaptive safeguards 
should be in place to secure the interests of participants over the life of a project. A 
possible model is provided by a publicly articulated, ‘living’ ethics and governance 
framework that reflects the expectations of participants and is subject to review and 
revision through mechanisms that involve representatives of the full range of 
interests of participants in the initiative. 
12 Researchers should operate demonstrably within a local governance framework able 
to maintain reasonable surveillance in order to identify inappropriate data use and 
administer sanctions for misuse. Researchers should be members of a recognised 
research environment with appropriate arrangements in place to ensure their 
research meets ethical standards.  They should provide undertakings regarding the 
confidential and secure use of data and that they will refrain from any attempt to 
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identify participants from whom data may have been derived. 
13 All international collaborative data research initiatives should operate within an 
explicit, public ethics and governance framework that has agreement from the 
initiative’s constituent partners. International collaborators should be able to 
demonstrate that they can fulfil recommendation 12 by applying equivalently strong 
governance standards (using legal and other mechanisms available in their national 
jurisdiction). 
14 All partners in international collaborations should integrate the provisions of the 
ethics and governance framework (EGF) agreed by the initiative as far as possible at 
their local research site. The partner should ensure that they adhere to the EGF, for 
example by ensuring participants have given appropriate consent for the use of data 
and samples in the initiative and that they are informed of potential transfer across 
borders. 
15 National bodies should publish their policies on the use of cloud services in health 
data settings so that data initiatives can include this in their decision making and 
interactions with publics and participants. 
16 Biomedical researchers should give consideration to arrangements that will 
maximise the potential of participant-driven research to contribute to generalisable 
health knowledge and secure public benefits while providing adequate protection of 
those involved through continuing ethical and scientific appraisal. Key stakeholders 
are citizen patient researchers, biomedical research bodies, research funders and 
journal publishers. All stakeholders should encourage optimal use of human studies 
for improved health outcomes 
17 The research community, including all academic and commercial partners, data 
controllers and custodians, public services and government agencies should actively 
foster opportunities to create a more explicit and reflective foundation for extending 
data access in the public interest. We urge all stakeholders in the medical research 
enterprise to continue to develop robust and comprehensive, yet efficient privacy 
protecting rules, guidelines and measures. Among other things these should aim at: 
■ Providing greater clarity for members of the public about ways that their biomedical 
data are used, and may be used in the future, along with a realistic 
acknowledgement that no system can guarantee privacy and confidentiality in all 
circumstances. 
■ Securing commitments from data controllers to a responsible approach to the 
extension of data access as part of their core mission statement; they must publish 
information about their approach to data access, transparency and accountability, 
and whether, and on what terms, they will consider extending access to data.  
■ Demonstrable and continual improvement of collection, storage and data access 
procedures against explicit standards for accuracy, reliability and security 
 
R eflec tions  (c hapter 8) 
41. Consideration of the state and direction of travel of information technology, data science, 
research and governance described in the report, and reflections on examples in health 
care and population research, lead to some practical precepts for professionals involved 
in data initiatives.  In particular they should: 
■ identify prospectively the morally relevant values and interests in any data initiative.  
■ take special care to identify those people whose interests may be especially at risk, 
and interests that arise from diverse values  
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■ not rely simply on compliance with the law as a way of securing that data use is 
morally appropriate, as the law does not always fully reflect moral norms  
■ identify the existing privacy norms in relation to the contemplated uses of data  
■ involve a range of those with morally relevant interests in the design of the data 
initiative in order to arrive at a publicly statable set of expectations about how data will 
be used 
■ state explicitly the set of morally reasonable expectations about the use of data in the 
initiative.   
■ involve a range of those with morally relevant interests in the continuing governance 
and review of the data initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
I
N
T
R
O
D
U
C
T
I
O
N
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s
1 
Introduction 
The Council’s terms of reference charge it, among other things, ‘to identify and define ethical 
questions raised by recent advances in biological and medical research.’ The developments 
with which this report is concerned are not peculiar to biomedicine although their impact on 
biomedicine raises significant and distinctive issues. The relevant ‘recent advances’ that the 
Working Party is responding to are principally two, and they are closely linked: 
■ first, the unprecedented quantity and variety of data collected through technologies of
biological measurement (e.g. genomic and imaging data) and the accumulation of these
stored data (e.g. medical records, biobanks), increasingly in machine readable formats;
■ second, the development of more powerful ways of transferring, linking and manipulating
data afforded by information technologies, and of analysing these data afforded by data
science.
The report contains 17 propositions relating to these developments, four principles for ethical 
governance of data initiatives, and 17 specific recommendations for action.  It has a broadly 
tripartite structure.  The first part is largely descriptive: it describes some of the relevant 
advances in data collection and use, and the conditions and influences that are pushing it in 
particular directions.  It describes the limitations of existing security, legal and governance 
measures that have been applied to the new uses of data and the challenges that therefore 
arise. The middle part explores the nature of the morally relevant values and interests at 
stake in data initiatives and develops a way of understanding data initiatives as social 
practices. Through a consideration of how the values are incorporated through the social 
processes involved in their formation and governance, it proposes a way of securing morally 
desirable outcomes. In the light of this, the third part of the report draws examples of good 
practice and identifies areas for improvement in selected data initiatives taking shape in 
health care and institutional research contexts. The intention is that, in addition to 
making specific recommendations, the report will provide an enduring resource and a 
support for constructive engagement with questions about the ethical use of data in 
health care and biomedical research. 

 Chapter 1 
Data 
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Chapter 1 – Data 
Chapter overview 
This chapter describes some of the sources and varieties of data that are accumulating 
in health care and biomedical research settings, and the increasing ways in which data 
may be used. 
Data provide the raw materials for reasoning and calculation. The informational value of 
data arises from the context in which they are placed, and how they relate to other data. 
The meaning, utility and value of data may be transformed as they appear within 
different contexts such as health care, research and public policy. Digitisation has 
allowed an escalating accumulation of data in health care and biomedical research 
settings, including: 
■ clinical care data (e.g. primary care and hospital records) 
■ data from clinical trials and observational studies  
■ patient-generated data (e.g. from ‘life logging’ or consumer genetic testing)  
■ laboratory data (e.g. from imaging, genome sequencing and other ‘omics’) 
■ administrative data or metadata  
Advances in information technology (faster information storage, retrieval and 
processing) and data science (more powerful statistical techniques and algorithms) have 
created novel opportunities to derive insights from the analysis of big datasets, and 
particularly through the combination or linking of datasets. While these developments 
are not specific to biomedical research and health care, they are having a significant 
impact in these fields, with morally significant implications. They have led to the 
emergence of a new attitude towards data that sees them as exploitable raw materials, 
which can be put to use for a variety of purposes beyond those for which they were 
originally collected. 
‘Data initiatives’ involve the re-using data in novel contexts and linking them with data 
from other sources. However, inconsistent data quality and peculiarities arising from the 
context of data collection can present technical difficulties in exploiting these 
opportunities. Furthermore, legal and ethical limitations placed on the re-use of data for 
secondary purposes limit the re-use of existing data sets. 
 
Introduction 
1.1 This chapter is about the accumulation and use of data in biomedical research and 
health care that has been enabled by developments in computing, biotechnologies, 
bioinformatics and professional practice since the last decade of the 20th Century. The 
dramatic growth in the volume and variety of these data and in our capacities for 
collecting, storing, combining, analysing and putting them to use, are the main 
advances that have given rise to this report. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics believes 
that these connected developments are significant and that the issues they raise are 
important not only for specialists, and in certain circumstances, but generally, and for 
all members of society.  
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1.2 Many of the sources of biological and health data described in this chapter are not new. 
We have been collecting and accumulating data in many areas of life since the advent 
of writing and the practice of analysing those data is as old as the practice of 
medicine.1 Even those sources of data that involve the most advanced technologies 
have often taken some time to enter routine use.2
Data and digitisation 
 The timeliness of this report rests on 
a claim that those innovations in data production, along with advances in the capture 
and analysis of data, have brought about a shift of emphasis in the way in which 
knowledge, well-being and public goods are pursued that has morally significant 
consequences.  
1.3 ‘Data’ means ‘given things’, i.e. things that are known or assumed as facts rather than 
deduced, inferred or imagined by us. Data produced by observation or measurement 
form the basis of reasoning and calculation.3
1.4 When we use census data to calculate average lifespan within a population we are 
treating data as given (e.g. baby boys living in the most deprived areas in England in 
2010-12 can expect to live 7.5 years less than those in least deprived areas).
 For the purposes of this report we simply 
draw a distinction between data, which we treat as the raw materials for analysis, and 
their informational value, which is given by the relation in which they stand to other 
facts or conclusions within a particular context. It is through relational properties that 
data have in a particular context that they acquire real-world significance: whereas data 
are treated as simply given, information has meaning. Ethical questions arise from how 
we use data within a context that gives them a particular meaning. Such a context 
might be, for example, one created by a particular research question we are trying to 
answer or a decision with which we are faced.  
4
 
1 For example, the Hippocratic corpus (Books I and III of Epidemics) contains forty two case histories. Hippocrates (1923) 
Volume I: Ancient medicine. Airs, waters, places. Epidemics 1 and 3. The oath. Precepts. Nutriment (London: William 
Heinemann), available at: https://archive.org/details/hippocrates01hippuoft. 
 When 
we investigate the accuracy of those data or question how they were collected we 
interrogate their informational value (e.g. what is the age range used to classify who 
falls into the category of a ‘baby’?). When we investigate the social meaning of data, 
we begin to ask about assumptions and values underlying the information (e.g. what 
does ‘deprived’ mean in this context?). Changing the context in which data are 
presented can significantly alter their informational value, especially if there are 
unusual or atypical values in that the new context. For example, data about our 
individual biology collected to diagnose disease or predict disease risk may also serve 
to identify us or establish our relationship to others. Conversely, data that were not 
originally acquired for health purposes can become a valuable source of health 
information. For example, data about our lifestyles – our alcohol intake or the contents 
2 For example, gene sequencing has been possible since the 1970s and has been in use in clinical practice for decades, (for 
example, in Down’s syndrome screening, Philadelphia chromosome testing for leukaemia, and neonatal screening 
programmes. The sequencing method in use today was developed largely by Frederick Sanger in 1977; see: Sanger F, 
Nicklen S, and Coulson AR (1977) DNA sequencing with chain-terminating inhibitors Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 74(12): 5463-7, available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/74/12/5463. See also: Hutchison III CA (2007) DNA 
sequencing: bench to bedside and beyond Nucleic Acids Research 35(18): 6227-37, available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2094077/;Korf BF (2013) Integration of genomics into medical practice 
Discovery Medicine 16(89): 241-8, available at: http://www.discoverymedicine.com/Bruce-R-Korf/2013/11/08/integration-of-
genomics-into-medical-practice/.  
3 The Oxford dictionary gives one meaning of data as “things known or assumed as facts, making the basis of reasoning “. 
Stevenson, A and Waite, M (2011) Concise Oxford English dictionary, 12th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
4 See: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-health4/life-expec-at-birth-age-65/2006-08-to-2010-12/sty-life-expectancy-
gap.html. 
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of our shopping baskets, our daily activities and exercise routines – can become ‘health 
data’ when framed by questions of mental health or disease risk in later life. Social data 
can help to predict the course of epidemics and inform public health responses to 
them.  
1.5 The development that has allowed the collection and accumulation of unprecedented 
amounts of data is digitisation. The widespread use of electronic media means that 
data are generated at a rate that is difficult to imagine.5 In less than a generation the 
recording of medical data has moved from ‘doctors’ notes’ to computer-based records 
that capture standardised information, are accessible in a range of settings, and 
support a wide range of purposes in addition to clinical care of the individual patient 
(such as resource planning, cost effectiveness evaluations, etc.). A similar journey has 
taken place in biomedical and population health research: within the span of an 
academic career, many researchers have gone from using an edge-notched punch 
card system to digital data mining using cloud-based data services several orders of 
magnitude more powerful.6
Data, rec ords  and tis s ues   
  
1.6 The association between data and the medium in which they are stored may create 
difficulties from the point of view of governance. Lloyd George who, as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, introduced the National Insurance Act 1911, famously came into 
conflict with the medical profession over the question of who owned the new medical 
records he introduced. From that it emerged that the Secretary of State owned the 
paper, the doctor owned the writing on it, and the record would pass to the Government 
on the patient’s death for statistical analysis.  
1.7 A great deal of biological data, such as DNA sequence data is encoded within the 
tissues of the body, which enables it to serve so well as a biometric identifier for 
forensic purposes. Similarly, advances in synthetic biology have allowed DNA 
molecules to be used as a storage system that might conceivably be used in the future 
for archiving. (It has been claimed that world's total stock of information, 1.8 zettabytes 
at the time, could be stored in about four grams of DNA).7
1.8 The relationship between tissues and data has been subject to legal as well as 
technological displacement: in a significant case relating to DNA sample and profile 
 At present, retrieval is too 
slow and expensive to make this useful for computing purposes, although this limitation 
might be overcome in future.  Developments in sequencing speed, for example, might 
eventually make it more cost effective to sequence patients’ DNA as required rather 
than storing the information on more expensive magnetic or semiconductor memory.  
 
5 IBM’s website, for example, carries the claim that “Every day, we create 2.5 quintillion bytes of data — so much that 90 per 
cent of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years alone.” See:  
 www-01.ibm.com/software/sg/data/bigdata/. 
6 In a common example of the former system, information was recorded on a number of index cards, and holes were punched 
around the edges, each one representing a data point. The (binary) data value would be given by whether the hole was then 
notched to continue it to the outer edge of the card. This allowed the answer to a research question to be found by identifying 
the cards that fell from the stack (possibly over several iterations for complex Boolean questions) when something like a 
knitting needle was inserted into the appropriate holes around the edge. For larger data sets mechanical counter sorters 
could be used. 
7 Church GM, Gao Y and Kosuri S (2012) Next-generation digital information storage in DNA Science 337(6102): 1628, 
available at: http://arep.med.harvard.edu/pdf/Church_Science_12.pdf; Goldman N, Bertone P, Chen S et al. (2013) Towards 
practical, high-capacity, low-maintenance information storage in synthesized DNA Nature 494: 77-80, available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3672958/pdf/emss-51823.pdf. This estimate is reported at 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230401/Harvard_stores_70_billion_books_using_DNA. A byte is a unit of digital 
information comprising 8 bits (each of which can have two values). A zettabye is 1021 bytes. 
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retention by the British police, the European Court of Human Rights has suggested that 
tissues containing DNA should be subject to the EU data protection regime.8 The 
Article 29 Working Party (the European advisory body on data protection established 
under Article 29 of the European Data Protection Directive) acknowledged the need to 
attend carefully to the legal status of tissues and the range of data subjects’ rights they 
engage.9 The persistence of this question nevertheless exemplifies the fact that 
technological developments for extracting data – not restricted to DNA sequencing – 
have created complexities at the intersection of multiple regulatory and governance 
regimes for data and tissues. A case in point is the longstanding difficulty of 
determining what should and may be done with ‘Guthrie’ cards (records containing a 
blood spot sample routinely collected for neonatal health screening in many countries 
since the late 1960s).10
Observational data  
 
Proposition 1 
There is a growing accumulation of data, of increasing variety, about human biology, 
health, disease and functioning, derived ultimately from the study of people. 
 
C linic al c are data  
1.9 One of the primary sources of data with which we shall be concerned is clinical care. 
From the moment of birth, each of us, in the developed world, is more likely to interact 
with health care professionals than almost any other public service. Since the 
introduction of the ‘Lloyd George’ record in 1911, information has been recorded 
routinely about all NHS patients.11
1.10 The original paper records were vulnerable to physical deterioration, and to misfiling or 
being misplaced, and subject to increasing costs of storage.
 Originally aides-mémoires that recorded the 
information an individual doctor judged to be useful in order to treat the same patient 
on subsequent occasions, or to refer them to a colleague, medical records have 
become increasingly standardised and multi-purpose.  
12
 
8 See S. and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581.  
 The problems 
associated with paper record management combined with the need to gain rapid 
reimbursement led many GP practices to keep ‘additional records’ on computer despite 
the fact that the keeping of paper records remained mandatory in the UK until October 
9 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2004) Working document on genetic data (WP 91), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp91_en.pdf. See also Beyleveld D and Taylor M (2008) 
Patents for biotechnoloy and the data protection of biological samples and shared genetic data, in The protection of medical 
data: challenges of the 21st century, Herveg J (Editor) (Louvain-la-Neuve: Anthemis). 
10 See: Laurie G, Hunter K, and Cunningham-Burley, S. (2013) Storage, use and access to the Scottish Guthrie card collection: 
ethical, legal and social Issues (The Scottish Government Social Research), available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2014/01/7520. 
11 The A5-sized record card envelope was introduced in 1911 by David Lloyd George when Minister for Health. The use of 
Lloyd George records was mandated until October 2000 and GP practices are still required to maintain extant paper records. 
A typical GP practice, with 6000 patients will house over 5,000,000 pages in Lloyd George envelopes.  
12 It is notable that the Royal College of Physicians only approved standards for paper-based medical records in 2007, 
indicating the need for records to be interpretable outside their original source. Standards for electronic records were 
published by the RCP in 2013. See: https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/resources/generic-medical-record-keeping-standards; 
www.rcplondon.ac.uk/resources/standards-clinical-structure-and-content-patient-records. 
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2000.13 Computerisation has facilitated developments in medical practice, allowing 
multidisciplinary teams to work together across health care sites, specialties and 
agencies. It has also significantly enabled the possibility of research using health 
records.14 Health care systems now record and standardise ever more data about 
people and their care, integrating data from other care providers (outside immediate 
health care), including ‘plans’ (e.g. care pathways) as well as outcomes, which include 
patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs).15 Increasingly, substantial amounts of 
data are being recorded that are ancillary to the practice of medicine.16
C linic al trials  and obs ervational s tudies   
 There is a 
growing expectation that more information about lifestyle and environmental factors will 
be recorded, as these are increasingly recognised as potentially modifiable 
determinants of health risk.  
1.11 A significant amount of scientific data is collected during clinical trials for medicines, or 
other clinical research, in which researchers design the study, allocate different 
interventions to separate groups of people and attempt, as far as possible, to 
standardise other factors that could influence the outcomes. However these are limited 
in scale. In contrast, observational study data are collected alongside the provision of 
health care or periodically over time. Observational study data, either from disease-
specific populations or from the public more generally, are the main resources for 
statistical analysis and modelling using epidemiological methods for public health 
research. Such data are also used in social science research to study the everyday 
behaviour of individuals or cultural groups.17
1.12 Observational studies can involve a snapshot of a state of affairs at a particular time 
but longitudinal observational studies gather large amounts of data over long 
timescales (sometimes generational) during which contributory factors can be 
investigated.
 Although clinical trials are often referred to 
as the ‘gold standard’ for investigating research hypotheses, both observational and 
clinical trial data have much in common in terms of the statistical methodology used to 
identify the relative importance of different characteristics or events, in other words, to 
invest the data with meaning and extract information.  
18 Most prospective observational studies involve a recruitment and 
consent process in order to collect medical data, biological samples and other data, 
such as retrospective medical history or lifestyle data, via interviews or questionnaires. 
Studies vary considerably in the time commitment of participants and the possibilities of 
unintended harms whether physical, mental, emotional or informational for 
participants.19
 
13 See chapter 6 (below) for a more extended discussion of health record systems. 
 One of the most famous is the Framingham Heart Study, which has 
14 The business model for VAMP, an early GP computerised record system, was predicated not on sales of systems to GPs, 
but of sales of statistical data to pharmaceutical companies (see chapter 6 below). 
15 Although what patients feel and how they function have always been part of medical records, the codification of such data 
and the secondary uses that this enables are new.  
16 See NHS Confederation (2013) Challenging bureaucracy, available at 
http://www.nhsconfed.org/~/media/Confederation/Files/Publications/Documents/challenging-bureaucracy.pdf. 
17 For social science data collection, see: Lapan S, Quartaroli M and Riemer F (2012) Qualitative research: an introduction to 
methods and designs (San Francisco: Wiley). 
18 In the UK, the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study (LS, in England and Wales) and Scottish Longitudinal Study 
(SLS) link data for a sample of the population from administrative, ‘vital events’ and health data sets, starting with a sample 
from the 1971 and 1991 census returns, respectively. For ONS LS, see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/user-
guidance/longitudinal-study/index.html; for SLS see: http://sls.lscs.ac.uk/. 
19 This can range from the minimally intrusive (e.g. where data are collected in accordance with the participants’ consent from 
health records, through periodic interviews (as in the case of the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children - 
ALSPAC) or sampling (UK Biobank) through to regular invasive sampling (for example, in the Harvard Biomarkers Core, 
which involves regularly taking a variety of biological samples from participants with Parkinson’s disease and other 
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been running in Framingham, Massachusetts, since 1948. Observation of study 
participants has contributed significantly to understanding of the risk factors for 
cardiovascular (and other) disease, which were previously thought to be associated 
with natural ageing.20
1.13 Because, unlike clinical trials, the parameters of the study are not strictly controlled, 
scale is an important aspect of observational studies. Whereas the original 
Framingham study enrolled just over 5,000 adults in 1948, much larger observational 
studies have since been initiated. The UK 1958 birth cohort (and later ones) enrolled 
98 per cent of the over 17,000 mothers giving birth in a particular week in England, 
Wales and Scotland, and follow-up of the children has continued at intervals ever 
since.
  
21 The UK’s new Life Study will gather data on more than 80,000 babies to look 
principally at social and environmental determinants of development and health.22 UK 
Biobank has enrolled a hundred times the number of volunteers in the original 
Framingham study in order to obtain sufficient numbers of cases of all the common 
diseases to facilitate a broad range of research investigations (see chapter 7 below). In 
the Million Women Study, over a million women were recruited through NHS Breast 
Screening Clinics between 1996 and 2001 and followed up for a range of health 
conditions including cancers, osteoporosis and cardiovascular disease.23
1.14 While certain practicalities of data capture and storage (participants’ willingness, 
researchers’ time and resources, and data storage technologies) limit observational 
studies, new monitoring devices or activity monitors, and wearable or implantable 
technologies (e.g. ambulatory heart rate monitoring devices), have made data 
collection more frequent (even continuous) and much less resource intensive, as well 
as socially acceptable.
  
24 Web-based questionnaires have also made the collection of 
other data from research participants much more efficient, and the rapid and 
widespread diffusion of mobile phone technology, allowing geospatial location and 
remote transmission, is providing innovative opportunities for collection of data relevant 
to real world scenarios.25
 
neurodegenerative diseases and a healthy control group, see: 
http://www.neurodiscovery.harvard.edu/research/biomarkers.html). 
  
20 Mahmood SS, Levy D, Vasan RS and Wang TJ (2014) The Framingham Heart Study and the epidemiology of cardiovascular 
disease: a historical perspective The Lancet 383(9921): 999-1008. 
21 Power C and Elliott J (2006) Cohort profile: 1958 british birth cohort (national child development study) International Journal 
of Epidemiology 35(1): 34-41, available at: http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/1/34.short. The Avon Longitudinal Study of 
Parents and Children (ALSPAC) studies a geographically local cohort, enrolling more than 14,000 pregnant women in the 
early 1990s and has consistently generated research findings about genetic and environmental aspects of health since then 
(see: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/). 
22 See: http://www.lifestudy.ac.uk/homepage. 
23 Research using data from the Million Women study has been influential in the development of clinical guidelines and public 
health, particularly for planning screening programmes and use of Hormone Replacement Therapy. See: 
http://www.millionwomenstudy.org/introduction/; http://www.ox.ac.uk/research/research-impact/million-women-study. 
24 See: Pierleoni P, Pernini L, Belli A, and Palma L (2014) an android-based heart monitoring system for the elderly and for 
patients with heart disease International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications, available at: 
http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijta/2014/625156/; Svagård I, Austad HO, Seeberg T, et al. (2014) A usability study of a 
mobile monitoring system for congestive heart failure patients Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 205: 528-32, 
available at: http://ebooks.iospress.nl/publication/37543; Banos O, Villalonga C, Damas M, et al. (2014) PhysioDroid: 
combining wearable health sensors and mobile devices for a ubiquitous, continuous, and personal monitoring Scientific 
World Journal, available at: http://www.hindawi.com/journals/tswj/2014/490824/.  
25 For example, Google’s flu trends service, which aims to identify the spread of flu symptoms in near real time, based on 
search terms entered into its search engine and geolocation of searching, thereby enabling timely public health measures to 
be taken in response. See http://www.google.org/flutrends/. However, the approach has limitations that differ from those of 
traditional disease surveillance: see http://www.nature.com/news/when-google-got-flu-wrong-1.12413; 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24626916.  
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L ifes tyle and s oc ial data innovations  
1.15 A number of applications have emerged for tracking daily life (‘life logging’) in terms of 
inputs (e.g. food, air quality), states (e.g. mood, blood oxygen levels) and mental and 
physical performance. Such self-monitoring and self-sensing can combine wearable 
sensors (e.g. the ‘fitbit’) and computing (e.g. ECG, blood oxygen, steps taken).26 The 
availability of screening devices such as continuous blood pressure recorders would 
seem to be quite widely used (in the UK) to supplement the blood pressure screening 
generally available through the National Health Service.27 There is also an initially 
rather modest uptake of commercial genetic profiling, which provides genetic risk 
estimates to customers for a number of diseases and traits.28
1.16 The primary aim of collecting such data is for individuals to self-monitor as a means of 
improving health and fitness, often using apps that may involve uploading data to the 
Internet (members of the Quantified Self movement are enthusiastic sharers of lifestyle 
data through social networks), where it may be used to inform those with similar 
interests or taken up more widely into research.
 These technological 
innovations have had the effect of allowing non-specialists to develop their interests in 
research at both a personal and more public level.  
29 There is also at least one platform 
that allows customers of direct-to-customer genetic tests to publish their results, to 
compare theirs with others and find information about their implications. There are also 
recreational family history services based around DNA testing.30
Laboratory data  
 Similar approaches 
using social networking platforms have also been adopted by patient groups that aim to 
generate data about conditions affecting the members. These data may then be made 
available to researchers to help in the development of more effective products, services 
and care. One of the best known is PatientsLikeMe (see chapter 7 below). Some 
companies who provide testing and interpretation (such as the genetic profiling 
company 23andMe) may themselves also carry out research using their customers’ 
samples and information. The data they generate may be reported, although they are 
not usually made available for wider research use.  
Imaging 
1.17 Imaging offers a way to understand complex biological phenomena by making use of 
human capacities for processing visual representations. Different wavelengths of 
energy are used, ranging from those for MRI (long wavelengths), through infrared 
 
26 An emerging technology is ‘physiological computing’: for example the Xbox One game console has a built-in camera that can 
monitor the heart rate of people in the room for the purpose of exercise games, but could be put to other uses. See: 
Fairclough S (2014) Physiological data must remain confidential Nature 505(7483): 263, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.14524!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/505263a.pdf. 
27 Khattar RS, Swales JD, Banfield A, et al. (1999) Prediction of coronary and cerebrovascular morbidity and mortality by direct 
continuous ambulatory blood pressure monitoring in essential hypotension Circulation 100: 1071–6, available at: 
http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/100/10/1071.short. 
28 One of the leading providers, 23andMe, encountered difficulties when the FDA halted some of its operations in the USA, 
although it has launched new services in other countries, including the UK, and claims to have 600,000 customers 
worldwide. See: Annas GJ and Sherman Elias S (2014) 23andMe and the FDA New England Journal of Medicine 370(11): 
985-8, available at: http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1316367; 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/02/google-genetic-testing-23andme-uk-launch.  
29 For the quantified self movement, see: http://quantifiedself.com/. Examples of applications such as the Google Fit and 
Apple’s Health Kit and iPhone and iPad Health app allow data to be used for app development and for further purposes, 
depending on the design and privacy settings. 
30 For publication of DNA profiles, see Greshake B, Bayer PE, Rausch H and Reda J (2014) openSNP–A Crowdsourced Web 
Resource for Personal Genomics PLoS ONE 9(3): e89204, available at: http://www.plosone.org/article/infoper cent3Adoiper 
cent2F10.1371per cent2Fjournal.pone.0089204; for an example of a DNA genealogy service, see: http://dna.ancestry.com/. 
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thermal imaging, into the visual spectrum, to X-rays (very short wavelengths), as well 
as ultrasound. Most modern imaging applications related to health care generate digital 
data. In many cases, the image is used to summarise a complex set of quantitative 
data as ‘picture elements’, each of which encodes a value for the interaction of the 
imaging energy and object at a corresponding point in space. In practice, the raw data 
collected as a string of values have little intrinsic relationship to an image. The visual 
pattern or form is reconstructed from the full set of data by filtering it to enhance true 
signal against noise (e.g. scattered light or glare for visual images) and then 
assembling the most probable representation based on understanding of how the data 
were acquired. For imaging techniques like functional MRI (fMRI), the development of a 
functional image is explicitly probabilistic: hundreds of images are summed and 
statistically contrasted to estimate true signal changes associated with the changes in 
brain physiology that are linked with perception or thought. 
1.18 Representations of brain activity associated with cognitive processes are becoming a 
tool for understanding brain functions in health and disease. Their popularization has 
provided a visual metaphor for ‘thought’ as the transfer of information in the brain. They 
have also suggested the possibility of brain imaging being used as a lie detector or 
even a ‘mind reader’.31 In fact, while the information content of images is high, all of the 
techniques are restricted to gathering limited dimensions of information. Brain imaging 
methods capture correlates of cognitive processes with limited spatial-temporal 
resolution. While correlates of different types of thoughts can be distinguished in a 
probabilistic way, the ‘contents’ of thought thus far cannot be captured in any general 
sense.32
1.19 A revolution has occurred in imaging as the very large datasets (often gigabytes even 
for a single complete set of brain MRI, for example) have been able to be manipulated 
and integrated with other datasets as well as easily searched for specific data using 
digital computational methods. This has allowed new kinds of features to be detected 
(‘visualized’”) and new measures to be defined as well as enabling easier storing and 
sharing of patient information among clinicians. Viewed in this way, imaging has 
become as much an extension of contemporary bioinformatics as the skilled use of a 
particular physical method.  
  
B iomarkers  
1.20 Scientific laboratory services have, for a long time, played an important part in the 
diagnosis of disease, initially through cellular and chemical evaluation of blood and 
tissues as well as molecular profiles. Pathology services interact with a variety of 
registries and tissue banks and, analogously to GP clinical records, information is 
managed in the UK through a range of Laboratory Information Management Systems 
(LIMS). Biomarkers (or biological markers) are measurable characteristics that can 
indicate an underlying biological state or condition, such as a disease state. The value 
of different biomarkers depends on the accuracy of the measurement, the association 
 
31 Some have even coupled this with notions of remote surveillance (e.g., satellite imaging) to conclude that there is a potential 
for mass mind-reading and, with it, the ultimate destruction of privacy. However, attempts at making fMRI work in lie 
detection have arguably been, to date, just as ineffective as the old-fashioned polygraph. See: Vrij A (2008) Detecting lies 
and deceit: pitfalls and opportunities, Volume two (Chichester: Wiley), p365ff. 
32 See also Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013) Novel neurotechnologies: intervening in the brain, available at: 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/neurotechnology/. 
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between what is measured and the underlying state of interest, and the relevance of 
this to the particular question to be addressed.  
1.21 The use of biomarkers, and the role of laboratory services, has become increasingly 
widespread. Biomarkers may be able to identify disease prior to development of 
symptoms. Through the use of biomarkers, ostensibly similar clinical presentations 
have been revealed to be distinct, leading to more tailored therapeutic interventions 
(Personalised medicine). However, the identification and validation of biomarkers can 
be demanding, requiring large-scale data linking across large numbers of variables.33
Genome sequencing  
  
1.22 Gene sequences have been used for decades as biomarkers to inform diagnosis, 
disease prediction and clinical management, but recent advances in sequencing 
technologies are changing practice. Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) technologies 
now in use are claimed to double the capacity to produce sequence data every year, 
outpacing Moore’s Law.34 The cost of a sequencing run has also decreased 
dramatically. Although estimates vary, a whole human genome – the full sequence of 
more than three billion base pairs comprising the DNA molecules contained in a human 
cell nucleus – can currently be sequenced for approximately $5,000 and this cost is 
expected to continue to drop.35
1.23 These factors have enabled researchers to produce enormous amounts of genomic 
data from humans, animals, plants, insects, fossils, bacteria and other organisms. In 
humans, over 3,500 Mendelian or single-gene disorders have been identified and now 
a variety of approaches, such as whole genome and exome sequencing and genome-
wide association studies, are used to target rare variants.
  
36 Sequencing is also helping 
clinicians to understand disease better, for example to classify cancer tumour genomes 
to determine whether a certain drug or treatment will be more or less effective, and is 
now being used directly in clinical treatment.37 Cancer tumour sequencing has been 
shown to be capable of producing results sufficiently quickly to allow a clinician to 
adjust a patient’s treatment plan as a result of the sequence data.38
 
33 See: Academy of Medical Sciences (2013) Realising the potential of stratified medicine, available at: 
http://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/viewFile/51e915f9f09fb.pdf. 
  
34 See: Illumina (2013) An introduction to next-generation sequencing technology, available at: 
http://res.illumina.com/documents/products/illumina_sequencing_introduction.pdf. Moore’s law, first proposed in 1965, refers 
to the observation that the number of transistors able to be fitted on to an integrated circuit will grow constantly at an 
exponential rate, approximately doubling every two years. 
35 National Human Genome Research Institute (2013) DNA Sequencing Costs, available at: 
http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/; Illumina claimed in early 2014 that its HiSeq X Ten sequencing system could 
reduce the cost of sequencing to as low as $1000 per whole human genome. See: http://www.nature.com/news/is-the-1-000-
genome-for-real-1.14530. However, there are some indications that the rate of advance is not steady; the cost of sequencing 
actually increased by 12per cent between April 2012 and October 2012, although it then fell again. See Hall N (2013) After 
the gold rush Genome Biology 14(5): 115, available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/gb-2013-14-5-115.pdf. For 
a discussion of the implications of the fall in cost, see: Stein LD (2010) The case for cloud computing in genome informatics 
Genome Biology 11(5): 207, available at: http://genomebiology.com/2010/11/5/207. 
36 See: Brunham LR and Hayden MR (2013) Hunting human disease genes: lessons from the past, challenges for the future 
Human Genetics 132(6): 603-17, available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00439-013-1286-3; on approaches 
used, see: Lee S, Abecasis GR, Boehnke M and Lin X (2014) Rare-variant association analysis: study designs and statistical 
tests The American Journal of Human Genetics 95(1): 5-23, available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929714002717. 
37 Sekar D and Thirugnanasambantham K, Hairul Islam VI, and Saravanan S (2014) sequencing approaches in cancer 
treatment Cell Proliferation 47(5): 391-5; Roychowdhury S and Chinnaiyan AM (2014) Translating Genomics for Precision 
Cancer Medicine Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 15: 395-415.  
38 Welch, JS, Westervelt P, Ding L, et al. (2011) Use of whole-genome sequencing to diagnose a cryptic fusion oncogene 
Journal of the American Medical Association 305(15): 1577-84, available at: 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=897152. 
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Other ‘omics’ 
1.24 In research applications (and, it is likely, in some clinical applications in the near 
future), in addition to the increase in genomic data, data relating to other groups of 
biological molecules are increasingly being linked to genomic and other health data. 
These include proteomics (the study of the entire set of proteins expressed in a cell or 
tissue at a certain time); transcriptomics (the study of the set of RNA transcripts that 
that indicate the pattern of gene expression at any given time); metabolomics (small 
molecules such as sugars and fats in a biological cell, tissue, organ or organism, which 
are the end products of cellular processes); microbiomics (the microorganisms that 
inhabit the gut, genitalia, skin, lungs, etc.); and epigenomics (the reversible 
modifications of a cell’s DNA or associated molecules that affect gene expression 
without altering the DNA sequence). Whereas a person’s germline genome is relatively 
stable throughout their life, the other ‘omics’ listed above vary over time, yearly, daily 
and hourly, potentially providing a new insight into the interaction of an individual with 
their environment. For example, epigenomic studies have shown that, while 
monozygotic twins have an almost identical epigenomic profile during their early years, 
by middle age their profiles have diverged, which is likely to be due to different 
environmental exposures and may result in differing susceptibilities to disease.39
1.25 Findings such as these are already motivating research into how a person’s clinical 
data, genome and other ‘omic’ profiles together determine personalised responses for 
health and disease. However, they require the substantial capacity and skills in the 
accumulation, management and analysis of large amounts of biological data.
  
40
 
  
1.26 With the increasing amount of ‘omic’ data becoming available to use, there are 
renewed calls to improve the linking of those data with phenotypic data – an 
individual’s observable or detectable traits and characteristics – in order to understand 
and catalogue variations within a population and, in turn, to improve the diagnosis and 
stratification of diseases.41 Deviations from what is considered normal can be used to 
make a diagnosis and indicate treatment.42 However, the precision of this kind of 
diagnosis is limited as a spectrum of phenotypic differences may be associated with 
any disease or condition and, conversely, a single phenotype may be associated with 
more than one disease. Knowing a patient has cancer, for example, or even breast 
cancer, leaves a clinician with a considerable range of options for treatment. 
Genotyping of breast tumours suggests that breast cancer should now be regarded as 
at least 10 distinct diseases that respond differently to different therapies.43 To define 
subclasses of disease with a common biological basis, and therefore to discover and 
select the most appropriate care, more detailed (‘deep’) phenotyping is required.44
 
39 Haque FN, Gottesman II and Wong AHC (2009) Not really identical: Epigenetic differences in monozygotic twins and 
implications for twin studies in psychiatry American Journal of Medical Genetics Part C: Seminars in Medical Genetics 
151C(2): 136-41, available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajmg.c.30206/full.  
 
40 Costa FF (2014) Big data in biomedicine Drug Discovery Today 19(4): 433-40.  
41 Kohane IS (2014) Deeper, longer phenotyping to accelerate the discovery of the genetic architectures of diseases Genome 
Biology 15(5): 115, available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/gb4175.pdf. 
42 Robinson PN (2012) Deep phenotyping for precision medicine Human mutation 33(5): 777-80, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/humu.22080/full. 
43 Curtis C, Shah SP, Chin S-F et al. (2012) The genomic and transcriptomic architecture of 2,000 breast tumours reveals novel 
subgroups Nature 486(7403): 346-52, available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3440846/. 
44 Robinson PN (2012) Deep phenotyping for precision medicine Human mutation 33(5): 777-80. 
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Critically, this approach requires the use of computational informatics systems to 
manage the data and to analyse it along with other data, including genome and clinical 
data.  
 
Administrative data or metadata 
1.27 Health services routinely collect ‘transactional data’ in the same way as other sectors: 
billing information, activity data, etc., which may or may not reveal who was treated or 
what sort of treatment they had. Data are often collected to analyse relative 
performance, to identify good and bad practice, for anti-fraud measures, as well as 
general management information collected for operational purposes. Some data types 
may be peculiar and essential to health systems such as the English NHS, for example 
those needed for the purposes of the Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF).45
1.28 Some of these data may be ‘personal data’ or ‘sensitive personal data’ for legal 
purposes. For example, administrative data such as clinic diaries may indicate no more 
than that a person saw a particular clinician at a certain place and time. As we have 
argued, the significance of this information will depend on how it is framed in relation to 
the informational context and the interests of the subject and those who might have 
access to it: such information may be highly sensitive if it relates to a visit to an STI or 
fertility clinic, for example. Equally, missing data, such as non-attendance at a clinic, 
can be highly informative.  
  
1.29 Clinic attendance records are a special case of metadata. These are data that describe 
the contents of substantive data files or records and the circumstances of their creation 
and processing, for example, the size of data files, the time or location at which they 
were processed, the identity of the author or processor, and various technical features 
of the data. Records of communications are another example: call logs of who called 
whom and when may reveal a highly sensitive patient relationship. Clinical computer 
systems have, for many years, recorded metadata: about the identity of the person 
accessing the record, the changes they made, the time it was accessed or altered, the 
transmission of data between systems, etc., generating substantial audit trails. 
1.30 Metadata can be useful both for organising substantive data and as research data in 
their own right. The distinction between data and metadata may be increasingly difficult 
to sustain as metadata and measurement or observation data can be equally 
informative depending on the context: the fact of a communication between a patient 
and a consultant in a known specialism can reveal information about a patient’s health; 
confirmation of an individual’s presence at a specific time in a geographical location, 
whether the record of a mobile phone use or a photograph, can be equally 
informative.46
 
45 The Quality Outcomes Framework is a voluntary incentive scheme for GP practices in England, rewarding them for how well 
they care for patients, requiring various indicators to measure performance (see also chapter 6 below.) 
 
46 The surveillance activities of the US National Security Agency that were brought to light in 2013 made more use of metadata 
than content as information about who called whom, when, and where, is often critical in unravelling criminal conspiracies or 
focussing investigations (see chapter 2 below). 
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Data science  
Proposition 2 
Advances in data technology and data science provide more ways, and potentially more 
powerful ways, to collect, manage, combine, analyse and understand data in biological 
research and health care. 
 
1.31 The need to process complex sets of biological and health data has led to the 
development of specialist techniques and related fields of expertise including 
bioinformatics and health informatics. These fields contain the knowledge, skills and 
tools that are applied to produce, manage and analyse data in order to generate 
information for particular purposes. They typically involve the use of computing, 
statistical and mathematical sciences.  
B ig data 
Proposition 3 
Advances in data science and technology have given rise to a new attitude towards data 
that sees it as a valuable resource that may be reused indefinitely in other contexts, 
linked, combined or analysed together with data from different sources. These uses 
have both practical advantages and limitations. 
 
Proposition 4 
The opportunities arising from data linking and re-use are presented as both novel and 
significant in the way in which they bring about new relationships between data and 
theory (‘data-driven’ and ‘big data’ approaches to research) and between data and 
practice (data modelling for policy and clinical decision making).  
 
1.32 The term ‘big data’ initially characterised a problem that gave birth to novel solutions: 
that the size of datasets was outstripping the ability of typical database software to 
capture, store, manage and analyse them.47 Although there is no settled consensus as 
to the definition of ‘big data’, computational informatics professionals, who are 
concerned with the analysis of big data, initially gathered around a characterisation in 
terms of three ‘V’s: volume, variety and velocity.48
 
47 “The term 'big data' is meant to capture the opportunities and challenges facing all biomedical researchers in accessing, 
managing, analyzing, and integrating datasets of diverse data types [e.g., imaging, phenotypic, molecular (including various 
'–omics'), exposure, health, behavioral, and the many other types of biological and biomedical and behavioral data] that are 
increasingly larger, more diverse, and more complex, and that exceed the abilities of currently used approaches to manage 
and analyze effectively.” See: US National Institutes for Health http://bd2k.nih.gov/about_bd2k.html#bigdata. 
 To work with massive datasets, in 
particular those created as by-products of the electronic mediation of so many social 
48 For the ‘3 Vs’ definition, see: http://strata.oreilly.com/2012/01/what-is-big-data.html. Other commentators have embellished 
this basic characterisation with an arbitrary number of further Vs: veracity, validity, volatility, etc.  
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
16   
interactions, from public administration to Internet shopping, web-searching, and social 
networking, requires cost effective, high speed computing and high volume storage, as 
well as scalable computational frameworks for analysing the data.49 It has also required 
the development of a variety of computationally intensive tools in order to extract 
insights from data (such as visualisation – see the discussion of ‘imaging’ above).50
1.33 In current usage, ‘big data’ therefore refers less to the size of datasets involved (‘big’ 
being a relative term) than to the approach to extracting information from them using 
analytical techniques successively described under the rubrics of ‘statistics’, ‘artificial 
intelligence’, ‘data mining’, ‘knowledge discovery in databases’ (KDD), ‘analytics’ and, 
more recently, ‘data science’.
 
This understanding of big data presents the extraction of value from datasets as being 
essentially a technical challenge, for example, to integrate and exploit different sources 
of data, such as images, voice records and numerical databases.  
51
1.34 Advances in the fields of computational informatics and statistical data mining that 
characterise ‘big data’ initiatives have at least two kinds of significant implication. First, 
the possibility of increasing the useful information that can be extracted from given 
resources of data, in particular by combining or linking datasets, may lead to a 
substantial reconfiguration of human and other resources, having consequential 
impacts (such as the training of more analysts or, for example, hiring more analysts 
and fewer doctors). Second, the use of these techniques within biomedicine suggests 
the emergence of a new attitude to data held by researchers and health systems, 
namely, as a resource amenable to a wide variety of uses and in pursuit of an 
unbounded range of purposes. In short, health records and research data can be re-
conceived as a kind of raw material, to which the image of ‘data mining’ is perfectly apt, 
rather than as existing to serve a circumscribed purpose or range of purposes.  
 The common feature of these approaches is the 
interrogation of datasets to discover non-obvious patterns and phenomena through 
finding correlations within the dataset. This may be done with or without a prior 
hypothesis about the causal relationships involved. Because of the complexity of the 
datasets the interrogation of the data for this purpose involves the application of an 
automated procedure, an algorithm.  
1.35 Use of the term ‘big data’ therefore calls attention less to a technical achievement (or 
challenge) than to a change in perspective that entails associated changes in 
behaviour. Commentators point to emergent properties of data at a large scale and the 
advantages of big data approaches in dealing with ‘noisy’ or messy datasets. Some 
even speak in ideological terms about the virtues of liberation from hypothesis-guided 
inquiry. 52
 
49 Examples of such frameworks are Google’s proprietary MapReduce data processing model or the open source Apache 
Hadoop model.  
  
50 The basic principles of this technique are not new, although the quantities and complex relationships between data involved 
require the use of substantial computing power. Early examples include Florence Nightingale’s "rose charts” of mortality in 
the Crimean War (which showed that the numbers of soldiers dying as a result of combat injuries were far outweighed by the 
number of those dying from disease) and John Snow’s plot of the 1854 Soho cholera outbreak (which narrowed the source 
to an infected water pump in Broad Street (now Broadwick Street) and helped to replace miasmic (‘bad air’) theory with 
modern understanding of cholera as a water borne disease). 
51 For a history of computational and data science from 1960 to 2009, see: The Royal Society (2012) Science as an open 
enterprise (figure 2.1, at page 15), available at: https://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/science-public-enterprise/Report/. 
52 Mayer-Schönberger V and Cukier K (2013) Big data: a revolution that will transform how we live, work and think (London: 
John Murray), at page 14. 
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Data quality  
1.36 The ways in which data science uses information, however, have both advantages and 
limitations. Given uncertainties in the accuracy of data, data from a larger number of 
data points can, in theory, increase the statistical power of the analysis. If the data 
collection includes the whole population of interest (‘n=all’), errors due to sampling are 
reduced. However, if the data are subject to ascertainment bias, then more such data 
may only exaggerate that bias.53
1.37 The intrinsic precision of data can vary with their origin: alternative kinds of equipment 
may be used, there may be simple differences in the training of observers, external 
factors (such as stress on a patient when measuring blood pressure) which may not be 
ascertainable, and errors in transcribing or converting data can be introduced.
 Data quality therefore remains an issue, particularly 
with ‘found’ data, ‘data exhaust’, or data originally collected for different purposes.  
54 Both 
technology and methodology play a role in the generation of data: there will typically be 
differences in the genome sequence given for the same individual depending on which 
company has supplied the sequencer and associated informatics.55 Data quality can 
also be affected by use of different terminologies or criteria for the use of specific terms 
in different data entry contexts.56 For example, a GP may use different criteria for the 
diagnosis of depression to those used by a psychiatrist. It is important to be aware of 
these factors as users may place undue faith in a computer record, failing to appreciate 
that computers often store data collected by humans. The uncritical analysis of 
computer records can magnify any phenomena related to the human input. The 
complex technologies and procedures used to produce biomedical data (such as 
imaging or genome sequencing) may involve processing according to preset 
methodologies to clean data and impute the value of missing data before they are 
rendered amenable to analysis.57
1.38 Obstacles to the re-use of data have been a lack of widespread knowledge about what 
data are actually collected and held, lack of standardisation, and lack of tools and 
infrastructure to link, curate and analyse datasets. Ethical constraints and, of course, 
the constraints of data protection law and existing standards of good practice also limit 
data reuse. Many of the technical obstacles may be surmountable, although some 
limitations, especially the quality of data at the point of collection, will be less tractable 
and more persistent. Other constraints may represent important safeguards.  
 
 
53 Ascertainment bias is a systematic distortion in measuring the true occurrence of a phenomenon that results from the way in 
which the data are collected with the result that all relevant instances were not equally likely to have been recorded. 
54 See, for example, Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, and Donaldson MS (Editors) (2000) To err is human: building a safer health system 
(Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in America) (Washington: National Academies Press), available 
at: http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9728. 
55 Patel RK and Jain M (2012) NGS QC: a toolkit for quality control of next generation sequencing data PLoS ONE 7(2): 
e30619, available at: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0030619#pone-0030619-g003.  
56 Fortier I, Burton PR, Robson PJ et al. (2010) Quality, quantity and harmony: the DataSHaPER approach to integrating data 
across bioclinical studies International Journal of Epidemiology 39(5): 1383-93, available at: 
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/39/5/1383.short. 
57 An fMRI brain scanning experiment measuring the brain ‘activity’ of a dead salmon offers a sobering demonstration that 
methodologies commonly used in imaging can produce high false positive rates. See: Bennett C M, Baird AA, Miller MB, and 
Wolford GL (2009) Neural correlates of interspecies perspective taking in the post-mortem Atlantic Salmon: An argument for 
multiple comparisons correction (poster presentation), available at: http://prefrontal.org/files/posters/Bennett-Salmon-
2009.pdf. 
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Data initiatives  
1.39 The main ethical concerns that arise as a result of the production, accumulation and 
use of data that we have described are less about the size or detail of any one dataset 
in isolation but rather about the potential for extraction of information either directly, by 
the application of analytical tools, or by first linking or combining datasets. A particular 
source of concerns, although certainly not the only one, is the capacity for the data to 
reveal significant information about particular individuals in a way that they are either 
unaware of or unable to control.  
1.40 Throughout this report we will refer to the kinds of activities that are of interest to us as 
‘data initiatives’. These may be large – at the scale of a national biobank, health system 
or international research collaboration – or small – on the scale of a discrete research 
project to examine co-incidence of cases in two data registries. Large or small, the 
essential feature of a data initiative is that it involves one or both of the following 
practices: 
■ Data collected or produced in one context or for one purpose are re-used in another 
context or for another purpose. This translation between contexts or transformation of 
purposes may mean that the data take on a different meaning and significance. (An 
example might be where medical records are used by the police to solve a crime such 
that ‘markers of health and functioning’ may become ‘indicators of guilt’.) This may be 
described as ‘re-use’, ‘secondary use’ or ‘repurposing’ of data.  
 
■ Data from one source are linked with data from a different source or many different 
sources. This may be in order to facilitate a purpose for which one of the datasets 
was produced, or for some further purpose, possibly unrelated to any of them. This 
might involve combining the datasets for the purpose of a single analysis or creating 
some durable (permanent or temporary) link between them. (An example might be 
where data from a disease registry are linked to data about the location of discharges 
of environmental pollutants to examine or monitor any link between them.)  
1.41 There are several reasons to re-use data rather than collect it afresh. First and 
foremost, reusing data is efficient and allows the same data to do more work. Some of 
this work may be closely connected with the original purposes, such as allowing 
research results to be validated or allowing data from across research projects to be 
collated in meta-studies. Re-using data avoids the cost, inconvenience, and possibly 
the annoyance involved in having to approach people repeatedly to gather much the 
same data. Thus data collected in a clinical consultation may be used for health service 
planning and medical research, but is also potentially of interest as evidence for social 
policy making, actuarial purposes (e.g. insurance pricing), market research, product 
development, marketing, and many other purposes. It is not clear how often or how 
widely data, particularly non-standardised data, may be re-used as time and 
technology move on, generating novel sorts of questions and requiring new kinds of 
measurements (although if new data are needed there may nevertheless be benefit in 
linking them to earlier data). However, these limitations may be offset by increasingly 
sophisticated algorithms that allow data in existing datasets to be correlated and 
‘mined’ for new insights. As a result, the limits of the potential utility of any given 
dataset are increasingly unforeseeable.  
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Conclusion 
Proposition 5 
Data collected in biomedical research and health care are not intrinsically more or less 
‘sensitive’ than other data relating to individuals. However, they can be extremely 
‘sensitive’ depending on the context in which they are used and how they are related to 
other information. The use of data in different contexts and for different purposes may 
influence how people are treated by others, including by public authorities, in ethically 
significant ways. 
 
1.42 The description of any data as ‘biological’ or ‘health’ data is increasingly misleading. 
From the perspective of data science whether they are ‘biological’ or ‘health’ data 
depends on the use to which they are put as much as the source from which they were 
obtained or the purpose for which they were originally collected.  Biomarker data may 
be used to inform someone’s treatment, but they may also be used for the 
development of therapies, the allocation of costs, or the planning of services, moving 
variously between health care, research, financial and administrative contexts.  
1.43 Nevertheless, data about individual biology and health are considered by many people 
to be somewhat more ‘sensitive’ than much other day-to-day information. Partly, this 
may be to do with social norms, and expectations about medical confidentiality and the 
importance attached to certain kinds of records: people may feel very differently about 
the use of data from their medical records than they might about the use of the same 
data taken from a research assessment, for example. Partly, this may have to do with 
the fact that the data may reveal stigmatising information, such as sexual and mental 
health states, though other personal data can be equally sensitive, depending on the 
context and circumstances.58 The analysis, linking and use of certain kinds of data can 
also have critical implications for life and well-being.59
1.44 The problem of pinning down data as ‘health’ data, or as ‘sensitive’ or ‘personal’ data is 
compounded by the fact that the relevant literatures are vexed by imprecise, 
inconsistent and sometimes conflicting terminology. It is a reflection of the novel and 
unsettled problems raised by the possibilities of data science that there is no 
universally accepted lexicon, although the lack of one is frequently bemoaned. That 
none exists may also bear witness to political tussles over the values embedded in 
such terms as ‘data sharing’ (which has connotations of beneficence and mutuality) 
and ‘anonymisation’ (which promises obscurity). 
 This point can work towards both 
the need to protect confidentiality as well as the need to use the data wisely to improve 
safety and quality of health care.  
60
 
58 See, for example, Nagel T (2002) Concealment and exposure (New York: Oxford University Press), especially the title essay. 
  
59 Discussions on the draft European Union General Data Protection Regulation (to replace the existing EU Data Protection 
Directive) have sought to introduce ‘genetic data’ as a special class of data over and above mere health data, because of its 
potentially identifying and predictive nature. It is a consequence of the approach that we will develop in this report that such a 
categorisation misses the point. For the draft Regulation, see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
60 Recognising this, the recent UK Information Governance Review recommended the adoption and use of a single set of terms 
and definitions relating to information governance that both staff and the public can understand. See: The Caldicott 
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1.45 Likewise, the developments in data use that have led to this report are of a general 
nature, and are not limited to the biological sciences and biomedicine, but are diffused 
across public administration, the provision of commercial and financial services, and 
other fields. Nevertheless, as a bioethics Council our principal interest is in the ethical 
use of data in relation to biology and medicine. Therefore, while conscious of this wider 
environment, in this report we shall nevertheless focus on data initiatives within 
medicine (or health care more broadly) and research in the biological, biomedical and 
clinical sciences.  
 
Committee (2013) Information: to share or not to share? The information governance review, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-information-governance-review. In the absence of a satisfactory consensus, 
the way in which we use key terms in this report is described in the text and summarised in the Glossary. 
 Chapter 2 
Data opportunities and 
threats  
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Chapter 2 – Data opportunities and threats 
Chapter overview 
Given the UK’s strong research base in the biomedical sciences and the unique 
resource and infrastructure of the UK’s National Health Services, the use of health data 
has become a strategic focus. 
There is a clear public interest in the responsible use of data to improve wellbeing 
through improved health advice, treatment and care, as well as through increasing 
economic prosperity more generally.  These objectives are being pursued in three main 
ways: 
■ increasing efficiency and transforming service delivery  
■ generating improvements in medical treatment  
■ generating economic growth from the life sciences  
Policy orientations to achieve these outcomes include: 
■ increasing IT intensity and introducing new infrastructure in health systems  
■ establishing partnerships between the public and private sectors  
■ centralising data resources  
■ promoting ‘open data’ and ‘data sharing’  
■ investing in ‘big data’ 
However, there are a number of risks and fears, including:  
■ misuse of data leading to harms to individuals and institutions  
■ discriminatory treatment of individuals and groups 
■ fear of state surveillance of citizens  
The negative impacts of data misuse are potentially much wider than are those 
recognised by legal and regulatory systems.  Furthermore, the nature of privacy harms 
and of the judicial and regulatory systems means that they are likely to be under-
reported by the victims. 
A number of recommendations are made relating to understanding data use, research 
into data misuse, preventing fraudulent access to data, reporting abuses of data and 
penalties for deliberate misuse of data. 
 
Introduction  
2.1 In the previous chapter we discussed developments in data production and data 
analysis. These developments have a range of possible consequences, many of which 
are significant but very few of which are inevitable. The scientific, technological and 
clinical factors that shape them comprise an interacting and evolving system along with 
policy, economic and social conditions. This chapter examines the economic and policy 
drivers of further developments in the use of data in biomedical research and health 
care. Considerable enthusiasm has been generated by the potential for using 
information to produce transformative efficiencies in services, generate new knowledge 
and promote innovation. This has led to substantial public investment and an enabling 
policy environment in the UK and elsewhere. ‘Data sharing’, ‘big data’, ‘open data’ and 
‘data revolution’ have become familiar buzzwords in public and policy discourse. Here 
we describe the main dimensions of opportunity opened in biomedical research and 
health care by data science and technology, consider the policy orientations of the UK 
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Government and others to realise them, and identify some of the costs and risks that 
these might entail.  
Opportunities for linking and re-use of data 
Proposition 6 
The continuing accumulation of data (see Proposition 1) and the increasing power and 
availability of analytical tools (see Proposition 2) mean that new opportunities arise, and 
will continue to arise, to extract value from data. There is a public interest in the 
responsible use of data to support the development of knowledge and innovation 
through scientific research and to improve the well-being of all through improved health 
advice, treatment and care. 
 
T he ‘value propos ition’ 
2.2 The global financial crisis of 2007-8 and the subsequent economic downturn, focussed 
the attention of governments on the extraction of value from existing assets, the search 
for greater efficiency and the promotion of economic growth building on areas of 
existing strength. In the UK this focus has fallen on, among other things, the 
exploitation of public sector data (PSD), IT innovation, and the strong research base in 
the life sciences.61
2.3 The promotion of national economic growth on the back of public sector data was a 
theme of the Shakespeare Review (2013), which envisaged that Britain could ‘be the 
winner’ of ‘phase 2’ of the digital revolution. America, it said, had won the first phase 
which was about connectivity and access to information and efficiency gains; the 
second phase would be about extracting value from the data. A 2011 report from the 
McKinsey Global Institute provides some idea of context. It suggests that, in 10 years, 
given the right strategic innovations, data use in the US health sector could generate 
$300 billion of value per year (two thirds in efficiency savings) and that “medical clinical 
information providers, which aggregate data and perform the analyses necessary to 
improve health care efficiency, could compete in a market worth more than $10 billion 
by 2020.”
  
62
“We should remain firm in the principle that publicly-funded data belongs to the 
public; recognise that we cannot always predict where the greatest value lies but 
know there are huge opportunities across the whole spectrum of PSI [public sector 
information]; appreciate that value is in discovery (understanding what works), better 
 Shakespeare argued that the vast advantage enjoyed by the USA in terms 
of its domestic market size, the west-coast entrepreneurial culture, and the existence of 
firms like Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and eBay, could be offset by making 
public-sector data available to innovative firms in the UK. 
 
61 For a discussion of the link between research investment in the biosciences and national economic growth see Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging Biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good, available at: 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/emerging-biotechnologies, especially chapter 7 (‘Research and Innovation Policy’). 
62 McKinsey Global Institute (2011) Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and productivity, available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation, at page 6. MGI studied 
the US healthcare sector – along with 4 others – and concluded that there are opportunities to generate $300 billion/ year 
through big data (as distinct from simple automation). 
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management (tracking effectiveness of public administration), and commercialisation 
(making data practically useful to citizens and clients); create faster and more 
predictable routes to access; and be bold in making it happen.”63
2.4 While the large administrative datasets such as those held by Companies House, the 
Land Registry, the Met Office and the Ordnance Survey offer an abundance of ‘ripe, 
low hanging fruit’, public sector health data have, for a long time, been seen as a prized 
asset with exploitable potential, albeit (in the UK) one that has been hampered by a lag 
in introduction of IT systems compared to other industries.
 
64
Efficiency and transformation of service delivery 
 The value proposition of 
data initiatives in biomedical research and health care has essentially three 
dimensions: generating significant service efficiencies through the better use of 
business intelligence, generating improvements in the practice of medicine, and 
generating value through science and innovation. These three dimensions are 
interrelated: all data initiatives in biomedical research and health care can be located 
within the volume that they describe. 
2.5 Pressure to make wider use of individual health information has come from the evolving 
professional and institutional organisation of health systems (which includes more 
complex treatment pathways on one hand, and attempts at IT-driven administrative 
simplification and cost control on the other) as well as the long-recognised opportunities 
for research. In the UK, resource constraints facing the NHS, in the context of more 
general austerity policies and the burdens of an ageing population, have led to the 
need to find significant efficiency savings which present serious challenges to the 
NHS.65 IT innovation and more effective use of data are placed at the heart of the 
response to these challenges, both in terms of more efficient processes and the use of 
evidence to improve clinical decisions.66
2.6 The aims of policy initiatives in this area are, however, more ambitious than simply the 
more efficient and widespread use of electronic records and systems. Information 
technology and data science is envisaged as disruptive technology that will 
 The NHS England ‘care.data’ programme, for 
example, has been described as necessary in order to secure the future of an 
affordable NHS in England. (We discuss this argument in chapter 6.) 
 
63 Stephan Shakespeare (2013) Shakespeare Review: an independent review of public sector information, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/198752/13-744-shakespeare-review-of-public-
sector-information.pdf, at page 6. The Shakespeare Review followed the Government Growth Review 2011 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/autumn-statement-growth) which outlined plans to establish the Open Data Institute 
(http://theodi.org/) with some Government funding, and the White Paper (Cm 8353) Open data: unleashing the potential 
(2012), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-data-white-paper-unleashing-the-potential. 
64 In his 2002 Report, Securing our future health: taking a long-term view (http://si.easp.es/derechosciudadania/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/4.Informe-Wanless.pdf), Derek Wanless highlighted the poor state of ICT use in the UK health 
service and that significant investment was required to improve informational infrastructure. His follow-up report for the King’s 
Fund, Our future health secured? A review of NHS funding and performance (2007) 
(http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/our-future-health-secured-review-nhs-funding-
performance-full-version-sir-derek-wanless-john-appleby-tony-harrison-darshan-patel-11-september-2007.pdf), concluded 
that, although there had been some positive developments, further improvement in ICT systems was still needed. See also 
chapter 6.  
65 The 'Nicholson Challenge' was first set out by Sir David Nicholson, (then) chief Executive of the NHS, in the NHS Chief 
Executive's Annual Report for 2008-09 (NHS, May 2009) and refers, in effect, to the need for the NHS to achieve efficiency 
savings of £15-20 billion by 2014/15. The QIPP (Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention) policy agenda set out a 
programme of actions designed to meet this challenge (see https://www.evidence.nhs.uk/qipp). 
66 For example, a 2014 report from a big data solutions company claims that better use of data analytics could free between 
£16.5 billion and £66 billion worth of NHS capacity. Bosanquet N and Evans E (2014) Sustaining universal healthcare in the 
UK: making better use of information (http://volterra.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Final-EMC-Volterra-Healthcare-
report-web-version.pdf). The biggest single projected saving (£5billion) relates to time saved searching for missing records. 
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revolutionise the way in which health care is delivered.67 They are expected to enable a 
shift towards prediction, prevention, personalisation and ‘responsibilisation’ in health 
care, to be facilitated by a range of e-Health initiatives.68
“information and data sharing between patients and health service providers, 
hospitals, health professionals and health information networks; electronic health 
records; telemedicine services; portable patient-monitoring devices, operating room 
scheduling software, robotized surgery and blue-sky research on the virtual 
physiological human.”
 According to the European 
Commission, ‘e-Health’ is a portmanteau policy area that includes: 
69
2.7 The e-Health vision is built on the foundation of electronic care records, which are fed 
with data from a variety of sources, including patients, who are expected to access 
them easily and routinely. According to the UK Department of Health these will 
“progressively become the source for core information used to improve our care, 
improve services and to inform research.”
 
70 The European Union’s 2012 eHealth Task 
Force Report, Redesigning health in Europe for 2020, sets out five ‘levers for change’: 
patients taking control of their data, liberating data for business intelligence and 
research, integrating systems to add value and drive out error, ‘revolutionising’ health 
by making it responsive to patient needs and ensuring that no one is excluded.71 
However, alongside these positive ambitions there are also warnings that if 
governments do not act to secure the public interest they may cede control of the 
overall direction of innovation to giant commercial Internet companies.72
Generating improvements in medical treatment 
 (This is an 
aspect that we attend to through the approach we develop in the remainder of this 
report.) 
2.8 Ethical imperatives relating to data in health care and biological research have 
traditionally pulled in opposite directions. In health care, the primary reason for patients 
to share personal information with their doctors was to optimise the care they received. 
The privileged relationship of confidentiality between the patient and doctor has meant, 
at least since the time of Hippocrates, that only the strongest reasons could justify 
broader disclosure.73
 
67 See, for example, the 3 key imminent shifts in medical practice identified by Simon Stevens (NHS England CEO): “a coming 
revolution in biomedicine, in data for quality and proactive care, and in the role that patients play in controlling their own 
health and care” (speech to the annual conference of the NHS Confederation, 4 June 2014). See 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/06/04/simon-stevens-speech-confed/. 
 This principle has been generally accepted down the ages in 
Western medicine, notwithstanding the growth in the number and variety of those 
68 On ‘responsibilisation’ see the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2010) Medical profiling and online medicine: the ethics of 
'personalised healthcare' in a consumer age, available at: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/personalised-healthcare-0. 
69 See http://ec.europa.eu/health/ehealth/policy/index_en.htm. 
70 Department of Health (2012) The power of information: putting all of us in control of the health and care information we need, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/giving-people-control-of-the-health-and-care-information-they-need, 
at page 5. See also: National Information Board, Department of Health (England) (2014) Personalised health and care 2020: 
using data and technology to transform outcomes for patients and citizens. A framework for action, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/personalised-health-and-care-2020. 
71 See http://www.president.ee/images/stories/pdf/ehtf-report2012.pdf. 
72 The EU eHealth Task Force Report (2012) Redesigning health in Europe for 2020 presents e-Health opportunities in the face 
of the threat that giant internet corporations might replace governments as the rule setters. 
73 The Hippocratic Oath, as usually understood, contains the following precept: “What I may see or hear in the course of the 
treatment or even outside the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must noise abroad, I will keep 
to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.” For a further discussion of confidentiality, see chapters 3 and 4. 
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involved in the provision of health care (including, for example, various clinical 
specialisms, administrators, medical secretaries and auditors).  
2.9 For a long time, decisions about the treatment of patients relied on the training and 
experience of individual doctors, learning informally from the experience of others, case 
reports in specialist publications, and advice from Royal Colleges or health care 
delivery organisations. This would be brought to bear on how the patient presented in 
the clinic, the patient’s phenotype, and their recorded or recounted medical history. Two 
sets of developments, involving ‘wider’ and ‘deeper’ data, have transformed the 
practice of medicine in the last half century. 
2.10 The first development came about as a result of combining data to compare the 
effectiveness of different interventions on significant numbers of patients in relevantly 
similar circumstances. In the second half of the 20th Century, the randomised, 
controlled trial (RCT) became the ‘gold standard’ approach to determining the 
effectiveness of medical interventions. When they are well constructed, RCTs allow the 
effect of a therapeutic intervention to be isolated from circumstantial factors that might 
affect the outcome.  
2.11 The publication of data from trials made possible the further step of meta-analysis or 
systematic review, which can increase statistical power and confidence in the 
findings.74 This enabled the clinical judgement of individual doctors to be supported by 
an ‘evidence base’ of carefully collected and interpreted data.75 However, considerable 
skill is required in interpreting and applying evidence to clinical situations: evidence 
from trials concerns the efficacy of a treatment in optimised conditions but not its 
effectiveness for a particular patient in real world circumstances. The availability of data 
from clinical trials does not annul the value of observational studies and ‘real world’ 
data. Furthermore, the effectiveness of treatment will depend not only on the interaction 
between the intervention and the disease, but also on the patient, whose values and 
preferences are not only important to the ‘success’ of the treatment but also contribute 
to what ‘success’ means.76
2.12 A second development in the field of biomedicine has focussed on overcoming the 
limitations of evidence-based medicine (EBM) by considering more data in order to 
understand variations in patient response. This is achieved by stratifying the ideal 
patient population based on additional dimensions of information. The focus of stratified 
or personalised medicine was initially on integrating genomic data, and this remains an 
important pillar, although increasingly as part of more complex ‘knowledge networks’.
 
77
 
74 Most meta-analyses deal with efficacy (a positive difference attributed to the intervention in a carefully controlled trial 
situation) and few with serious, uncommon or rare adverse events, which the underlying RCTs are seldom sufficiently 
powered to detect. 
 
75 For systematic review, see: http://www.cochrane.org/. Nevertheless, meta-analyses of RCTs, which are designed to increase 
the reliability of inferences drawn from the study data, may offer only relatively weak support for those inferences compared 
to an adequately powered (and randomised) trial. See: Turner RM, Bird SM, and Higgins JPT (2013) The impact of study 
size on meta-analyses: examination of underpowered studies in Cochrane reviews PLoS ONE 8(3): e59202, available at: 
http://www.plosone.org/article/infoper cent3Adoiper cent2F10.1371per cent2Fjournal.pone.0059202.  
76 This is recognised in evidence-based practice (EBP), which integrates three components: the best relevant research 
evidence, the professional expertise of the clinician and the values and preferences of the patient. It begins by framing the 
clinical question to be addressed from the care needs and preferences of the patient. 
77 Compare Department of Health (2003) Our inheritance, our future: realising the potential of genetics in the NHS, NHS 
Genetics White Paper (Cm5791-II), available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http:/www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/
@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4019239.pdf with (US) Committee on a framework for developing a new taxonomy of 
disease; National Research Council (2011) Toward precision medicine: building a knowledge network for biomedical 
research and a new taxonomy of disease (Washington, DC: National Academies Press), available at: 
https://www.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/legacy_files/documents/new-taxonomy.pdf. 
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The contemporary vision is for medicine based on large data resources as well as 
better standardisation of data and linkage between phenotype and genotype data with 
additional lifestyle, environmental and social data.78
Generating economic growth through the life sciences  
 Putting these together can provide 
a detailed picture of the nature of the disease affecting a patient, how and why it is 
manifesting itself in that individual as it is, and that patient’s likely response to any 
treatments. The same data can help to identify risk factors for disease or those 
individual characteristics, practices or treatments associated with the best health 
outcomes. This is a different approach from orthodox EBM, which seeks to avoid 
questions about phenotypic and environmental variability using statistical control 
techniques. While EBM simplifies, the big data approach is to embrace complexity. 
2.13 The network of databases within the National Health Services in the UK provides a 
source of abundant longitudinal phenotypic and pathology data that could give rise to 
significant new insights. A key axis of research policy in the UK and, indeed, of 
research policy’s contribution to national industrial policy, has been the combination of 
NHS infrastructure and genome science. This has been a consistent theme in both 
health and science policy since the Human Genome Project, building on the 
possibilities of population genetics and personalised medicine.79
 
  
Box 2.1: Data intensive bioscience: the Human Genome Project  
The Human Genome Project offers an example of ambitious bioscience as ‘big science’: 
large-scale projects, usually involving international consortia and with multiple research 
sites often distributed internationally, usually funded (or part funded) directly or indirectly 
on a vast scale by national governments in the public interest.  
Extracting value from knowledge of the human genome has, however, turned out to be 
more difficult than most (certainly most policy makers) expected. It has both required 
and accelerated the development of computational biology and the demand for 
biological data – deeper genotyping and phenotyping, and the inclusion of clinical data. 
The establishment of data sharing resources with strong links between health services, 
academic institutions and industrial partners is seen as a key element of research 
programmes of this sort.80
 
 This is echoed in almost every area of the biosciences.  
2.14 The potential of research capability in the NHS was emphasised in 2003 by a report for 
the Department of Trade and Industry, Bioscience 2015 – Improving National Health, 
Increasing National Wealth and in the Genetics White Paper Our inheritance, our 
future: realising the potential of genetics in the NHS, which stressed the value of an 
“Integrated Care Records Service (ICRS) – the standard patient record, one per 
 
78 Kohane IS (2014) Deeper, longer phenotyping to accelerate the discovery of the genetic architectures of diseases Genome 
Biology 15:115, available at: http://genomebiology.com/2014/15/5/115. 
79 See: Department of Trade and Industry (1999) Genome Valley: the economic potential and strategic importance of 
biotechnology in the UK report, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/genomevalley/report.htm; see also: Fears R and Poste G 
(1999) Building population genetics resources using the U.K. NHS Science 284(5412): 267-268. 
80 Academy of Medical Sciences (2013) Realising the potential of stratified medicine; available at: 
http://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/more/news/realising-the-potential-of-stratified-medicine/. 
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patient, which will hold all health and social care data”.81 The emphasis on research in 
health policy documents continued in the 2012 The Power of Information report and the 
subsequent White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS and, to an extent, 
through the NHS Constitution.82 Indeed, the choice to articulate an NHS constitution at 
all and the ‘social contract’ mode in which it is articulated (through pledges, rights and 
responsibilities) signals a more reciprocal view about the contribution of patients both to 
their own care and to the wider public interest in national health and wealth. Rather 
than simply paying taxes and receiving health care when they need it, patients now 
implicitly become morally enjoined contributors to a public data resource. The 
exploitation of the NHS as both a data source and research infrastructure was at the 
centre of the 2010 Strategy for UK Life Sciences which argued for an amendment to 
the NHS constitution to introduce a “default assumption (with ability to opt out): for data 
collected as part of NHS care to be used for approved research, with appropriate 
protection for patient confidentiality”; and “that patients are content to be approached 
about research studies for which they may be eligible.”83 The initiative represented by 
the Strategy for UK Life Sciences was further consolidated in 2014 by the formation of 
a refreshed and expanded Office for Life Sciences (OLS) jointly by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Department of Health (DH), with the 
intention of making the UK attractive as a place to invest in life science research and 
facilitating cooperation between basic research and the NHS.84
2.15 As of 1 April 2013, the Secretary of State for Health has a statutory duty to promote 
research (and the use of research evidence) in exercising functions in relation to the 
health service.
 (It is taking concrete 
shape in the current ‘100,000 Genomes’ project to be delivered by Genomics England 
Ltd. We discuss this case in more detail in chapter 6.)  
85 A similar duty applies at all levels of the NHS. This formal requirement 
consolidates the orientation of the NHS not simply towards becoming a ‘learning’ health 
system (through which data are fed back into commissioning and service development) 
but a combined care and research system.86
 
81 Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT) (2003) Bioscience 2015 – improving national health, increasing national 
wealth, available at: http://www.bioindustry.org/document-library/bioscience-2015/1bia-1103-bioscience-2015.pdf; 
Department of Health (2003) Genetics White Paper (Cm 5791 – II) Our inheritance, our future: realising the potential of 
genetics in the NHS, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/
@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4019239.pdf, at page 53. 
  
82 Liberating the NHS, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213823/dh_117794.pdf; The power of 
information, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213689/dh_134205.pdf; 
Department of Health (2013) The NHS Constitution for England, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170656/NHS_Constitution.pdf. 
83 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2011) Strategy for UK life sciences, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32457/11-1429-strategy-for-uk-life-
sciences.pdf, at page 32. This was underlined in a speech by the British Prime Minister in December 2011, in which he 
argued for changes to the NHS Constitution to make every NHS patient a “research patient” with their medical details 
“opened up” to private healthcare firms (see: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-life-sciences-and-
opening-up-the-nhs). See also: NHS England (2011) Innovation, health and wealth: accelerating adoption and diffusion in the 
NHS: “It is a key goal of the NHS for every willing patient to be a research patient, enabling them to access novel treatments 
earlier. The greater the number of patients involved in research, the wider the public benefit.”, available at: 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/adopt-diff.pdf, at page 17. 
84 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-bigger-better-office-for-life-sciences. 
85 These positive duties were provided in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, s.6. See: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents/enacted. 
86 The National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) provides a key means of giving effect to this obligation. See: 
http://www.nihr.ac.uk/documents/about-NIHR/Briefing-Documents/1.1-The-National-Institute-for-Health-Research.pdf. 
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Policy orientations 
2.16 There are potentially different ways of realising the opportunities presented by data 
science and technology in biomedical research and health care. Here we abstract some 
of the main orientations that characterise contemporary policy in the UK and some 
other countries. 
IT  intens ity 
2.17 Computerisation has transformed areas of life such as banking and administration, as 
well as research, through advances in computational speed, network communications 
and digital storage. The tools and practices of bioinformatics have radically transformed 
the pace of discovery in biomedical research and biology more generally, and the 
nature of the research enterprise and the professional skills involved.87
2.18 The promise of efficiency savings and collateral benefits from the implementation of 
information technology has proved enduringly appealing to policy makers faced with 
essentially intractable problems of conflicts over resources. This appeal has been 
burnished by the impressive projections of IT companies and consultants.
 Similar gains in 
health care have, however, proved more elusive. 
88
2.19 The disappointments of previous experience may be manifestations of a ‘productivity 
paradox’, which suggests that simply implementing more efficient technologies 
(replacing paper files with electronic ones, for example) will not yield significant benefits 
without a more substantial reconfiguration of the way in which they are used.
 
Furthermore it has endured despite evidence of public sector organisations, in both the 
UK and overseas, having long running difficulties with IT systems, with many projects 
being late, over budget or failing to deliver the promised functions or savings. (We 
discuss the implementation of information technology in health care in more detail in 
chapter 6 below). 
89 It is 
therefore to be expected that attempts to digitise health care will take longer, cost more 
and save less than those with pressing political deadlines might wish. The strategy 
proposals from the National Information Board (the body responsible for commissioning 
informatics services for health and social care in England), set out in Personalised 
Health and Care 2020, however, continue the IT-intensive approach with increasing 
expectations placed on e-Health initiatives to deliver benefits.90
 
87 Schatz, MC (2012) Computational thinking in the era of big biology Genome Biology 15: 177, available at: 
http://genomebiology.com/2012/13/11/177; Thessen AE and Patterson DJ (2011) Data issues in the life sciences ZooKeys 
150: 15-51, available at: http://zookeys.pensoft.net/articles.php?id=3041&display_type=list&element_type=12. 
 
88 See note 66 above. 
89 The productivity paradox is pithily summed up in a quip by to the economist, Robert Solow: “You can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” (New York Times Book Review (12 July 1987) We’d better watch out). See 
also: David, PA (1990) The dynamo and the computer: an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox 
American Economic Review 80(2): 355-61, available at: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/e124/David90_dynamo.pdf; 
Brynjolfsson E (1993) The productivity paradox of information technology Communications of the Association for Computing 
Machinery 36(12): 66-77; Jones SS, Heaton PS, Rudin RS, and Schneider EC (2012) Unraveling the IT productivity paradox 
– Lessons for Health Care New England Journal of Medicine 366: 2243-5, available at: 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1204980.  
90 National Information Board, Department of Health (2014) Personalised health and care 2020: a framework for action, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/personalised-health-and-care-2020. For a brief critical response 
see: Greenhalgh T and Keen J (2014) “Personalising” NHS information technology in England (editorial) British Medical 
Journal 349: g7341. 
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P ublic -private partners hips  
2.20 The relationship between industry and universities in the biosciences has been close 
through most of the 20th Century, with the pharmaceutical industry making use of 
academic science as the basis for the development of successful medicines. The 
relationship has been cemented by the crossing of individuals between the academic 
and commercial sectors and the institutional collaborations that characterised the early 
phase of the biotechnology industry in the 1990s. While a tension arose between the 
public and private sectors when human gene sequencing led to an initial rush to secure 
intellectual property rights through potentially valuable patents, this was largely 
resolved by adaptations in patent law.91
2.21 When the complexity of gene function for complex diseases became evident, the need 
to link gene sequence information to clinical data to identify the relationship between 
genetic variation and disease risk (e.g. through genome-wide association studies) led 
to recognition of the value of research based around large-scale biobanks.
  
92 Although 
some commercial biobanks that allowed the linking of phenotypic and pathology (e.g. 
genetic biomarker) data appeared, the long timescales and uncertainties, which are the 
norm in biotechnology, underscored the importance of contributions from the public and 
charitable sectors (e.g. the Wellcome Trust, Cancer Research UK), who could invest 
for the ‘long haul’.93
2.22 Medical research charities provide an important function in the funding ecosystem, and 
both the size and orientation of their influence is significant. It is inevitably easier to 
raise money for some conditions (such as cancers and heart disease) than others, 
which has caused difficulties for rare disease research. The biggest charities, like the 
Wellcome Trust, which dispenses more money than the Medical Research Council in 
the UK, can have a significant effect on the direction of research. The Wellcome Trust 
has consistently, and perhaps critically, advanced genome research and helped to 
build the UK’s infrastructure and expertise in this area, as well as promoting data 
sharing and open data.
  
94 As they are not politically accountable for their strategic 
decisions, charities are not as vulnerable to external political or economic pressures as 
governments and firms, although they may be susceptible to different forms of public 
and sectional interest. UK Biobank, which depends substantially on Wellcome Trust 
funding, was established explicitly to support research that is in the ‘public interest’ 
(see chapter 7).95
 
91 Hopkins M, Mahdi S, Patel P, and Thomas SM (2007) DNA patenting: the end of an era? Nature Biotechnology 25: 185-87, 
available at: http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v25/n2/pdf/nbt0207-185.pdf. See also: Cook-Deegan R and 
Chandrasekharan S (2014) Patents and genome-wide DNA sequence analysis: is it safe to go into the human genome? 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 42(s1): 42-50, available at: 
https://aslme.org/media/downloadable/files/links/0/4/04.SUPP_Cook-Deegan.pdf.  
  
92 Biobanks were established in quick succession in many parts of the world, though particularly in the U.S. and Europe around 
the time of the completion of the Human Genome Project. See: Vaught J, Kelly A, and Hewitt R (2009) A review of 
international biobanks and networks Biopreservation and Biobanking 7(3): 143-50; Hewitt, RE (2011) Biobanking: the 
foundation of personalized medicine Current Opinion in Oncology 23: 112-9; Wichmann, H-E, Kuhn KA, Waldenberger M, et 
al. (2011) Comprehensive catalogue of European biobanks Nature Biotechnology 29: 795-7. Scott CT, Caulfield T, Borgelt, E 
and Illes, J (2012) Personal medicine – the new banking crisis Nature Biotechnology 30(2): 141-7. 
93 See the small number of gene-based diagnostics and drugs derived from genomic targets currently available. See, for 
example, Hopkins MM, Martin P, Nightingale P, and Kraft A (2008) Living with dinosaurs: genomics, and the industrial 
dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry, conference paper, available at: 
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=3847&cf=29.  
94 For example, through the Sanger Institute in Hinxton/Cambridgeshire, which led both the practical work and the political 
orientation of the UK contribution to the Human Genome Project. 
95 See UK Biobank Coordinating Centre (2011) Access Procedures: application and review procedures for access to the UK 
Biobank resource, available at: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Access_Procedures_Nov_2011.pdf. 
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2.23 Although the public sector generates most of the data and has a near monopoly on 
collecting certain sorts of data, data analysis and innovation will probably continue to 
be pushed out to the private sector owing to the lack of public sector IT capability and 
political decisions about the shape and balance of the innovation ecosystem, including 
the fostering of diverse research approaches.96
■ funding of ‘underpinning research’ and skilled workforce (academic institutions) 
 The public and charitable sectors have 
therefore progressively taken on at least three distinct functions over the course of the 
last three decades, in support of anticipated delivery of biomedical products by the 
private sector.  
■ funding of major data resources (e.g. UK Biobank)  
■ funding of infrastructure/ capacity (e.g. National Programme for IT) 
C entralis ation of data 
2.24 Whereas standardisation is desirable and technical interoperability essential for linking 
separately collected and maintained datasets, the drive towards exploitation of public 
data in the UK has, additionally, involved the consolidation and centralisation of some 
data resources in so-called ‘safe havens’ for health and public sector data, such as the 
Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC).97
2.25 Although centralisation is convenient for the extraction of value through the application 
of data analysis, consolidated databases create large targets for unauthorised technical 
access, unauthorised access by insiders, or abuse of authorised access at the behest 
of powerful lobbyists.
  
98
Open data 
 Centralisation of data is not the only way of achieving the 
objectives of research. For many years, for example, GP systems had mechanisms for 
researchers to send queries to practices and receive aggregated answers. The 
centralised approach to health data taken by the HSCIC in England is conspicuously 
different from that adopted in Scotland, for example. (These approaches are discussed 
in more detail in chapter 6.) 
2.26 For several decades it has been recognised that clinical trials and other research 
studies that do not show a clear difference between medicines (or interventions) are 
less likely to be published in the medical literature. As a result, systematic reviews, 
using only published outcomes of medical studies, can reach misleading conclusions. 99
 
96 For a discussion of recent UK research policy, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging Biotechnologies: 
technology, choice and the public good, available at: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/emerging-biotechnologies, especially 
chapter 7 (‘Research and Innovation Policy’). 
 
Pharmaceutical companies, in particular, have attracted scrutiny and suspicion as 
clinical trials results are not always made public in a timely fashion and some – 
97 Department of Health (2014) Protecting health and care information: a consultation on proposals to introduce new 
regulations, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323967/Consultation_document.pdf. There are 
further arrangements for distributed accredited safe havens as recommended by the Caldicott review. See: The Caldicott 
Committee (2013) Information: to share or not to share? The information governance review, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-information-governance-review, at s.6.5. 
98 See discussion of ‘data threats’ at paragraph 2.32. 
99 See, for example, Easterbrook PJ, Gopalan R, Berlin JA, and Matthews DR (1991) Publication bias in clinical research The 
Lancet 337(8746): 867-72.This publication bias or ‘file-drawer problem’ has been observed in many scientific disciplines. 
See: Scargle JD (2000) Publication bias: the “file-drawer” problem in scientific inference Journal of Scientific Exploration 
14(1): 91-106, available at: http://scientificexploration.org/journal/jse_14_1_scargle.pdf.  
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
32   
especially negative results unfavourable to the company – not published at all.100 This 
has led to pressure for all trials to be registered and results published, and has also 
contributed to a more general argument in science for data to be ‘open’, that is, made 
available publicly for independent validation of findings and for secondary research.101
2.27 Open data has been defined as data that anyone is free to access, use, modify, and 
share, so long as it is correctly attributed and further use is not constrained.
 
Indeed, if data derived from national resources such as the NHS or administrative 
databases are to be used for research there is a strong moral argument that their use 
should not be restricted to only those who can pay for them (e.g. to publication in 
academic journals with access restricted by paywalls) or to those with particular kinds 
of interest. 
102 Open 
data is therefore unlikely to contain individual-level data or data that might be subject to 
data protection measures.103 The open data movement nevertheless suggests a 
strengthening of the ethical ‘imperative’ for data sharing, albeit without weakening the 
imperative to protect individuals’ privacy.104
2.28 Although the open data movement is self-consciously modelled on the ‘open source’ 
software movement, its organisation and driving forces are different.
 It is also partly a response to concerns 
about research inefficiency (e.g. unwitting duplication or failing to exploit synergies) and 
the need for raw data in order to test the reproducibility of research findings, and about 
turning around poor practice and misconduct (e.g. withholding unfavourable research 
results).  
105
2.29 Open data policy is currently being supported enthusiastically by some governments, 
notably in the UK and the USA, through initiatives to put ‘public data’ into the public 
domain.
 While the open 
source and free software movements developed ‘from the bottom up’ enjoy broad 
support and are involved in the maintenance of much of the planet’s digital 
infrastructure, and while many scientists strongly support open access publication, the 
open data movement has less substantial voluntary support.  
106 They argue that this is the best way of extracting economic value from the 
data (in contrast to the model now adopted by commercial data brokers such as 
Google and Microsoft).107
 
100 See, for example, Goldacre B (2012) Bad pharma: how drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients (London: Fourth 
Estate). 
 In some cases this policy is enshrined in legislation: the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA) placed an obligation on the HSCIC to publish 
information it holds that is not subject to privacy restrictions.  
101 Already many clinical trials have been registered on open access sites (especially if publically funded) and in September 
2013 it became a requirement to register when getting Research Ethics Committee approval in the UK (see 
http://www.hra.nhs.uk/news/2013/09/10/trial-registration-to-be-condition-of-the-favourable-rec-opinion-from-30-september/). 
In April 2014, the European Parliament adopted a new Clinical Trials Regulation, which requires all trials in Europe to be 
registered before they begin, and trial results to be published within a year of their end. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/reg_2014_536/reg_2014_536_en.pdf. There is now a global movement for 
registration of all clinical trials (http://www.alltrials.net/). 
102 See http://opendefinition.org/od/. 
103 See, however, the discussion of the Personal Genome Project in chapter 7. 
104 See Royal Society (2012) Science as an open enterprise, available at: https://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/science-public-
enterprise/Report/; see the Bethesda statement on open access publishing (2003), available at: 
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/bethesda.htm. Some funders, such as the Wellcome Trust, make it a condition of 
grants that the findings of research are published in open access journals. See: http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-
us/Policy/Policy-and-position-statements/WTD002766.htm. 
105 The charge of “open-washing” is sometimes levelled at those who conflate data sharing and open data in order to imply that 
ethically ambiguous sharing initiatives have the laudable ‘transparency’ of open data.  
106 See Business, Innovation and Skills Committee (2013) 3rd special report – open access: responses to the committee's fifth 
report of session 2013-14, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmbis/833/83302.htm. 
107 Commercial data brokers such as Google or Microsoft keep data locked up in their data centres. They allow third parties to 
build apps on top of it, and monetise it through adverts or access charges.  
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B ig data and the knowledge ec onomy 
2.30 The exploitation of data science and technologies has acquired a central role in the 
political narratives around revitalising the UK economy.108 Especially since 2012, this 
field of investigation has been seen as one of the ‘eight great technologies’ around 
which UK research and industrial policy has been built.109 Similarly, the Europe 2020 
growth strategy gives prominence to big data in the ‘Digital Agenda’ for ‘smart 
growth’.110
2.31 In the UK, health science and biotechnology is one of the main dimensions along which 
value is expected from big data.
 The revision of European data protection law (the replacement of the 
existing Directive 95/46/EC with a new Data Protection Regulation) was initially 
presented as a streamlining of rules to facilitate data movement and support 
commercial activities (as well as to secure citizens’ rights in the face of technological 
advances and to harmonise implementation across the Community). 
111 This sector is seen as especially promising because 
of the existing academic and research base, favourable commercial conditions, and 
potentially exploitable national data collections. Substantial political energy and 
investment is being directed towards capacity building, investment in infrastructure, 
education and training, streamlining regulation, developing innovation pathways and 
creating a welcoming commercial environment. The Medical Research Council (along 
with nine other funders) has made substantial investment (including £20M capital 
funding) in the Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research and UK Health Informatics 
Research Network.112 Similar developments in the use of administrative data have 
seen the establishment of a network of Administrative Data Research Centres 
(ARDCs) in each of the four home countries. Both systems provide safe havens for 
linkage of datasets and analysis by approved researchers.113
Data threats  
  
Proposition 7 
Decisions and actions informed by the use of biological and health data may have both 
beneficial and harmful effects on individuals or on broader groups of people (e.g. 
families, companies, social groups, communities or society in general).  
 
108 See, for example, the Cabinet Office Data Strategy Board (see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-strategy-
board-and-public-data-group-terms-of-reference. 
109 See, for example, Willetts D (2013) Eight great technologies, available at: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/eightper cent20greatper cent20technologies.pdf.  
110 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF. It is worth noting, also, the 
persistent use of human genome sequencing as a trope for big data. See, for example: 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240226052/Cameron-announces-300m-big-data-human-genome-database-project.  
111 The recognition of the political significance can be seen, for example, in the Prime Ministerial backing for the launch of the 
100K Genomes project. See: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/uk-to-become-world-number-one-in-dna-testing-with-plan-
to-revolutionise-fight-against-cancer-and-rare-diseases/. 
112 The Farr Institute is named after William Farr (1807-83), one of the ‘founding fathers’ of medical statistics. Centres (‘nodes’) 
have been established at University College, London, the University of Manchester, Swansea University, and the University 
of Dundee (http://www.farrinstitute.org/).  
113 ADRCs (http://www.adrn.ac.uk/) enable large numbers of academic and other researchers to analyse and link data from, for 
example, tax, benefit, and education systems. These developments make it possible that, for example, medical researchers 
will be able to study disease outcomes as a function of income or education level; equally, researchers interested in taxation 
policy or in mechanisms for reducing disability benefit claims will have access to large-scale medical data. See Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) Improving access for research and policy: the government response to the report 
of the administrative data taskforce, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206873/bis-13-920-government-response- 
administrative-data-taskforce.pdf.  
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Proposition 8  
The potential benefits and harms that could arise from data use may be valued radically 
differently by different people and by the same people at different times. 
 
C yber s ec urity 
2.32 Large datasets with multiple users and access points are more attractive targets for 
attack. Studies of reported data breaches across sectors by The Identity Theft 
Resource Center, a US non-profit organisation monitoring data theft, find an emerging 
trend of the health-care sector as the target for the largest share of attacks (a greater 
number than the business sector).114 Attacks can involve technical penetration by 
outsiders, dishonesty by insiders, or subversion of the executives who control the 
system. In the NHS, attention has historically focussed on the first of these; the NHS 
network, for example, uses encryption and many users authenticate themselves with 
smartcards. While this may have forestalled possible attacks of the first kind it does 
offers no protection against threats that fall in the second two categories. Abuse by 
insiders has a long history and the NHS is often the single largest reporter of data 
breaches to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).115
2.33 In addition to direct compromise of data security there are also secondary threats from 
malicious inference from legitimately released data and statistics. These cannot be 
resolved by access control or improved security because they make use only of data 
available through legitimate interfaces. For example, considerable concern was 
expressed when it emerged that the consolidated Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
records of England and Wales, consisting of about a billion finished consultant 
episodes from 1998–2013, had been sold to a number of non-profit and for-profit 
researchers, some of whom had been granted commercial re-use licences that 
continue to allow them to re-sell the data.
  
116
2.34 Distrust of centralised information systems, of the technical or human elements, as well 
as principled opposition to inadequately justified or governed data processing, has 
provoked responses from privacy and civil liberty perspectives,
  
117 and from powerful 
professional groups such as the British Medical Association (BMA).118
 
114 See http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/2014databreaches.html. 
 This, in turn, has 
raised concerns that support for research, and the benefits that may follow from 
responsible data re-use, could be negatively affected by such a loss of confidence. (We 
discuss an example in more detail in chapter 6.) 
115 There is mandatory reporting of NHS Level 2 security breach incidents both to the Department of Health and to the 
Information Commissioner's Office. See: https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/Publications/IGper cent20SIRIper cent20Reportingper 
cent20Toolper cent20Publicationper cent20Statement_Final_V2per cent200.pdf. There is an automated tool within the NHS 
Information Governance Toolkit for this purpose. No other public or private body has the same degree of mandatory 
reporting. This, taken with the vast amount of data held on every citizen contributes to the fact that the NHS is often the 
single largest reporter of data breaches. 
116 See the ‘Partridge Review’ of data releases made by the NHS Information Centre (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/datareview). See 
also: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10656893/Hospital-records-of-all-NHS-patients-sold-to-insurers.html; 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/analysis/2352497/nhs-data-governance-in-critical-condition.  
117 See, for example, http://www.medconfidential.org; http://www.no2id.net/. 
118 See: http://bma.org.uk/news-views-analysis/news/2014/march/caredata-confidentiality-concerns-cannot-be-ignored-say-
doctors; http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-work/ethics/confidentiality-and-health-records/care-data. 
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S tate s urveillance  
2.35 The data protection movement arose in the 1960s out of concerns about states building 
‘data banks’ which would enable them to exercise surveillance and control over their 
citizens.119 Half a century later, in 2013, a contractor working for the US National 
Security Agency (NSA), fled the USA with information, which he subsequently made 
public, about the activities of the NSA and its PRISM project.120 Edward Snowden’s 
revelations, which were published in the UK by The Guardian newspaper, had a chilling 
effect on support for personal data systems sponsored by the state or big corporations. 
They contained (among many other things) evidence relating to the UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) having extensive access to sensitive personal 
information which it shared with the US National Security Agency.121
2.36 Snowden’s disclosures have provoked a significant debate about the security of IT 
infrastructure in Europe, with Germany taking a lead in putting forward proposals to 
create a European communications network to keep data from passing via the US, 
where they are vulnerable to the NSA.
  
122 The European Commission was already 
promoting the idea of European cloud computing and the Snowden revelations gave 
this more impetus. Many legal and governance issues arise in respect of the use of 
data cloud resources: cloud computing is a good way of solving the practical problems 
of processing very large amounts of data and it allows researchers in different 
jurisdictions to access a large centralised resource without the need to transfer data.123
2.37 The timing of Snowden’s disclosures cannot have failed to have an effect on the 
progress of the draft EU Data Protection Regulation, which was made significantly 
more restrictive by the lead parliamentary committee. The anticipated chilling effect on 
medical research of the Parliament’s amendments has been viewed with concern, in 
turn, by medical researchers, research funders and some interest groups.
 
However, most cloud computing facilities are either in the USA or run by US firms and 
thus open to US warrants and, in other cases, it is unclear who ultimately controls 
access to cloud data. (We discuss the use of cloud computing for data analysis and 
collaborative biomedical research in chapter 7.) 
124
 
119 Younger Committee (1972) Report of the committee on privacy, Cmnd. 5012 (London: HMSO).  
 
120 PRISM is the familiar name of a mass electronic surveillance programme run since 2007 by the US National Security 
Agency. It collects data on internet communications from providers of internet services pursuant to requests under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008 and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The 
Snowden disclosures suggested that the scale of data collection went significantly beyond the scope intended by the 
legislation providing for it. For further information on the Snowden disclosures, see: http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/the-nsa-files.  
121 See: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa.  
122  See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26210053. The US “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” (otherwise known as the ‘USA PATRIOT Act’, 
see: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm) allows the US authorities, under prescribed circumstances connected 
with national security and crime, to gain access to data held by US companies (including data on non-US citizens). The Act 
itself was a consolidation of existing powers, but it has become emblematic of the proactive and wide ranging use of state 
powers in the name of national security post-September 2001. 
123 For example, since 2011 PA consulting has uploaded HES data obtained from the HSCIC to Google BigQuery in order to 
manipulate the data: see http://www.paconsulting.com/introducing-pas-media-site/releases/pa-consulting-group-statement-3-
march-2014/ and http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/3948/Statement-Use-of-data-by-PA-consulting. 
124 See the joint statements from non-commercial research organisations and academics (updated December 2014), scientific 
research organisations (May 2013) and Federation of the European Academies of Medicine (June 2012), all available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Spotlight-issues/Personal-information/Data-protection-legislation/index.htm. 
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Dis c rimination  
2.38 People who regularly use Internet browsers and search engines will be familiar with 
targeted pop-ups and personalised recommendations. Those who use the Internet for 
shopping are likely to be aware of the recommendation services of the sort pioneered 
by online retailer Amazon.com. These functions rely on customer profiling, where an 
individual’s online activities (or rather those associated with a specific IP address or 
linked via a cookie on a device) are linked to create a ‘user profile’. This may be done 
via a single entity (e.g. Amazon) or through intermediary sites (e.g. Doubleclick) 
invoked during web-page transition on many sites where activity across many entities 
are gathered to give more comprehensive information about an individual’s interests.125
2.39 Similar approaches may be used to infer further attributes of the user (and associate 
them with their online profile). For example, it has been shown to be possible to infer 
gender and sexuality with a high degree of reliability from use of social networking 
sites.
 
It is this latter ‘surveillance’ that raises concerns as it is hard for an individual to control 
this in any way. It may be that few people have problems with single entity uses, for 
example, to produce recommendations, although they may find some of the marketing 
pop-ups irritating or perhaps embarrassing, as they may inadvertently reveal that 
person’s interests to other users of the IP address or device. These technologies are 
linked to 'risk profiling' and screening in health care, with the same concerns about 
trying to provide benefits to individuals without appearing to 'look over their shoulders'.  
126 The same may be possible for health conditions (see Google flu tracking127
2.40 For the purposes of targeted advertising, a fairly high probability of statistical 
correlation supporting a correct inference is usually sufficient; but whereas receiving 
inappropriate advertisements may be a minor irritation in most cases, in some it may 
have more significant consequences. An infamous account concerns a father who 
complained about US retail company, Target, sending his school-aged daughter 
coupons for baby products, only to discover later that she had been correctly profiled 
as pregnant by the company’s software, using her purchasing patterns as markers.
) or 
other private information. In other words, correlations found in large datasets can 
support inferences based on individual online behaviour that can ‘create’ personal data 
where none was provided directly. It is important to consider what may rest on such 
inferred information.  
128
 
125 “Some generic work can be done with de-identified data that is related to anonymous purchase data, but better targeted 
marketing depends upon knowing at least some of the properties of the possible purchasers, and ideally their identity. The 
main concerns/fears are that people who are less fit/at higher risk of disease and/or who have functional impairment will be 
discriminated against if identifiable biomedical data about them is widely available outside clinical practice & academic 
research establishments.” Consultation response by Ian Herbert, available at: 
 
There is an interesting postscript to the story of Target’s pregnancy divination. An 
academic researcher from Princeton University carried out an experiment to see 
whether it would be possible to hide her own pregnancy from big data analytics. Given 
that so many social and economic transactions are mediated by electronic devices 
linked to the Internet this presented a significant challenge. Her conclusion was that 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-
health-data/evidence-gathering/.  
126 See Kosinski M, Stillwell D and Graepel T (2013) Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human 
behaviour Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110(15): 5802-5, available at: 
http://www.pnas.org/content/110/15/5802.full?sid=8148a219-8733-4ad0-adfe-e1523cb5feba. 
127 Google’s flu trends service aims to identify the spread of flu symptoms in near real time, based on search terms entered into 
its search engine and geolocation of searching, and thereby enabling timely public health measures to be taken in response. 
See: http://www.google.org/flutrends/. However, the approach has limitations that differ from those of traditional disease 
surveillance: see http://www.nature.com/news/when-google-got-flu-wrong-1.12413.  
128 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
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hiding from big data is so inconvenient and expensive that it would be a difficult lifestyle 
choice.129
2.41 Some applications, such as credit scoring and differential pricing (where individual 
consumers are charged different prices for the same product or service based on 
factors such as credit history), may have the effect of systematically compounding 
social inequalities.
  
130 Others may perpetuate and reinforce societal inequality and 
discrimination (even where they do not rely directly on information about, for example, 
race, ethnicity, religion, etc.).131
2.42 One of the key difficulties with regulating the use of algorithms is their opacity, often 
even to those who employ them, and their complexity, which makes them difficult to 
understand and therefore to combat. One response to this has been to call for 
enhanced regulation and public scrutiny, although the commercial value of algorithms 
means that there may be reluctance to disclose them and some may be protected as 
trade secrets.
 Even the most sophisticated algorithms are imperfect 
predictors, and the more unusual the case they are applied to, the more unreliable they 
become. At the very least, computer profiling can be insensitive, and fail to respect 
individuality, changing preferences and caprice. It could even make options of interest 
invisible and inaccessible to individuals.  
132
Mis us e of data  
 The widespread adoption of profiling and algorithmic prediction has 
potentially significant social consequences and raises important questions of public 
ethics and regulation.  
2.43 We have referred to a change in attitude towards data, generated by the recognition of 
its secondary use value, and the need for shared access to these, brought about by the 
increasing complexity and data dependency of professional practices such as 
medicine. The change in emphasis can be traced in successive versions of the General 
Medical Council’s guidance on confidentiality and the distance travelled between the 
two ‘Caldicott reports’ on information governance in the NHS.133 The first Caldicott 
report (1997) set out conservative principles to ensure the maintenance of patient 
confidentiality in the complex data flows that followed the implementation of IT systems 
within the NHS, and their operation by staff unaccustomed to dealing with information 
governance issues.134
 
129 See: http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2014/04/29/3432050/can-you-hide-from-big-data/. 
 It ushered in a new role in NHS institutions that quickly became 
known as the ‘Caldicott guardian’ who was usually a senior health professional 
130 Differential pricing based on consumer profiles may result in those with poor credit histories being charged more for a 
product or services than the more well-off on the basis that they present a greater credit risk, thus compounding their 
disadvantage and exploiting their vulnerability. See: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/how-big-data-enables-
econ_b_5820202.html. 
131 Gandy OH Jnr (2010) Engaging rational discrimination: exploring reasons for placing regulatory constraints on decision 
support systems Ethics and Information Technology 12(1): 29-42. 
132 Danna A and Gandy OH Jnr (2002) All that glitters is not gold: digging beneath the surface of data mining Journal of 
Business Ethics 40(4): 373–86, available at http://web.asc.upenn.edu/usr/ogandy/DMper cent20published.pdf. 
133 After 2009, the section of the GMC guidance that emphasised, quite straightforwardly, the importance of medical 
confidentiality acquired an important qualification: “But appropriate information sharing is essential to the efficient provision of 
safe, effective care, both for the individual patient and for the wider community of patients”. See: (pre-2009) http://www.gmc-
uk.org/Withdrawn_core_guidance_watermarked.pdf_27014281.pdf and (post-2009): http://www.gmc-
uk.org/static/documents/content/Confidentiality_-_English_0914.pdf, at page 6. The 2009 guidance also contains new 
elaborated sections on public interest and research. 
134 See: The Caldicott Committee (1997) Report on the review of patient-identifiable information, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/P
ublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4068403 and (2013) Information: to share or not to share? The information governance 
review, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-information-governance-review.  
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responsible for the protection of patient information. The second Caldicott report, 
appearing after the National Programme for IT, sought to promote a culture of 
responsible data ‘sharing’, including for secondary uses, and identified the possibility 
that failures to use data effectively could compromise treatment of patients as surely as 
failures to protect data could harm them.  
2.44 Evidence of direct harm arising from misuse of data, particularly from re-identification of 
individuals from de-identified or pseudonymised datasets, is difficult to find. Registers 
of data breaches and complaints to the data protection authorities exist, and many 
such breaches are reported in the media. However, despite much hearsay and 
anecdotal evidence, and a scattering of clearly described incidents in the literature, we 
found no systematic assessment of harms arising as a consequence of data misuse. 
Therefore, as part of the evidence gathering that informed our deliberations we 
commissioned, jointly with the Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (EAGDA), some 
independent research into this question.135
Box 2.2: Empirical typology of data abuses, their causes and resulting harms  
 The researchers developed an empirical 
typology of harms arising from the misuse (‘abuse’) of data from biomedical research 
and health care, which was related to the type of abuse that led to them and its root 
cause.  
Type of abuse 
(decreasing 
intentionality)  
Causes of abuse 
(decreasing 
intentionality)  
Harms caused by abuse 
(decreasing severity) 
■ Fabrication or 
falsification of data 
■ Theft of data 
■  Unauthorised disclosure 
of or access to data 
■ Non-secure disposal of 
data 
■ Unauthorised retention 
of data 
■ Technical security 
failures 
■ Loss of data 
■ Non-use of data 
■ Abuse of data to meet 
NHS/organisational 
objectives 
■ Abuse of data to protect 
professional reputation 
■ Abuse of data for self-
gain (e.g. monetary 
gain) 
■ Abuse attributed to third 
parties (e.g. hackers) 
■ Disclosure by the press 
or media 
■ Unauthorised access 
without clinical or lawful 
justification (e.g. for 
curiosity) 
■ Against the wishes/ 
objections of the 
individual 
■ Abuse as a result of 
insufficient safeguards 
■ Receipt of suboptimal 
care, resulting in 
detriment to health or 
death 
■ Individual distress e.g. 
emotional, physical, etc. 
■ Damage to individual 
reputation (e.g. societal, 
personal or professional) 
■ Individual, financial loss 
■ Damage to public 
interest (e.g. loss of faith 
in confidential health 
service, general loss of 
public trust in medical 
profession, delayed or 
stunted scientific 
progress etc.) 
■ Damage to 
organisational reputation 
(e.g. to NHS) 
 
135 EAGDA was established by the Wellcome Trust, Cancer Research UK, the Economic and Social Research Council, and the 
Medical Research Council to provide strategic advice on the emerging scientific, legal and ethical issues associated with 
data access for human genetics research and cohort studies (see: http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Spotlight-
issues/Data-sharing/EAGDA/index.htm). The research was delivered by a multidisciplinary team of researchers from the 
Mason Institute at the University of Edinburgh’s Law School (see: http://masoninstitute.org/) and the Farr Institute’s CIPHER 
at Swansea University’s College of Medicine (see: http://www.farrinstitute.org/centre/CIPHER/34_About.html). Their report, 
Laurie G, Jones KH, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence relating to harm resulting from uses of health and 
biomedical data is available on our website at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
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■ Abuse arising out of a 
Freedom of Information 
request 
■ Abuse due to 
maladministration (e.g. 
failure to follow correct 
procedures) 
■ Abuse due to human 
error (e.g. sending a fax 
to the wrong recipient) 
■ Non-use due to 
misinterpretation of legal 
obligations 
■ Potential for harm to 
individual, organisation 
or the public interest in 
future 
■ No evidence of harm 
found due to lack of 
reported information 
 
Source: Laurie G, Jones KH, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence relating to harm resulting 
from uses of health and biomedical data, available on our website at: 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
 
2.45 Methodologies for identifying harm face a number of serious limitations. First, the 
definition of harm used by the ICO excludes many incidents that would be considered 
harmful by data subjects.136 Second, for data from health care settings, there is a lack 
of central reporting in the NHS.137 Third, there are obstacles to obtaining redress: in the 
UK (as opposed to the USA), costs shifting, whereby the loser of a civil case generally 
pays the winner’s costs, constitutes a serious discouragement to civil action for breach 
of confidence, since it is thus extremely risky for a private individual with limited means 
to sue. Consequently, abuses do not show up in law reports. Furthermore, criminal 
prosecutions for breach of confidence appear not to be a priority for law enforcement 
and only become so in high profile cases, such as the News International sponsored 
‘phone hacking’.138 There is also the added complication that the victim may be 
unaware, and may never become aware, of the ‘harm’ (for example, where they are 
unsuccessful in a job application owing to information illicitly in the possession of the 
would-be employer). Finally, it may very often not be in the interest of the victim to 
pursue relief for privacy harms given that privacy harms are likely to be compounded 
by any publicity. The scarcity of documented cases of harm does not, therefore, 
provide very much reassurance that they do not exist. Those that are well documented 
in the available literature probably represent the tip of a much larger iceberg, as figure 
1 (below) suggests.139
 
136 See Laurie G, Jones KH, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence relating to harm resulting from uses of health 
and biomedical data, available on our website at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-
gathering/. 
 
137 A Freedom of Information (FOI) request by a Working Party member to the HSCIC for information on data breaches relating 
to the Personal Demographics Services (PDS) drew a response that information was not collected centrally and it would be 
necessary to contact individual trusts to obtain the data. See: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/pds_exploits_and_breaches. 
138 R. v. Coulson and ors (unrep.) 4 July 2014. See sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Saunders: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/sentencing-remarks-mr-j-saunders-r-v-coulson-others.pdf. 
139 Figure 1 is not drawn from the commissioned report; it was produced by Peter Singleton, a former member of the Working 
Party. 
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Figure 1: the ‘confidentiality funnel’  
2.46 Because of the demanding conditions for an adverse effect to be formally classified as 
a harm the commissioned research distinguished between ‘harm’, which could be 
recognised as a cause for action, and ‘impact’, which included non-actionable but 
nevertheless morally significant adverse effects. The research sought evidence of both 
‘harms’ and ‘impacts’. The research found that the broad category of 
‘maladministration’ was the main cause of data abuse and therefore an important 
potential source of harm (although the majority of the evidence related to health care 
rather than research systems). One form of maladministration is simple human error.  
Box 2.3: The case of Helen Wilkinson 
While most national database collections are created with the best of intentions, it is 
important to recognise that they often use either identified data or at least identifiable 
data about patients’ treatments, which entails privacy risks where information (whether 
true or, as in this case, false) may have consequences for an individual to whom it is 
connected. 
In 2004 Helen Wilkinson was a GP Practice Manager who discovered that data 
submitted to the NHS-wide Clearing Service (NWCS) managed by McKesson for the 
NHS had a mis-coded record indicating that she had attended an alcohol advisory 
service in 1998 instead of a surgical procedure.140
Attempts to have this corrected were thwarted and led to her case being debated in 
Parliament in June 2005, including the fact that there were no facilities for patients to 
opt-out of their data being collected centrally.  
 
Although the database concerned would not be used for actual medical treatment (or in 
 
140 The facts of this case are given in House of Commons Hansard, 16 Jun 2005, Col.495, where the case is reported as the 
subject of an adjournment debate. 
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the case of screening invitations, would not use this particular data), Ms Wilkinson 
nevertheless suffered substantial personal embarrassment and distress as a result of 
the error and the difficulty in correcting it and, as a result, withdrew from the care of the 
NHS. 
 
2.47 Errors of the kind described in Box 2.3 above may be particularly damaging if they are 
replicated across information systems and if they go undetected and inform the way in 
which individuals are treated (in the broadest sense). Where they are detected they 
can usually be corrected (although any dissemination that has already taken place 
through other systems may make this more difficult).  
2.48 There are, however, abuses more intentionally damaging than simple errors of 
administration. For many years, NHS systems have been abused by private 
investigators, journalists and others to track down targets of investigation. A standard 
technique was the ‘blag’ or false-pretext telephone call, in which the caller phones one 
NHS organisation pretending to be from another NHS organisation and asks for 
information about a patient. 141 In 1996 the BMA issued guidance on how to detect and 
avoid such abuse: rather than simply handing out information over the phone, staff 
were advised to log all requests, consult a senior clinician for approval and call back 
only to numbers in the phone book rather than to a number given by the caller.142 In 
that year, staff at the NW Yorkshire Health Authority, trained to follow this guidance, 
discovered several dozen false-pretext calls per week.143
2.49 The broad conclusion of the research, which we endorse, was that relying on 
compliance with current legal requirements is insufficient to avert harm and that ‘harm’ 
as currently recognised by authorities (the ICO, tribunals and courts) failed to provide a 
complete picture of how harm resulting from abuse of data is perceived or experienced 
by individuals.
 The system that is now the 
natural target for attacks is the NHS’s Personal Demographics Service (PDS), which 
contains the private contact information of all NHS patients and is available to 
hundreds of thousands of NHS staff, who use it routinely to verify the names and dates 
of birth of patients presenting for treatment and look up NHS numbers so that records 
can be retrieved.  
144
“This is not to suggest that groundless concerns or abstract fears should drive 
information governance practices. Rather... the range of considerations about what 
might be construed as harmful is far wider than the law alone recognises. As such, 
the lesson is that due attention should be paid to possible impacts when using health 
and biomedical data, and to ensuring that governance mechanisms and actors within 
  
 
141 This risk was highlighted in the case of Jacintha Saldanha, a night sister at King Edward VII Hospital in London, who 
committed suicide after transferring a hoax call from Australian radio station, 2Day FM, to a nurse caring for the pregnant 
Duchess of Cambridge, believing the call to be from the Queen and the Prince of Wales 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/12/jacintha-saldanha-death-suicide-prank-call-dj-apologises). 
142 Anderson R (1996) Clinical system security – interim guidelines British Media Journal 312(7023):109–111, available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2349761/pdf/bmj00524-0047.pdf. 
143 Hassey A and Wells M (1997) Clinical systems security – implementing the BMA policy and guidelines, in Personal medical 
information: security, engineering, and ethics, Anderson R (Editor) (Berlin: Springer) pp 79–93. 
144 The research made a technical distinction between ‘harms’ from the hard evidence search (essentially those that satisfied a 
legal definition) from negative ‘impacts’ that were identified in the soft evidence.  
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them have the ability to assess and, where appropriate, respond to data subjects’ 
expectations.”145
2.50 The commissioned report was intended only as an initial scoping exercise. It has, 
however, sufficiently demonstrated the importance and urgency of carrying out more 
thoroughgoing research in order to form a realistic picture of the incidence and possible 
hazards of data abuse. Based on our examination of this area, and in the light of our 
deliberations, we make a number of recommendations below. 
 
Recommendation 1 
We recommend that relevant bodies, including public and private research 
funders and UK health departments, ensure that there is continued research into 
the potential harms associated with abuse of biological and health data, as well as 
its benefits. This research should be sustained as available data and data technologies 
evolve, maintaining vigilance for new harms that may emerge. Appropriate research that 
challenges current policy orientations should be particularly encouraged in order to 
identify and test the robustness of institutional assumptions. 
 
Recommendation 2 
We recommend that the Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel 
and the Health Research Authority supervise, respectively, the maintenance of 
comprehensive maps of UK health and research data flows and actively support 
both prospective and continuing evaluation of the risks or benefits of any 
policies, standards, or laws governing data used in biomedical research and 
health care.  
 
Recommendation 3 
We recommend that the Government make enforceable provisions to ensure that 
privacy breaches involving individual-level data that occur in health services and 
biomedical research projects are reported in a timely and appropriate fashion to 
the individual or individuals affected.  
 
Recommendation 4 
We recommend that the Health and Social Care Information Centre maintain 
prospective assessments to inform the most effective methods for preventing the 
inadvertent or fraudulent accessing of personal health care data by unauthorised 
individuals.  
 
 
145 Laurie G, Jones KH, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence relating to harm resulting from uses of health and 
biomedical data, available on our website at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/, at 
page 161. 
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Recommendation 5 
We recommend that the UK government legislate to introduce criminal penalties, 
comparable to those applicable for offences under the Computer Misuse Act 
1990, for deliberate misuse of data whether or not it results in demonstrable 
harm to individuals.  
 
Conclusion 
2.51 The opportunities promised by advances in IT and data science, and the demands of 
wider industrial policy to develop the knowledge economy, have provoked a 
reorientation of policy on the use of biomedical and health data from care support 
towards a broader value extraction. This is the case in several major developed 
economies. In the UK, a particular focus has been on the development of genomic 
technologies and the exploitation of data collected by the NHS. The effect of policy 
decisions has been to promote – and, to an extent, to lock in – data-intensive initiatives 
as a generator of economic activity in the near term and to establish the conditions for 
improved and more cost-effective treatments and services in the long term. This 
nevertheless makes it difficult to disentangle the confusion of motives behind policies 
affecting the protection and exploitation of data in biomedicine and health care.  
 

 Chapter 3 
Values and interests in 
data initiatives 
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Chapter 3 – Moral values and interests in data initiatives  
Chapter overview 
This chapter discusses the significance and nature of information privacy norms and the 
relationship between privacy and public interests.  
The concept of privacy and the distinction between public and private have evolved 
throughout history. Privacy is important in the formation and maintenance of individual 
and group identities. Norms of confidentiality and information sharing characterise 
different relationships between people and groups. Medical confidentiality allows 
information sharing that might otherwise infringe privacy norms to take place for specific 
professional purposes.  
Consent provides a mechanism to make controlled exceptions to an existing privacy 
norm for specific purposes. However, consent does not itself ensure that all of the 
interests of the person giving consent are protected nor does it set aside the moral duty 
of care owed to that person by others who are given access to the information. On its 
own, consent is not always necessary, nor always sufficient for ethical extensions of 
data access.  
While individuals have privacy interests in the use of data, they also share group 
interests in the wider use of data for health research. The broader public interest may 
come into conflict with individual privacy but the relationship is usually complex. This 
complex relationship leads to a need to reconcile the articulation of the private within the 
public and the public within the private. A fundamental moral question facing data 
initiatives is therefore: ‘How may we define a set of morally reasonable expectations 
about how data will be used in a data initiative, giving proper attention to the morally 
relevant interests at stake?’ 
 
Introduction 
3.1 In this chapter we consider the morally relevant values and interests engaged by the 
use of data in biomedical research and health care. Our aim will be to understand 
what is at stake when claims are made about whether it is right or wrong to allow or to 
make particular disclosures of information. While data initiatives involving 
computerised data analysis have developed mainly in the late 20th and early 21st 
Century, many of the core moral questions they raise have been debated in some 
form for at least two-and-a-half millennia. We shall nevertheless try to formulate as 
clearly as possible the questions that must be addressed when ethical concerns are 
raised about current and future data initiatives.  
The value of privacy  
Proposition 9 
Privacy is fundamentally important to individuals (and groups) in the establishment and 
maintenance of their identity, their relationships and their sense of personal well-being.  
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T he public  and private s pheres  
3.2 Human beings, as the philosopher Aristotle observed, have the capacity to form 
political communities and do so almost everywhere they exist.146
3.3 The concept of privacy has a long and evolving history in Western social and political 
philosophy. In the fourth century BCE, Aristotle described the distinction between the 
spheres of private life – the life of the household – and public life – the free life of 
citizens in the polis, the Greek city state.
 The benefits of 
cooperative action are obvious: people working together can achieve what one 
person alone might never achieve. Nevertheless, just as human beings are born into, 
and drawn into, communities that advance their individual and common aims, they 
simultaneously value and preserve a sphere of ‘private’ thought and action.  
147 The private household was rigidly 
organised in order to supply the necessary conditions of life efficiently. In contrast, the 
public or political sphere was characterised not by necessity and toil but by freedom 
and discourse.148
3.4 The public/private distinction, as it would have been understood by the ancient 
Greeks, is transformed in modernity when labouring activities formerly constrained to 
the private realm of the household are transferred to the public sphere and organised 
through economic cooperation within societies. In the modern age, private life 
became increasingly important for the flourishing of individuality, for personal 
development and the cultivation of intimate relationships, both inside and outside the 
home.
  
149
3.5 The vigorous defence of a sphere of free individual action to which society had no 
claim was a central preoccupation of modern liberal philosophers such as John Stuart 
Mill. “The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society,” 
wrote Mill in On Liberty, “is that which concerns others. In the part which merely 
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”
  
150 This conception of a protected sphere 
was important, however, not only as a defence from society, but as a source of free 
moral action. According to Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction, freedom can be thought 
as having negative (‘freedom from’) and positive (‘freedom to’) aspects.151
 
146 Aristotle, Politics, book I, available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html. 
 The first is 
the protection of a sphere of action from interference by others; the second concerns 
147 Ibid. In the ancient Greek polis, privacy is connected with the body, with manual labour necessary for the maintenance of life 
and with reproductive labour necessary for the continuation of the species. 
148 The freedom of the polis meant an equal freedom for citizens, although this has little in common with our contemporary 
understanding of equality: it presupposed the existence of (an inevitable majority of) ‘unequals’ – women, children, servants 
and slaves, whose labour was subordinated to the freedom of the male head of the household. A more recent critique in the 
feminist tradition argues that the defence of privacy can provide cover for the abuse and degradation of women and others. 
For a critical survey of some feminist writing on privacy, see Gavison R (1992) Feminism and the public/private dimension 
Stanford Law Review 45(1): 1-45. 
149 The political theorist Hannah Arendt argued that modern society inverts the norms of behaviour characteristic of the ancient 
Greek political realm, so that public behaviour becomes highly regulated, with the home life becoming a private refuge of 
‘intimacy’. Arendt H (1958) The human condition, 2nd Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). See also Habermas J 
(1991 [1962]) The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press) for an extensive analysis of the concept of the public sphere. 
150 Mill JS (1859) On liberty, available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm, at page 18. This thought 
is embodied in Mill’s ‘harm principle’. 
151 See: Berlin, I (1969 [1958]) Two concepts of liberty, in Berlin I (1969) Four essays on liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), available at: http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/seminar/berlin.pdf.  
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the freedom expressed by being the ‘author’ of one’s actions, and an active agent in 
the formation of one’s social world.  
Informational privac y  
Proposition 10 
Control of certain information is generally viewed by individuals as an important aspect 
of maintaining their privacy; access to or disclosure of information contrary to their 
wishes can affect individuals’ well-being and infringe their rights. 
 
Proposition 11 
Not all personal information is private and some personal information is legitimately 
public. Privacy norms depend on the nature of the relationship between individuals or 
between individuals and institutions, including the state.  
 
3.6 Some philosophers argue that having the opportunity to be free from observation by 
others is essential to the formation and maintenance of individual identity and 
‘personhood’. A variety of arguments, all tending to this general conclusion, are 
offered in the literature. For example, privacy is claimed to be psychologically 
essential for personhood because the possibility of withdrawing from observation is 
necessary in order to assimilate and reflect on life experiences, and to identify one’s 
unique individuality.152 Privacy is said to be practically necessary because 
observation by others inevitably transforms the conditions in which the person 
chooses and acts, and, by placing external constraints on their moral choices, denies 
respect for them as a moral agent.153 Privacy is said to be necessary, furthermore, 
because it is through the ritual of respecting privacy that the social group recognises 
the entitlement of an individual to their own moral existence.154
3.7 Disclosure and withholding of information between people has an important function in 
establishing the structure of social relationships, as a means by which particular people 
are included or excluded. Family, group, community – even national – identities may be 
formed and confirmed by norms of information sharing. The fact that someone shares 
intimate information with one person and not with others, can function as a token of 
friendship, cement social bonds, promote trust, and encourage reciprocal sharing, all of 
which lay the foundation for future cooperation.
 Finally, privacy is 
necessary for intimacy, which is nurtured by a process through which people 
progressively share hidden aspects of themselves.  
155 The sharing of information has been 
said to establish ‘moral capital’ that is a currency for interpersonal relationships.156
 
152 See, for example, Van Manen M and Levering B (1996), Childhood’s secrets: intimacy, privacy, and the self reconsidered 
(New York: Teachers College Press), available at: https://archive.org/details/childhoodssecret00vanm.  
 
Breaching such norms (reading someone’s private diary without their permission, for 
153 Benn SI, Privacy, freedom, and respect for persons, in Schoeman FD (Editor) (1984) Philosophical dimensions of privacy: an 
anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp223-44. 
154 Reiman JH (1976) Privacy, intimacy, and personhood Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(1): 26-44. 
155 See: Fried C (1970) An anatomy of values: problems of personal and social choice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press).  
156 Fried C (1970) An anatomy of values: problems of personal and social choice (Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press). 
See also Gavison R (1992) Feminism and the public/private dimension Stanford Law Review 45(1): 1-45. 
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example, or ‘hacking’ into their telephone messages) both has the practical 
consequence of undermining trust and exhibits a moral attitude of lack of respect for 
them as a person. On the other hand, enforcing non-disclosure norms (such as ‘keep it 
in the family’ in cases of domestic abuse) can be equally morally unacceptable. We 
therefore have to ask whether the norms themselves are morally appropriate, as well 
as who has the authority and the power to modify or transgress them.157
3.8 Different norms of disclosure and withholding of information will apply to different kinds 
of relationship. A disclosure (e.g. infection with a stigmatising disease) that might be 
expected in one context (e.g. between close family members or clinical professionals) 
might be surprising in another (e.g. among work colleagues). A person may participate 
simultaneously in many different relationships, governed by different norms, for 
example, distinct personal, social and professional networks. The norms governing 
these relationships, along with the membership of the networks themselves, may 
change over time.
 
158 In the contemporary world, control of access to and disclosure of 
information has become increasingly significant in measure with the role played by 
information exchanges in the conduct of life. The presence of information technology – 
giving the capacity to store, replicate and communicate data indefinitely – has acted as 
an exponent to this. People may consider public buildings (swimming baths, for 
example) public places where anyone might observe or overhear them but they might 
consider the presence of CCTV or a ‘webcam’ an ‘invasion of privacy’.159
Confidentiality and consent 
 To answer 
the question whether such behaviours should be considered an ‘invasion’ of privacy, or 
whether disclosures of personal confidences are a ‘breach’ of privacy, we must define 
not only the nature of the expectations that have been frustrated, but what people are 
entitled to expect in these circumstances.  
Proposition 12 
Expectations of privacy relating to norms of access to and disclosure of information may 
be formalised and enforced, for example, through rules of confidentiality. These rules 
and expectations may be modified by individuals in specific cases, for example through 
explicit consent procedures.  
 
157 Ruth Gavison, for example, argues for the importance of a critique of the deployment of a public/private distinction rather 
than of the distinction itself. Gavison R (1992) Feminism and the public/private distinction Stanford Law Review 45(1): 1-45. 
158 Mark Taylor uses the term ‘norms of exclusivity’ to describe how the conditions of information access are deployed between 
different people in different social contexts: “Privacy is established by norms regulating access to individuals or groups of 
individuals: it represents a relevant state of separation defined and mediated by particular standards. In order to capture 
more fully the idea that relevant separation can only be assessed according to particular norms, I suggest that privacy 
concerns ‘norms of exclusivity’.” Taylor M (2012) Genetic data and the law: a critical perspective on privacy protection 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at page 25. See also Helen Nissenbaum, who posits ‘contextual integrity’ as a 
benchmark for privacy ‘to capture the nature of challenges posed by information technologies’: “Contexts, or spheres, offer a 
platform for a normative account of privacy in terms of contextual integrity. [...] contexts are partly constituted by norms, 
which determine and govern key aspects such as roles, expectations, behaviours, and limits. There are numerous possible 
sources of contextual norms, including history, culture, law, convention, etc. Among the norms present in most contexts are 
ones that govern information, and, most relevant to our discussion, information about the people involved in the contexts. I 
posit two types of informational norms: norms of appropriateness, and norms of flow or distribution. Contextual integrity is 
maintained when both types of norms are upheld, and it is violated when either of the norms is violated.” Nissenbaum H 
(2004) Privacy as contextual integrity Washington Law Review 79(1): 119-58, at page 119. 
159 See, for example, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2008) HC 58-I A surveillance society? (fifth report of 
session 2007–08), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/58/58i.pdf. See 
paragraph 4.6.  
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3.9 An important class of privacy norms is embodied in the principles and practice of 
confidentiality. Whereas privacy may be about access to a number of different things 
(such as access to one’s body, one’s home or one’s possessions) confidentiality is 
exclusively about information. However, confidentiality is not simply synonymous with 
informational privacy.  
Box 3.1: ‘Privacy’ and ‘confidentiality’  
The terms ‘privacy’ and ‘confidentiality’ are sometimes used imprecisely. They are often 
used in conjunction (as in ‘privacy and confidentiality issues’) which may contribute to an 
elision of the distinct concepts, and in casual discussion they are occasionally used 
interchangeably. It is therefore worthwhile clarifying how we understand their distinct 
meanings. 
■ Privacy concerns the interest people have in others’ access to themselves, their 
homes and property, or to information about them. What counts as ‘private’ can 
change depending on social norms, the specific context, and the relationship 
between the person concerned and those who might enjoy access. Informational 
privacy is maintained by selectively withholding or allowing access or through 
establishing limits on acceptable behaviour by others (e.g. proscribing voyeurism).  
■ Confidentiality concerns the assurance that information provided by a person (or by 
another body) will not be further disclosed without their permission (except in 
accordance with certain established laws, norms or expectations about when 
confidentiality obligations may be set aside). Duties of confidence are created by 
well-established expectations that attach to certain relationships (for example, 
between a doctor and a patient or between a lawyer and a client) or may be agreed 
between parties in a specific context (for example, parties to a commercial contract 
or contract of employment). They allow information to be made available for the 
purposes of that relationship (and perhaps also to others whose involvement is 
necessary to achieve those purposes), but for no other purpose. In short, 
confidentiality is one – but only one – of the tools used to achieve and maintain 
privacy.  
 
3.10 Moral duties of confidence exist among individuals (friends sharing a secret, for 
example) but some duties of confidence are made enforceable through contractual and 
legal instruments or through the reasonable expectations that patients, for example, 
have of their doctors. Medical confidentiality exists because information that doctors 
might need in order to diagnose or treat a patient might be information that is non-
obvious and of a type that the patient might not otherwise (other than for the purpose of 
obtaining diagnosis and treatment) want to disclose (including to the doctor concerned) 
or publish more widely. Similar considerations apply in the case of research. Medical 
confidentiality protects patients from harm in two ways: it both encourages them to 
disclose information essential to their treatment, so that they do not suffer the harm of 
untreated disease, and it provides assurance against any harm that may occur to them 
from a more general disclosure of the information. Over time, respecting confidence 
helps to foster trust.  
3.11 Privacy norms may be modified informally by individuals simply through their 
behaviour (in the way that they may impart private information to others), particularly 
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where they trust the individual to understand and observe the appropriate norms and 
not to disclose the imparted information any further. Privacy norms may also be 
modified through formal mechanisms, such as giving consent, particularly where a 
formal structure exists to provide assurance that those norms will be complied with, 
such as obtains in the case of medical treatment or legal advice.  
Box 3.2: Consent  
Consent sets aside norms and standards, such as the expectation of confidentiality, in 
specific ways for specific purposes.160
Valid consent is consent that is freely (autonomously) given: for it to count as valid it 
cannot be obtained by coercion or deception. Furthermore, the person consenting 
should be aware of the morally relevant implications of giving consent. This does not 
mean that the consenting person needs to be aware of every last detail and 
consequence of the use of the data (so-called ‘broad’ consent may count as valid 
consent) but they should be aware of those details about the proposed use and the 
reasonably foreseeable implications that are morally significant to them. There is clearly 
room for considerable debate about how much information and understanding is 
necessary for consent to be valid, when different forms of argument and encouragement 
may undermine freedom and when the limits of previously given consent (perhaps one 
given in very different circumstances) are reached.  
 Consent does not abolish the underlying norm but 
modifies its application by creating a specific exception. (We discuss the operation and 
limitations of consent procedures further in chapter 4.) 
 
3.12 It should be noted that, while observing the terms of consent respects the interests of 
the person giving it in a limited way, the fact that information is only disclosed in 
accordance with the terms of the consent does not in itself protect the person from any 
harm resulting from the use of the information. Thus, consent should not be thought of 
as shifting the liability for any privacy infringements from the user of data to the 
‘consenting’ person, and simply obtaining consent does not exhaust the moral ‘duty of 
care’ owed by the user of the data. This is consistent with the structure of consent, 
which implies permission to use the data but no obligation to do so, particularly where 
doing so would infringe the subject’s interests. The fact that someone’s consent must 
be sought is not, however, necessarily or straightforwardly empowering for the person 
giving it, particularly where the options available to them are highly constrained.161
3.13 Consent is neither always necessary (since not all norms would otherwise prohibit data 
access and disclosure) nor sufficient (since it does not set aside the moral duty of the 
user of data with respect to others) for ethical use of data. However, where there is a 
 
Consent is often, in fact, a rather blunt tool, allowing only a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
response. Genuine respect for the autonomy of individuals as ‘world forming’ is likely to 
be better realised through a richer involvement in the formation of norms and options 
than simply accepting or refusing options presented by others.  
 
160 The normative function of consent in creating a conditional waiver of pre-existing rights is discussed in Manson N and O'Neill 
O (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
161 This is the case, for example, where use of social networking software requires that the user accept the terms of an 
agreement that allows the provider to extract their use data and mine it for their own purposes or release it for others to use. 
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reasonable expectation that disclosure of information may infringe a well-grounded 
entitlement to privacy, consent may play an important role in enabling that disclosure.  
Community and solidarity 
3.14 Conventional forms of Western morality treat the person – usually a living human 
individual – as the fundamental unit of moral agency and value. Nevertheless, the 
assumption that privacy relates only – or primarily – to personal forms of identity is not 
universal, or not necessarily applicable to all forms of information. There may be 
different indices for privacy norms, some relating, for example, to the family group, tribe 
or community, even when the information in question pertains most obviously to a 
single individual among them. These norms may differ significantly between distinct 
cultures or contexts.162
3.15 In some recent bioethical writing on data access, a concept of solidarity has been 
promoted as a reaction to what many bioethicists see as the over-privileging of 
individual autonomy at the expense of wider public interest. The concept of solidarity 
describes social cohesion as a result of the homogeneity or interdependence of 
individuals making up a community.
  
163 The concept has been applied particularly in 
relation to genetic and genomic information (our ‘shared genetic heritage’), but also in 
relation to biobanks and biomedical research more generally.164 This concept of 
solidarity may be embodied and formalised in institutions.165
3.16 The arguments for solidarity as a moral basis for extending data access in relevant 
cases have, generally, been cautious rather than revolutionary. In the literature, 
solidarity tends to be proposed as a default social norm from which individuals retain 
the entitlement to withdraw, rather than as a moral obligation from which they may be 
released only exceptionally. While they change the emphasis, in ways that may bear 
on decisions about appropriate forms of governance (we discuss concrete examples in 
chapters 6 and 7), the arguments for solidarity rarely seek to overturn the primacy of 
individual autonomy. Implicitly, the shift in disposition comes about as the result of 
increased opportunities available to derive public benefit from personal data where the 
privacy risks to individuals are well managed, as well as the increasing practical 
difficulties of maintaining individual level controls in complex data flows.
  
166
 
162 For a specific case, see guidance on ethics in relation to the Canadian First Nations, Inuit and Metis communities: 
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-eptc2/chapter9-chapitre9/. 
 In practice it 
amounts to little more than a justification for ‘broad’ models of consent: for example, 
the replacement of specific individual consent for research uses of data (to the extent 
163 See the distinction between ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ solidarity in Durkheim É (1984 [1893]) The division of labour in society 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan), book I, chapter II and III. The concept is also important in ethics and political philosophy: for a 
discussion of the recent emergence of the concept in bioethics see Prainsack B and Buyx A (2011) Solidarity: reflections on 
an emerging concept in bioethics, available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/solidarity/. 
164 See the concept of ‘genetic solidarity’ in: Human Genetics Commission (2002) Inside information: balancing interests in the 
use of personal genetic data (London: HMSO), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061023110946/http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/insideinf
ormation_summary.pdf. In relation to biobanks, see, for example, Stjernschantz Forsberg J, Hansson MG and Eriksson S 
(2009) Changing perspectives in biobank research: from individual rights to concerns about public health regarding the return 
of results European Journal of Human Genetics 17(12): 1544-9; Buyx A and Prainsack B (2013) A solidarity-based approach 
to the governance of research biobanks Medical Law Review 21(1): 71-91. 
165 See the ‘third tier’ solidarity in Prainsack B and Buyx A (2011) Solidarity: reflections on an emerging concept in bioethics, 
available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/solidarity/. 
166 See Stjernschantz Forsberg J, Hansson MG and Eriksson S (2009) Changing perspectives in biobank research: from 
individual rights to concerns about public health regarding the return of results European Journal of Human Genetics 17(12): 
1544-9. 
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that they should be re-contacted to consent to novel uses) with general ‘participation 
agreements’.167
3.17 It is relevant to observe, moreover, that just as the (re)emergence of the concept of 
solidarity can be seen as a reaction to the constraints of autonomy and individualism, 
the assertion of autonomy in bioethics was itself partly a reaction to extreme derogation 
of human rights that took place in Europe in the middle of the 20th Century and 
continued in totalitarian regimes during the latter part of that century.
 
168 Partly, also, it 
was an expression of growing resistance to institutionalised paternalism in fields such 
as medicine.169
Public interest 
 Although these political conditions may have been largely extinguished 
in Europe, it is easy to conceive that the pendulum may swing back towards autonomy 
as a consequence of large-scale privacy intrusions by states, for example, though the 
activities of state organisations such as the US National Security Agency (see chapter 
2). 
3.18 The ‘public interest’ is not the opposite of private interests although it is sometimes 
contrasted with them. The ‘public interest’ can be thought of as securing objectives that 
are valued by society.170
T he objec ts  of the public  interes t 
 There are two questions that we must address when we 
consider the relationship between the public and private interests. The first question is 
about the content of the public interest (i.e. its objects) and how this relates to the aims 
and interests of individuals. This leads us to questions about legitimate procedures for 
making collective decisions. The second question is about the force that should be 
given to the public interest, most importantly where it is in tension with private interests. 
This takes us to juridical questions about when it is legitimate to limit or even override 
private interests in the name of the public interest. Clearly, these questions are 
interconnected: the nature of the objects of the public interest and the value assigned 
to them will relate to the force that public interest claims have.  
3.19 Identifying the proper objects of the public interest is not straightforward and political 
philosophers have argued about the merits of different approaches. A general 
distinction can be drawn between those that rely on abstract reasoning from premises 
(such as propositions about the moral nature of human beings) and those that employ 
empirical methods to discover actual preferences (such as, voting or deliberative 
decision making).  
 
167 Prainsack B and Buyx A (2013) A solidarity-based approach to the governance of research biobanks Medical Law Review 
21(1): 71-91. 
168 Chadwick R and Berg K (2001) Solidarity and equity: new ethical frameworks for genetic databases Nature Reviews 
Genetics 2(4): 318-21. 
169 See Katz J (1984) The silent world of doctor and patient (New York: Free Press). 
170 We use the terms ‘community’ and ‘society’ to indicate, respectively, associations in which there is a unity of values and a 
common will among the members, and associations in which their shared project represents a compromise for the sake of 
self interest. The distinction was made by sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (using the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, 
respectively, to denote these forms of association). Tönnies F (2001 [1887]) Community and civil society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), book I. A community founded on kinship ties is the example of the first, whereas a trading 
group is an example of the second. All social groups are, in reality, a mixture of the two so the terms are used to emphasise 
the nature of a given association rather than to describe it. Feintuck uses definition of public interest within the field of 
regulation: “[...] the concept of public interest as a justification for regulatory intervention into private activity, limiting the 
exercise of private power, in pursuit of objectives valued by the community.” Feintuck M (2004) ‘The public interest’ in 
regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), at page 6. 
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3.20 The ‘common good’ theories of medieval Christianity take up Aristotle’s understanding 
of the relation between particular goods and the good of all as being the good of 
human beings in view of their nature. In supposedly pious societies the object of the 
common good was implicitly common to all (or ought to be so, once people were 
enabled to understand the vanity of their temporal concerns and carnal appetites).171
3.21 As the exclusive pursuit of conflicting private interests is likely to be destructive (or, at 
least, sub-optimal), a way of limiting conflict and securing cooperation and the provision 
of public goods is desirable.
 
The identification of the public good as the set of goods that all people share is 
appealing, but it offers a much poorer prospect of guiding policy or action in diverse 
societies where there may be disagreements over priorities and where individuals have 
strongly developed and diverse private interests. In these circumstances the objectives 
common to all are likely to be rather abstract: things like ‘security’, ‘health’ and 
‘prosperity’.  
172 One way of doing this is to envisage the terms of an 
implicit contract that specifies what limitations to the free pursuit of their interests 
people ought to accept and, in return, what the legitimate role of the state will be in 
securing public goods. The idea of a ‘social contract’ of this kind was formulated by 
thinkers of the European Enlightenment (Locke, Hume, Rousseau) and had an 
influence on the founding fathers of the United States of America (Jefferson, 
Madison).173
3.22 An alternative approach that attempts to draw out the public interest by aggregating 
individual private preferences is offered by utilitarianism, as formulated in the 18th 
Century by, for example, Jeremy Bentham.
 
174
3.23 Any approach to determining where the public interest lies will have advantages and 
disadvantages. Any approach that derives rules of action from abstract principles must 
make assumptions about what it is people should value, notwithstanding what their 
actual subjective preferences may be. It will then have to account for how this can be 
consistent with respect for individuals as free moral agents. Aggregative approaches 
have the virtues of clarity and simplicity but, pursued mechanically, they can lead to 
perverse outcomes (for example, in a three voter system where two voters vote to kill 
the third and appropriate her property). There are many historical examples of 
 Utilitarianism assumes that if members 
of the community ‘vote’ to maximise their own happiness or ‘utility’ the aggregation of 
their interests will indicate the outcome that will maximise absolute utility. This both 
recognises and accepts that people may have different ideas about their preferred 
outcome but aims to find a resolution that they should all accept if they agree in 
advance that the voting procedure is a fair way of resolving them. 
 
171 Aquinas T, Summa contra gentiles, III.17.6, available at: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm. 
172 The concept of “public goods” is used loosely here to mean goods that are provided for public benefit: in economics, public 
goods are those that are non-rivalrous (my use of it does not deprive you of the opportunity to use it) or non-excludable (it 
cannot be made available to me without also making it available to you), or both. For those reasons public goods are 
typically provided by the state rather than by the market, since it is difficult to make commercial profit and public goods are 
vulnerable to ‘free riding’ (people consuming the goods without paying for them). Examples include policing and street 
lighting, and public health initiatives. 
173 The idea of the social contract predates the Enlightenment as it is usually described (i.e. beginning in the late 17th Century 
and lasting until the rise of romanticism in the late 18th). An important precursor was Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) 
written during the English Civil War. The social contract tradition endures in the US notably in the work of John Rawls. See 
Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). 
174 See Bentham J (1789) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, available at: 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/bentham1780.pdf. Classical utilitarianism identifies the public interest with the 
preponderance of interests within a political community, which is arrived at simply by aggregating the interests of individual 
members. The chief appeal of an approach of this kind is its procedural fairness: “everybody to count for one, nobody for 
more than one.” This dictum was attributed to Bentham by John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism (1861), available at: 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/mill1863.pdf, at page 44. 
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individual interests being disregarded in the name of the common good. For this 
reason, where utility calculations are used as the basis of public decision making (e.g. 
in the form of cost-benefit analysis), the outcomes are usually qualified by some 
distributive principle (to ensure fairness) or other limiting factor (such as rights to non-
interference) in order to prevent the interests of some being sacrificed for the good of 
others.  
3.24 The best approach may well lie in some combination of both principle (to foreclose 
intuitively unacceptable outcomes) and practical reasoning (to allow expression to a 
plurality of legitimate interests). The approaches discussed above are not the only ones 
available and we will return to this discussion when we tackle the question of finding 
ethically appropriate forms of governance for specific data initiatives in chapter 5. 
T he forc e of the public  interes t 
3.25 In relation to the data initiatives with which we are concerned, the public interest will be 
an important legal and regulatory concept. This is particularly so where these initiatives 
are public initiatives, carried out with the involvement of the public sector or with public 
funding, or are otherwise aimed at delivering public goods. The claim that the object of 
any data initiative is an important public good may offer a justification for modifying the 
usual privacy norms (as, for example, some contagious disease reporting has been 
made mandatory to avert epidemics). However, it is not only the state that can appeal 
to public interest as a justification for normative action. Private actors may appeal to 
public interest as a justification for interfering with others’ privacy, as when newspapers 
publish ‘private’ information about public figures. Individuals may claim a breach of 
confidentiality norms is justified by the public interest, for example when 
‘whistleblowers’ make public interest disclosures. 
3.26 Whereas public interest plays an important regulatory function in keeping private 
interests in check, or may justify overriding them in certain circumstances, there is a 
concern that it might be used to justify unacceptable levels of paternalism or state 
intrusion into private affairs. A significant bulwark against the intrusion of the state into 
the lives of its citizens, and of individuals into each others’, is provided by human rights 
instruments.175
 
175 “The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) makes important contributions to how the UK should conceptualise the 
notion of privacy and concomitantly protect against prospective violations of individuals’ Article 8 rights, outwith the more 
narrow confines of the Data Protection Act 1998.” Laurie G, Jones K, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence 
relating to harm resulting from uses of health and biomedical data, at page 11 available at: 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
 (We will discuss human rights law in the next chapter.) Human rights 
law guarantees the protection of private life against interference except where this is 
necessary for an overriding public interest. A key concept in determining when a 
particular interference is justifiable, developed in the jurisprudence, is that of 
‘proportionality’. In other words, the interference, which must be necessary in order to 
achieve a legitimate aim, must be proportionate (sufficient but not excessive) to the 
achievement of that aim. Furthermore, it must be knowable, in a way that informs 
individuals’ expectations and allows them to modify their actions accordingly. Thus, 
uses of data that might, at face value, interfere with privacy interests can be justified so 
long as these conditions are met. However, for the time being we are not concerned 
with situations in which rights come into conflict, but with interests and preferences, 
and the production of moral norms.  
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The mutual implication of public and private interests 
3.27 Individuals are embedded in communities in complex ways: each has a private interest 
in protecting their privacy but also in contributing to the public good because, as a 
member of the public, they and those they care about benefit from the good that they 
bring about through cooperation with others in society. Likewise each knows that there 
is a public interest in respecting their privacy because the good of the community 
depends on their willingness to enter into voluntary cooperation with others under 
conditions in which they must share private information with confidence.  
3.28 Consequently, our problem is not finding a ‘balance’ between privacy and public 
interest for a data initiative, but resolving a double articulation, between the private 
interest in protecting privacy and promoting the public good, and the public interest in 
protecting privacy and promoting the public good.176
Proposition 13 
 We all have interests on both 
sides, private and public, as individuals, members of families, groups, communities and 
nations. Navigating among these different relationships with other individuals, 
professionals and institutions requires a subtle negotiation of many different norms of 
information access and disclosure, of when and how they may be modified and where 
hard and fast limits should be drawn.  
A fundamental question to be addressed in relation to the ethical design and conduct of 
data initiatives is:  
How may we define a set of morally reasonable expectations about how data will 
be used in a data initiative, giving proper attention to the morally relevant 
interests at stake? 
 
3.29 The question proposed above (proposition 13) is the one that we will be mainly 
concerned with answering, along with examining how data initiatives have addressed it, 
explicitly or implicitly. Formulating the question in this way recognises that people’s 
interests may be mutually limiting or mutually reinforcing. What it is morally 
‘reasonable’ to expect depends upon an assessment of the moral claims of those 
interests. When we consider whose interests are relevant it is important to remember 
that these include the expectations not only of those to whom data relate, but of those 
making use of the data, and those who have an interest in the aims or outcomes of a 
data initiative. It is also important to acknowledge that those whose privacy interests 
are engaged may also have interests in securing the individual and public benefits of 
data use. Three sorts of consideration will be relevant in formulating an answer to this 
question: 
■ the identification of the norms of privacy and disclosure that are applicable in relation 
to a specific data initiative. (Some, but not all of these, may be encoded in laws and 
professional rules of conduct.)  
■ how respect is shown to persons, especially where their individual preferences do not 
coincide with these norms. (This may often be for good reason, e.g. because their 
 
176 In X v. Y [1988] 2 All E.R. 648, for example, the law was understood as requiring a balance of two public interests (in 
maintaining confidentiality and in disclosing information of public interest). 
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contextual vulnerabilities, or even arbitrary preferences, may deserve to be 
respected.)  
■ the form of governance (for example, the regulation of professional conduct) that will 
give acceptable assurance that the expectations will be met.  
Conclusion 
3.30 In this chapter, we have examined the kinds of interests that are at stake in data 
initiatives and why these are morally relevant, and arrived at the formulation of a key 
moral question that faces data initiatives. Different approaches to resolving complex 
sets of interests may have advantages and disadvantages but it is likely that an 
appropriate approach will involve a mixture of ethical principles and empirical methods. 
This will be the subject of chapter 5. First, however, we will consider the problems with 
which conventional governance approaches are faced as a result of the developments 
in data science, information technology and data policy that we discussed in the 
previous two chapters. 
 
 
 

 Chapter 4 
Law, governance and 
security 
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Chapter 4 – Law, governance and security 
Chapter overview 
This chapter discusses the effectiveness of legal, technical and administrative measures 
to protect privacy in the face of advances in information technology and data science. 
Privacy is protected by a number of overlapping legal measures, principally: formal 
privacy rights, which guarantee freedom from interference; rules of data protection, 
which control the ‘processing’ of various kinds of ‘personal data’; and duties of 
confidentiality, which bind people in certain professional relationships.  
A number of technical measures are used to prevent the identification of individual 
subjects, including aggregation, anonymisation or pseudonymisation of data. While de-
identification measures may help to protect privacy they may not make re-identification 
impossible. The risk of re-identification is both difficult to quantify and may become 
greater over time. De-identification should therefore be combined with further controls on 
the access to and uses of data. 
A standard control is to limit access to data in accordance with consent. Broad consent 
allows subjects to set certain parameters for the use of the data but it may be hard to 
foresee the relevance of certain implications and the scope of consent given when data 
are collected may become unclear in changing circumstances, especially over long time 
periods. Continuing involvement of subjects through ‘dynamic’ forms of consent can 
address this but is potentially demanding.  
Neither anonymisation nor compliance with consent offer sufficient protection from 
potentially harmful consequences of data use. Additional controls on the use of data – 
on who is permitted access, for what purposes, and how they must conduct themselves 
– are required. These have both administrative and technical aspects.  
Data initiatives are increasingly caught in a double bind by the obligation to generate, 
use and extend access to data while, at the same time, being obliged to protect privacy 
as a moral obligation and a requirement of human rights law. 
 
Introduction 
4.1 The legal framework applicable to data use in biomedical research and health care 
recognises, broadly, two sorts of measures that may be applied to protect the interests 
of citizens against potentially injurious misuse of data. First, it recognises operations 
that alter the data in order to de-identify them so that their use no longer poses a direct 
risk to data subjects through them being identified. Second, it recognises controls on 
access to data so that the data are only made available to authorised users, in 
circumstances in which they are expected not to be misused or to otherwise result in 
harm to data subjects. These measures are often used in combination. The law permits 
and prohibits data processing according to the kinds of additional measures taken. In 
this chapter we will consider the kinds of measures in use and their principal 
shortcomings in the face of advances in information technologies and data science, 
and the changing data environment. We will also consider the way in which 
conventional measures have been modified to address these difficulties. 
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Legal framework for use of biological and health data 
Proposition 14 
How data are managed, used and re-used is as morally relevant as how they are 
classified or how they were obtained.  
 
4.2 Many of the data used in biomedical research and health care come from people. At 
the point at which they are collected from a person they are personal data, data that 
are related to that individual. 177
A legal right to privac y 
 The processing of data that relate to living individuals is 
governed by rules set out in data protection law. Some personal data may also be 
private, data to which the individual does not wish others to have access. Access to 
and disclosure of private data is governed by privacy norms that refer to relationships 
between those individuals (or groups) and others. Some disclosures of data may 
potentially cause harm to individuals. To disclose data without proper respect for the 
individuals concerned may infringe their rights. The overlapping legal frameworks 
governing the use of data are engaged variously by whether or not data are personal 
data (data protection), by the transgression of established norms (confidentiality) or the 
infringement of privacy rights. We discuss these frameworks in outline below; 
information governance measures for specific health and research systems are 
described in chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
4.3 Given the moral significance of privacy and the consequences of violating privacy 
norms, some of these norms and the means of protecting them have been set down 
in law. The legal traditions both in the US and Europe, though very different in many 
respects, have nevertheless evolved protections for privacy by way of concerns for 
individual liberty and human dignity.178
4.4 The legal right to privacy arose initially as a defence of property in the early modern 
age.
  
179 The utilitarian philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, 
subsequently developed the defence of a sphere of self regulation and private action 
against interference by others, and especially by public authorities (see chapter 3). 
The development of distinct informational privacy rights came about in the context of 
developments in mass communication technologies in the late 19th Century (such as 
mass-circulation newspapers, photography and telegraphy). Reflecting on the injury 
to individuals that resulted from uncontrolled dissemination of information about them, 
the US jurists Warren and Brandeis influentially sought to frame a new right to privacy 
as a ‘right to be let alone’.180
 
177 ‘Personal data’ is a technical (and contested) concept in data protection. See paragraph 4.8. 
 This right was distinct from the right to property (since 
178 See Whitman JQ (2004) The two Western cultures of privacy: dignity versus liberty (Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship 
Series, paper 649, available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=fss_papers. 
179 Locke’s Second treatise of government (1690) suggests that the primary purpose of government is to protect property rather 
than to pursue common ends.  
180 Warren SD and Brandeis LD (1890) The right to privacy Harvard Law Review 4(5): 193-220, available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1321160?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. They note that a right such as they propose “has 
already found expression in the law of France” (the Loi Relative à la Presse, 11 Mai 1868). Warren and Brandeis consider 
the desirability of criminal protection but their proposal is for a civil tort, pending further legislation. The law on privacy has 
been developed by the US courts since it was first formulated. 
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their concerns went beyond the theft of intellectual property), and was not based on 
any implied contract or trust (since privacy rights are not exercisable against a 
specific individual but are ‘rights against the world’181). Instead it was based on “the 
more general right to the immunity of the person – the right to one's personality”, 
although it was recognised that this right must be limited by public interest.182
4.5 In the 20th Century a European right to respect for private life was provided by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) and a number of other high-level legal and regulatory 
instruments.
  
183 The citizen’s ‘right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence’, guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, is not absolute but is 
qualified to permit interference with the right when it is necessary for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others and a number of other specific public interest 
purposes. Where privacy rights are engaged, determining whether they are violated 
requires balancing the claims of the victim against the justification offered for the 
infringement and assessing whether the infringement is necessary and proportionate 
to the achievement of those aims according to supposed norms. The idea that 
informational privacy is connected to the right to one’s personality has been 
developed in more recent jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights 
that takes up aspects of the ‘right to privacy and family life’, guaranteed by the 
ECHR.184
4.6 A related idea, which acknowledges the indelibility, indefinite reproducibility and ease 
of recall of digital information, is the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’, that is, to have 
personal information – including public information – expunged from records. The 
recent decision of the European Court of Justice in the González case established a 
right to have information provided by Internet search companies removed if it 
infringed individual privacy.
  
185 This is significant in that it implicitly acknowledges the 
impact on privacy of features of information technologies that are not relevantly new 
in kind but extraordinarily greater in power (the significance does not lie in the 
difference between the informational value, the persistence or truth value of electronic 
records compared to, for example, paper records, but their power to impinge on 
personality).186
 
181 Warren and Brandies note that “since the latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to take pictures 
surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required protection, and the law of tort 
must be resorted to.” (ibid., at page 211). 
  
182 Ibid., at page 207. There must be a “line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of 
the public welfare or of private justice”; more general guidance is suggested to stem from jurisprudence relating to libel and 
slander, as well as intellectual property. (ibid., at page 214). 
183 ECHR Article 8 (available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf). The Convention is transposed into 
UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42). Similar rights are included 
in related instruments (such as other Council of Europe Conventions and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf) and UN Declarations. 
184 It is even more strongly embodied in the concept of Persönlichkeitsrecht developed in the German courts; see Consultation 
response by Atina Krajewska and Ruth Chadwick, available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-
data/evidence-gathering/.  
185 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Case 
C‑131/12). The court found that search engines must consider requests for delisting of results that ‘appear to be inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed’ 
(para.93), subject to exceptions relating to public figures and to balancing the data subject's fundamental rights with the 
rights of others to information. Google subsequently established a procedure through which people might apply to have their 
names removed from Google’s index and received a large number of applications. 
186 See paragraph 3.8. 
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Data protec tion law 
4.7 Data protection law does not concern privacy as such, but rather the ‘processing’ of 
‘personal data’. Personal data are, broadly, data that relate to a living individual who 
can be identified from those data or from a combination of those and other available 
data. 187 An early impetus for data protection legislation was the fear that governments 
would increasingly develop centralised computer ‘data banks’ containing information 
about their citizens.188 But, as the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission 
concluded in 1977: “The real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties 
through the automation, integration, and interconnection of many small, separate 
record-keeping systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous, even benevolent, 
and wholly justifiable.”189
4.8 In the UK and in Europe data protection has been successively framed by a set of 
relatively stable principles.
 
190 The central tenet of data protection law is that personal 
data should be processed fairly and lawfully. The requirement for fairness places stress 
on the fact that the person processing the data (the ‘data controller’) has made 
reasonable efforts to ensure that those to whom the data relate (‘data subjects’) are 
aware of who is processing the data and for what purposes.191 The legislation 
furthermore treats certain categories of data, including health data as being, for the 
most part, sensitive personal data.192
 
187 The concept of ‘personal data’ is frequently contested, particularly in relation to the extent of other information that may 
reasonably be expected to be available to be combined with the information in question in order to identify the subject, i.e. 
the context of processing (or possible processing) is important. Not all personal data are collected from a subject: some may 
be generated from non-personal data. Furthermore, some personal data may relate to more than one individual – data about 
members of the same family, for example. 
 Consequently, more exacting requirements apply 
to the processing of these data. The requirement for fairness links the acceptability of 
different types of processing to the understanding and expectations of the people to 
whom the data relate. A number of legal grounds for processing data are given 
(broadly, where the processing is necessary for a number of prescribed purposes or 
where the processing is carried out with the consent of the data subject or in their own 
vital interests). Furthermore, the laws of most countries acknowledge that there are 
circumstances in which the objections of data subjects may justly be disregarded or 
overridden, for reasons ranging from the protection of minors to the notification of 
serious infectious diseases. In Europe, exceptions must be made by means of law that 
is sufficiently clear for its consequences to be foreseeable.  
188 See, for example, the Younger Committee (1972) Report of the committee on privacy, Cmnd. 5012 (London: HMSO). 
189 U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission (1977) Personal privacy in an information society, available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/49602NCJRS.pdf, at page 533. 
190 The UK’s Younger Report (op.cit.) had 10 principles; the OECD (1980) Guidelines on the protection of privacy and 
transborder flows of personal data honed eight (available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm), 
which found their way into successive domestic Data Protection Acts (1984, 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/35/pdfs/ukpga_19840035_en.pdf) and 1998 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29; Schedule 1 Part 1) and the EU data protection Directive 95/46/EC (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML). 
191 See Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule1, Part 2. 
192 See Data Protection Act 1998, s.2. Although the legislation specifies ‘sensitive personal data’ as personal data that fall into a 
number of pre-defined categories there is some support for a construction that makes the context of processing relevant to 
whether data is ‘sensitive’ as well as whether it is ‘personal’: see Common Services Agency v. Scottish Information 
Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47 per Lord Hope, at 40 (available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080709/comm-1.htm). Whether or not it is the case in law, 
from a commonsense perspective, not only whether data is ‘identifying’ but also whether it is about ‘health’, can depend on 
the context in which it is placed, as we argued above. 
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4.9 The multinational nature of contemporary commercial organisations, health systems 
and biomedical science mean that data will often be expected to travel across 
jurisdictional boundaries and their associated protective measures.193 At the time of 
writing a draft General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is making progress through 
the European lawmaking procedure.194 The intention of the GDPR is both to update EU 
law to account for advances in information technology and to harmonise its 
implementation across the Union. Unlike the existing Directive, which must be 
transposed into national law, allowing account to be taken of national legal traditions, a 
Regulation becomes directly applicable law in each Member State. The final form of the 
Regulation is currently unclear, although its principal mechanisms are likely to be 
similar to those of the existing Directive. It may, nevertheless, have significant impact 
on the extension of access to health data, depending on the provisions adopted with 
regard to consent.195
C ommon law  
 
4.10 Confidentiality is an important way of codifying expectations about how data will be 
handled. These expectations may be created by professional relationships (such as 
that between a doctor and a patient) or through explicit undertakings or contracts. 
Where they are not made explicit in this way, the legitimacy of expectations about the 
use of data relies not only on a subjective element (the individual’s own expectations) 
but also a social element (whether society is prepared to recognise that expectation as 
reasonable).196 Case law establishing a tort (civil offence) of the misuse of ‘private 
information’ has been developing in England and Wales, for which the threshold test is 
whether the person publishing information knows or ought to know that there is a 
reasonable expectation that the information in question will be kept confidential.197
4.11 The common law in England and Wales, and developing case law in Scotland, 
provides a duty of medical confidentiality (essentially a ground to sue for any breach 
of confidentiality). This is further codified in professional guidance, as well as through 
contractual agreements, that allow the conditional disclosure of information for 
specific purposes and provide assurance that it will not be disclosed further than 
necessary for that purpose or used for other purposes (especially those that might 
cause detriment to the patient).  
 
What is reasonable will depend on the context and the moral interests at stake.  
4.12 The duty of confidentiality cannot be absolute: a strong justification, particularly one 
that involves the protection of others, can license a breach of confidence. There is a 
body of case law that addresses the balance of competing interests for lawful breach of 
 
193 The EU Data Protection Proposals restrict transfers of personal data outside the European Economic Area (EEA), except 
with explicit consent, though only addresses data held in the EU. The Regulation will be extra-territorial when data is held on 
EU citizens overseas (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/data-collection/data-transfer/index_en.htm). This mirrors the 
reach of the US Patriot Act, which can require any US company to provide personal data held by them (whether as controller 
or processor) to the National Security Agency. 
194 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/review/index_en.htm. 
195 In the version adopted by the European Parliament, for example, specific consent would be required for the use of data 
(including pseudonymised data) in research. Research organisations have claimed that this will have a serious negative 
impact on the conduct of research that is currently lawful (see footnote 124).  
196 The concept of ‘legitimate expectation’ is one that has arisen in administrative law in England and Wales; the test of 
reasonable expectation of privacy was applied in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 (available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040506/campbe-1.htm); a similar ‘concept of reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ has been developed by the US Supreme Court (see: Smith v. Maryland [1979] 442 U.S. 735, 740, 
available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/442/735/case.html). 
197 See Campbell v. MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 per Hale L.J at 134. This was confirmed recently in Vidal Hall and Ors v 
Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) in which ‘personal’ and ‘private’ information are considered separate ‘types’ of information.  
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confidentiality.198 Furthermore, there are recognised situations, provided for in legal 
instruments along with additional controls, in which confidentiality may (and in some 
cases, must) be set aside. (For example, in England and Wales, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that a judge may order that the police may have 
access to medical records for the purpose of a criminal investigation).199 Perhaps most 
relevantly, section 251 of NHS Act 2006 (formerly section 60 of Health & Social Care 
Act 2001) creates a power, exercised under Regulations, to set aside the common law 
duty of confidentiality in certain circumstances, permitting the processing of confidential 
patient information for medical purposes, without the consent of the data subject, in 
specified circumstances and subject to various controls.200
Security of data 
 
Operations  des igned to prevent the identific ation of data s ubjects  
Aggregation 
4.13 A great deal of useful research, particularly in the area of public health, can be carried 
out using aggregated data. Indeed this has been the major underpinning of much 
epidemiological and aetiological research that has led the better understanding of 
health and disease. This use is analogous to the way that data produced by the UK 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) supports development of government policy and 
secondary academic research. Of course, the data have to be collected in the first 
place, so will be personal data prior to their aggregation but, once aggregated, the 
privacy interests of research participants are usually thought to be protected. 
4.14 Nevertheless, it is sometimes possible to pick data relating to individuals out of 
aggregate data. As a simple example, professorial salaries at most universities are 
confidential but aggregate data may be available. If a department has only one female 
professor, and publishes the average salary for all professors, then it cannot publish 
the average salary for all male professors, since that would allow the female 
professor’s salary to be worked out with ease. A statistic that leaks individual data is 
 
198 See W v. Edgell [1990] 1 All ER 835 (in which a psychiatrist sent a confidential expert opinion on the fitness of a criminal to 
be moved from a secure hospital to the medical director of the hospital and to the Home Office in the public interest); X v. Y 
[1988] 2 All ER 648 (in which a Health Authority successfully sought to prevent publication by a newspaper of the names of 
doctors receiving treatment for AIDS). 
199 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60, s.9. Other statues mandate the submission of otherwise confidential 
information to a public authority, such as the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22, s.11) and Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 Reg.6 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1988/1546/made) (provides that a doctor must notify the relevant local authority officer if 
they suspect that a patient has a ‘notifiable disease’), the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37, s.31) (creates a statutory register of gamete donors and fertility treatments), 
the Abortion Regulations 1991 Reg.4 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1991/499/contents/made) (mandatory notification of 
abortion procedures), the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/1-2/20) 
(mandatory procedures for informing a relevant authority about births and deaths), and the Children Act 2004 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/31, s.12) (duties on authorities to co-operate in order to safeguard or promote the 
welfare of children). 
200 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/41/section/251. The relevant regulations are the Health Service (Control of 
Patient Information) Regulations 2002 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1438/made). This power is only applicable in 
England & Wales – Scotland’s legislators were not moved to provide a similar mechanism. Following the passage of the 
Care Act 2014 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents/enacted), the procedure depends formally on advice 
from the Confidentiality Advisory Group, an independent committee hosted by the Health Research Authority that advises the 
HRA/Secretary of State for Health on the merits of data access applications (see: 
http://www.hra.nhs.uk/resources/confidentiality-advisory-group/). In all cases the Data Protection Act will apply, especially the 
7th Principle. See also: Health Research Authority (2012) Principles of advice: exploring the concepts of ‘public interest’ and 
‘reasonably practicable’, available at: http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2014/12/v-2_principles_of_advice_april_2013.pdf. 
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
66   
called a ‘tracker’. Trackers have been studied for over 30 years and are increasingly 
relevant to medicine. In 2008 and 2009 the Public Library of Science (PLoS) Genetics 
published a series of papers demonstrating how an individual subject could be 
identified in aggregate genomic data.201 While this does not in itself imply that the 
individuals identified could be traced from that data alone or identified in another 
context, the individual-level data extracted could potentially be linked with other 
datasets leading to positive re-identification (see below), thereby making it potentially 
personal data.202
Anonymisation 
 For this reason we have to consider anonymisation and 
pseudonymisation more carefully. 
4.15 Anonymisation – literally the removal of the name – used to be done by simply blanking 
out a person’s name and address from a paper record. This gives some privacy from 
casual inspection but dates of birth, postcodes and other distinctive elements of linked 
information can be used to re-identify individuals with relative ease. For practical 
identification, phenotype data, photographs (which are common in some medical 
databases) and even behavioural data (an individual’s ‘mobility pattern’ for example) 
can effectively identify individuals.203
4.16 Research is often carried out on anonymised data, such as Genome-Wide Association 
Studies (GWAS), in which researchers have genome data from two populations, one 
with a trait of interest and the other without, which they compare in order to identify 
variations correlated with the trait. The holding of genomic datasets often raises 
concerns because they constitute “a biometric that can be used to track and identify 
individuals and their relatives.”
 In a birth cohort study where the week of a child’s 
birth is already known, a little further information, such as sex, birth weight, mode of 
delivery, etc. is probably sufficient to pick out an individual in the dataset. To achieve 
‘anonymity’ increasing amounts of associated data must be stripped away to give 
confidence that re-identification is no longer possible.  
204
 
201 The first of these was Homer N, Szelinger S, Redman M, et al. (2008) Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts of 
DNA to highly complex mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping microarrays PLoS Genetics 4(8): e1000167, available 
at: http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pgen.1000167#pgen-1000167-g003. Similar 
articles followed and these prompted the NIH to amend their anonymisation policy at the time 
(http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/10/28/back-to-the-future-nih-to-revisit-its-genomic-data-sharing-policies/; 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/322/5898/44.1.long#ref-2). Schadt, Woo and Hao (2012) support the assumption that 
some people can be identified in most individual level biomedical and health record data sets, see: Schadt EE, Woo S and 
Hao K (2012) Bayesian method to predict individual SNP genotypes from gene expression data Nature Genetics 44(5): 603-
8. 
 While the identification of blood relatives may not be 
feasible with other biomarkers, such as the proteome and microbiome, they may be 
equally informative in other ways and both offer, in effect, as precise a personal 
202 See Ehrlich Y and Narayanan A (2014) Routes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy Nature Reviews Genetics 15(6): 
409-21, available at: http://www.nature.com/nrg/journal/v15/n6/full/nrg3723.html.  
203 de Montjoye Y-A, Hidalgo CA, Verleysen M, and Blondel VD (2013) Unique in the crowd: the privacy bounds of human 
mobility Scientific Reports 3: 1376, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/full/srep01376.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+mediaredef+%28jason+hirschhorn%27s+Media+ReDEFined%29. Whether or not data can be 
‘intrinsically identifying’ is a conceptual problem that turns on the propositional/recognitional meaning of ‘identifying’. It is 
possible to argue that no data set is identifying (without a specific context) or, alternatively, that every datum is identifying in 
some context. 
204 Consultation response by GeneWatch UK, available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-
gathering/. See Heeney C, Hawkins N, De Vries J, Boddington P and Kaye (2010) Assessing the privacy risks of data 
sharing in genomics Public Health Genomics 14(1): 17-25, available at: http://www.karger.com/Article/Abstract/294150: 
"once genomic data is publicly released, it is virtually impossible to retrieve it or to make it private again, or even to know who 
has the information or to what use it is being put." (at page 22).  
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‘fingerprint’ as the genome itself.205
Box 4.1: Re-identification: some examples 
 The most important difference is not only that we 
can sequence the genome efficiently but that we also have large and growing 
databases (such as those held by most national police forces, and those of firms like 
23andMe) to link genomic data to identifiable people. For anonymisation to fail unique 
data is insufficient; it must also be capable of being linked to a living person (see Box 
4.3 below).  
Case A: During the height of the Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)/‘Mad Cow 
disease’ scare, a doctor interviewed on television mentioned that he had seen a teenage 
vegetarian girl who had contracted new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). The 
media succeeded in identifying the girl within a few days, and the doctor was 
subsequently brought before the GMC Disciplinary Committee for breach of confidence. 
He was cautioned by the Committee, despite having attempted (unsuccessfully) to hide 
her identity by speaking in generalities. 
Case B: An ‘anonymous’ sperm donor in the USA was identified and traced by a 15-
year-old who had been born through the use of his donation. By using a genetic 
ancestry test and a commercial database a surname was suggested for men who 
shared his Y chromosome characteristics. That could then be used to narrow the search 
around information that his mother had been given at the time of treatment which, finally, 
led to the identification of the donor.206
Case C: Group Insurance Commission (GIC), a purchaser of health insurance for 
employees, released records of state employees to researchers, having removed 
names, addresses, social security numbers, and other identifying information, in order to 
protect the privacy of these employees. As a demonstration, Latanya Sweeney 
purchased voter rolls, which included name, zip code, address, sex, and birth date of 
voters in Cambridge MA (USA) and, by combining the voter roll information with GIC’s 
data, was able to identify data relating to the Massachusetts governor who had assured 
residents of their privacy. (From GIC’s databases, only six people in Cambridge were 
born on the same day as the governor, half of them were men, and the governor was the 
only one who lived in the zip code provided by the voter rolls.) The information in the 
GIC database on the Massachusetts governor included medical diagnoses and 
prescriptions.
 
207
Case D: Researchers found the individuals to whom 50 ‘anonymous’ DNA sequences 
belonged that were posted online for the purposes of scientific research by querying 
other public databases. The researchers were not only able to assign names to the DNA 
sequences but could also begin to identify family traits.
 
208
 
 
 
205 Hawkins AK and O'Doherty KC (2011) “Who owns your poop?”: insights regarding the intersection of human microbiome 
research and the ELSI aspects of biobanking and related studies BMC Medical Genomics 4: 72, available at: 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1755-8794/4/72/. 
206 See: http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_12558.asp. 
207 Sweeney L (2002) k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and 
Knowledge-based Systems 10(5): 557-70, available at: https://epic.org/privacy/reidentification/Sweeney_Article.pdf. 
208 Gymrek M, McGuire AL, Golan D, Halperin E, and Erlich Y (2013) Identifying personal genomes by surname inference 
Science 339(6117): 321-4, available at: http://data2discovery.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Gymrek-et-al.-2013-
Genome-Hacking-Science-2013-Gymrek-321-4.pdf. 
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Pseudonymisation 
4.17 In some cases, it may be desirable for the process of de-identification to be reversible, 
for example, to feed back information to an individual within a cohort who is discovered 
to be at particular risk, or to validate an analytical procedure, or to enable further data 
about individuals to be added over time.209 This is possible where, rather than being 
removed, identifiers are replaced with a unique code. A simple approach that was 
recommended by the first Caldicott report was the use of the NHS number in place of a 
patient’s name.210 In the context of communications within health services this was an 
improvement on using names, as the data were at least not obviously identifiable, and 
so reduce the risk of accidental disclosure, although in this case a very large number of 
people have access to the key meaning that re-identification would be easy for 
insiders. This could be improved by removing overtly identifying information on a 
medical record, such as name, address, postcode, hospital number and NHS number, 
and replacing it with an encrypted NHS number, encrypted using a key held by a 
Caldicott guardian.211
4.18 Using more complex pseudonymisation mechanisms at the scale of a health service is 
not straightforward. Pseudonymisation at source can work well in some instances, such 
as adverse drug reaction reporting, where records from different sites do not need to 
be linked. If it is done centrally, the question arises of whether the local health care 
providers (and the patients) trust the centre to do it properly. It is possible to use a 
‘trusted third party’; for example, the Icelandic health service had a system whereby 
care records were sent from GPs and hospitals to the data protection authorities, who 
removed patient identifiers, replaced them with an encrypted version of the patient’s 
social security number and sent the record on to the secondary uses database. 
However, even that system was vulnerable to data insertion attacks; by adding a new 
record to a patient’s file and then looking at the secondary database, an insider could 
still identify patients there.  
 Pseudonymisation mechanisms are often much cruder than this, 
however. 
4.19 It is usual with either anonymisation or pseudonymisation to redact or obfuscate other 
fields as well as removing direct identifiers, e.g. limiting to postal area and to age (or 
age group) rather than full postcode and date of birth. Furthermore, data are routinely 
encrypted to protect communications between web browsers and web servers, and 
encryption offers an additional layer of security for data held in cloud storage to support 
collaborative research.212
 
209 Deryck Beyleveld, for example, argues that, given a wide concept of privacy (and other rights that can apply), true 
anonymisation can violate privacy rather than protecting it. For example, the right to privacy arguably includes a right to know 
the personal implications for oneself of research but this is rendered impossible by anonymisation; individuals arguably have 
a privacy right (under suitable conditions) for medical research to be conducted. Beyleveld D (2011) Privacy, confidentiality 
and data protection, in The SAGE handbook of healthcare ethics, Chadwick R, Ten Have H, and Meslin EM (Editors) 
(London: SAGE), pp95-105. 
 Data values may also be randomly perturbed to maintain 
210 Department of Health, The Caldicott Committee (1997) Report on the review of patient-identifiable information 
(recommendation 8), available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/P
ublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4068403. It is worth noting that this approach is not as strong when used with the 
Scottish CHI number which includes embedded information about gender and date of birth. 
211 See paragraph 2.43. 
212 These approaches allow statistical analysis to be carried out on encrypted data without direct access by researchers, who 
only see the results. Such approaches have been used, for example, to study data from individuals affected by stigmatising 
conditions such as antimicrobial resistant organisms and HIV. See El Emam K, Arbuckle L, Essex A, et al. (2014) Secure 
surveillance of antimicrobial resistant organism colonization or infection in Ontario long term care homes PLoS ONE 9(4): 
e93285, available at: http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0093285. 
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statistical validity but reduce the risk of re-identification.213 Such techniques were used 
in the system that was the subject of the Source Informatics case, which started to 
establish UK case law on anonymisation.214
4.20 There are many other techniques that can be used in statistical disclosure control. For 
example, one may answer each query based on only a sample of the population data, 
so that slightly different queries are answered on the basis of quite different sets of 
data, and tracker attacks therefore become difficult.
 
215
Weaknesses of de-identification  
 However, no technique is 
without vulnerabilities.  
Proposition 15 
De-identification of individual-level data is, on its own, an unsafe strategy for ensuring 
the privacy of individuals to whom the data relate. This can only be expected to become 
more unsafe with the continued accumulation of data (see Proposition 1) that makes 
potentially identifying linkages possible and with the increasing power and availability of 
analytical tools (see Proposition 2) that can realise this potential. 
 
4.21 If enough identifying data are removed from a dataset then one may be able to assert 
that the data are sufficiently anonymous to pose little risk of re-identification. For 
example, a file consisting of just the gender of every person in the UK (60 million 
records of just one field of one character) would clearly be anonymous, provided the 
fields are only coded ‘M’ or ‘F’.216
4.22 There are a few applications where anonymised data can be and are safely used. The 
classic case is the system that was the subject of the Source Informatics case. This is 
used to analyse doctors’ prescribing habits to generate information that is then sold to 
drug companies so they can assess the effectiveness of their sales representatives. 
Neither doctors nor patients are identified and repeat prescriptions are not linked. In 
effect the system records how many prescriptions each doctor wrote for each drug in 
each time period, with the data being perturbed (deliberately altered) to prevent 
inference attacks.
 The problem is that such a redacted file is virtually 
useless. 
217
4.23 While unlinked episode data can be used for some purposes, most researchers want to 
link up successive episodes of care so they can analyse health outcomes. Hence the 
use of pseudonymisation to ensure that data from different datasets can be properly 
 
 
213 The procedure of randomly altering data values prior to publication to prevent identification is known as Barnardisation after 
the mathematician, George Alfred Barnard. The question of what constitutes ‘anonymised’ data, and the status of 
‘barnardised’ data under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 was considered by the House of Lords in Common 
Service Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080709/comm-1.htm. 
214 R v Department of Health, ex parte Source Informatics [2001] QB 424. See paragraph 4.22. 
215 Greater use of sampling methods was one of the approaches advocated in response to our consultation (Professor Sheila M 
Bird OBE FRSE, see: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/). 
216 A few cases coded for transgender conditions might permit some of the records to be associated with particular individuals 
but with no actual disclosure as one would need to know all the relevant information anyway to achieve the identification. 
217 For technical details, see: Matyáš V (1998) Protecting the identity of doctors in drug prescription analysis Health Informatics 
Journal 4(3/4): 205-9. 
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correlated, to ensure that individuals are not counted twice, and to allow the validation 
of analyses performed on them. However, linking is only possible with access to the 
original algorithm or key-file, so someone must hold what are, in effect, personal data. 
There are three possibilities:  
■ the data can be linked by the source 
■ the data can be linked by the recipient  
■ the data can be linked by a third party  
4.24 How appropriate each of these approaches may be will depend to a great extent on the 
circumstances of the particular initiative, although the use of third parties is becoming 
increasingly accepted as good practice for data linking. (We will consider specific 
examples in chapters 6 and 7 below.) However, even if the technical mechanisms for 
removing identifiers or replacing them with pseudonyms are sound, the increasing 
richness of the digital data environment, combined with the availability of analytical 
tools, presents a significant challenge by increasing the risk of re-identification.  
Box 4.2: Technical anonymity 
The anonymity set is the set of all individuals with whom a data subject might be 
confused; thus if instead of being named, someone is merely described as “a Member of 
Parliament” the anonymity set consists of the set of Members of Parliament.  
The privacy set is the set of people to whom a data subject requires that a given 
sensitive datum not be disclosed. For most data subjects and most sensitive data, the 
privacy set may consist of friends, family, colleagues and enemies – perhaps a hundred 
individuals (though for celebrities and in some particular contexts the privacy set may be 
essentially everyone). For any recorded datum, the privacy set may change substantially 
over time, as an individual’s circumstances change.  
There is a failure of anonymisation if the anonymity set is reduced to one from the 
viewpoint of anyone in the privacy set. This will happen if the dataset is available to 
someone in the privacy set (although privacy will remain so long as no one in the privacy 
set has the means or inclination to perform the re-identification or access to the 
necessary data). 
 
4.25 Individuals can be identified within an anonymity set by processes of deduction or 
inference. Where the anonymity set is small, additional brute force inquiries may also 
work. The basic risk of deductive re-identification arises because a person disclosing 
information often does not know what other information is available to the person to 
whom the information is disclosed.218
 
218 The UK Government has been criticised for failing adequately to transpose Recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive, which 
stipulates that “to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to 
be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person” (see: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML). As presently drafted, the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation contains a similar recital (recital 23: “The principles of protection should apply to any information 
concerning an identified or identifiable person. To determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all 
the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the individual.”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf). See also the Information 
Commissioner’s Code of Practice on anonymisation: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf. 
 This is complicated by the fact that they may 
originally disclose it in the context of a specific relationship (e.g. to a hospital 
administrator) but be unaware of other relationships in which the information recipient 
may stand with respect to the subject (neighbour, family member, etc.), at that time or 
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in the future. However, this is not merely a risk arising from the ‘linking’ of study data 
with ‘environmental’ data available to people handling the data but arises in the 
controlled context of linkage studies themselves. As one of our consultation 
respondents argued:  
“Linking can be done very nearly as well with data pseudonymised at source as with 
identifiable data and so no longer requires identifying data, and would not per se 
usually require patient consent. Very few secondary uses require identifying data for 
any other reason. However linked data is richer than the data from any single 
source, and may well be so potentially identifiable that it has to be treated as 
identifying data, as the DPA (Data Protection Act) 1998 states it should.”219
4.26 The significance of the data context is recognised in the way that anonymisation is 
understood in legal instruments. For example, the Article 29 Working Party (the 
European advisory body on data protection established under Article 29 of the 
European Data Protection Directive) describe an effective anonymisation solution as 
one that “prevents all parties from singling out an individual in a dataset, from linking 
two records within a dataset (or between two separate datasets) and from inferring any 
information in such a dataset.”
 
220 As they note, this implies that simply removing 
directly identifying elements is generally not enough. Consequently, additional 
measures, depending on the context, will usually be required to prevent individual 
identification or record linking. These measures must take the data context into 
account, so standardised anonymisation protocols will usually be insufficient and 
anonymisation must therefore be sensitive to risk of re-identification.221
4.27 It seems difficult to conclude that the privacy of a data subject can be guaranteed by 
any predetermined set of de-identification measures. The privacy of the data subject 
depends upon what tools and other information are available to those who have 
access to the data, and whether the potential viewer is a benign researcher or 
disinterested administrator, or a malicious and motivated attacker. If it is therefore not 
tenable to consider data simply as either identifying or not based on the nature of the 
data alone, we have to think in terms of a continuum that includes: 
 Furthermore, 
future-proofing is bound to be difficult where the data are to be retained for long 
periods. So as well as anonymisation, some further maintenance and control of the 
context will also be required.  
■ data that are identifying in most contexts (proper names, and addresses, 
photographic portraits, etc.);  
 
219 Consultation response by Ian Herbert, available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-
gathering/. The HSCIC is currently looking into the utility and security of data pseudonymised at source. See: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/review_of_pseudonymisation_at_so#incoming-496410; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-pseudonymisation-review. See also: Data linkage and Data Quality sub-
group 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/385954/Data_Linkage__Data_Quality_Sub_G
roup_Terms_of_Reference_V1.1.pdf; Report (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14828/HSCIC-Data-Pseudonymisation-Review-
--Interim-Report/pdf/HSCIC_Data_Pseudonymisation_Review_-_Interim_Report.pdf). 
220 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2014) Opinion 05/2014 on anonymisation techniques, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf. 
221 The response of the NIH to the article by Homer et al. to generally restrict access to GWAS data was criticised as to harsh 
(http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080904/full/news.2008.1083.html). See also Erlich Y and Narayanan A (2014) Routes for 
breaching and protecting genetic privacy Nature Reviews Genetics 15(6): 409-21, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/nrg/journal/v15/n6/full/nrg3723.html. 
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■ data that are contingently identifying in conjunction with readily/publicly available 
data;  
■ data that are contingently identifying in conjunction with not-readily-available data but 
data that may be available, either already or in the foreseeable future, to someone 
seeking to re-identify individuals from the data. 
4.28 One might think of these as data that are identifying to: (1) anyone, (2) a nosey 
neighbour, and (3) a motivated attacker, perhaps with the kind of resources available to 
national security services.222
4.29 There seems to be a broad consensus, which is supported by respondents to our 
consultation, that irreversible anonymisation of meaningful data is practically 
unattainable given the availability of data tools and environmental data for 
contextualisation.
 However, the critical thing is the extent to which advances 
in data science and information technology may narrow the gap between (2) and (3) 
and, indeed, shift all the boundaries. This is particularly relevant for data that may 
remain sensitive for a long time into the future. The distinctions between these three 
segments of the spectrum concern contingent technical thresholds and thresholds of 
confidence (e.g. the absence of an adequate combination of skill and will to misuse 
data) rather than robust categorical distinctions. This has implications for governance: 
the unsettled and indefinite limitations of privacy through anonymity mean that there 
will be a need for continuous monitoring and reflective control of disclosures. 
223 This is now increasingly accepted in policy circles, too.224
Controlling data access and use 
 Re-
identification now has to be considered not only as a theoretical possibility but also as a 
practical one. However, this risk is very difficult to quantify because a number of factors 
will usually be uncertain, such as the nature and availability of contextual information, 
the range of people in the ‘privacy set’ who have an interest in re-identifying an 
individual, their motives, intentions, resources and technical capabilities, and how all 
these things may change over time. Nevertheless, the days when both policymakers 
and researchers could avoid privacy issues by simply presuming that anonymisation 
was an effective privacy mechanism are drawing to a close. Henceforth, claims that 
privacy can be assured through anonymisation when data are accessible to a large or 
indefinite number of people should be treated with suspicion. People who provide data 
in the context of health care and research will need to be made aware of this. 
4.30 Within health care and biomedical research, the conventional approach to any 
extension of data access (for example, when health information is communicated 
outside the immediate context of confidentiality created by the provision of treatment) 
was encapsulated in the injunction ‘consent or anonymise’. Where the purpose could 
be achieved with sufficiently de-identified data, this was often preferred over seeking 
consent as this is assumed to be most convenient and to minimise the risk to the data 
 
222 The ICO Code of Practice on anonymisation introduces the concept of a ‘motivated intruder’ test (https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf, pp22-4), although this is limited to an intruder who is a member of 
the public (not enjoying any specific legal powers), does not possess any specialist knowledge such as computer hacking 
skills, or have access to specialist equipment or resort to criminality in order to gain access to data that is kept securely. A 
difficulty is identifying the scope of motivated intruders for the lifetime of a data resource, which may be as long, or longer, 
than the lifetime of the data subject. 
223 A 2010 paper by Paul Ohm (see:Ohm P (2009) Broken promises of privacy: responding to the surprising failure of 
anonymization UCLA Law Review 57: 1701-77, available at: http://www.patents.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E1685C34-19FF-47F0-
B460-9D3DC9D89103/26389/UCLAOhmFailureofAnonymity5763.pdf) gave rise to a debate in legal and policy circles on the 
appropriate response to computer science research on re-identification techniques. 
224 See, for example, evidence to the House of Commons Health Select Committee on 1 July 214 (available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/health-committee/inquiries/parliament-
2010/cdd-2014/). 
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subject.225
C ons ent 
 As we have seen, there is a genuine difficulty establishing what level of de-
identification will produce reliably ‘anonymous’ data.  
4.31 Given the limited utility of effectively anonymised datasets and the technical difficulties 
of linking pseudonymised data, data initiatives that re-use health and biomedical data 
have often found it necessary to seek the consent of data subjects to provide them with 
a legitimate ground for their activities.226 The practice of obtaining consent for the use 
of medical information was historically poor, although it is improving. For many years, 
the NHS accepted that simple compliance could be used as a sufficient signal of 
consent: when the phlebotomist asked the patient to roll up their sleeve, doing so could 
be taken as consent to the drawing of blood. But the drawing of blood is not an end in 
itself, and consent to a number of data processing and data generating (e.g. pathology) 
procedures are also implicit in the sleeve-rolling request. ‘Implicit consent’ was used to 
recognise data processing that was necessary in order to provide health care and 
treatment to an individual, in terms of direct care and the running of health care 
services.227
4.32 A problem arises when incompatible norms are in play. Patients may assume that data 
about them will be used to support their own direct care, while health care 
professionals and medical researchers may operate under assumptions that secondary 
use of patient data is routine and unproblematic. Following the first Caldicott report 
matters started to improve and a typical GP practice now has a notice in the waiting 
room informing patients that their data may be used for research unless they opt out.
 There may be cases in which the underlying norms are so well established, 
and the implications so broadly accepted, as to make implicit consent a legitimate 
default.  
228 
In such cases, only a few people may make use of the opt-out, which is unlikely to 
frustrate the objectives of the data use. Underlying this is a keen awareness on the part 
of policymakers that most people will accept the offered defaults. (If consent to 
secondary uses of health records is opt-in, few people will bother and medical research 
will be compromised; if consent is opt-out, again few people will bother, and medical 
research can proceed freely.)229
 
225 The ‘consent or anonymise’ rule was established by the Patient Information Advisory Group (later the Ethics and 
Confidentiality Committee of the National Information Governance Board and now the Confidentiality and Advisory Group of 
the Health Research Authority). 
 For this reason, choosing the default option is a 
morally significant decision. There is also the practical problem of finding a way to 
226 There are other grounds for the lawful processing of personal data in most relevant data protection legislation (e.g. Directive 
95/46/EC) but, arguably for reasons of compatibility with the ECHR, consent is generally sought.  
227 It is sometimes suggested that sleeve-rolling can be seen as tantamount to seeking to enter into a contract. A problem with 
relying on implicit consent is that the EU Data Protection Directive did not consider the seeking of healthcare services from a 
state provider to be seeking or entering into a contract (unlike private healthcare) nor do Member State laws recognise these 
consequential processes within their own laws. In other words, the underlying norms to which a procedure needs to refer for 
its legitimacy are formally absent. 
228 For the first Caldicott report, see The Caldicott Committee (1997) Report on the review of patient-identifiable information, 
available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/P
ublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4068403. Patients who have attempted to opt out have, however, faced very significant 
hurdles. Following pressure from privacy campaigners, the Health and Social Care Information Centre is now intending to 
produce more effective opt-out mechanisms. 
229 This can be seen in the context of government interest in ‘libertarian paternalism’, which means allowing citizens to choose, 
but setting the defaults so that those who are not motivated to choose otherwise will end up with what is considered ‘good for 
them’. See: Thaler RH and Sunstein CR (2009) Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), and the Behavioural Insights Team, or ‘Nudge Unit’: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team. 
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support what are effectively registers of those who do not wish their data to be used or 
to be contacted for research studies, and to ensure that the opt-outs are respected 
across all systems.  
4.33 So-called ‘broad consent’ is a solution that invites people to agree to parameters for the 
use of data without specifying the fine detail. It is sought, for example, from volunteers 
who sign up for a biobank study and give blood samples as well as consent for their 
records to be used for all kinds of activities falling within a general description of 
‘medical research’. Broad consent is not necessarily the opposite of ‘specific’ consent 
since it may be both broad and specific – covering a wide range of activities for 
specified purpose such as research into the causes of complex diseases just as much 
as it may be narrow (for very limited uses) but vague. Nevertheless, broad consent 
typically operates at a higher level of abstraction in contrast to more narrow consent 
that has a clearly defined method and aim in sight. Crucially, it also contains the 
possibility of consenting to unforeseen and possibly as-yet-unimagined uses as long as 
their morally relevant features are encompassed within the description of what has 
been ‘consented to’.230
4.34 An alternative way of overcoming the scope problems of ‘one-off’ consents (narrow or 
broad), and that does not require data users to constantly seek new or refreshed 
consent, is to engage the active participation of the data subjects. So-called ‘dynamic 
consent’ allows control of data access by individuals, enabled by mechanisms such as 
consent portals.
 This is why, even if the scope of the consent to use of data can 
be circumscribed (e.g. by a general criterion such as ‘for medical purposes’) there can 
be serious ethical issues if, for example, the data are used selectively for private gain 
rather than public good.  
231 These mechanisms also provide a way of informing participants 
about opportunities for, and outcomes of, the use of data, and can be configured to 
allow them to set a number of preferences and choose the level of their engagement. 
Continuing participation can have the advantage of allowing participants to shape the 
possibilities of research through their decisions about what uses of data to permit by 
effectively ‘voting’ for those uses by consenting to them. However, some commentators 
have raised concerns that dynamic consent may not be suitable or serviceable if the 
data are used for many purposes, such as reuse of health data for service planning.232
4.35 Dynamic approaches to consent may have the advantage of being consistent with the 
more stringent data protection requirements currently being proposed in the GDPR, in 
  
 
230 See Manson NC and O’Neill O (2007) Rethinking informed consent in bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
231 See Kaye J, Whitley EA, Lund D, et al. (2014) Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century research networks 
European Journal of Human Genetics (advance online publication), available at: 
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ejhg201471a.html and Bernal P (2010) Collaborative consent: 
harnessing the strengths of the Internet for consent in the online environment International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology 24(3): 287–97, available at: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/28370/1/Collaborative_Consent.pdf. Consumer facing 
companies have begun to emerge whose business models range from purchased online heath record services, to free 
services where the company exists to exploit the data they control on behalf of their customers. Companies like Miinome and 
Allfiled provide platforms to secure compensation or other benefits for data subjects in return for allowing use of personal 
data by third parties: “Technology Company Allfiled believes there is money to be made in providing a platform that gives 
each individual consumer control of his or her own data.” (http://www.forbes.com/sites/trevorclawson/2014/03/14/data-
disruption-putting-control-of-information-in-the-hands-of-consumers/). 
232 See objections to opt-in for care.data where it is argued that losing a small percentage of records would lead to selection 
bias. Tim Kelsey, National Director for Patients and Information, NHS England, giving evidence to the House of Commons 
Health Committee on 1st July 2014: “The evidence is really clear that the people who need health services most receive them 
least, and they are also the least likely to opt in if we were to offer that service. If we want an inclusive national health 
service, we have to be able to plan in the interests of the entire community, particularly for those who would be least likely to 
opt in to the care.data scheme.”, available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/handling-of-nhs-
patient-data/oral/11192.pdf, at page 49. 
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particular the requirement for explicit consent to the use of sensitive personal data.233 
They are being explored by international ‘big data’ initiatives such as those of the 
International Medical Informatics Association (IMIA) and the Global Alliance for 
Genomics and Health.234 It may be argued that, in a context of greater personalisation, 
‘responsibilisation’ and ‘consumerisation’, individuals will be able – and may be 
required – to exercise greater choice over how they interact with health systems, public 
services and other actors.235 The National Programme for IT (NPfIT, now defunct) 
experiment with HealthSpace was discouraging, but other applications such as 
PatientsLikeMe and HealthUnlocked report high levels of engagement from motivated 
patients, not to mention the popularity of health-related ‘apps’.236 Mechanisms of this 
sort have been promoted as enablers of new forms of participant-driven research or 
‘citizen science’.237
4.36 Concerns about the scope of consent – although they are not the only concerns – 
might be obviated if people donate data or tissue samples on a completely unlimited 
basis. A model is offered by the use of ‘portable legal consent’.
 (We discuss participant-led research initiatives further in chapter 7, 
below.)  
238
Difficulties for consent in data initiatives 
 This provides a kind 
of open source licence for the use of data. However, only a highly altruistic minority of 
people are likely to be prepared to give completely unlimited permission of this sort. By 
analogy, in the world of open-source software, some code is licensed without limits (for 
example, under the FreeBSD license) while much more code is published subject to 
the condition that people who adapt it must also share their adaptations, which 
encourages its use in collaborative or cooperative contexts. It is quite possible that 
many people would agree to their data being used only in not-for-profit research but 
have a different opinion if research is conducted by a private company (see chapter 5 
below).  
Proposition 16 
Where a person providing data about themselves cannot foresee or comprehend the 
possible consequences when data are to be available for linkage or re-use, consent at 
the time of data collection cannot, on its own, be relied upon to protect their interests. 
 
 
233 See GDPR (draft), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.  
234 For the IMIA, see: http://www.imia-medinfo.org/new2/node/10. For the Global Alliance, see: 
http://www.ebi.ac.uk/sites/ebi.ac.uk/files/shared/images/News/Global_Alliance_White_Paper_3_June_2013.pdf. The ‘Global 
Alliance’ proposal, which embodies a form of dynamic consent, seems, on its face, to be compliant with the Albrecht 
amendments to the GDPR, for example. See also services like Mydex and ID3 which can be seen as part of a general 
movement to put individuals in control of their own data (and, possibly, anticipate opportunities to capitalise it, too).  
235 On personalisation, ‘responsibilisation’ and ‘consumerisation’, see paragraph 2.6 and, more generally, Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (2010) Medical profiling and online medicine: the ethics of 'personalised healthcare' in a consumer age, available 
at: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/personalised-healthcare-0. 
236 For an evaluation of HealthSpace in the context of the NPfIT, see: Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, et al. (2010) The 
devil’s in the detail, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/scriefullreport.pdf. 
237 See Vayena E and Tasioulas J (2013) Adapting standards: ethical oversight of participant-led health research, PLoS 
Medicine 10(3): e1001402, available at: 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001402. 
238 See: http://sagecongress.org/WP/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/PortableLegalConsentOverview.pdf; http://del-fi.org/consent. 
For a discussion see Vayena E, Mastroianni AC, and Kahn JP (2013) Caught in the web: informed consent for online health 
research Science Translational Medicine 5(173):173fs6, available at: http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/5/173/173fs6.full. 
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4.37 The orthodox view of consent is that it is valid if, and only if, it is voluntarily and freely 
given. This means not just that it is un-coerced but that it is deliberate.239 The process 
of informing people giving consent (i.e. providing the information necessary to ensure 
that the decision to consent is genuinely informed) can be expensive, and people often 
misunderstand to what they are consenting.240 (These difficulties apply equally to 
‘privacy notices’ that have developed as an important way of ensuring that data 
processing is ‘fair and lawful’.)241 Where the further information that may be generated 
by additional uses of data is unpredictable or indefinite, ‘fully informed’ consent is 
difficult to solicit meaningfully. This is of particular concern with research that involves 
searching databases for potentially significant correlations rather than to confirm or 
falsify a specific hypothesis since it may turn up findings which have unanticipated 
implications.242
4.38 There is a further complication in the case of data that, while freely obtained from one 
individual, may also relate significantly to the privacy interests of other individuals, 
including those not yet born. (Genomic data offer a good example but by no means the 
only one.) Thus, a DNA sequence may reveal probabilistic information or, in rare 
cases, disease traits or other characteristics in biological relatives, not merely about the 
person from whom it was obtained. In such cases, there is a divergence between the 
scope of autonomy (who gives or withholds permission for data access) and the scope 
of privacy (those whose privacy interests are affected by this permission) that current 
data protection mechanisms find difficult to manage.
 A meaningful ‘consent’ process in these circumstances (as used 
occasionally, for example, with biobanks) involves the data subject making a decision 
that they are willing, in effect, to give undefined researchers unconditional and 
irrevocable permission to use the data they provide in perpetuity, in ways to be 
determined by others.  
243
4.39 Against this background, there are still debates in health research about obtaining 
‘consent for consent’ (consent to be approached to take part in research). This arises 
because only those who have legitimate access to data in the first place may be able to 
identify candidate subjects for research or be permitted to seek a subject’s consent to 
be approached for possible enrolment in research, or for their data to be disclosed to 
researchers. For example, a medical researcher may wish to enrol patients in an 
aggregated dataset in a clinical trial but cannot approach the patient directly. 
Researchers must then rely on, and possibly pay, those with legitimate access to the 
data (GPs, for example, in the case of primary care records) to contact the patient to 
 This presents a very difficult 
challenge for existing security and privacy techniques that tend to rely on the exclusive 
relation of data to an individual subject in order to enforce protection. 
 
239 Various constructions (‘informed’, ‘fully informed’, ‘freely given’, ‘express’, etc.) appear in different instruments. The DP 
Directive states: “’the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.” (Art.2(h), available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML). 
240 See, for example, Pentz RD, White M, Harvey RD, et al. (2012) Therapeutic misconception, misestimation, and optimism in 
participants enrolled in phase 1 trials. Cancer 118(18): 4571-8, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cncr.27397/pdf. Seeking consent can even be counterproductive to research if the 
culture of consent-seeking generates an unwarranted suspicion about reasons why the person seeking consent is apparently 
keen to shift the burden of liability, although this may misunderstand the function of consent. 
241 This was a part of the concerns expressed by GP bodies (representing data controllers) in relation to the transfer of patient 
data to the HSCIC as part of the care.data programme, i.e. that reasonable efforts had not been made to inform patients of 
the purposes for which their data would be used. See: http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/nhs-england-bows-to-confidentiality-
concerns-and-launches-2m-national-publicity-campaign-on-caredata/20004748.article#.VKe57iusWSo. 
242 Wolf, SM, Lawrenz FP, Nelson CA, et al. (2008) Managing incidental findings in human subjects research: analysis and 
recommendations Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 36(2): 219-48, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2008.00266.x/abstract. 
243 See Gertz R (2004) Is it 'me' or 'we'? Genetic relations and the meaning of 'personal data' under the Data Protection 
Directive European Journal of Health Law 11(3): 231-44. 
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ask if they are willing to participate in research. This increases the cost and difficulty of 
research and GPs may be too busy to act as intermediaries.244
4.40 While there are both practical and conceptual difficulties with obtaining consent, there 
are, equally, difficulties with withdrawing it. If consent cannot abolish the underlying 
rights, legal controls or norms that it waives, it should, therefore, be capable of 
withdrawal or of modification by further conditions. (This does not mean, of course, that 
once data has been used it can be ‘un-used’. For example, if the health data of a 
consenting research subject contribute to results published in a research paper, 
withdrawal of consent does not mean that they should be able to get an order for 
Google to delist any scientific papers based on their data. But it should mean that they 
should be able to prevent the researchers making further use of that data.)
 Furthermore the 
processing of the data for this purpose (to identify candidates for research) must itself 
have a legitimate ground and take place in accordance with applicable data protection 
law. 
245 It can be 
both difficult and costly to extract a subject’s data from a dataset, especially if the data 
have been aggregated and distributed.246 Moreover, withdrawal may undermine the 
purpose for which the data are being used if that purpose depends on having an 
appropriate sample. Further practical difficulties with exercising a right of withdrawal, 
might arise if the data subject is unaware of the ways in which data relating to them 
have been propagated.247
The limited role of consent  
 
Proposition 17 
It is a continuing moral duty of data custodians and users to promote and protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of those who have provided data about themselves 
irrespective of the terms of any consent given.  
 
4.41 The existence of consent for the use of data does not, in itself, reduce the risk of harm 
to data subjects. While, it apparently foregrounds the authority of the data subject, it 
does so by redistributing the burden of responsibility for outcomes from sole reliance 
on the data user’s probity under moral and legal responsibilities to a rule-governed 
model in which the data subject may set some of the rules (or, at least, make a limited 
choice among those on offer). If used cynically, however, it may be simply an attempt 
to shift the moral responsibility for using data fairly from the data user to the data 
subject. Where there is a pre-existing expectation of privacy, seeking consent may be a 
requirement to show respect for persons; however, consent alone is not sufficient (or 
 
244 Recognising this as a difficulty, in 2013 the Health Research Authority invited researchers to submit models of good practice 
for identifying research participants. See http://www.hra.nhs.uk/news/2013/12/11/call-good-practice-models-identifying-
potential-participants-research-studies/).  
245 We should also note that there may be cases in which someone refuses consent to information disclosure that is 
nevertheless legitimate (i.e. where they have unreasonable expectations of privacy because no underlying privacy right or 
norm exists that would prevent the disclosure). 
246 “Once an individual’s data has been used in aggregate in analysis, it is effectively impossible to remove that information 
inherently from aggregate analysis.” Anonymous Consultation response, available at: 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. See also note 407 at paragraph 7.4 with regard 
to UK Biobank. 
247 And, in particular, if they are the data subject of data provided by someone else (as may arguably be the case with some 
genetic data). 
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necessary) to protect privacy. For this, some additional governance mechanism is 
required, which may ensure that consent is complied with and provide redress where it 
is not but should, in any case, provide overarching protections.  
4.42 The limitations of anonymisation or consent mechanisms for secondary uses of data, 
particularly where data are to be disclosed to third parties, linked with other datasets 
and/or used for indefinite further purposes, has necessitated the search for more 
satisfactory legal bases for data processing and for suitable measures and processes 
to give effect to them.248 Researchers and other secondary users may therefore 
increasingly seek to use statutory exemptions such as those provided by section 261 of 
the HSCA 2012, particularly if the secondary uses might be objected to on compatibility 
grounds, if consent might be refused, and anonymisation is no longer trusted.249
G overnanc e and s ecurity 
 In this 
light, the ethical appropriateness of such an approach requires all the more urgent 
consideration.  
4.43 Because of the risk of misuse and consequential privacy infringements, de-
identification and consent measures may be supplemented by further governance 
arrangements. These usually take the form of some additional control to limit data 
access to authorised users. These arrangements usually have related managerial (e.g. 
data access committees) and technical (e.g. safe havens) aspects. We consider some 
specific examples of governance practices in chapters 6 and 7. 
Authorisation of data access 
4.44 A number of bodies provide governance of information access at different levels and in 
different ways. Within the terms of applicable law, data access or disclosure (supplying 
extracts from databases) may be subject to approval by functional elements within the 
information governance infrastructure of institutions, with or without independent advice 
or oversight. Research Ethics Committees (RECs) and Data Access Committees may 
provide scrutiny of specific applications or for specific data collections, although RECs 
do not necessarily monitor compliance with the terms of any agreement following their 
opinion or decision. Institutional oversight committees (such as the UK Biobank’s 
Ethics and Governance Council – see chapter 7) do provide continuing scrutiny but 
have limited powers. The Data Access Advisory Committee of the Health and Social 
Care Information Centre and the Health Research Authority’s Confidentiality Advisory 
Group (formerly the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ECC) of the National 
Information Governance Board) provide advice in relation to specific cases but do not 
hold formal authority to approve access. While ethics committees often have one or 
more participant representative, additional advice may also be sought from separate 
panels of representatives of participant and patient communities, particularly with long-
term research programmes such as biobanks.  
 
248 As US computer scientist Arvind Narayanan points out: “Data privacy is a hard problem. Data custodians face a choice 
between roughly three alternatives: sticking with the old habit of de-identification and hoping for the best; turning to emerging 
technologies like differential privacy that involve some trade-offs in utility and convenience; and using legal agreements to 
limit the flow and use of sensitive data. These solutions aren’t fully satisfactory, either individually or in combination, nor is 
any one approach the best in all circumstances.” (https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/randomwalker/no-silver-bullet-de-
identification-still-doesnt-work/). But see also Sethi N and Laurie G (2013) Delivering proportionate governance in the era of 
eHealth: making linkage and privacy work together Medical Law International 13(2-3): 168-204, available at: 
http://mli.sagepub.com/content/13/2-3/168. 
249 Section 261 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7) provides, inter 
alia, for the HSCIC to disseminate (but not publish) identifying information if it considers doing so to be in the public interest. 
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4.45 Authorising bodies have regard to higher level strategic advice and professional 
guidance that is provided by a variety of bodies such as the Expert Advisory Group on 
Data Access (EAGDA), research funders (such as the MRC), various professional 
organisations (e.g. the BMA), regulatory bodies (e.g. the GMC) and Royal Colleges. 
General guidance, adjudication of complaints and enforcement is provided in the UK by 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and by the case law established by the 
First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) of the General Regulatory Chamber and the 
courts.  
4.46 Institutional bodies, although they often fulfil a quasi-judicial function are, nevertheless, 
open to the criticism that they are not always independent. It is a possible criticism of 
bodies like research ethics committees and data access committees that they diffuse 
responsibility for upholding the rights of patients and research subjects, making it very 
much less likely that researchers who abuse data will be sued or prosecuted. In 
particular, the fact that a project has received ethics approval makes it highly unlikely 
that researchers would be found to have criminal intent (mens rea – an essential 
element for successful prosecutions in criminal offences), and standardising practices 
frustrates civil actions that might be judged ‘by the standards of the industry’.250
Limiting data access 
 This 
criticism draws attention to the possible consequences of relying on institutions and 
orthodoxies rather than critically examining underlying moral norms of access and 
disclosure; we will return to this and to the potential need for broader forms of 
accountability in the next chapter.  
4.47 There are additional technical mechanisms that provide greater security, such as that 
data linkage may be performed within a regulated safe haven. The original safe haven 
was the hospital library where records were kept and where researchers went to 
interrogate them. The records remained in the library, and the researcher emerged with 
only some notes of the aggregated results. They were extended to health authorities, 
which had facilities for the safe storage of paper records that could be reviewed for 
administrative purposes.  
4.48 The use of safe havens was advocated by the second Caldicott review, whereby a 
secure centre provides a pseudonymisation and linkage service.251 A variant is the 
trusted third party (TTP) which was envisaged to provide economies of scale and have 
no incentive to interfere with the data. The now defunct National Programme for IT 
(NPfIT) had specified a ‘Pseudonymisation Service’, until the contractors realised how 
difficult it would be to anonymise data effectively and that this would be operationally 
more complex than had been envisaged. The formalisation of a system of accredited 
safe havens for health data in England is, at the time of writing, in train under proposed 
regulations.252
 
 
 Systems that enable third party linking and access to linked data via 
safe havens or the equivalent have been developed in Scotland (SHIP) and Wales 
251 The Caldicott Committee (2013) Information: to share or not to share? The information governance review, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-information-governance-review. 
252 Department of Health (2014) Protecting health and care information (consultation) (HMSO), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323967/Consultation_document.pdf. 
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(SAIL), and for specific initiatives (e.g. GeL). (We discuss some examples in chapter 
6.)253
Limitations to data use 
 
4.49 Formal agreements (Data Sharing Agreements, Data Re-use Agreements and Material 
Transfer Agreements, depending on the nature of the procedure) may be used to set 
out the terms on which data access or disclosure is to take place. These may restrict 
the use of the data to an approved class of users, for approved purposes and forbid 
further disclosure or attempts to re-identify individuals in the dataset. Penalties for 
breach of an agreement (that do not otherwise constitute criminal offences) remain 
comparatively lenient, however. They may include, in theory, refusal to provide further 
data access in future. In health systems such as the NHS, data-sharing agreements or 
service contracts allow the NHS to commission services from third-party suppliers or 
provide information externally.  
4.50 Agreements may not be effective or well managed, however: failures in the 
management of data sharing agreements were identified in the 2014 Review of data 
releases made by the NHS Information Centre (‘Partridge review’).254
4.51 The enforcement of data sharing agreements and contracts relies on the possibility of 
detection, and on effective sanctions. These depend both for credibility and efficacy on 
the existence of systems of audit, inspection, regulation and enforcement that can 
detect and remedy the mischief.
  The HSCIC has 
talked about a ‘one strike and out’ principle but this does not appear to have been 
adopted fully and an external enforcement mechanism is lacking. Furthermore, there 
are no practical mechanisms available for other stakeholders, such as patients, to take 
enforcement action independently of the data controllers.  
255 Where fundamental rights are at stake, and they 
cannot be protected by private action, there is a reasonable argument that at least the 
most egregious breaches should be brought within the scope of the criminal law. This 
is why, in chapter 2, we made a series of recommendations in relation to the 
identification of possible harms, mapping of information flows, reporting of breaches 
and the creation of an offence of deliberate misuse of data. For this latter, we found 
much support among those we consulted in the preparation of this report.256
Conclusion  
 
4.52 From the point of view of knowledge discovery (whether in health care or biomedical 
research), for which the widest access to the richest data is implicitly desirable, those 
designing data initiatives find themselves in something like a double bind, a demand 
that they do two mutually contradictory things at the same time:257
 
253 For SHIP, see chapter 6, below. For a description of the SAIL process, see: http://www.saildatabank.com/faq.aspx#. 
  
254 PwC LLP (2014) Data release review (HSCIC), available at: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/datareview. The review found that the 
NHS Information Centre (the forerunner of the present Health and Social Care Information Centre) was unable to locate 
agreements relating to releases of individual-level data so it was not possible to determine to whom the data had been 
released, and there was no evidence that a company contracted to the Information Centre to manage releases had obtained 
appropriate clearance. 
255 Penalty schemes may be applied at the level of re-identification (before any discriminatory treatment has been visited on 
individuals), or of misuse of data (preparatory to discriminatory treatment), although as we have observed (see chapter 2) 
these are not easily detectable. 
256 See: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/.  
257 On the ‘double bind’ see Bateson G (1972) Steps to an ecology of mind: collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, 
evolution, and epistemology (San Francisco: Chandler). This is presented as a double bind rather than a simple tension 
 
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 
4
 
L
A
W
,
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
A
N
C
E
 
A
N
D
 
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
 
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
 81 
■ researchers and administrators are encouraged to generate, use and extend access 
to data (because doing so is expected to advance research and make public services 
more efficient); however,  
■ there is a similarly strong imperative, and a requirement of human rights law, to 
protect privacy (and the more access to data is extended, the greater are the risks of 
abuse). 
4.53 In this chapter we have discussed the difficulties that may arise for data initiatives in 
effectively anonymising individual-level data (and even aggregate data) and in 
determining whether consent is effective and valid for a proposed use of data. We have 
also discussed the need for governance to have broader accountability. We draw three 
main conclusions from our discussion. First, ‘anonymisation’ is unlikely on its own to be 
sufficient to protect privacy as it is simply too hard to prevent re-identification. Second, 
the consent of data subjects is not always morally necessary (the use of personal data 
may not affect privacy interests) and is never sufficient to secure their moral interests 
(consent to use of data does not make harm arising from that use impossible, nor does 
it offer any direct say in what options are available). Third, while governance provides 
an essential, enabling condition for data initiatives, the form it should take and the way 
in which it should be deployed cannot be determined without reference to the norms 
and interests at stake in a particular data initiative, and without wider forms of 
accountability. In the next chapter we move from these largely negative conclusions to 
a more positive account of how a set of morally reasonable expectations may be 
defined and met in the context of data initiatives.  
 
  
 
because there is an imperative to do both things simultaneously (i.e. share more information and make information more 
secure), not merely to find a balance between them (e.g. share less information so that what is shared is more secure). 
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 Chapter 5  
Ethical governance 
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Chapter 5 – Ethical governance of data initiatives 
Chapter overview 
This chapter develops an ethical approach to the design and governance of data 
initiatives and sets out some principles for guidance. 
Data initiatives are practical activities that involve a number of actors (who might be 
individuals, groups, institutions, etc.) some of whom stand to benefit or lose from the 
outcomes. Tensions and potential conflicts between values and interests can arise at the 
level of the individual, of professions or of the public. The ethical formation of a data 
initiative is a matter of reconciling these values and interests in a coherent set of morally 
reasonable expectations.  
A morally reasonable set of expectations should embody four principles: 
■ the principle of respect for persons 
■ the principle of respect for established human rights 
■ the principle of participation of those with morally relevant interests 
■ the principle of accounting for decisions 
The principle of respect for persons does not mean that individuals’ interests may 
never be overridden, but that they may only be overridden where there is a legitimate 
reason to do so. As a principle of design of data initiatives, the principle of respect for 
human rights seeks to avoid potential rights conflicts and violations rather than leaving 
them to be dealt with retrospectively through judicial processes. The participation of 
people with morally relevant interests allows the identification of relevant privacy norms 
and the development of governance measures (such as design of consent and 
authorisation procedures) in relation to these norms; it allows preferences and interests 
to be expressed and transformed through practical reasoning, and account to be given 
of how these interests are respected in decision making, helping to foster trust and 
cooperation. The principle of accounting for decisions ensures that expectations, as 
well as failures of governance and control, are communicated to people affected and to 
others more widely. It also ensures that data initiatives remain in touch with changing 
social norms. 
 
Introduction 
5.1 In chapter 3 we examined the moral values and interests engaged by the collection, 
retention and use of data in biological research and health care. We saw that private 
and public interests in these activities are interrelated, often in complex ways, and may 
be – but are not automatically – in tension. At the end of that chapter we proposed a 
question to structure reflection on the moral acceptability of data initiatives. They 
should, we argued, define a set of morally reasonable expectations about how data will 
be used in the data initiative, giving proper attention to the morally relevant interests at 
stake. We suggested that an answer should take into account three sorts of 
considerations: the underlying norms of data access and disclosure, the respect for 
people in terms of their individual values and interests, and the governance of 
professional conduct in the public interest. In the previous chapter we examined 
different legal frameworks and concluded that the minimal conditions they offered did 
not exhaust or always correspond to morally relevant norms for specific data initiatives. 
We discussed different consent procedures and concluded that obtaining consent from 
the ‘subjects’ of data was not sufficient (or always necessary) to make the use of data 
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morally acceptable. And we discussed tools and procedures of governance and 
concluded that they gave only a partial answer to questions of moral accountability.  
5.2 In this chapter we will take up the question posed at the end of chapter 3 and propose 
a way of moving, usually in conditions of some uncertainty, from the complex of often 
poorly articulated and possibly inconsistent values and interests that are engaged by 
data initiatives to a more coherent, shared and publicly articulated solution. Our 
approach is based on an understanding of the establishment and conduct of data 
initiatives as an activity that requires cooperation between people whose interests they 
engage. We examine how engaging in this activity can inform and develop the 
relationship between moral norms, individual values and interests, and governance in 
the public interest, and help to define appropriate governance arrangements. In the 
course of this we will propose an ethical framework comprising four elements (which 
are set out in Box 5.1 at the end of the chapter).  
Morally relevant interests 
5.3 Interests are not abstract ideas, existing independently of their bearers and outside 
time, or unreflective desires demanding satisfaction. They are tied to the people whose 
interests they are, to a particular material context and orientated towards specific future 
goals. The contexts in which interests are expressed may involve a number of different 
people, professions and practices. Indeed, the potential of a data initiative to extract 
value, and the novel features that give rise to ethical questions, typically result from 
converging developments in a number of fields of endeavour (for example, the 
application of computational methods to human biology) rather than a tipping point in 
the development of any one field. Although no list can be exhaustive, data initiatives in 
biomedical research and health care might involve: 
■ Information governance professionals 
■ Clinicians and other health care practitioners who hold or use data 
■ Biomedical scientists and researchers (including pathologists, imaging specialists, 
geneticists, epidemiologists, etc.)  
■ Social and behavioural scientists 
■ Bioinformaticians, statisticians and data scientists 
■ Information technology developers 
■ Research funders (who may be the public as national taxpayers) 
■ Commercial firms 
■ Public policy makers and administrators (service commissioners, etc.) 
■ Independent advisors (lawyers, bioethicists, etc.)  
■ Regulators 
■ Patients or research study participants whose data are included in the initiative (who 
might also be members of any of the forgoing categories)  
■ The wider ‘public’ (or ‘publics’)258
5.4 Along with their skills and resources (including data), each of those involved in a data 
initiative will bring a particular set of interests and expectations.
  
259
 
258 ‘The public’ is, of course, a controversial category: see discussion in Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging 
Biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good (esp. Chapter 5), available at: 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/emerging-biotechnologies. 
 These may be more 
259 Interests may be in either maintaining or altering these norms, either in the specific case of an initiative or in general.  
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or less shared and more or less stable within professional or disciplinary groups. (They 
may be established through professional codes of ethics of good practice guidelines 
within membership organisations, for example.) But in other cases they may be 
contested within a given field or profession, perhaps as different ‘schools’ or 
‘movements’. They may be further complicated by historical peculiarities, political 
differences, as well as national traditions and legal contexts (particularly in large 
international collaborations). The public interest in a data initiative may also be more 
complex and far-reaching than the immediate aims of the initiative. As well as the 
immediate aims of the initiative, there may be a public interest in supporting national 
research or production capacity (so that it can support the development of other 
products) or even in generating economic activity more generally.260 Two further sets of 
potentially, but not necessarily, conflicting interests will be those of the public (or of that 
portion of the public that the data initiative aims to benefit) and those – who may 
overlap with the first group – from whom the data were collected.261
5.5 As well as alignments and tensions between professional groups and among 
individuals within those groups, the interests of individuals themselves can be 
inconsistent, contrary, and changeable. Research in psychology, behavioural 
economics, and other social sciences has shown, for example, that the behaviour of 
individuals in regulating access to and disclosure of private information may not follow 
rational or predictable patterns.
  
262 One example of this is the so-called ‘privacy 
paradox’, which refers to the dissonance between individuals’ stated and revealed 
preferences (for example, people’s stated preferences for privacy and their behaviour 
using public online social networks).263
5.6 The formation of a data initiative is therefore a complex social practice where tensions 
and potential conflicts of interests exist at many scales: at the level of the individual, of 
professions, and of the public. Thinking about data initiatives in this way avoids placing 
different interests (public and private, researchers and subjects, science and society, 
etc.) in simple opposition. (See chapter 3 where we drew attention to the mutual 
implication of public and private interests.) It focuses attention, instead, on how 
initiatives are formed by those with relevant interests and how, within this context, 
those involved may collectively develop their moral ‘craft’ through shared 
 
 
260 A common feature of discourse around innovation is equivocation between the scientific, therapeutic and broader strategic 
and economic aims (for example, between improving treatments for everyone and beating international competitors in a race 
to develop those treatments). See chapter 2 (above) for a discussion of this confusion of public interests.  
261 Health research is generally in the public interest on the basis that any healthy member of the public may be affected by ill 
health. This is less true for rare hereditary diseases, for example, where the existence of solidarity relations between those at 
risk and other members of the community comes into the question. 
262 Irrational behaviour has a number of explanations including the presence of ‘framing effects’ that distort the appraisal of 
evidence; preferential modes of reasoning identified by moral psychology that function especially when relevant information 
exceeds available cognitive capacity; and prevailing social norms. On ‘framing effects’ see Tversky A and Kahneman D 
(1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice Science 211(4481): 453-8; on ‘moral psychology’ see Haidt J 
(2012) The righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion (New York: Pantheon); on ‘prevailing social 
norms’ see Utz S and Krämer N (2009) The privacy paradox on social network sites revisited: the role of individual 
characteristics and group norms Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 3(2), article 1, 
available at: http://cyberpsychology.eu/view.php?cisloclanku=2009111001&article=1. 
263 For a survey of evidence about the relationship between what people say and what they do online, see Acquisti A, John LK 
and Loewenstein G (2013) What is privacy worth? The Journal of Legal Studies 42(2): 249-74, available at: 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-ISR-worth.pdf. While, for example, the promiscuity of younger 
generations in online social networking is a popular trope, it is also argued that they are actually more cautious and adept at 
simultaneously managing multiple interactions governed by different privacy norms. See, for example, Marwick AE and Boyd 
D (2014) Networked privacy: how teenagers negotiate context in social media New Media and Society 17(6): 1051-67. 
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understanding of ‘good practice’.264
Morally reasonable expectations 
 It also suggests that the elucidation of relevant 
interests should be an important initial step in the formation of a data initiative.  
5.7 The interests that apply to different data initiatives will vary according to the initiative in 
question. Nevertheless, there is a general need to find a way of reaching decisions 
about the use of data that command respect, particularly among those who may feel 
that their own preferences have not prevailed. If the decision-making process lacks 
moral legitimacy, they may feel that their interests have been disregarded by others, 
especially to the advantage of those with greater political, economic or social power.  
Moral reas onablenes s  
5.8 The question with which we concluded chapter 3 concerned what it might be 
reasonable for those who participate in data initiatives to expect concerning the use 
and control of the data. There are broadly two ways in which something might be 
argued to be ‘morally reasonable’. First, a proposition might be morally reasonable if it 
conforms to an objective moral standard or principle. What establishes that standard 
and who judges conformity with it are therefore important second-order questions. 
Second, a proposition might be judged to be reasonable where it is the outcome of a 
legitimate procedure, for instance democratic decision making.265
5.9 The weakness of approaches based on substantive principles is that if they are too 
abstract they leave open a wide margin of interpretation concerning how they should 
be applied. If they are too prescriptive they may proscribe solutions that can optimise 
ethical data use according to legitimate and possibly diverse values. Purely procedural 
approaches, on the other hand, can result in morally perverse outcomes if they are not 
constrained or guided by some principle (as we noted in chapter 3). Procedural 
approaches therefore generally include an appeal to objective moral standards that 
both legitimise and place some limitations upon the relevant procedures. The approach 
we propose here has a strong procedural dimension – emphasising both participation 
and accountability – but is grounded in and constrained by a strong commitment to 
‘respect for persons’.  
 In this case, who 
participates in this procedure and how it is conducted are equally important secondary 
questions.  
Principle 1 – Respect for persons 
The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should be 
grounded in the principle of respect for persons. This includes recognition of a 
person’s profound moral interest in controlling others’ access to and disclosure of 
information relating to them held in circumstances they regard as confidential.  
 
264 See Parker M (2012) Ethical problems and genetics practice (esp. chapter on ‘moral craft’ pp. 112-30) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
265 An example of this approach is outlined by Normal Daniels under the rubric ‘accounting for reasonableness’: see Daniels N 
(2000) Accountability for reasonableness: establishing a fair process for priority setting is easier than agreeing on principles 
British Medical Journal 321(7272): 1300-01, available at: 
http://www.bmj.com/content/321/7272/1300?ijkey=e1c0e7705033bda924d2556bec2d6af8da87175d&keytype2=tf_ipsecsha.  
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5.10 The principle of respect for persons is the principle that all persons have a special 
moral status that means they are owed respect simply in virtue of being persons and 
not because of any contingent characteristics, individual merit or social position.266 
Respecting persons takes the practical form of treating persons in ways that have 
regard to their own interests, not merely treating them as tools to secure our own ends 
or gratification.267
5.11 The principle of respect for persons, with regard to information access and disclosure, 
implies that consideration should be given to how their wishes about certain uses of 
information should be taken into account. This does not imply simply doing what people 
want. In many cases the things that different people want are incompatible. Data 
initiatives are collective activities that require cooperation. What is ‘reasonable’ in the 
context of a data initiative must, therefore, pay appropriate respect to all those with 
morally relevant interests. It means, furthermore, that the initiative should not assume 
that their interests can be respected simply by taking account only of the interests of a 
family, tribe, community, or nation to which they belong.  
 
5.12 There may be rare cases in which a data initiative may depend on people accepting 
something (the disclosure of certain data relating to them, for example) that they would 
prefer not to happen. This is not always incompatible with respect for persons, even in 
the face of their active and specific objections. There are two main cases in which the 
argument for mandatory inclusion of individual data in a dataset by appeal to necessary 
and proportionate interference is made (see paragraph 4.5). The first case is where an 
aim of paramount public interest can only be achieved by either comprehensive 
participation (or could not be achieved by a level of participation expected under non-
compulsory conditions) or can only be achieved by the inclusion of particular 
individuals. Such cases as these arise (although not without controversy) in the domain 
of public health, where individual objections to state intrusion into private life are 
sometimes overruled in the public interest. Limitations of this sort underpinned a series 
of Vaccination Acts in the UK in the 19th Century (for the eradication of smallpox) and 
may be invoked in contemporary public health emergencies.268 A relatively 
uncontroversial example is the mandatory reporting by doctors of ‘notifiable’ 
diseases.269 The second case is one in which full participation is not necessary, but 
where it can be argued that ‘free riding’ (i.e. benefitting from a public good that others 
have borne the cost of providing) is regarded as morally unacceptable. Some have 
sought to apply this argument to national health data initiatives to develop or improve 
medical treatments or care.270
 
266 Philosophers have argued about the criteria for being a ‘person’ and whether it applies to ‘marginal cases’ (e.g. neonates, 
people with severe cognitive impairments, or cognitively advanced higher primates or computers). Such considerations may 
become operationally relevant when decisions about data relating to particular subjects fall to be made.  
  
267 Philosophical support for the principle is usually derived from the work of the Prussian Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel 
Kant. See: Kant I (1998 [1785]) Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
268 The 1853 Act, for example mandated vaccination of every infant whose state of health would stand it and registration of the 
fact with the registrar of births. See: Porter D and Porter R (1988) The politics of prevention: Anti-vaccination and public 
health in 19th century England Medical History 32: 231-52, available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1139881/pdf/medhist00062-0007.pdf.  
269 A duty is placed on a doctor to notify the relevant local authority officer if they suspect that a patient has a ‘notifiable disease’ 
under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22) and Public Health 
(Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1988/1546/contents/made). For the legal basis of 
information sharing in relation to health, see: Department of Health (2007) NHS information governance. Guidance on legal 
and professional obligations, available at: http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/infogov/codes/lglobligat.pdf.  
270 See: Chan, Sarah and Harris, John. 2009. Free riders and pious sons – why science research remains obligatory Bioethics 
23(2): 161-171, available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00648.x/full; Stjernschantz Forsberg 
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5.13 The fact that some data initiatives involve relationships between individuals and the 
state, which, as is often said, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force to require 
compliance where it is not freely given, gives rise to our second requirement, 
concerning human rights.  
Principle 2 – human rights 
The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should be 
determined with regard to established human rights. This will include limitations on 
the power of states and others to interfere with the privacy of individual citizens in the 
public interest (including to protect the interests of others).  
 
5.14 Some data initiatives have been challenged in the courts because they have been 
seen as breaching privacy rights enshrined in UK and European law.271 The 
mechanics of the judicial process, however, mean that the acceptability of a practice 
may not be tested until there is a victim. It is often the case that the evolution of the 
law lags behind the invention of new initiatives and in some cases behind the 
evolution of social norms (although in some cases it can encourage such evolutions, 
as with the recognition of the rights of certain minorities). For reasons that we 
discussed in chapter 2, in the case of data abuses there can be a long interval 
between the cause of the harm and the effect, and abuses may continue for years 
before a harm is detected and addressed. Furthermore, as our commissioned 
research showed, it is necessary to consider a broader range of morally relevant 
effects than might meet the standards of harm required to engage legal rights.272
5.15 The purpose of promoting human rights as a formative principle for data initiatives is 
therefore to encourage a prospective consideration of how conflicts might arise and 
how they might be resolved (particularly where legal provisions are inadequate, 
inaccessible, unclear or conflicting), or avoided altogether. The aim is also to 
encourage the foundation of data initiatives on the moral rights that underpin legal 
systems, rather than to focus on simply satisfying the requirements of positive law, 
possibly on the construction most favourable to the aims of the initiative (and not 
necessarily to the interests of all those affected by it).  
 A 
final consideration against merely relying on the judicial process is that seeking relief 
might actually compound the harm by drawing attention to it, so ‘victims’ may be 
unwilling to take action.  
5.16 The principle of respect for persons and the requirement to respect human rights set 
the criteria for what expectations about the use of data may qualify as morally 
reasonable. Together, they provide the substantive ‘guide rails’ for the formation of 
morally acceptable data initiatives, without prescribing what specific measures should 
be adopted in the context of any particular data initiative. Within these bounds we still 
need to determine how the relationship between the relevant norms, the interests of 
 
J, Hansson MG, and Eriksson S (2014) Why participating in (certain) scientific research is a moral duty Journal of Medical 
Ethics 40: 325-8, available at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/40/5/325.short.  
271 An example of an initiative subject to a successful claim is the UK National DNA Database (see S. and Marper v. The United 
Kingdom; http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html).  
272 See: Laurie G, Jones KH, Stevens L, and Dobbs C (2014) A review of evidence relating to harms resulting from uses of 
health and biomedical data, available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
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individuals and the external controls of governance should be resolved in any given 
concrete situation.  
Moral reas oning 
5.17 While individual interests may sometimes be overridden in the public interest, more 
usually, however, people will accept outcomes that they would not necessarily prefer 
because they are an indissociable part of a ‘bundle’ of goods that they value. This may 
be the case, for example, with freely provided Internet services, where users ‘trade off’ 
some unfavourable ‘terms and conditions’ in order to gain access to a service.273
5.18 One way in which decision makers have sought to understand prevailing norms in 
society is through research into public opinion. A number of qualitative and quantitative 
exercises, including surveys, consultations and public dialogue events, have been 
carried out into the use of data for biomedical research and other purposes. These 
have mainly been sponsored by research funders, who typically want to understand 
how use may legitimately be made of available data resources and to promote public 
trust in research. A body of received wisdom that claims support from these findings 
has built up in the UK about the use of stored information. This suggests that there is a 
broad majority of public support for information to be used for a range of secondary 
purposes (including in biomedical research and health service improvement) so long as 
people are asked about this. However, this support is said to fall away to a significant 
extent where they are not asked, or where the research involves private companies 
operating for profit.
 This, 
however, assumes that people are mere consumers, reduced to accepting or refusing 
an option presented to them, or choosing between several available ‘offerings’. Where 
the question is about the design of a data initiative rather than selection from among a 
number of available options, it is no longer a matter of evaluating the different tradeoffs 
as a consumer but instead about negotiating between the moral interests of different 
participants (where one ‘participant’ may represent the ‘public interest’). There are 
strong reasons to believe that, in the case of data initiatives in which questions of 
public interest are at stake, involving those with interests in the design and conduct of 
the initiative is preferable to simply offering pre-determined options, not least because 
there is a public interest in the optimisation of outcomes for all. Rather than treating 
norms and values as fixed or imponderable, such an approach may offer a way of 
bringing these into play in order to produce a new equilibrium within a particular 
governed context. 
274
 
273 There is a well-known apothegm in information technology that if someone is not paying for the service, ‘they’re not the 
consumer, they’re the product’, meaning that the reason they are able to obtain the service without payment is that the 
service provider is able to make a return by selling data provided (when registering for or using the service) or somehow 
monetise it thereafter. See: http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2012/03/21/meme-patrol-when-something-online-
is-free-youre-not-the-customer-youre-the-product/. 
 The current reality of medical research is that it relies upon 
274 The published evidence comes from a mixture of commissioned market research and academic social science. See Hill EM, 
Turner EL, Martin RM, and Donovan JL (2013) “Let’s get the best quality research we can”: public awareness and 
acceptance of consent to use existing data in health research: a systematic review and qualitative study BMC Medical 
Research Methodology 13(1): 72, available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/13/72. The Consultation response 
by Ian Herbert (available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/) also provides a 
very helpful list of relevant research, drawn from his 2012 report Fair shares for all: sharing and protecting electronic patient 
healthcare data, available at: http://phcsg.org/publications/fair-shares-for-all-final/. Subsequent relevant research includes 
Ipsos MORI Dialogue on data: exploring the public’s views on using administrative data for research purposes, available at: 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Dialogue_on_Data_report_tcm8-30270.pdf; CM Insight research for Wellcome Trust (2013) 
Summary report of qualitative research into public attitudes to personal data and linking personal data, available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Publications/Reports/Public-engagement/WTP053206.htm; Sciencewise ERC (2014) 
Big data: public views on the collection, sharing and use of personal data by government and companies, available at: 
http://www.sciencewiseerc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/SocialIntelligenceBigData.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=Rica
rdo-AEA+Ltd&utm_campaign=4132283_SWper cent2fMonthly_digestper cent2fNAOper 
cent2fED57482500_May+2014&dm_i=DA4,2GKHN,1SUKGU,8Y5R6,1); Ipsos MORI’s research on trust in data and 
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clinical and commercial research collaborations and partnerships to develop 
innovations for the health care system (see chapter 2 above). Difficult issues therefore 
arise, for example, if data are collected initially through the health care system or 
academic institutions and then access is given to a pharmaceutical company as a part 
of collaborations.275 It is not clear, however, that these details are considered when 
people give their opinions to researchers.276 This evolving area would benefit from 
further research. As some of the academic papers acknowledge, the research may 
suffer from a sample bias that favours participants who are positive about research.277
5.19 While public opinion research gives a valuable indication of some relevant norms its 
limitations as a support for decision making must be understood. It presents decision 
makers with a number of difficulties, not least the value that should be given to opinions 
from the interested and the disinterested, those informed by morally relevant interests 
or those informed by merely prudential or even immoral ones, those that are top-of-the-
head and those that result from earnest and prolonged deliberation.
  
278
5.20 Public opinion research typically provides evidence in decision making where the 
actual decisions are taken elsewhere, in contexts to which access is restricted and 
through procedures that are often obscure.
  
279
5.21 In chapter 3 we discussed a number of ways of resolving problems of collective action. 
We mentioned common good, social contract and utilitarian approaches to these 
problems and noted that all had advantages and disadvantages.
 In the case of data initiatives there are 
reasons to give particular attention to people whose morally relevant interests are 
engaged, not simply as a source of evidence of the norms that must be managed, but 
as collaborators in the elaboration of the whole system. This means not only the 
professionals who deliver it and those who stand to benefit but also – and perhaps 
most importantly – people whose privacy and welfare are at stake. This can be prudent 
because their decisions about whether to participate or not can enable or frustrate the 
initiative once it is established. But it also expresses respect for them as persons who 
have morally significant interests and the capacity to contribute positively to the 
shaping of the social world.  
280
 
attitudes toward data use/data sharing for the Royal Statistical Society (2014), available at: 
http://www.statslife.org.uk/news/1672-new-rss-research-finds-data-trust-deficit-with-lessons-for-policymakers. 
 If individuals are to 
be included there are two main ways in which their interests may be brought to bear 
275 See: Ipsos MORI for MRC (2007) The use of personal health information in medical research, available at: 
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/documents/pdf/the-use-of-personal-health-information-in-medical-research-june-2007, which found 
pharmaceutical companies to be among the least trusted organisations where personal health information is concerned 
(trusted by just 6 per cent of the population, confirming long-standing trends research on general trust in professions). 
276 Clemence M, Gilby N, Shah J, et al. (2013) Wellcome Trust monitor wave 2: tracking public views on science, research and 
science education, available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtp053113.pdf.  
277 For such an acknowledgement, see Hill E, Turner E, Martin R and Donovan J (2013) "Let's get the best quality research we 
can": public awareness and acceptance of consent to use existing data in health research: a systematic review and 
qualitative study BMC Medical Research Methodology 13(1): 72, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2288/13/72. 
278 On the problems and paradoxes of public engagement, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging biotechnologies: 
technology, choice and the public good, especially chapter 5 (‘Public perspectives’), available at: 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/emerging-biotechnologies. 
279 This is self-consciously true of government which reserves a ‘safe and protected space’ for policy making. See also: Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics Nuff’ said blog (4 February 2013) Engagement in open policy making; or how to train your academic, 
available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/2013/engagement-in-open-policy-making-or-how-to/.  
280 See paragraph 3.19ff. 
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fairly, namely through aggregation or deliberation.281 The basic difference is that 
aggregative approaches assume that people have stable or rational preferences from 
which the preferences of the group can be deduced, whereas deliberative approaches 
place value on the fact that individual moral interests in collective outcomes may be 
transformed as they encounter each other in a context of reasoned argument and 
discussion.282
5.22 A deliberative approach may address the complex problem of resolving varied, 
confused, and possibly conflicting norms and interests into a coherent and mutually 
acceptable set of common aims and expectations.
  
283 This demonstrates respect for 
persons because (and insofar as) it arises from the face-to-face encounter between 
moral agents who recognise and treat each other as such.284
Principle 3 – Participation  
 It also recognises that the 
elements of any solution (the norms, mechanisms to account for diverse values and 
forms of governance) are interrelated and co-dependent.  
The set of expectations about how data will be used (or re-used) in a data 
initiative, and the appropriate measures and procedures for ensuring that those 
expectations are met, should be determined with the participation of people with 
morally relevant interests. This participation should involve giving and receiving public 
accounts of the reasons for establishing, conducting and participating in the initiative in a 
form that is accepted as reasonable by all. Where it is not feasible to engage all those 
with relevant interests – which will often be the case in practice – the full range of 
relevant values and interests should nevertheless be fairly represented.  
 
5.23 The principle of participation requires decision makers not merely to imagine how 
people with morally relevant interests ought to expect data to be used but to take steps 
to discover how they do, in fact, expect data to be used and to engage with those 
expectations. The participation of people with interests at stake in the design of data 
initiatives gives decisions a strong claim to legitimacy. Independently of the outcome, 
participants, and the wider public, are more likely to accept the process as being a fair 
and respectful way of resolving any differences between them with regard to decisions 
that may affect them all.285
5.24 The outcome of such a process is by its nature provisional, a ‘working solution’. 
Circumstances or expectations may change; they may prove unrealistic; there may be 
  
 
281 Both aggregation and deliberation have a claim to procedural fairness. See also: Knight J and Johnson J (1994) Aggregation 
and deliberation: on the possibility of democratic legitimacy Political Theory 22(2): 277-96; Gutmann, A and Thompson D 
(2004) Why deliberative democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
282 Daniels and Sabin note that moral values are not simply like tastes or preferences: aggregation “seems insensitive to how 
we would ideally like to evolve moral disputes, namely through argument and deliberation.” Daniels N and Sabin J (1997) 
Limits to health care: fair procedures, democratic deliberation and the legitimacy problem for insurers Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 26(4): 303-50, at page 338. 
283 There are a number of well-known advantages and disadvantages of deliberative approaches. Some of these are discussed 
in Parker M (2007) Deliberative bioethics, in Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H, and McMillan JR (Editors) Principles of 
health care ethics (Chichester: John Wiley& Sons), pp185-91. 
284 Among the implications of the principle of respect for persons is not only a respect for the things that persons value but also 
a recognition that they themselves can, when they are enabled to do so, take responsibility with others for actively creating 
the conditions that, for example, manage their privacy and promote the common interest. Furthermore, it is an implication of 
respect for persons that this is morally preferable (i.e. more respectful) when this is done by those people themselves or 
through their nominated representatives. 
285 See also guidance outlined in the recent report for Sciencewise, Data policy and the public: shaping a deeper conversation, 
available at: http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/Data-policy-and-the-publicJan-2015.pdf.  
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improvements or failures. Consequently, though the process may be provisionally 
concluded with the production of a publicly statable set of expectations about how data 
will be used and governed, there is often a need for continuing reflection and review. 
The principle of participation therefore applies equally to the establishment of a data 
initiative and to its continuing governance.  
Ac c ounting for dec is ions  
5.25 Deliberation is a social activity that requires participants to engage in a common ‘public’ 
discourse through which they can account to each other for the positions they take.286 
This accounting, given through a face-to-face encounter between moral agents with a 
common purpose, can build trust among people with different interests, allow them to 
discover where trust may be placed intelligently and design the terms of a data initiative 
accordingly.287 Like any social activity, however, deliberation is vulnerable to abuse, 
domination or capture by those with power.288 It is also at risk from cognitive and social 
effects such as framing and ‘groupthink’.289
Principle 4 – Accounting for decisions 
 There are two main antidotes to these 
effects: the internal commitment to fair conduct, and openness to external scrutiny and 
revision. It is important, therefore, that the initiative is embedded in broader system of 
accountability that allows for challenge and dispute resolution. The notion of 
accountability emphasises the extension of the processes of moral deliberation, namely 
the requirement to ‘give an account’ that is intelligible and acceptable to the person to 
whom it is given. It also emphasises the function of ‘holding to account’, namely the 
imposition of a judicial power with legitimate authority. 
A data initiative should be subject to effective systems of governance and 
accountability that are themselves morally justified. This should include both 
structures of accountability that invoke legitimate judicial and political authority, and 
social accountability arising from engagement of people in a society. Maintaining 
effective accountability must include effective measures for communicating expectations 
and failures of governance, execution and control to people affected and to the society 
more widely.  
 
5.26 The principle of ‘accounting for decisions’ emphasises two forms of accountability that 
face in notionally divergent directions. The first is formal accountability, through 
regulatory, judicial and political procedures. In a democratic society this should be 
 
286 This notion of the public use of reason that claims the right of reason to challenge authority draws on a modern tradition from 
Kant (What is enlightenment?) that has found different contemporary expressions in European thinkers such as Jürgen 
Habermas (Moral consciousness and communicative action) and proponents of deliberative democracy (e.g. Amy Gutmann; 
Norman Daniels).  
287 For a discussion of the significance of trustworthiness and the placing of trust, see: O’Neill O (2002) Autonomy and trust in 
bioethics (Gifford Lectures 2001) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). It seems preferable to construct an initiative in 
conditions that foster trust, and that allow the interrogation of and making provision for the limits of trustworthiness, rather 
than simply to treat participants as consumers in a free market of more or less trustworthy initiatives.  
288 Those able to exploit differentials of knowledge, articulacy, economic and political power, for example. 
289 On framing see Tversky A and Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice Science 
211(4481): 453-8; on ‘groupthink’ see Turner ME and Pratkanis AR (1998) Twenty-five years of groupthink theory and 
research: lessons from the evaluation of a theory Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 73(2/3): 105-15, 
available at: http://homepages.se.edu/cvonbergen/files/2013/01/Twenty-Five-Years-of-Groupthink-Theory-and-
Research_Lessons-from-the-Evaluation-of-a-Theory.pdf.  
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accessible to those with a relevant moral interest (potentially up to the level of the 
whole political community where the data initiative in question raises issues of public 
policy). The second is accountability to the broader mass of moral stakeholders who, 
perhaps for practical reasons, cannot participate directly in the formation or governance 
of the initiative. Periodic engagement with a broader public, for example, provides a 
way of ensuring that they are fairly represented and that governance is not ‘captured’ 
by partial interests. Formal and social accountability are closely linked, as a system 
that loses its social mandate will come under pressure politically. However for either to 
work, people (and in particular the dispersed and potentially vulnerable participants 
whose information is used) need effective means of learning what has happened to 
their data. This inevitably requires a careful consideration of the design not just of the 
systems that a given data initiative calls into being, but of the institutional structures in 
which they are embedded, to ensure that there is sufficient transparency and incentives 
to report abuses and to rectify them.290
Conclusion 
  
5.27 The question we posed at the end of chapter 3 was: ‘How may we define a set of 
morally reasonable expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative, giving 
proper attention to the morally relevant interests at stake?’ Different data initiatives will 
have different objects, engage different moral values and interests, and give rise to 
different sets of expectations. We have suggested that a good answer may be given 
through a procedure of moral reasoning that is bounded by respect for persons and 
human rights, involves the participation of those representing the range of morally 
relevant interests at stake, and is embedded in institutional and social procedures for 
accountability. 
5.28 With these principles in mind, in the following chapters we consider a number of 
concrete data initiatives in order to highlight instances of good practice and areas 
where attending to these principles may offer better solutions than those that have 
been found.  
Box 5.1: Summary – ethical principles for data initiatives 
The use of data in biomedical research and health care should be in accordance with a 
publicly statable set of morally reasonable expectations and subject to appropriate 
governance.  
■ The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should be 
grounded in the principle of respect for persons. This includes recognition of a 
person’s profound moral interest in controlling others’ access to and disclosure of 
information relating to them held in circumstances they regard as confidential.  
■  The set of expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative should 
be determined with regard to established human rights. This will include limitations 
on the power of states and others to interfere with the privacy of individual citizens in 
the public interest (including to protect the interests of others). 
■ The set of expectations about how data will be used (or re-used) in a data 
initiative, and the appropriate measures and procedures for ensuring that those 
expectations are met, should be determined with the participation of people with 
 
290 See recommendation 3. 
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morally relevant interests. This participation should involve giving and receiving 
public account of the reasons for establishing, conducting and participating in the 
initiative in a form that is accepted as reasonable by all. Where it is not feasible to 
engage all those with relevant interests – which will often be the case in practice – the 
full range of values and interests should nevertheless be fairly represented.  
■ A data initiative should be subject to effective systems of governance and 
accountability that are themselves morally justified. This should include both 
structures of accountability that invoke legitimate judicial and political authority, and 
social accountability arising from engagement of people in a society. Maintaining 
effective accountability must include effective measures for communicating 
expectations and failures of governance, execution and control to people affected and 
to the society more widely.  
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Chapter 6 – Data initiatives in health systems 
Chapter overview 
This chapter discusses developments in the functions and purposes of health 
information systems and draws lessons from some specific initiatives.  
Health-care IT systems were originally introduced to facilitate basic administrative tasks 
but have evolved to provide business intelligence for service improvement and to 
support observational research. These come together in the concept of a ‘learning 
health system’.  
Information systems in the English NHS have moved towards a centralised approach 
now overseen by the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). Debate 
around the ‘care.data’ programme focused attention on assumptions about the 
relationship between privacy norms relevant to NHS patients and the legal norms under 
which HSCIC operates. It highlighted the absence of reflection on this difference and of 
a capacity to address it, and raised questions about how the rights of individuals were 
respected, resulting in a damaging loss of public and professional trust.  
The Scottish Informatics Programme involved initial public consultation to identify 
relevant social norms. It developed a model of bespoke data linkage using a safe haven, 
subject to proportionate governance that takes into account both privacy risk and public 
benefit. Governance refers to an explicit, potentially revisable, statement of guiding 
principles and best practices that takes account of the findings of public engagement.  
The 100,000 Genomes project involves linking data from genome sequencing with 
individuals’ NHS records to investigate some cancers and other diseases. Authorised 
researchers from all sectors may access a firewall-protected, pseudonymised dataset 
with the broad consent of patients. The dataset is administered by a Government-owned 
company, Genomics England Ltd. The claimed public interest lies explicitly in securing 
economic as well as scientific and therapeutic benefits, by stimulating the commercial 
sector. 
A number of recommendations are made in relation to defining reasonable expectations 
of data use, accounting for data use and delivering outcomes in the public interest. 
 
Introduction 
6.1 This chapter and the following one examine concrete contexts in which data initiatives 
have taken shape. In this chapter we will show how the introduction of information 
technology has wrought a transformation in our understanding of whole health care 
systems, particularly the NHS in the UK. From being a system focussed on the delivery 
of health care to those in immediate need, the introduction of IT in the health services 
has broadened and blurred the horizons of the system.  
6.2 In the context of health care, perhaps more than elsewhere, the potential uses of data 
have influenced choices about information technology infrastructure, which is only 
partly about the delivery of health care. Other functions include the delivery of research 
insight, better resource allocation, support for innovation and evidence to inform policy. 
Data and IT initiatives also seek to extend the boundaries of health care beyond 
responding to illness, for example, to predicting who might get ill before they 
experience any symptoms and to understanding the rich combination of medical, 
behavioural and environmental factors relevant to health conditions. 
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6.3 The health services in the UK offer a number of examples of data initiatives at different 
scales, from the macro (e.g. the National Programme for IT – NpfIT), through the meso 
(e.g. the ‘100,000 Genomes’ project) to the micro (e.g. a clinical evaluation of a 
particular intervention). These have not always gone smoothly. While their possible 
failings as infrastructure projects are of moral relevance (when they miss opportunities 
to deliver benefits, or when they use public resources inefficiently, or undermine public 
trust) our interest will be primarily to identify good practice and areas for improvement 
in how they manage the relationship between underlying norms of access and 
disclosure, respect for individual values and interests, and governance in the public 
interest. Drawing on our discussion so far, the critical decisions for each initiative will 
be those that place them at different points on the following critical axes: 
■ The arrangements for storage (whether data are retained close to the point of 
collection or gathered together in safe havens or in a single, central repository)  
■ The arrangements for data disclosure/access (whether data are published, subject to 
controlled disclosure, controlled access or mediated access)  
■ The role given to individual patients (from explicit individual consent, through implicit 
consent with opt-out, to no individual authorisation) 
■ The range of users and purposes approved for access/disclosure (from restricting 
access to particular classes of users, such as academic researchers, or an 
expectation that the broader public interest will be served by any responsible use of 
data, including by commercial users). 
6.4 The optimum relationship between norms, private freedoms and public objectives may 
be found through consideration of the interests and values at stake in the practical 
context. Health services in the UK have a long and complicated history, and giving 
attention to the way in which information use has developed will help us to understand 
the interests and drivers involved.  
IT innovation and developing information requirements 
6.5 As in other sectors, health care has a number of basic information needs that are 
increasingly met by computerised systems. The way in which these systems were 
introduced to health care paralleled other sectors in many respects, usually starting 
with routine administrative tasks.  
T rac king patients  
6.6 General Practitioners (GPs) were relatively quick to adopt computers to manage 
patient medical records, primarily to facilitate repeat prescriptions and later to manage 
complete patient records. Some of the earliest systems in the UK were developed on 
microcomputers in the late 1970s by technically adept GPs themselves.291
 
291 One of the first GP computer systems, the Integrated General Practice system was developed by an Essex GP in 
collaboration with IT staff from a local shoe factory (an example of skills clustering leading to innovation) and successfully 
marketed to other practices via a venture capital funded company (Value Added Medical Products, or VAMP). For a brief 
history, see: Health Service Journal (12 August 1999) VAMP comes alive. 
 The 
Department of Health (DH) introduced standards (‘requirements for accreditation’) in 
the late 1990s, along with government subsidies for compliant systems. These ensured 
that public administrative requirements would be incorporated alongside clinical 
requirements. In 2000 GPs were officially allowed to stop keeping paper records and 
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move to a paperless system although many had converted to a fully electronic system 
before then, albeit without necessarily having transferred legacy data from the retained 
paper files. In 2003 the new GP contract transferred effective ownership of GP systems 
away from GPs to Primary Care Organisations, which thus became the software 
vendors’ customer.292
6.7 Hospitals adopted electronic patient administration systems from the late 1960s to 
manage patient appointments and track patients across the hospital, but these were 
not primarily for managing medical data, which often continued to be held separately in 
paper notes. Patients were usually identified by an assigned ‘hospital ID’ and, where 
available, their NHS Number.
  
293
6.8 The English NHS Number used to be managed electronically through the National 
Strategic Tracing Service (NSTS), introduced in 1999 to allow NHS organisations to 
discover or check the NHS Number for individuals. This followed the recommendation 
of the first Caldicott Committee to increase the use of the NHS Number so that simple 
anonymisation could be used for administrative analyses of patient data, minimising the 
need to transmit data with full identifiers in order to link and de-duplicate datasets.
 Hospitals might also have local clinical or laboratory 
systems to capture information directly from different types of machine, such as 
analytical instruments, or from clinicians. These vary from simple spreadsheets of 
results to complex scientific systems. However, they would often be only loosely 
integrated with the central patient administration system, perhaps having the patient’s 
hospital ID as the only common feature. Regional health care systems often developed 
on the back of national requirements to facilitate collection of datasets in the days 
before universal use of the Internet (or a Virtual Private Network such as NHSNet). The 
data collected could then be used for regional planning and commissioning. 
294 
There were a number of restrictions on access to NSTS to prevent it being used to re-
identify anonymised records or to trace individuals. Unfortunately, these were so 
cumbersome or intrusive that many health regions set up their own ‘master patient 
index’ to provide a more rapid service locally, while using the NHS number only for 
those patients coming from outside their region.295 In Scotland a separate Community 
Health Index (CHI) Number is used to identify patients nationally, which must be used 
for each health care episode.296 Some countries, such as the USA, have no such 
universal health number, and it is often argued that this makes national collation of data 
difficult.297 This argument is somewhat suspect, however: universal naming systems 
are often sold as a means of improving data quality but in practice there are many 
difficulties and they rarely fulfil their potential.298
 
292 Primary Care Organisations (PCOs) are NHS England in England, Health and Social Services Boards in Northern Ireland, 
Local health boards in Wales, and primary care divisions within area health boards in Scotland. See: 
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/training-exams/gp-curriculum-overview/~/media/Files/GP-training-and-
exams/Curriculum%20previous%20versions%20as%20at%20July%202012/curr_archive_4_2_IMT_v1_0_mar06.ashx. 
 Similarly, while some people oppose 
universal numbering on privacy or even religious grounds, most patients are easily 
identified even by traditional methods such as name and date of birth. 
293 The old-style NHS Number (XXXXX NNN) originally appeared on a baby’s birth certificate; the new NHS Number (NNN-
NNN-NNNN) is allocated from birth (see: http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/nhsnumber/patients/yournumber). 
294 The Caldicott Committee (1997) Report on the review of patient-identifiable information, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/P
ublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4068403. 
295 See, for example: http://www.tamesidehospital.nhs.uk/documents/EnsuringAccuratePatientInformationPolicy.pdf. 
296 Those in the Border regions may have both, as their GP may be in England but their nearest hospital in Scotland. 
http://www.ehealth.scot.nhs.uk/support-documentation/document-holder2/. 
297 See, for example, http://www.cardiosource.org/en/Advocacy/Issues/Health-Information-Technology/ACC-Policies-and-
Activities/Unique-Patient-Identifier-Principles.aspx. 
298 See “Naming” in Anderson R (2008) Security engineering – a guide to building dependable distributed systems (Wiley), 
available at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html. 
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Obs ervational res earc h  
6.9 Various GP system providers have set up research databases based on proprietary 
extracts from their systems. First was VAMP (now InPractice Systems) whose original 
business model was to provide free PCs to GPs and then sell access of the 
aggregated data to pharmaceutical companies. This facility was donated to the 
Department of Health in 1994, where it became the GP Research Database. Most GP 
systems support a facility, MIQUEST, introduced in 1996, that allows queries to be 
run by participating GP systems at the discretion of the GP practice and return 
aggregated data for research or other purposes. Exceptionally, individual-level data 
could be requested, but only age and postal area (not full postcode) would be 
returned to limit identifiability. In 2012, the Clinical Practice Research Datalink 
(CPRD) was established. This combines the activities of the MHRA’s General 
Practice Research Database (GPRD) and the Department of Health’s NIHR Research 
Capability Programme.299 The CPRD is accessible to researchers for a variety of 
research purposes, including observational research and planning interventional trials 
and can support clinical decision making by providing clinicians with relevant, real-
world data to inform their consultations with patients.300
6.10 A number of condition-specific registries have been developed over the years to help to 
understand the effect of those conditions and provide integrated services to those 
affected. For example, cancer registries (of which there are 11 run by eight regional 
organisations, also confusingly called ‘registries’).
  
301 These cancer registries link with 
the Office of National Statistics death register to identify when patients on the various 
registries die (so mortality statistics can be generated – and compared with other 
countries’ experience).302
P erformance evaluation and improvement 
 Recruitment to registries used to be seen by recruiters as 
part of clinical care with the possibility for patient opt-out rather than specific opt-in 
consent. It was a challenge to this presumption (from some wording in the GMC 
Confidentiality guidance in 2001) that led to the introduction of Section 60 of the Health 
& Social Care Act 2001 (now Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006) and the Health Service 
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 to enable the use of this information 
for research without specific consent under some conditions (see chapter 4). The path 
established by cancer registries subsequently provided a template for other specialties. 
6.11 Organisations need feedback in order to improve quality and ensure safety. For this 
purpose, health systems generally, health organisations separately, clinical teams as 
well as individual clinicians compare their performance with the norm or with others’ 
performance. If there is a public interest in health care, there is also a public interest in 
supporting good practice and identifying and eliminating poor provision. In the UK, 
health care intelligence providers such as Dr Foster have created a business in 
monitoring and analysing outcomes so that patients and funders can see which 
 
299 See: http://www.cprd.com/home/. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Some people reserve the term ‘register’ for the database and ‘registry’ for the organisation where registering takes place. 
302 One of our reviewers drew to our attention the fact that delays in death registration in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
can have the effect of undermining the evidence-base for epidemic monitoring, record-linkage research and policy 
development. The Royal Statistical Society has recommended that registration of the fact of death (pending determination of 
cause of death) should take place in a timely fashion 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubadm/406/406we08.htm). 
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hospital departments have the lowest mortality rates.303 On the one hand, this can be 
useful in detecting failing institutions; on the other, if not interpreted with reference to 
the context, it can penalise hospitals that tackle more complex, high-risk cases turned 
down by others. Nevertheless, the trend for increased public monitoring of medical 
performance now appears to be well established. In the USA, websites like ZocDoc 
and Vitals are establishing patient feedback as a norm, as TripAdvisor has done for 
hotels.304
6.12 The distinction between striving for continual improvements in productivity through 
efficiency and innovation, and improving health through developing better patient 
information and treatment – that is, through research – begins to disappear in the 
concept of a so-called ‘learning health care system’. While these two senses of ‘service 
improvement’ (business productivity and improved care) have always been related, 
they have been the subject of separate information and governance systems. The 
integration of these systems represents a more recent innovation.  
 
6.13 Three moral justifications have been suggested for this integration: the need for a just 
system, for high quality care, and for a system that supports economic well-being. 305 
These are said to entail moral requirements on both clinicians and patients to 
participate in research aimed at service improvement (‘learning’).306 The key claim is 
that there is no ‘do nothing’ option because of the growing pressure of circumstances: 
at an individual level, people are getting ill (healthy people becoming ill, ill people 
getting more ill, and new illnesses appearing); at a system level, resources to meet 
these demands are more or less tightly constrained (although the level of constraint is, 
of course, a result of political decisions). Proponents of learning health systems may 
accept that the risk of data abuses increases as a result of a learning activity, and that 
such activities may impose additional burdens on patients (such as extra visits to 
clinics). However, they believe that these can be minimised through appropriate 
controls and that the residual risk is justified.307
P ublic  adminis tration and s ervic e delivery  
 
6.14 Over the last 25 years, there has been continuous pressure for more administrative 
access to records for purposes such as clinical audit, service planning and cost 
control.308
 
303 See: www.drfoster.com. 
 Indeed, these may often have been the real drivers behind centralisation 
efforts, with ‘research’ promoted as a desirable further purpose and often as the public 
rationale. The biggest single driver of centralisation in the UK was, however, the 
304 The Economist (26 July 2014) DocAdvisor, available at: http://www.economist.com/news/international/21608767-patients-
around-world-are-starting-give-doctors-piece-their-mind-result/. 
305 See Faden RR, Kass NE, Goodman SN, et al. (2013) An ethics framework for a learning health care system: a departure 
from traditional research ethics and clinical ethics Hastings Center Report 43(s1): S16-S27, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hast.134/full. 
306 Faden et al. (op.cit) offer a Rawlsian account of common good to justify a 'norm of common purpose'. This is based on "the 
reciprocal obligation that arises among strangers who occupy the role of patient over time" (at page 23). In their system, the 
first 4 principles they advance are designed to protect individual rights and freedoms, and limit the claims that can be made 
of any individual participant. 
307 Ibid. 
308 The collection of UK national statistics was a recommendation of the Körner Committee, which carried out a major review of 
health service information between 1980 and 1984. In the 1980s the NHS Exeter system was developed to bring together 
data sets from across England with 21 regional centres collating data and transmitting them to the national centre at Exeter 
(building on an earlier initiative to develop a national PAS system there). The data covered a range of topics from GP 
registrations, organ donor registration, national screening programmes, to GP capitation payments. The Exeter system is 
now known as the National Health Applications and Infrastructure Services (NHAIS). 
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purchaser/provider split, introduced in 1991.309 The fact that medical procedures 
performed in hospitals had to be paid for meant that information about the procedure, 
the patient, and the cost had to flow on a large scale. This led to the establishment of 
the Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) database, amongst others, to track activity 
across the NHS as a whole. 310 The HES database was largely populated using data 
from the NHS-wide Clearing Service which handled payments. Otherwise data was 
only available on a piecemeal basis, gleaned from individual audits or research 
studies.311
6.15 In 1992, the Department of Health published the Information Management and 
Technology (IM&T) Strategy, whose vision was a single electronic health record (EHR) 
for each patient, accessible to everyone working within the NHS.
  
312 The British Medical 
Association objected that making patient records available beyond the teams 
responsible for a patient’s direct care would compromise both safety and privacy.313 
This led to the first Caldicott review and the creation of ‘Caldicott Guardians’.314
6.16 In 2002, with high-profile backing from the (then) Prime Minister, the Department of 
Health announced a major infrastructure initiative, the National Programme for IT 
(NPfIT). This was to be implemented by Connecting for Health, a new agency 
established to drive forward ‘ruthless standardisation’ across the NHS in England.
 In 
1998, NHS England released a new IT strategy, Information for Health, promoting the 
adoption of both EPRs that would be held at a particular care provider and EHRs to be 
shared across all providers.  
315 
(Wales and Scotland had separate initiatives taking rather different approaches.) The 
aspiration was to deliver the EPR systems promised in Information for Health, in a time 
frame of about three years.316
6.17 The NPfIT supported a number of features. Some, like the Picture Archiving and 
Communication System, which provided an accessible electronic archive for radiology 
images, proved to be both useful and successful.
  
317
 
309 NHS and Community Care Act 1990, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/19/contents. The internal market 
was brought to an end in 1997 but the split continued through the introduction of Primary Care Groups (then Primary Care 
Trusts). 
 Others, like the ‘Choose and Book’ 
310 Initially data were collected annually, then quarterly. At the time of writing they are collected on a monthly basis 
(http://www.hscic.gov.uk/hes). 
311 It is notable that it was only in 1999 that Professor Sir Brian Jarman at Imperial College used HES data to produce 
comparative mortality statistics, thus creating quite a storm about why these figures were unreliable, though few suggestions 
on how to improve on them and reduce adverse incidents. See: Jarman B, Gault S, Alves B, et al. (1999) Explaining 
differences in English hospital death rates using routinely collected data British Medical Journal 318: 1515-20, available at: 
http://www.bmj.com/content/318/7197/1515.full. 
312 Department of Health (1992) Getting better with information: an IM&T Strategy for the NHS in England (London: HMSO). 
See: http://www.intosaiitaudit.org/9899371.pdf. 
313 R Anderson (1996) Security in clinical information systems, British Medical Association, available at: 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/policy11/policy11.html. 
314 See paragraph 2.43. 
315 Department of Health (2002) Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS, national strategic programme, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/
@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4071684.pdf. 
316 Computer Weekly (18 Feb 2008) Secret papers reveal Blair’s rushed NpfIT plans, Computer Weekly, available at: 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/public-sector/2008/02/secret-papers-reveal-blairs-ru.html; BBC News (25 October 
2007) NHS IT time-frame 'ludicrously tight', available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7061590.stm; Campion-Awwad O, 
Hayton A, Smith L and Vuaran M (2014, MPhil Public Policy 2014, University of Cambridge) The national programme for IT 
in the NHS – a case history, available at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/npfit-mpp-2014-case-history.pdf, at page 13.  
317 Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACS), though not part of the original specification for NPfIT, moved 
radiology images from film-based processing to electronic recording. The systems were generally set up on a regional basis 
as a shared service to hospitals (with feeds to GP practices as well) for economies of scale. In this case, the technology was 
well developed if not widely adopted: a few leading sites (mainly in the USA) had taken on such facilities and proved them to 
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electronic booking system to enable a GP to book a specialist appointment for a patient 
while the patient was still in the surgery, were much less so. One feature strongly 
promoted by Connecting for Health was the Summary Care Record (SCR), a 
nationwide system containing a GP record summary (initially, current prescriptions and 
allergies) that would facilitate out-of-hours care and could also enable patients to view 
their own records via a mechanism called HealthSpace.  
Box 6.1: The Summary Care Record 
The first national care record to be implemented was the Scottish Emergency Care 
Summary (ECS), starting in 2002 and achieving near complete coverage by 2007.318
It was limited to basic allergies, adverse drug reactions, and current (<12 months) 
medications data. Patients were able to opt out and would be asked for ‘consent to view’ 
the record by clinicians treating them.
 
The role of the ECS was simply to allow the most immediate medical details to be 
available in an emergency, by out-of-hours GPs, clinicians at Accident and Emergency 
(A&E) departments in hospitals, or call-centre staff at NHS24.  
319
The introduction of the Summary Care Record (SCR) in England was more ambitious, 
carried out on a reduced timescale (2½ years) as the first stage in a move to full 
electronic health records and involved a wholesale replacement of almost all NHS 
systems as part of the National Programme for IT. Initially it would contain a summary of 
information from the patient’s GP system and referral and discharge correspondence 
(though not clinical details), and, later, Common Assessment Framework (CAF) care 
plan documents to permit ‘joined up’ care delivery between health and social care 
services.  
 
The decision to provide access to the system through a browser-based stand-alone 
application raised security and confidentiality concerns as it separated the access to the 
SCR from any local governance process. It also created some confusion between the 
SCR as a record and the SCR ‘application’, and how each might be accessed. 
The SCR has been bedevilled by technical and policy difficulties that derived largely 
from the scale of the ambition and the number of variables, including arguments about 
what options individuals might exercise (which information could be uploaded from 
detailed care records, including, for example, ‘sealed’/‘sealed and locked’ envelopes), 
the legitimacy of default options (the RCGP and BMA argued for an ‘opt in’ approach, for 
example), and how individuals’ choices could be given effect through the technical 
architecture of the system.  
 
 
be effective. The technology also required relatively little change to clinical practice (calling up an image on screen was often 
easier than obtaining the film) but it enabled a number of further enhancements. It raised the possibility of rationalising 
radiology reporting services across hospitals, rather than requiring each hospital to have its own staff; teams could be 
merged, relocated, or even outsourced if necessary, though this led to important debates about patient understanding of how 
their images might be shared and whether reduction of clinician-radiologist interaction mattered. 
318 Although this was the first national record, the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Care Record was implemented even earlier. 
While all 14 Health Boards participated, in 2007 some 7 GP practices had chosen not to participate, so their patients’ records 
where not present. It is not clear if this was for reasons of principle or practicalities, such as incompatible systems. 
319 Nevertheless the system was the subject of a high-profile confidentiality failure when a doctor accessed the records of a 
number of public figures. See: “Medical records of Gordon Brown and Alex Salmond hacked” Daily Record, 1 March 2009, 
available at: http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/medical-records-of-gordon-brown-and-alex-1011941. 
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6.18 However, a review of the SCR in 2010 found little evidence of benefit. It found that 
even staff in Accident and Emergency services did not often access it and that patients 
also made little use of HealthSpace.320 A significant number of people also opted out of 
the SCR owing to concerns about data would be handling.321 (Criticism that the patient 
information circulated in pilot areas made opting out difficult led the campaign ‘The Big 
Opt Out’ to produce an opt-out letter, which was extensively downloaded.) The NPfIT 
was officially dismantled in 2013 with major objectives unachieved and amid public 
criticism of management failure and cost overrun.322
Box 6.2: Connecting for Health – an assessment 
  
NPfIT has been described as ‘the largest ever civilian IT project failure in human 
history’.323 It has been documented by many articles in the computing and health IT 
press and by successive parliamentary committee inquiries. A recent case history 
classifies the problems according to three main themes:324
■ Haste. Politicians and programme managers rushed policy making, procurement and 
implementation processes, allowing insufficient time for consultation with key 
stakeholders and failed to deal with confidentiality concerns;  
 
■ Design. The government pursued an overambitious and unwieldy centralised model, 
without giving consideration to how this would impact user satisfaction and 
confidentiality issues; and 
■ Culture and skills. NPfIT lacked clear direction, project management and an exit 
strategy, meaning that the inevitable setbacks of pursuing such an ambitious 
programme quickly turned into system-wide failures. Furthermore, the culture within 
the Department of Health and government in general was not conducive to swift 
identification and rectification of strategic or technical errors. 
One further problem with the centralised commissioning and ownership of health IT is 
that IT suppliers respond to the priorities of the customer rather than the clinical user of 
the system, which allowed the collection of data for central use to compete with the 
objective of improved care or efficient local service delivery.325
 
320 Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, et al. (2010) The devil’s in the detail: final report of the independent evaluation of the 
Summary Care Record and HealthSpace programmes, available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/scriefullreport.pdf. This was 
equally true of patient-centred health record offerings from Google and Microsoft: the former has been closed and the latter 
developed into a more conventional ‘white label’ product. For a discussion of online personal health records, see Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2010) Medical profiling and online medicine: the ethics of 'personalised healthcare' in a consumer age, 
available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/personalised-healthcare-0/. 
 
321 As of 18 December 2014 the number of people who had opted out was 528,034 according to the HSCIC (see: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/2220/FOI-disclosure-log).  
322 House of Commons Public Accounts Select Committee (2013) The dismantled National Programme for IT in the NHS 
(Nineteenth Report of Session 2013–14) HC 294 (London: TSO), available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news/npfit-
report/. 
323 See: The NHS’s national programme for information technology: a dossiers of concerns (2010), available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.304.9601&rep=rep1&type=pdf; House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee, The national programme for IT in the NHS: progress since 2006, 2nd report of session 2008-09, HC 
153, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubacc/153/153.pdf; Computer Weekly 
(22 September 2011) The world’s biggest civilian IT project finally looks to have failed but is the NHS IT failure a surprise?, 
available at: http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/outsourcing/2011/09/the-worlds-biggest-civilian-it-project-finally-looks-to-
have-failed-but-it-is-no-surprise.html.  
324 A recent case history classifies the problems according to three main themes. See: Campion-Awwad O, Hayton A, Smith L 
and Vuaran M (2014, MPhil Public Policy 2014, University of Cambridge) The national programme for IT in the NHS – a case 
history, available at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/npfit-mpp-2014-case-history.pdf. 
325 Foundation for Information Policy Research, Evidence submitted by the Foundation for Information Policy Resarch (EPR 61), 
Select Committee on Health, 15 March 2007; at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmhealth/422/422we22.htm. 
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6.19 The experience of the NPfIT may, nevertheless, be salutary for health care data 
initiatives more generally because it highlight the risks of external drivers overtaking the 
establishment of data initiatives (see chapter 2) and of lack of involvement or 
imbalance of key interests, and the need adequately to address values and norms 
relating to confidentiality (chapter 5). These lessons are important, moreover, because 
the SCR service, along with many of the other projects previously overseen by 
Connecting for Health, have themselves continued, with responsibility for their delivery 
having been passed to the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). 
The Health and Social Care Information Centre 
6.20 The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) has replaced Connecting for 
Health as the Department of Health’s agency for driving the implementation and use of 
health IT for business intelligence and to equip the NHS to be a learning health system. 
Box 6.3: The Health and Social Care Information Centre 
The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) is an executive non-
departmental public body that took its current form following the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 (HSCA). The HSCIC was created with the intention of being a national focal 
point for information collection across health and social care that is responsible for 
collecting, transporting, storing, analysing and disseminating the nation’s health and 
social care data.326 Continuing the work of its predecessor, the NHS Information Centre, 
and absorbing continuing elements of the Connecting for Health programme (e.g. the 
NHS Spine, the National Back Office and SUS), a key aim of the HSCIC is to provide a 
trusted ‘safe haven’ for health data.327
The stated aim of the HSCIC is to ‘revolutionise’ the ability to unlock NHS and care data. 
It has been given the legal and administrative power and responsibility to: 
 NHS health data comprises approximately a 
quarter of this data; the majority is social care data. 
■ Collect information from health and social care bodies 
■ Hold that information within a secure environment 
■ Make that information readily available for others to turn into “actionable business 
intelligence”328
At present, the HSCIC collects a range of information, including (monthly) Hospital 
Episodes Statistics (HES) which relate to in- and out-patient appointments, and accident 
and emergency admissions. This is intended to be supplemented by primary care data 
through NHS England’s ‘care.data’ programme (see below).  
 
 
6.21 The intention is that the HSCIC will hold comprehensive and integrated information 
about the care patients receive from all parts of the health service, including hospitals 
and GP practices. It is hoped that by collecting this information and analysing it, 
 
326 The responsibility to provide information under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was analysed in Grace J and Taylor MJ 
(2013) Disclosure of confidential patient information and the duty to consult: the role of the health and social care information 
centre Medical Law Review 21(3): 415-47. 
327 Health and Social Care Information Centre (2014) A strategy for the Health and Social Care Information Centre 2013-2015, 
available at: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/13557/A-strategy-for-the-Health-and-Social-Care-Information-Centre-2013-
2015/pdf/hscic-strategy-2014.pdf. 
328 Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2012. Exploiting the potential of health and care data, available at: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/ourrole. 
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researchers can compare the safety of different NHS hospitals, monitor trends in 
different diseases and treatments and use the data to plan new health services.  
6.22 There are two levels of information release relevant to the HSCIC: general publication 
(i.e. open data) and limited access.329 Data disclosed for limited access may include 
potentially identifying individual-level data or, with the subjects’ consent or if it is in the 
public interest, identifying data. Disclosures are governed by agreements about 
purposes for which the data will be used, who will have access, and whether they may 
be sold on to third parties.330
Box 6.4: Data available from HSCIC 
 (In theory, the HSCIC could audit compliance with these 
agreements but in practice it does not and this does not seem to be budgeted for in the 
costs recovered through the charges made for data extracts.) The HSCIC also offers to 
link its own data to data supplied by the customer (see Box 6.5 below).  
Product Description 
Tabulation A statistical table of aggregate data. 
Bespoke extract - 
pseudonymised  
A one-off extract tailored to the customer’s requirements of 
specified data fields containing patient identifiable data, sensitive 
data items or both. 
Standard extract Cumulative data for the financial year to date, delivered on a 
monthly basis via a subscription service. Users sign up to 
receive a year’s worth of data, delivered in monthly increments 
Bespoke data 
linkage 
A bespoke service linking one or more datasets held by the 
HSCIC to data supplied by the customer. 
Patient status 
and/or tracking 
Products designed to enable customers to receive one-off or on-
going notifications of mortality and morbidity events affecting a 
specified patient cohort. 
List cleaning Validating demographic data to ensure it is accurate and improve 
linkage outcomes. 
Source: Data Linkage and Extract Service: Service Charges 2013/14331
 
 
6.23 While HSCIC will not exclude particular organisations from using their data, access to 
datasets will only be granted if the data will be used broadly for purposes beneficial to 
health or health care.332
 
329 The Health and Social Care Act 2012 (s.260) imposes a general duty on the HSCIC to publish data that it collects, although 
identifying data are exempt from this requirement. 
 In providing data, the HSCIC operates on a ‘cost recovery’ 
basis: it does not charge for data itself but applies charges to cover the costs of 
processing and delivering its service. The cost is determined by the amount and type of 
data required (between a few hundred and a few thousand pounds). The HSCIC takes 
330 ‘commercial reuse licenses’ enable firms to resell personal health information to third parties. See also the HSCIC register of 
approved data releases: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/dataregister.  
331 Available at: www.hscic.gov.uk/media/12443/data-linkage-service-charges-2013-2014-
updated/pdf/dles_service_charges__2013_14_V10_050913.pdf.  
332 This was clarified in the Care Act 2014, s.122; which amends s.261 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to specify that 
the HSCIC may only further disseminate information for the purposes of ‘the provision of health care or adult social care’ or 
‘the promotion of health’. The breadth allowed of these purposes was debated during the passage of the Act. 
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advice on data access from its Data Access Advisory Group (DAAG), which makes 
available details of all approved projects that utilised HSCIC’s datasets containing 
‘sensitive’ data. Sensitive data may include a patient’s NHS number, postcode, date of 
birth and/or death, physical and mental health, etc. This arrangement was later fortified, 
but not before the HSCIC had been exposed to considerable political turmoil. 
6.24 As we have argued in this report, questions about the terms under which information 
may be collected and disclosed by the HSCIC need to be answered by first 
establishing the norms of access and disclosure that govern the kinds of information 
transactions involved. These questions found a public focus in the debate that arose 
around the programme to extract GP data for inclusion in the HSCIC database. This 
brought many GPs and civil society groups into conflict with NHS England, resulting in 
delayed implementation and redesign of the initiative.  
Box 6.5: The NHS England ‘care.data’ programme  
Care.data is a programme commissioned by NHS England and promoted with the 
caption ‘better information means better care’. Its purpose is to bring together routinely 
collected information from NHS organisations within the HSCIC. Care.data has been 
particularly focussed on the extraction of data from primary care records (GP data) and 
widening the range of data collected from secondary care (hospital data), to add to the 
hospital episode statistics (HES) data already routinely collected by HSCIC.333
The collection of GP data is through a new General Practice Extraction Service (GPES), 
which extracts information stored electronically within GP practices and sends it to the 
HSCIC. 
 
334
In the future, it is anticipated that care.data will join up with other NHS projects, for 
example, allowing phenotypic data to be linked to the genomic data produced by the 
100k Genome Project being delivered by Genomics England Ltd (GeL).
 This information does not include patient names but does include each 
individual’s NHS number, date of birth and full post code, as well as the patient’s history 
of diagnoses, prescriptions, vaccinations, etc. At present, particularly sensitive 
information (e.g. pregnancy termination) and handwritten or ‘free text’ notes will not be 
extracted.  
335
 
  
 
333 In Scotland, the mandated use of the CHI Number in relation to all health episodes, the comprehensive computerisation of 
routine clinical data and the centralisation of NHS data has allowed the Scottish Informatics Programme (SHIP) to develop a 
platform for EPR research involving the linkage of health and other records (now based at the Farr Institute @ Scotland 
(http://www.farrinstitute.org/centre/Scotland/3_About.html). Though different (and clearer) in its aims from care.data, SHIP 
has had a less troubled development than care.data, involving more academic reflection and a programme of public 
engagement in relation to its governance arrangements. 
334 See: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/gpes. This was originally due to begin in Spring 2014 but was delayed owing to opposition from 
GPs and civil society groups, with a pilot finally announced in late 2014. A function of GPES is to feed the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) used to calculate a significant part of GPs’ remuneration. QOF payments are made for meeting 
multiple targets for activities from screening through immunisation, and were previously claimed using paper forms. The 
proposal that QOF payments be computed automatically on live patient data that would be subjected to bulk upload without 
the practical possibility of an opt-out for either GPs or patients led to widespread protest. GPES is owned and managed for 
the NHS by the HSCIC and has an Independent Advisory Group (IAG), which considers applications to extract data from GP 
clinical systems from other organisations (e.g. NHS England, Public Health England) according to a defined approvals 
process (see: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/3472/Customer-requirements). 
335 Indeed, Sir John Chisholm, Executive Chair of GeL, has recently become a Non-Executive Director at HSCIC. GeL state that 
it is intended that the findings of the 100k Genome Project will be linked with identifiable data from primary care and hospital 
records and that this can be linked to relevant clinical data. See: ‘On the progress and outcomes from the NHS England 
Genomics Strategy Board and the genetics lab reconfiguration’, http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/180713-item16.pdf. See also: Tim Kelsey, The Guardian (5 November 2013) Five ways to enable 
transparency in the NHS, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2013/nov/05/transparency-operating-
principle-nhs.  
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6.25 A number of arguments have been deployed to establish the moral reasonableness of 
the care.data programme. The example is highly instructive because the sites of these 
arguments have moved from the extension of implicit norms, through attempts to 
rebalance these in legislation, to a public account of political decision making. 
T he moral jus tific ation of the ‘c are.data’ programme 
6.26 When care.data was initially proposed it was framed as an extension of previous 
programmes, such as the Secondary Uses Service (SUS) initiated by Connecting for 
Health.336
6.27 Any argument by analogy to previous initiatives is, however, only as robust as the 
justification for those previous initiatives. The identification of an inconsistency in 
attitudes between care.data and SUS or CPRD (if it is an inconsistency) does not 
indicate which (if either) of the inconsistent beliefs is correct. Care.data attracted a high 
level of media attention whereas SUS did not: however, it might be that people would 
have objected to SUS more strongly or in greater numbers if there had been a greater 
level of awareness of it.
 Analogies can also be drawn to other programmes such as the Clinical 
Practice Research Datalink (see paragraph 6.9 above), which already links a number 
of the same data sources that will be linked by the HSCIC and which has been 
implemented without critical attention. A first argument, then, is that if there is no 
morally significant distinction between these initiatives, and others have been 
accepted, then to object to care.data would be inconsistent.  
337 This raises important questions about how those norms 
were established (questions that we suggest may be addressed by our third and fourth 
principles of participation and accounting for decisions– see chapter 5). It has since 
become common ground that there was insufficient communication and consultation 
with key stakeholders prior to the planned introduction of the care.data programme.338
6.28 A second potential weakness of this argument is the robustness of the analogy. That is, 
whether the HSCIC’s proposed activities are constrained within the scope of those 
previously accepted (in the case of SUS, for example) and established in data 
protection law (see below) or, on the other hand, whether they transgress previously 
accepted moral and, arguably, legal norms of privacy and disclosure. Crucial in this 
respect is the question of who might have access to data or might receive extracted 
data from HSCIC, and for what purposes (which has been taken up through legislative 
action to re-establish a legal norm and associated mechanisms).
  
339
6.29 A second site of justification, then, concerns the legal norms applicable to care.data, 
specifically those of data protection and data sharing. The cornerstone of data 
protection law, that data processing should be fair, requires reasonable steps to be 
taken to give notice to the data subject of the purposes for which their data will be 
used.
  
340
 
336 See http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/sus. It is interesting that care.data is widely seen as 
controversial where SUS was not. Indeed, it has been argued that care.data became controversial only because the 
Secretary of State, in undertaking to honour the choice to ‘opt out’, actually gave prominence to the question of choice, and 
that the media became widely engaged with the issue. 
 In August 2013 NHS England maintained that it was the responsibility of GPs, 
337 In this case, the argument turns in the opposite direction and becomes a criticism of previous failings to inform the public. 
338 See: http://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/02/19/response-info-share/; http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/cd-stakeholder-lett.pdf. 
339 See the Care Act 2014, discussed below. 
340 DPA 1998, Sched.1, Part II. See also: Grace J and Taylor MJ (2013) Disclosure of confidential patient information and the 
duty to consult: the role of the Health and Social Care Information Centre Medical Law Review 21(3): 415-47. 
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as controllers of primary care patient data, to inform their patients about the data 
extractions. Owing to the extraordinary demands this would place on GPs’ resources, 
an attempt was made to inform patients through a NHS England leaflet, ‘Better 
information means better care’, which was sent to households in England.341 This was, 
however, widely criticised for its uninformative design, its limited circulation and its 
resulting lack of success in generating awareness; it did little to persuade many GPs 
that patients had been adequately informed.342 This information would be all the more 
important if patients were to be able meaningfully to exercise the opt-out they had been 
promised.343 This notwithstanding, however, the Health and Social Care Act 2012, in 
effect, mandated the submission of data to the HSCIC. The effect of the two Acts 
placed GPs at the intersection of potentially inconsistent requirements – not to submit 
data without giving adequate notice to the data subjects and to submit data to the 
HSCIC – that each invoked norms of privacy and public interest.344 On the eve of the 
first extractions, pressure from GP bodies and civil society groups caused a 
postponement of the data extraction to allow time to ‘build understanding’ of the aims 
and benefits of care.data.345
6.30 A third site of justification is the public account given of the conditions to which 
care.data was the proposed response, conditions that implicitly entailed the recognition 
of new norms in the light of which the care.data approach would be justified. Alongside 
considerations of individual privacy, there is a public interest in making use of data if 
doing so results in more efficient health service planning and delivery, better treatment 
and the development of scientific knowledge. Other things being equal, there is 
  
 
341 This was a volte-face from the position in August 2013, when the NHSE maintained that it was the responsibility of GPs to 
inform their patients about care.data. For the leaflet, see: http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/cd-leaflet-
01-14.pdf. The leaflet did not go to households that have registered with the Royal Mail’s ‘door to door opt-out’. However, it 
was delivered to households using the Mail Preference Service (see: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/cy/request/royal_mail_contract_for_caredata). 
342 In relation to its design, it was criticised for biased presentation of the benefits and risks of care.data, for failing to provide 
adequate information about how to opt out, and for not taking advice (Dame Fiona Caldicott, speaking to the BBC Radio 4 
PM programme, said that NHS England had gone ahead without waiting for her IIGOP committee’s advice on the leaflet 
(see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-27069553). It was also criticised in terms of its circulation (for example, an ICM 
survey for the BBC found that only 29% of 860 adults polled recalled receiving the leaflet and about 45% of people remain 
unaware of the plan to share some data from GP medical records; see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-26187980). 
Further criticisms included that the leaflet was not accessible for people with visual impairments and some others, and that it 
did not include the term ‘care.data’ anywhere. 
343 Patients were promised the opportunity to opt out of the programme by the Secretary of State for Health in the wake of the 
publication of the 2012 Information Governance Review report. As the HSCIC privacy impact assessment acknowledges, 
”patients have a right to object to personal information about them being collected and used by the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre” (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/12931/Privacy-Impact-
Assessment/pdf/privacy_impact_assessment_2013.pdf, at page 16). In law, this ‘opt out’ is constituted by a right to object to 
the use of data (with the ICO as an arbiter), which, pursuant to the Secretary of State’s undertaking, would be automatically 
upheld. Even in June 2014, however, an Ipsos MORI poll of 1,958 UK adults commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform 
Trust found that 51% of respondents said they had never heard of the scheme and 13% had heard of it but did not know 
what it was. On the substantive issues, a small majority were opposed to the ‘opt out’ basis on which care.data is 
proceeding, with 40% saying that their GP should only be allowed to share their data with explicit consent, and 13% saying 
that said data shouldn’t be shared by GPs under any circumstances. (This compares with 27% who said GPs should be able 
to share patient records if they had been informed and given a chance to opt out and 10% who said that they should be 
shared even without informing them.) See 
http://www.jrrt.org.uk/sites/jrrt.org.uk/files/documents/IpsosJRRTprivacypollMay2014full.pdf. 
344 It is important to appreciate, as we have argued, that norms of privacy and public interest are implied in both the applicable 
Acts (i.e. it is not the case that one defends individual privacy and the other the claims of public good), although arguably to 
different effect. This is also the case with the Care Act 2014. This is not inconsistent with the proposition that legislative 
action in this case is attempting to affect moral norms rather than merely to reflect them. 
345 In a letter to NHS England on the eve of the first intended extractions, the RCGP said: “While we recognise the substantial 
programme of activity and materials that has already been developed to communicate care.data, we believe that there is a 
deficit of awareness and understanding regarding the scheme amongst many members of the public and professionals.” 
(Letter from RCGP Honorary Secretary, Professor Nigel Mathers, to NHS England (18 February 2014), quoted in RCGP 
news release; see: http://www.rcgp.org.uk/news/2014/february/rcgp-calls-for-reassurances-before-controversial-data-
scheme-goes-ahead.aspx). See Pulse (17 February 2014) GPC calls for urgent talks over public awareness of care.data 
scheme, available at: http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/your-practice/practice-topics/it/gpc-calls-for-urgent-talks-over-public-
awareness-of-caredata-scheme/1/20005884.article?&PageNo=1&SortOrder=dateadded&PageSize=20#.VLZvx3uj9Oc. 
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likewise a public interest in using health data to generate economic growth by 
stimulating economic activity around it, and generating revenue or saving costs for the 
health service. The proponents of care.data have argued that there is such an 
overwhelming public interest in the programme that privacy interests should be 
qualified proportionately.346 This argument has been stated in terms no less than that 
‘the future survival of the NHS depends upon it.’347
6.31 The cogency of this argument depends on accepting its premises. These include (1) 
that changing conditions require such a measure to improve the efficiency of health 
care so that it can continue to be provided as a public good; (2) that the proposed 
approach is likely to contribute to this objective in the way intended
  
348; and (3) that the 
proposed approach is preferable to all alternatives.349 These premises rest on a 
number of further factual, political and speculative claims. It is empirically true, for 
example, that, with ageing populations and increasing technological intensity, inflation 
in health care costs has outstripped the rise in other prices worldwide. Nevertheless, 
UK health care is largely funded through taxation and the adequacy of resources is 
substantially a matter of political decision rather than a hard constraint. It is likely, 
therefore, that the NHS will continue to be caught in major political arguments about 
funding and resource allocation, with or without the business intelligence and advances 
in treatment promised by the HSCIC.350
Moving the arguments forward 
 
6.32 With moral and, arguably, also legal norms unresolved a second layer of debate 
concerned how individual freedoms should be respected. The default setting (choice of 
opt-out or opt-in) and the level of public information became a new focus of debate. 
The justification of default inclusion might be seen as extending the norm of social 
solidarity that is conventionally assumed to underwrite the provision of public health 
care. However, the content of those norms is not well developed or widely discussed 
(as the previous section shows). For example, the ‘imagined community’ to which these 
norms are referred is often taken to exclude commercial firms. However, disclosure of 
data to commercial firms is within the intentions of the HSCIC, so long as their objects 
are consistent with the purposes specified in law.351
 
346 See ECHR, Art.8(2). 
  
347 See evidence to House of Commons Health Select Committee, February 2014. Tim Kelsey: “My view is that it is one of the 
most important public debates we are having and it is about the future of the health service.” (Oral Evidence: Care.data 
database, HC 1105, 25 February 2014, available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/handling-of-nhs-
patient-data/oral/6788.pdf, at page 34). 
348 We noted in chapter 2 that the policy discourse has been consistently ambitious. For example, a 2014 report from a big data 
solutions company claims that better use of data analytics could free £16.5 billion and £66 billion worth of NHS capacity. 
349 Some have argued that if the same project were set on a voluntary basis people would decline to participate in such 
numbers that the data would be significantly less valuable. A major concern of those who opposed an opt-in approach is that 
it would disproportionately disadvantage those who are most vulnerable and in need of its benefits (i.e. those who have low 
social power and status, and are already disadvantaged, including the elderly and those with long-term illness and disability). 
The second premise has been challenged, however: it can be argued that a certain level of non-participation (whether 
through ‘opting out’ or choosing not to ‘opt in’) would be tolerable and still allow the aims of the programme to be met. (See: 
evidence to HC Health SC, February 2014, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/health-committee/news/14-02-25-cdd-ev/ and http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06781/caredata. On 
mandatory inclusion and the (un)acceptability of ‘free riding’, see paragraph 5.12. 
350 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2014) Funding pressures in the NHS: an ethical response (Forward Look background 
paper), available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/NHS_resource_pressures_final_FL_paper1.pdf. 
351 On ‘imagined communities’, see Busby H and Martin P (2006) Biobanks, national identity and imagined genetic communities: 
the case of UK biobank Science as Culture 15(3): 237-251. As we noted, the research and innovation system is complex, so 
 
 112 
6.33 The question of who might have access to the data and to whom it might be disclosed 
in turn raised the question of governance of data use by the HSCIC. This turned the 
spotlight on the organisation’s decision making procedures and their (or their 
predecessor, the NHS information Centre’s) management of data sharing agreements. 
HSCIC provided little clarity on how data would be used in the run up to the initial 
launch date of the care.data extraction programme and, indeed, had not at that time 
published a code of practice.352 Civil society groups opposed to the proposed 
introduction of care.data and the media began to draw attention to cases in which 
individual-level health data had been disclosed widely (including by the HSCIC’s 
predecessor body, the NHS Information Centre) in ways that presented re-identification 
risks.353
6.34 In these ways, the key moral elements of a data initiative that we have discussed in this 
report, namely, the relationship between the underlying moral norms (including their 
relationship to legal norms), the way of respecting individual moral interests and 
values, and the way in which decisions are made and accounted for, finally became 
explicit and the subject of public and political discourse.  
 
Solutions for the HSCIC  
6.35 Care.data has raised to public prominence a debate about the justification, beyond the 
purely legal basis, of the HSCIC’s collection and release of data. According to our 
approach, outlined in chapter 5, the moral question that confronts the HSCIC is to 
define a public set of morally reasonable expectations about the use of data generated 
by health and social care services. This should be done within a framework of 
principles that takes the mutual implication of public and private interests that we 
discussed in chapter 3 into account.  
6.36 The first task should be to identify the relevant norms. There may have been an 
assumption that there were no novel features and therefore that the norms of social 
and health care, of the ‘presumed broad consent’ of patients to the use of data within 
the NHS, would apply unaltered to the HSCIC initiative. However, the HSCIC initiative 
appeared to want to keep the scope of potential uses broad, in the spirit of treating data 
as a resource with multiple and undefined potential uses. It is not at all clear that all 
these possible uses would fall within the expectations of patients, and the reaction of 
GPs, civil society groups and the media demonstrated this. Indeed, findings from public 
opinion research suggest, as we noted in chapter 5, that while there is broad public 
support for some further uses of care data, such as biomedical research, many 
individuals still want to be asked about this, and there are other uses, such as 
commercial uses, that are viewed with suspicion.354
 
that even if medical research is carried out in English universities on an entirely non-profit basis, the commercialisation of 
any drugs discovered will almost inevitably involve the pharmaceutical industry. 
 It may be that these views would 
352 A code of practice has now been published by the HSCIC whilst this report was being finalised: HSCIC (2014) Code of 
practice on confidential information, available at: http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/infogov/codes/cop/code.pdf. 
353 Complaints were made to the ICO regarding the publicised ‘Staple Inn incident’ where individual-level data were apparently 
released to insurance actuaries. See: Information rights and wrongs blog (24 February 2014) Hospital records sold to 
insurance companies – in breach of the data protection act?, available at: 
http://informationrightsandwrongs.com/2014/02/24/hospital-records-sold-to-insurance-companies-in-breach-of-the-data-
protection-act/. A review of data releases made by the NHS IC was subsequently carried out by a non-executive director of 
the HSCIC, Sir Nick Partridge. The review identified a number of incidents relating to the previous body and also to HSCIC; 
some refer to ongoing practices at HSCIC and made recommendations, which have been accepted by the HSCIC. See: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/datareview. 
354 Hill EM, Turner EL, Martin RM, and Donovan, JL (2013) “Let’s get the best quality research we can”: public awareness and 
acceptance of consent to use existing data in health research: a systematic review and qualitative study BMC Medical 
Research Methodology 13: 72, available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/13/72. 
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not withstand further reasoning: we noted in chapter 2 that the involvement of 
commercial firms is a feature of the innovation system on which the medical 
developments that people want rely. It may be that increasingly broad use of data will 
play an important role in a sustainable future for the NHS. Such arguments gesture to 
the way in which private interests may be implicated in the broader public interest. But 
there was no open debate of these issues and arguments in public. One place in which 
these questions were opened up to deliberation, albeit belatedly, was through the 
‘autonomous’ advisory group, which was set up when the planned GPES extractions 
were postponed and which includes a number of NGOs and other stakeholders.355 
Broader consultation was also promised which may help at least to identify norms 
specifically relating to the proposed uses, as will the ‘pathfinder’ exercises in four 
areas, which will examine ways of communicating with patients to make the ability to 
opt out meaningfully exercisable.356
6.37 As we have noted in this report, the existence of a framework of legal norms offered by 
various legal instruments (governing data protection, the duties of public health care 
services, and human rights – discussed in chapter 4) does not entail complete moral 
freedom to act within it. While these offer a starting point, they are clearly not sufficient 
and may even come into conflict.
 
357 (No more can moral norms be shifted simply by 
passing new legislation: the law and public morality must correspond with each other, 
procedurally as well as structurally.) Though the Care Act 2014 was intended to clarify 
the purposes for which HSCIC data may be used, ‘the provision of health care or adult 
social care, or the promotion of health’ merely sets apparently more limited but by no 
means more precise criteria for decision making. 358 What the Care Act 2014 (and 
currently awaited secondary legislation) does recognise is the need for further moral 
guidance on data access for which the HSCIC, as an executive agency, was not itself 
resourced. The solution it provides is to take advice from the HRA Confidentiality 
Advisory Group (CAG), which, through its predecessors, the Patient Information 
Advisory Group (PIAG) and the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee of the National 
Information Governance Board (ECC), has experience with the questions of data 
access, moral norms and reasonable expectations, with which the HSCIC is faced.359
 
355 See: http://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/ad-grp/. 
 
The elusive – and possibly illusory – significance of the difference between individual-
level data and identifying data, as we have argued in this report (see chapter 4), makes 
the reliance on the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) for advice on disclosures a 
natural link in the scheme of governance as it presently exists. This is because, in 
effect, the question that must be posed for all disclosures of individual-level data (and a 
lot of aggregate data too) is the one that CAG is implicitly established to address, 
namely, whether the proposed disclosures would fall within the scope of reasonable 
expectations of disclosure. This advisory system is also buttressed by the appointment 
356 See: http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/caredata-pathfinder-proposal.pdf. 
357 The position of GPs with regard to the DPA v. HSCIC, see paragraph 6.29. 
358 Care Act 2014, s.122(3), which amends section 261 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. The scope of this amendment 
was debated during the passage of the Act: “Here the current wording of the Commons Amendment, although well meant—
we are pleased to have it—leaves open too many questions for interpretation. Their amendment suggests that use of 
patients’ data may be allowed for “the promotion of health”. This leaves us open to two types of possible interpretation that 
may be undesirable. For example, “promotion” could be taken to mean that food manufacturers could use data in their 
marketing campaigns for so-called healthy foods. That may or may not be desirable but it would put many off if it appeared 
that their data were being used for commercial gain in a competitive market.” per Lord Turnberg, HL Hansard,(7 May 2014) 
c1514. 
359 New Economics Foundation (NEF) research found public opposition to the use of s.251: see recommendation 5 of 
http://b.3cdn.net/nefoundation/2cb17ab59382fe7c67_bfm6bdoas.pdf. 
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of Dame Fiona Caldicott as the first National Data Guardian for health and care, a role 
described as ‘the patients’ champion on security of personal medical information’.360
6.38 While this entails that particular decisions of the HSCIC will receive support, it does not 
make any more explicit the scope of what are reasonable expectations, nor does it 
require an engagement with interested participants (although CAG is very likely to take 
account of social research to inform its own reasoning). Rather it suggests that the 
norms will be established and elaborated through developing expertise and precedent. 
This has the advantage of flexibility to respond to the evolving debate. However, it fails 
to make any clearer to the public what expectations they may have about who will have 
access to individual-level NHS data or for what purposes, and therefore from what they 
might be opting out when they consider whether to do so.  
  
Recommendation 6 
We recommend that an independent group of participant representatives is 
convened to develop a public statement about how data held by the Health and 
Social Care Information Centre should be used, to complement the Code of 
Practice on confidential information. This should clearly set out and justify what can 
reasonably be expected by those from whom data originate and be able to demonstrate 
that these expectations have been developed with the participation of people who have 
morally legitimate interests in the data held by the HSCIC, including data subjects, 
clinical professionals and public servants. 
 
Recommendation 7 
We recommend that, in addition to implementing the recommendations of Sir Nick 
Partridge’s review, all Data Sharing Agreements held by the HSCIC should be 
published, along with the findings of a periodic independent audit of compliance 
with those agreements.361
 
 
Recommendation 8 
We recommend that HSCIC Data Sharing Agreements should include a 
requirement to maintain an auditable record of all individuals or other legal 
entities who have been given access to the data and of the purposes to which it 
has been put; this should be made available to all data subjects or relevant 
authorities in a timely fashion on request.  
 
 
360 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-data-guardian-appointed-to-safeguard-patients-healthcare-information. 
361 Sir Nick Partridge (2014), Review of data releases by the NHS Information Centre, available at: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/datareview. The recommendations included that HSCIC develops one Data Sharing Agreement to 
be used for all releases of data, and which includes clear sanctions for any breaches. 
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The Scottish Informatics Programme and the Farr Institute 
6.39 In many ways the Scottish approach to the question of the reuse of data from health 
care has been the inverse of the English experience. The Scottish authorities began 
with public engagement to determine acceptability (rather than being forced to engage 
after the fact) and developed an integral governance approach along with the 
informatics infrastructure (rather than having to invent one to fill a vacuum between the 
legal framework and operational decision making), building public trust rather than 
undermining it. The Scottish Health service is, of course, much smaller than the English 
NHS, and organised and run differently. Data linkage is facilitated by the almost 
universal use of the CHI in Scotland, and the Scottish experience of moving to 
electronic patient records (EPRs) has been both more measured in ambition and 
smoother in execution than in England.  
6.40 The Scottish Informatics Programme (SHIP – formerly the Scottish Health Informatics 
Programme) was initiated to develop a research platform to support more systematic 
collection, governance and research use of linked EPRs, and to establish a research 
arm within the Information Services Division (ISD) of NHS National Services Scotland 
and to support the efficient functioning of public services more generally. It provides for 
linkage not only of care data but also data that have been gathered in cohort studies 
and other forms of publicly-held administrative data.362
Box 6.6: Health record linkage in Scotland 
 
SHIP began in 2008 as a collaboration between the universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and St Andrews and the Information Services Division (ISD) of NHS Scotland.  
It was established with a £3.6 M grant from the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research 
Council and the Economic and Social Research Council. The development of the 
infrastructure involved three workstreams: 
■ Public engagement to ascertain acceptability 
■ Legal review and development of proportionate governance approach 
■ Development of data linking methodology and associated IT infrastructure 
In 2014 the programme was moved to the Farr Institute @ Scotland, one of four Farr 
centres across the UK (see paragraph 2.31 above).363
A central element of the infrastructure is a National Safe Haven.
  
364
■ An indexing service provided by National Records Scotland, which establishes links 
 Unlike in the English 
HSCIC, data are not collected and held centrally; centralisation of data was found to be 
less acceptable during the prior public consultation. Instead, locally held datasets are 
linked within the safe haven for the purposes of specific analyses. The safe haven 
comprises three elements, provided by three separate organisations to increase privacy 
protection:  
 
362 SHIP (2012) A blueprint for health records research in Scotland, available at: http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/SHIP_BLUEPRINT_DOCUMENT_final_100712.pdf. These requirements should apply 
more specifically in the areas of clinical trials, pharmacovigilance, diabetes epidemiology, and research resulting from the 
linkage of EPRs to socioeconomic and environmental data. 
363 There is a Farr Institute – CIPHER – in Wales. For reasons of space we have not included a discussion of the situation in 
Wales, but the conditions in Wales are more akin to those in Scotland than those in England. 
364 The SHIP Blueprint cites the 2008 Data sharing review report as an inspiration and SHIP’s use of safe havens develops 
proposals within that report. See: The SHIP Blueprint 2012, available at: http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/SHIP_BLUEPRINT_DOCUMENT_final_100712.pdf. 
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between cases in different datasets using a CHI look-up table or probabilistic linkage  
■ An analytic platform housed in the University of Edinburgh’s Advanced Computing 
Facility, which holds the research dataset (without direct personal identifiers) and is 
accessed by researchers to conduct analyses 
■ A researcher Advice and Disclosure Control Service (eDRIS) provided by National 
Services Scotland NHS, which provides advice to researchers and statistical 
disclosure control. 
 
Data linking and governance 
6.41 Unlike in England where the HSCIC extracts data from local sources to a central data 
warehouse, in Scotland different datasets are held in distributed collections, each of 
which is overseen by a data custodian who must agree to the release of data for the 
specific purposes of the research. Also, unlike in England, Scotland (as does Wales) 
applies precautionary de-identification measures by splitting and encrypting 
demographic and clinical data prior to linking. This is achieved in the following way. 
Individual-level data are sent by each contributing data source to an indexing service 
where identifiers are removed and a code assigned. A different code is assigned to 
each individual case for each data source, but an index of corresponding codes is 
produced by the indexing service, which links the different codes assigned to the same 
individual where they occur in different data sources. The coded data are then returned 
to the source and sent on to the national safe haven for analysis by authorised 
researchers. The researchers are sent the index of corresponding codes by the 
indexing service so that they can match up cases from each source. It is therefore only 
within the safe haven that the data from the multiple sources can be linked, as a result 
of knowing the corresponding codes assigned to cases in the different sources. Data 
from different sources (e.g. primary care, administrative, etc.) are linked centrally only 
for the purposes of a specific analysis; the linked data are held securely in the safe 
haven and destroyed as soon as practicable after the results have been obtained.365
6.42 One of the sources of data will be primary care records, although GPs in Scotland 
exercise more control over data extractions than is proposed under NHS England’s 
care.data programme. The Scottish Primary Care Information Resource (SPIRE) will 
be built from Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) data about GP activity, as in 
England (see note 336 to Box 6.6 above), a standardised set of data about patients 
using primary care services that GPs may choose to provide (via an opt-in 
mechanism), and other bespoke extracts obtained with the permission of GPs.
 
This is apparently more complex than the HSCIC approach, but represents a balance 
between efficiency and acceptability (as determined with reference to prior public 
engagement). 
366
Proportionate governance 
 As in 
England, GPs are in a crucial position and bear significant responsibility to protect their 
patients’ interests alongside their own, although GPs in Scotland have not had to fight, 
as have English GPs, to assert their powers and responsibilities as data controllers.  
6.43 The SHIP approach begins with an assumption that the public and medical doctors are 
in most cases expecting health data to be used for socially beneficial research, an 
 
365 See also: http://www.isdscotland.org/Products-and-Services/Health-and-Social-Care-
Integration/docs/IF_Framework_HSC_Integration_Route_Map_V1.7.pdf.  
366 See http://www.spire.scot.nhs.uk/. SPIRE is expected to be operational from March 2015. 
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assumption supported by a dedicated research programme to review and build on 
existing evidence to this effect.367 The governance arrangements for data services are 
built around the concept of ‘proportionate governance’ and a stated set of guiding 
principles and related best practices.368 Among the guiding principles are protection of 
privacy and promotion of the public interest.369
6.44 ‘Proportionate governance’ denotes an approach to information governance in which 
the balance of risks and benefits and appropriateness of means to ends are central.
  
370
6.45 The use of risk assessment explicitly orientates SHIP initiatives towards ‘proportionate’ 
governance as distinct from ‘precautionary’ governance.
 
It aims to improve on existing approaches by including assessment of the relative 
merits of different governance mechanisms, the selection of appropriate governance 
pathways, and a choice of different governance tools appropriate to any given research 
application. It does not place reliance on any particular combination of anonymisation, 
consent or authorisation (see chapter 4). Furthermore, the approach is not focussed 
solely on the ‘kind’ of data in play but also, importantly, on the context in which it is in 
play. Rather than applying a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, risk assessment is used to 
determine what tools and pathways are appropriate in a particular case. Risk 
assessment has two functions in SHIP: one with respect to data protection and the risk 
of individual identification, and another with respect to authorisation of research in the 
public interest.  
371 This approach is possible 
where the context is one that is reliably controlled in such a way as to minimise risk 
(‘safe data, safe people, safe environment’).372 A particular difficulty of assessing risk in 
this area is lack of evidence. It makes good sense to ground risk assessment in 
evidence because it offers an explicit, public reference point rather than remaining a 
matter of private opinion or judgement. However, there are two problems in this case, 
relating to uncertainties about the future conditions and about present facts (inductive 
and epistemological uncertainties). The first is a standard problem of induction, which 
points to the difficulty of using past evidence to make judgements about the future 
when conditions or circumstances are changing significantly.373
 
367 See: SHIP public engagement work-stream, http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/c4.html and SHIP (2011) SHIP public engagement: 
summary of focus group findings, available at: http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Focus_Group_Findings_Briefing_Paper.pdf. 
 That is because it is 
the regularity of the circumstances that underwrites the inference about the future. We 
368 The ‘good governance framework’ has four key elements: (1) guiding principles and best practice, (2) proportionate 
governance, (3) roles and responsibilities of data controllers and (4) researcher training. See: Sethi N and Laurie G (2013) 
Delivering proportionate governance in the era of eHealth: making linkage and privacy work together Medical Law 
International 13(2-3): 168-204; Laurie G and Sethi N (2013) Towards principles-based approaches to governance of health-
related research using personal data European Journal of Risk Regulation 1: 43-57.  
369 See the SHIP blueprint, Appendix 7, available at http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/publications.html. 
370 “Proportionality is the overarching principle that ties the varying components of good governance together and should be the 
ultimate benchmark against which to assess the appropriateness of conduct – both at the level of individual linkage decisions 
and the choice of what counts as appropriate governance over those linkages.” Laurie G and Sethi N (2012) Laurie G and 
Sethi N (2012) Information governance of use of health-related data in medical research in Scotland: towards a good 
governance framework, University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper Series No 2012/13, available at: 
http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Working_Paper_2.pdf, at page 12.  
371 A precautionary approach is often thought to be appropriate in conditions of significant uncertainty, where there is a potential 
for widespread and/or irreversible harm. A precautionary approach might be thought to entail that where there is any risk of 
re-identification, for example, then data should be treated as ‘personal data’ and, reliance on other grounds being insecure, 
the consent requirements of the Data Protection Act duly engaged. 
372 Laurie G and Sethi N (2012) Information governance of use of health-related data in medical research in Scotland: towards a 
good governance framework, University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper Series No 2012/13, available at: 
http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Working_Paper_2.pdf. 
373 Hume D (1975 [1748]) Enquiries concerning the human understanding and concerning the principles of morals (3rd Edition) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), section IV. 
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have already discussed the significant problem of rapid developments in data science 
and the accumulation of data; indeed it is this scale and pace of these developments 
that provoked this report. The SHIP approach of not retaining linked data and not 
disclosing raw data, limits the dimension of uncertainty that arises from holding linked 
data for indefinite time periods in changing circumstances. In such a context, a 
negligible risk of re-identification may obviate the need for additional consent from 
patients where it would otherwise be required (albeit that, in line with the findings of 
public consultation, the burden falls on the researchers to demonstrate why consent is 
either unnecessary or inappropriate). A second problem with an evidence-based 
approach to risk is the fact that, while some relevant evidence might exist, there are 
reasons to think that undesirable outcomes are significantly under-reported and 
intrinsically difficult to find, rather than simply absent. This is strongly suggested by our 
commissioned research into harms associated with data abuse (see chapter 2).374
6.46 Even if it were reliably determinable, however, risk alone cannot be a sufficient basis 
for governance. This is because the nature of the questions with which we are 
concerned, which are partly moral questions, are not tractable solely by the application 
of evidence, no matter how much evidence is available. Their resolution requires, 
additionally, a form of reasoning that reveals and resolves the values and tolerances 
associated with different possibilities and consequences.
  
375
Authorisation, decision making and accountability 
 Whereas robust 
approaches to data handling may minimise the risk of re-identification of individual 
patients, they do not in themselves address questions of privacy and potential harms to 
privacy.  
6.47 Under the SHIP model a system of ‘authorisation’ of research operates alongside and 
somewhat independently of any requirement for consent and measures to de-identify 
the data, addressing instead the duty of care owed by professionals to the public out of 
respect for them as moral agents. (This is consistent with our conclusion, at which the 
SHIP analysis also explicitly arrives, that consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
protect the interests of those involved.)376
6.48 When one moves from the simple principle of minimising risk to the principle of 
optimising the balance and distribution of risks and potential benefits, the essentially 
political question of how this optimum is determined (and by whom, and in whose 
interest) becomes salient. This is, in effect, the most fundamental question of privacy: 
how we construct the norms that enable cooperation in pursuit of common goals but 
 Whether or not consent is judged to be 
required, the second function of risk assessment is to support the authorisation process 
in considering the ‘relative risk’ of a research initiative, taking account of the full range 
of interests at stake and the balance of likely hazards and benefits (not merely the risk 
of re-identification). This is to recognise that, from a public policy perspective, there are 
risks of both using and not using data, and that these may be distributed differently 
among the range of those with interests in the initiative. (Thus, the minimisation of risks 
for some, taken to its logical conclusion of simply locking down data and preventing all 
re-use, is not without consequences in terms of benefits foregone, both for those 
people and for others.)  
 
374 One response to this is to pursue further research as we have recommended (see recommendation 2).  
375 See our third and fourth principles (participation and accounting for decisions). 
376 Laurie G and Sethi N (2012) Information governance of use of health-related data in medical research in Scotland: towards a 
good governance framework, University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper Series 2012/13, available at: 
http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Working_Paper_2.pdf. 
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keep the unreasonable demands of others in check. Of course, this question is, in 
reality, always present and is only held in abeyance by a restricted framing of the 
question as if it were simply about this particular risk and how to manage it (the risk of 
re-identification of given individuals, for example); in reality, reducing the exposure to 
risks for one person almost always increases it for others. It is for this reason that, in 
chapter 5, we presented data initiatives as social practices, embedded in the wider life 
of the political society, which require those with interests at stake to reason together 
regarding their resolution.  
6.49 As we have done in this report, SHIP sets out principles that provide a reference point 
for deliberation and decision making without prescribing what should be done in any 
particular set of circumstances.377
6.50 In Scotland, the authorisation for release of data is acknowledged as being initially in 
the hands of GPs and other data custodians of the contributory datasets (e.g. NSS, 
NHS or within Health Boards). (The English system, by contrast, seems designed to 
shift these powers as far as possible to the centre. The fact that the GPES extraction of 
primary care data, rather than HES data, for example, became the main battleground 
owes much to the involvement of GPs as interested participants – as participants, of 
course, with their own interests in the possible data initiatives, alongside researchers, 
firms, patients and others.) Further authorisation for use of data is required (by law) 
from the data custodians and may be sought, additionally, from a body such as the 
Scottish Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC).
 Though the principles are not the same, they 
demonstrate a clear and explicit engagement with the question of the relationship 
between public and private interests that led us to posit our principles of respect for 
persons and human rights (see chapter 5). They provide a common language and 
frame of reference to consider what morally relevant interests are at stake, to reason 
through the issues, and to ground justifications offered for particular outcomes. It is 
important, therefore, to ask who should participate in this process and to whom and by 
what means their decisions are accounted for. 
378
6.51 The SHIP approach connects to the social basis of data sharing through a commitment 
to public engagement as an input to governance.
 In addition to the legal question of 
whether data may be released, the SHIP approach explicitly requires consideration of 
the moral question of whether data should be released. It is here that the question of 
‘balance of risks’ is engaged. 
379
 
377 The SHIP principles contain references to human rights and respect for individuals as moral agents. They are nevertheless 
more operational (and more numerous) than the higher-level principles set out in this report, which are intended to serve a 
broader range of applications. For the SHIP principles, see: http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Guiding_Principles_and_Best_Practices_221010.pdf. 
 The commitment to public 
engagement has been taken on by the Farr Institute @ Scotland, to raise awareness of 
378 PACs play a role somewhat analogous to the one now marked out for CAG in the English HSCIC system, although they 
have a formal approval function where CAG remains advisory. See: 
http://www.nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/privacy_advisory_committee.php. 
379 “13. Public and stakeholder engagement. Principles (1) Public and stakeholder engagement is an integral part of good 
governance. As far as possible, account should be taken of the full range of stakeholder positions in the development and 
implementation of governance arrangements. (2) The interests of one (or a few) stakeholder(s) should not dominate 
use/linkages or the conditions of the same, especially where this might be at the expense of other stakeholder interests. 
Robust justifications must be given for any departure from this principle. Best Practice (1) Stakeholder interests and 
expectations should be monitored over time by an appropriate body or individuals with appropriate expertise for the task. 
Where necessary, governance arrangements should be adapted to take account of shifting stakeholder needs and 
expectations. (2) Active engagement exercises should be developed and implemented over time to monitor and respond to 
stakeholder interests.” (http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Guiding_Principles_and_Best_Practices_221010.pdf, at page 16). 
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medical research and its benefits and to foster trust and to allow two-way 
communication between professional and public participants. As well as ad hoc 
activities, part of this commitment involves supporting a constituted Public Panel 
(currently with 20 members drawn from a cross-section of the Scottish public) that 
meets twice a year.380
6.52 One upshot of this has been the prior identification of expectations with regard to the 
involvement of the commercial sector. The stipulation that research should be in the 
public interest does not, in principle, bar private companies (e.g. pharmaceutical 
companies) using the resource. However, a key feature of the way the SHIP approach 
has been developed by the Farr Institute @ Scotland is that it takes seriously public 
guardedness about engaging with commercially motivated researchers by not allowing 
commercial users direct and un-chaperoned access to the data. At the same time, the 
approach acknowledges that in the science and innovation ecosystem as it currently 
exists, commercial actors can have an important role to play in promoting the public 
interest. In order to make use of the resource, therefore, private sector researchers 
must demonstrate that the research is in the public interest and form a partnership with 
NHS or academic researchers. It is these NHS or academic researchers who will 
undertake the analysis and have direct access to the raw data.
 (This is consistent with recommendations we make in relation to 
research in the next chapter.) 
381
6.53 The SHIP initiative demonstrates a number of elements of good practice according to 
our analysis and principles. It pays regard to context rather than simply the ‘type’ of 
data in use; it acknowledges the importance of responsible behaviour on the part of 
professionals over and above the duty to respect the consent of patients, even where 
data with a low risk of re-identification are used; it aims to resolve the ‘double 
articulation’ of public and private interests that we described in chapter 3, partly through 
a commitment to public engagement; and it takes seriously the need for trust and 
concerns about the involvement of commercial interests (which we consider further, in 
another context, in the next section).  
 If a private company 
is involved, they will have access to the results of the research although results will 
only be released following approval from the PAC to ensure that no identifying data will 
be released. An explicit consideration is the reputational risk and the impact on public 
trust that commercial involvement may represent in any particular case.  
The ‘100,000 Genomes’ Project  
6.54 The rich phenotypic and, increasingly, laboratory data held by the NHS and other 
health services, and the NHS’s continuing relationship with patients, offer scientifically 
and politically attractive opportunities to carry out biomedical research alongside 
treatment. One such initiative is the UK 100,000 Genomes Project.382
 
380 See www.farrinstitute.org/centre/Scotland/21_Public-Engagement.html. 
 This project 
brings into conjunction more explicitly than any other current initiative, the research, 
policy, and national economic drivers that we discussed in Chapter 2, and embodies a 
commitment to the prospects of genomic medicine and to the idea that the NHS should 
be their proving ground. This has led to a notable two-stranded rhetoric around the 
381 The electronic Data Research and Innovation Service (eDRIS) provides a single point of contact for researchers. See: 
www.isdscotland.org/Products-and-Services/eDRIS/. 
382 A member of our Working Party, Professor Michael Parker, chaired the initial CMO’s ethics working group leading up to the 
launch of the 100k Genomes Project. He is currently a Non-executive Director of GeL and chair of its Ethics Advisory 
Committee. 
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 
6
 
D
A
T
A
 
I
N
I
T
I
A
T
I
V
E
S
 
I
N
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
S
Y
S
T
E
M
S
 
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
 121 
project, which freely mixes the objectives of advancing science to improve human 
health with ambitious ‘techno-nationalism’383
“...the race is on. The benefits to human health (better and earlier diagnoses as well 
as personalised care) are so enormous that everyone will want to be in the game. 
Even so, the insights we can unlock are so numerous, there’s enough potential 
reward for all players. But when it comes to building the critical mass of data needed 
to tackle some of our most serious healthcare challenges, there will be one winner, 
and that will be Britain.”
:  
384
Box 6.7: The UK 100K Genomes Project and Genomics England Ltd  
  
The 100K Genome Project, announced in a speech by the Prime Minister in December 
2012, and launched formally on 1 August 2014, is a project to generate 100,000 whole 
genome sequences from NHS patients in England.385 The project gives shape to the 
ambition to realise the benefits of genomic medicine in the NHS.386 Its focus is on 
generating sequences from cancer patients and their tumours, patients with rare 
diseases (those affecting <1:1500 people) and their parents, and those with infectious 
diseases (HIV, tuberculosis, and hepatitis C) and antibiotic resistance. The project 
design was initially informed by reports from three working groups (on strategic priorities, 
ethics and data) established by the Chief Medical Officer for England.387 Following 
these, the decision was taken to establish a private limited company, Genomics England 
Limited (GeL), wholly owned by the UK Government, to deliver the project and to 
manage the extraction of value from it.388
■ to bring benefit to patients 
 The project has an embedded ethics team and 
an ethics advisory group. The aims of the project are stated as follows:  
■ to create an ethical and transparent programme based on consent 
■ to enable new scientific discovery and medical insights 
■ to kickstart the development of a UK genomics industry389
Suitable NHS patients will be invited to participate by their health professionals and 
complete consent forms outlining the aims of the initiative, the possible uses of their data 
and the mechanisms for governing this. No immediate therapeutic benefits are promised 
to those taking part but in some cases the information may be used to inform their 
 
 
383 On ‘techno-nationalism’ see Edgerton DEH (2007) The contradictions of techno-nationalism and techno-globalism: a 
historical perspective New Global Studies 1(1): 1-32, available at: 
https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/historyofscience/Public/files/c_contradictions_of_technoglobalism.pdf. 
384 Sir John Chisholm, Executive Chair of GeL and also a non-executive director of HSCIC. See: 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/news/14-predictions-2014/great-whole-genome-race. For a discussion of the link between biotech 
R&D investment and national economic growth, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) Emerging biotechnologies: 
technology, choice and the public good (esp. Chapter 7), available at: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/emerging-
biotechnologies. 
385 The actual number of patients will be about 75,000 as the remaining sequences will be tumour sequences (see: 
http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/the-100000-genomes-project/faqs/). 
386 Human Genomics Strategy Group (2012) Building on our inheritance: genomic technology in healthcare. a report by the 
Human Genomics Strategy Group: “We are currently on the cusp of a revolution in healthcare: genomic medicine – patient 
diagnosis and treatment based on information about a person’s entire DNA sequence, or ‘genome’ – becoming part of 
mainstream healthcare practice.”, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213705/dh_132382.pdf, at page 12. 
387 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mapping-100000-genomes-strategic-priorities-data-and-ethics. 
388 "Although this [GeL] is a company, it is only formed as a company so it can move more quickly to do these things [help 
patients, the NHS], to bring maximum benefit at the fastest speed." Mark Caulfield, cited in Martin P and Hollin G (2014) A 
new model of innovation in biomedicine? A review of evidence relating to the changing relationship between the private and 
public sector in the use of human genomics and personal medical information, available at: 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/, at page 14. 
389 See: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/. 
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treatment. A specific set of known genetic predispositions will be looked for and it is 
likely that the protocol will allow this information to be fed back to participants with their 
consent.390
The intention is to make data available to researchers in a secure setting where they can 
study it without extracting or storing it on a different infrastructure, so that their 
interactions with the data may be tracked and audited.
 Patients who do not wish to enrol will continue to receive the best NHS 
treatment currently available for their condition.  
391
 
 It will also contribute to making 
the NHS a ‘learning health system’ (see above) through Genomics England Clinical 
Interpretation Partnerships (GeCIP).  
6.55 The decision to deliver the 100,000 Genomes project through a limited company 
(owned and seeded with £100M investment by the Department of Health, but with 
ambition to seek substantial additional investment) was to allow it to operate flexibly 
and responsively, to enter into contracts and relationships with businesses, and to 
seize opportunities as they appeared. GeL’s main asset will be the 100,000 genomes 
database, from which it expects to make a financial return, either through direct 
payment for data access, or through royalty sharing or joint venture schemes with other 
companies.392 Although GeL has responsibility for ownership and delivery of the project 
it will contract other UK companies, universities and NHS institutions to carry out 
sample collection, sequencing, annotation and storage. The company has a number of 
parameters for how it will work which include that it will “ensure the benefits of the 
investment flows from the company to a large range of companies and contractors 
including SMEs” and “use any surplus to benefit the public health community.”393 Those 
benefitting are likely to be software developers, sequencing and annotation providers, 
and the life sciences industry, which will use the knowledge generated by the project to 
develop new products.394
Information governance 
 
6.56 Although GeL’s corporate governance arrangements follow a commercial model, 
information governance follows a pattern more familiar from biomedical research. A 
formal data access process will be established with advice from the Ethics Advisory 
Committee and wider consultation. The procedure will include a data access committee 
that will examine and make decisions about data access applications, and a formal 
data access agreement to be signed by researchers.  
6.57 Access to information with linked patient identifiers will be restricted to the clinicians 
working with patients (and, indeed, findings relevant to treatment of individual patients 
will be fed back to clinicians). Other users will only have access to de-identified data. 
All data will be held behind an NHS firewall, a model that has been compared to a 
‘reference library’: unlike HSCIC, GeL will not provide extracts of individual-level data. 
GeL’s customers (including academic and industry researchers) will have controlled 
access to that environment to carry out data analyses on linked, de-identified clinical 
 
390 The final protocol was not available at the time of writing.  
391 In the pilot phase, data is released to commercial organisations and annotation of the genome sequences is conducted 
within the annotators’ infrastructure, outside the NHS firewall. 
392 See: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Annotation-Supplier-Event-November-5-2013.pdf. 
393 See: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/how-we-work/. 
394 GeL peremptorily signed contracts with the sequencing provider, Illumina, to generate the genome sequences, thereby 
inflating a bubble in UK-based sequencing capacity and associated infrastructure. See: 
http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/uk-to-become-world-number-one-in-dna-testing-with-plan-to-revolutionise-fight-against-
cancer-and-rare-diseases/. 
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data and genome sequences. All operations within the environment will be traceable so 
that, for example, it will be possible to see who has reviewed what data, when and for 
how long and GeL will carry out regular ‘penetration testing’ to assess security.395 
When their analyses are complete, users will only be able to export their results (and 
not the raw data) across the NHS firewall.396 There is also an intention to develop a 
function that allows users to build ‘apps’ within the environment to interrogate data.397
Consent 
  
6.58 The project will seek patients’ active and explicit consent to retrieve samples and 
generate genome sequences and to authorise clinical, research and commercial use of 
the data, clinical feedback, re-contact through the patient’s clinician and lifelong access 
to patients’ medical records to allow the continuing updating of the GeL database. In 
other words, there will be a ‘broad’ initial consent procedure (for which UK Biobank has 
been widely cited as a model – see chapter 7, below). The richness of whole genome 
sequence and other -omic data, its association with one individual, and the possibility 
of it revealing predictive information about biological relatives, raises familiar privacy 
concerns as well as important treatment/benefit options for family members.398
6.59 Because many participants are patients or relatives of patients with serious disease the 
structure of their interests and motivations may be different than, for example, with an 
administrative or prospective research database involving apparently healthy people. 
Although they may have strong incentives (both self- and other-regarding) or 
dispositional vulnerabilities (owing to their status as patients) the thorough consent 
process suggests that their preferences can be respected, even if the options available 
do not correspond to their personal interests: even if, for example, the prospect of 
commercial use of the resource is a personal disincentive, it need not be morally 
unreasonable to offer people an option that allows them to trade this off against 
positive benefits as they see them. In other words, the circumstances of consent do not 
include coercion or unreasonable inducement, although there is potentially some 
uncertainty about the possible personal therapeutic benefit. 
 GeL 
states clearly that it cannot promise study participants that it will not be possible for 
users of the data to identify them, despite the security measures in place to prevent 
this.  
399
 
395 See: Notes of the meeting on 24th March, 2014 between patient advocates and Professor Michael Parker and Ms. Vivienne 
Parry of Genomics England, available at: http://independentcancerpatientsvoice.org.uk/consultations/. 
 In clinical genetic 
practice it has sometimes been the case that the boundary between clinicians as 
physicians and as researchers has become somewhat blurred. So, for example, having 
collected samples from patients for genetic aetiological research clinicians may have 
later been in a position to provide clinical benefit through feedback of information about 
genetic risks for patients and family members. In the 100,000 Genomes project 
clinicians will both recruit patients to the project and later may carry responsibilities for 
the feedback of clinically significant information to their patients or to use this to inform 
their treatment. Clearly, in such a situation, it is important that the patients being 
396 See http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/town-hall-engagement-event/. The arrangements for the pilot phase are different 
from the main project – see: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/annotation-supplier-event/. 
397 Described by Professor Tim Hubbard at Progress Educational Trust/GeL event “Genetic Conditions: how should your DNA 
be used in the 100,000 Genomes Project?” See: http://www.progress.org.uk/geneticconditions. 
398 Lucassen A and Parker M (2010) Confidentiality and sharing genetic information with relatives The Lancet 375(9725): 1507-
09. 
399 On the ‘therapeutic misconception’, see paragraph 4.37. 
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recruited have clear and realistic expectations about the clinical benefits that may or 
may not accrue to them through participation in the project.  
6.60 Patients and patient groups were, in fact, consulted and involved in the design of the 
consent process and materials. Although the consent given by participants is not open 
to additional conditions, and therefore does not offer an opportunity to express 
preferences that might shape the design of the resource or its use beyond their simple 
participation or non-participation, it is clear that candidate patients’ receipt of the best 
currently available treatment is not dependent on their participation in the 100,000 
Genomes project.  
6.61 The long term nature of the resource is also relevant. It is possible that clinically 
significant findings might emerge at any point throughout the life time of the project. 
However, families also change over time and the salience of findings may change for 
family members (for example, as they face reproductive choices). Some mechanism for 
managing these uncertainties, such as setting a time limit for feedback of information, 
will therefore be of great importance. Many of the most significant ethical questions 
relate to how the use of the resource will also develop in the future and what this will 
mean in changing circumstances. The mechanism for responding to such changes 
relies on the governance provided through the institution, in which the Ethics Advisory 
Committee plays an important role, and the option for participants to withdraw from the 
study.  
Elements of an ethical approach 
6.62 Looking at the 100,000 Genomes project through the lens of the approach we set out in 
chapter 5 focuses attention on two aspects in particular: the design of the project (and 
how this incorporates the public and private interests involved) and the governance of 
the project (and how well this respects the interests of participants in changing 
circumstances). 
6.63 Though there were a number of ‘Town Hall’ meetings in the development phase of the 
project, and the consent materials were developed through interviews and focus 
groups with patients and members of the public of diverse ages and backgrounds, 
there is no evidence of broader social engagement around questions of project 
design.400
6.64 We know, from previous public engagement, that the issue of commercial involvement 
excites particular preferences for many, who treat this as a morally salient, rather than 
morally irrelevant, feature.
 Like NPfIT, the policy process was carried out in haste with a strong political 
(indeed, Prime Ministerial) impetus, and many of its key parameters and elements of 
infrastructure were locked in prior to determination of the governance systems. Without 
social accountability there is a possibility that political, commercial and health drivers 
may conflict (or, at least, that their relationship may appear ambiguous, with potentially 
adverse consequences for broader public trust). Especially given the context of 
ambitious public rhetoric about realising the promise of genomic medicine in the UK, 
special care needs to be taken to avoid overselling the prospects of therapeutic benefit 
to participants.  
401
 
400 See, however: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/town-hall-engagement-event/.  
 This may be due to considerations of justice (equitable 
sharing of benefits), trust (belief that commercial involvement represents greater 
privacy risk) or other reasons. Although the choice to participate is not coerced, the 
401 See paragraph 5.18. 
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question arises whether the design of the project could have offered a morally 
preferable set of options than those offered by GeL. This is not a trivial question since, 
though a government-owned company, GeL exists to promote the public interest. Of 
course, the public interest may also be served by generating national income though 
the commercial activities stimulated by the resource. Furthermore, commercial input is 
an increasingly important part of contemporary academic research and ruling this out 
completely (as the 1958 birth cohort does, for example) may mean that the capacity for 
potentially desirable academic research is limited.402
6.65 The second question relates to the possible implications of as-yet-undefined uses of 
data in what may be a technologically and informationally very different future 
environment, and how these will be governed for public benefit and the protection of 
individual interests. Given the broad consent model and the breadth of potential uses 
and users, once the 100,000 genomes resource is established, considerable reliance 
will be placed on the governance system. One way of ensuring broader accountability 
would be to set out transparently the set of morally reasonable expectations about data 
use within the powers that are available to decision makers and to use this as a focus 
for both governance and for more inclusive decision making about the future of this 
public resource. The key document will be the data access policy.
 Given that there are other ways to 
achieve this, as the example offered by SHIP shows (see above), the case needs to be 
made out publicly that GeL represents the politically, scientifically and morally optimum 
resolution of the public and private interests at stake.  
403
6.66 Genomic testing is likely to become more routine in health systems and GeL may form 
a bridgehead for new forms of data linking in the NHS. The first 100,000 genomes 
could well be merely the vanguard for a more substantial genomic and phenotypic 
database, especially as the value of such databases increases significantly in relation 
to their size. Whether the model offered by GeL represents the most appropriate model 
for securing the public interest in the ethical use of genomic information in health 
services is therefore an important question since this was not extensively or publicly 
debated prior to the initiation of the project. 
 Such 
mechanisms, should not limit the flexibility and ability to seize opportunities that were 
seen as advantages of constituting GeL as a private sector actor, but would provide 
greater clarity and assurance with regard to policy.  
Recommendation 9 
We recommend that broader public consideration should be given to whether GeL 
provides the most appropriate model for the ethical use of genomic information 
generated in health services for public benefit before it becomes the de facto 
infrastructure for future projects. 
 
 
402 For information on the ‘1958 Birth Cohort’ (the National Child Development Study), see: 
http://www2.le.ac.uk/projects/birthcohort/1958bc. 
403 At the time of writing this is still under development.  
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Conclusion 
6.67 In this chapter we have looked more closely at the formation of a number of data 
initiatives that represent different approaches to the linking and re-use of data in health 
systems. We have looked at this formation not only structurally, but also in terms of 
how they came about, what incentives and drivers pulled and pushed them in different 
directions, and in the light of our contention that data initiatives where public and 
private interests are at stake are social and political practices, as well as moral and 
scientific ones.  
6.68 Each of the data initiatives resolves questions about centralisation and distribution of 
resources, how data are disclosed or accessed, the range of users and purposes, and 
how control is exercised in different ways. Thus the HSCIC and GeL models are more 
centralised than SHIP; the HSCIC model allows some disclosure of individual-level 
data whereas SHIP and GeL will only disclose the results of analyses carried out within 
their infrastructure; HSCIC and GeL allow direct access to data by commercial 
companies whereas SHIP is more guarded; GeL requires explicit, though broad, 
patient consent, whereas HSCIC and SHIP have (at least initially) rather different 
authorisation procedures in which individual preferences and values may figure 
(through a rather blunt opt-out or through a more constitutive participation); etc. Though 
there are lessons to be shared amongst these various experiences, perhaps the most 
salient lessons relate to our principles of participation and accounting for decisions 
through formal governance and wider social engagement. These strongly suggest that 
there are serious consequences for public trust and for the viability of data initiatives if 
they do not first take steps to identify the applicable moral norms that they must 
negotiate and put in place, in relation to these, well-supported measures to respect the 
interests engaged, supported by credible justification.  
6.69 As we have argued a key question that faces data initiatives and the health systems as 
a whole is what uses of data should be ‘expected’ as part of delivering national health 
care with quality, safety, and cost-effectiveness with ongoing improvement in the 
standards of care. It is becoming increasingly evident that there are commercial drivers 
behind many high-profile initiatives that have been proposed in recent years and, as 
empirical studies show, this is of significant concern for the public. The issues go 
beyond individual privacy, especially as datasets start to be linked together, and there 
is a need to have governance structures in which all interests are enabled to participate 
and that involve continuing review and reflection on the societal implications of such 
initiatives. Unless there are trustworthy governance systems in place that can engage 
with and reflect reasonable expectations in continuously evolving circumstances, 
initiatives that could have wide public benefits may continue to be challenged and fail to 
secure public confidence. 
 
 Chapter 7 
Population research data 
initiatives 
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Chapter 7 – Population research data initiatives  
Chapter overview 
This chapter describes research data initiatives in three clusters (biobanks, international 
collaborative research projects, and participant-driven research), identifies examples of 
good practice and draws lessons from some specific initiatives. 
Biobanks are major resources of tissues and data that may be used for a variety of 
research purposes. UK Biobank is a large population biobank established to support the 
investigation of a range of common diseases occurring in the UK. Key features of this 
are the broad consent model, its Ethics and Governance Framework and the 
independent Ethics and Governance Council. Questions arise for which it is necessary 
to review the set of expectations underlying its operation, including feedback of findings 
and commercial access to the resource. 
The UK10K Rare Genetic Variants in Health and Disease project confronts the problem 
of controlled disclosure of highly specific individual-level data among different groups of 
researchers working on distinct studies. It achieves this through a common ethical 
framework of policies and through guidelines that place considerable reliance on 
institutional sanctions and on the role of principal investigators. 
International collaborative research initiatives such as the International Cancer Genome 
Consortium and the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium need to accommodate differing 
local practices and tackle complex consent issues to do with re-use and international 
transfer of data. The use of cloud-based storage and processing services is becoming 
increasingly important but it raises issues such as third party access (for example, by 
security services).  
The wide availability of social networking platforms has facilitated participant-led 
research with norms and social dynamics that differ from more formal institutional 
research. They present distinct challenges of ensuring the protection of individual 
interests, of integration with institutional research, and of translation of findings into 
clinical products and practice. 
A number of recommendations are made in relation to a greater role for subject 
participants, accounting for governance through explicit frameworks, and the use of 
institutional measures. 
 
Introduction 
7.1 Increased capability for linking databases, along with technological and IT innovations, 
have accelerated the pace of data acquisition for large-scale population studies. 
Typically, population research initiatives of this type collect and store information from 
identifiable individuals, the study participants. They are supported by the increasing 
pace and falling cost of automated collection and laboratory analysis of biomedical 
samples and information, including genetic analysis. Many of the research 
methodologies in use are well established and build on earlier developments in 
population epidemiology and data science, but life sciences research is turning towards 
increasingly large resource platforms for use by international teams of researchers 
studying a wide range of health-related conditions, and using data from many 
thousands of individuals. Another feature of these initiatives is the richness of the data 
available for each participant, made possible by linking existing medical databases, the 
inclusion of data derived from genomic analysis, as well as ‘deep phenotyping’ (see 
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chapter 1) including lifestyle and behavioural data, data from imaging technologies and 
data derived through sensing devices. 
7.2 Biomedical research raises significant ethical and governance issues including 
recruitment of participants, how their morally relevant values and interests are 
respected (for example, through the choice of consent mechanisms), data security, 
decisions on feedback of medical information to participants, data access 
arrangements for researchers, data linking and movement trans-nationally, governance 
of the resource in the public interest, and strategies for disseminating the outcomes of 
research. In this chapter we consider a number of data initiatives in three broad 
clusters: biobanks, international collaborative research projects, and participant-driven 
research.  
Biobanking 
7.3 The term ‘biobank’ has become a catch-all phrase for many types of collection of 
biological samples and related data.404
UK  B iobank 
 Here we are concerned with collections that are 
established as prospective research resources comprising material and data from 
many participants. Our examples are two flagship British resources, UK Biobank and 
UK10K. 
7.4 The UK Biobank initiative is a major resource designed to support a range of research 
‘to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of serious and life-
threatening illnesses’ and the promotion of health throughout society.405 Through 
invitations sent to patients on geographically selected general practice lists, more than 
500,000 people between the ages of 40 and 69 were recruited. The intention is to 
follow them for at least 25 years through their GP and NHS hospital records as well as 
through periodic collection of data directly from the subject participants themselves.406
7.5 An International Scientific Advisory Board advises on scientific and policy matters and 
the research community is invited to contribute to shaping the direction of future data 
 
In 2012 the resource opened for use by researchers worldwide. Applications to use the 
resource are screened to ensure that projects meet established ethical and scientific 
standards, and to consider how the research meets the criterion of being in the public 
interest. Researchers using the resource give undertakings to abide by certain 
conditions of use and to treat data confidentially. They pay a modest fee calculated on 
a cost recovery approach for providing the data or samples. UK Biobank carries out 
extensive work validating and cleaning data and preparing it for use but does not 
undertake the research itself. 
 
404 See: Kaye J, Gibbons SMC, Heeney C, and Parker M (2012) Governing Biobanks: understanding the interplay between law 
and practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing); Shaw DM, Elger BS, and Colledge F (2014) What is a biobank? Differing definitions 
among biobank stakeholders Clinical Genetics 85(3): 223-7.  
405 See: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/.  
406 At the time of recruitment, participants give consent for UK Biobank to have long-term access to their existing and future 
NHS medical records and other health-related records. The consent form states:”I give permission for access to my medical 
and other health-related records, and for long-term storage and use of this and other information about me, for health-related 
research purposes (even after my incapacity or death).” Participants are able to withdraw from the study at any time on the 
basis of either no further contact, no further access to their data or no further use of their data. See 
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf and http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/faqs/can-i-
withdraw-from-uk-biobank/. 
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acquisition. Right from the start it was recognised that such a large multi-purpose 
biobank resource, designed to collect data and samples prospectively to facilitate 
research, would raise ethical and governance challenges both at recruitment and in 
later decades. Decisions were taken to put in place two distinctive measures, namely, 
the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework and an independent Ethics and 
Governance Council to advise the funders and UK Biobank.407
Recruitment 
  
7.6 There is a long history of population studies in Britain, including the 1946 and 1958 
Birth Cohorts studies up to the Life Study begun in 2012.408 It was recently estimated 
that 2.2 million people are currently taking part in large population studies in the UK 
(approximately one in thirty of the general population).409
7.7 UK Biobank sought to recruit as widely as possible across England, Wales and 
mainland Scotland (but not in Northern Ireland). Participants completed an automated 
questionnaire at local assessment centres and were interviewed about lifestyle, 
medical history and diet. In addition, basic assessments including weight, body mass 
index (BMI), heart function, blood pressure and bone density were made. Blood and 
urine samples were taken to be assessed for biomarkers, and DNA extracted for 
genomic analysis.
  
410
7.8 The overall UK Biobank volunteer rate was approximately 5.5 per cent of those 
approached.
 
411 The locations of Assessment Centres, and the surrounding GP 
practices where the potential participants were registered, were selected with the aim 
of creating a generalisable population sample, ‘so that research may ultimately benefit 
a wide diversity of people’.412 It is well known that it is harder (and more expensive) to 
recruit to population studies those with low income and of lower social status, those 
with poorer health and/or chronic conditions, and those from ethnic minority and rural 
communities.413 This proved to be the case for the UK Biobank sample. It is unclear 
how far strategies to ensure greater representation from at least the larger UK ethnic 
minority groups were pursued, but it seems that a compromise was reached between 
the costs of ensuring participation from hard to reach communities and accomplishing 
timely recruitment of 500,000 people. Regardless, some researchers have been critical 
of the lack of representativeness of the sample for the UK population.414
 
407 UK Biobank has been funded (about £62 million by the time participant recruitment was completed) by the Medical Research 
Council, the Wellcome Trust and the Department of Health together with a number of other public and charitable resources. 
For the EGF and EGC, see: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ethics/. 
 The UK 
Biobank recruitment strategies were justified on the grounds that nested case-control 
studies do not require a (near) representative sample. This may, however, limit the 
408 See the Cohort and Longitudinal Studies Enhancement Resources (CLOSER) for details of British birth cohort studies: 
http://www.closer.ac.uk/. 
409 Pell J, Valentine J and Inskip H (2014) One in 30 people in the UK take part in cohort studies The Lancet 383(9922): 1015-6 
and http://www.mrc.ac.uk/news-events/publications/maximising-the-value-of-uk-population-cohorts/. 
410 This was followed by an enhanced baseline assessment including eye measure, additional blood collection for RNA analysis 
and saliva sample collection. See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/data-showcase-timeline. 
411 Allen N. Sudlow C, Downey P, et al. (2012) UK Biobank: current status and what it means for epidemiology Health Policy 
and Technology 1(3): 123-6; see also Swanson JM (2012) The UK Biobank and selection bias The Lancet 380(9837): 110. 
412 See UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf, at page 4. 
413 Ridgeway JL, Han LC, Olson JE et al. (2013) Potential bias in the bank: what distinguishes refusers, nonresponders and 
participants in a clinic-based biobank? Public Health Genomics 16(3): 118-26; for ethnic minorities, issues include distrust of 
the medical profession, lack of awareness and economic burden. See Paskett ED, Reeves KW, McLaughlin JM et al. (2008) 
Recruitment of minority and underserved populations in the United States: the centers for population health and health 
disparities experience Contemporary Clinical Trials 29(6): 847-61. 
414 Swanson JM (2012) The UK Biobank and selection bias The Lancet 380(9837): 110. 
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range of research studies that use UK Biobank since those requiring a (near) 
representative sample may lack sufficient scientific validity. It also follows that the 
ambition for research outcomes to benefit a ‘wide diversity of people’ might fail to be 
achieved equally. 
Consent and governance 
7.9 Population-based biobanks generally create a resource for the use of researchers for 
future research that is unspecified at the time of collection. Thus, at the time of 
recruitment it is not possible to tell would-be participants in detail what research may be 
carried out with the data and samples they may donate. A ‘broad consent’ model is 
therefore adopted by many biobanks and was adopted by UK Biobank. Participants 
were given information about what data and samples would be collected and how the 
project would be governed but the scope of future research was defined only in general 
terms, as health-related research in the public interest. Participants are able to 
withdraw at any time from the project to different degrees: they may choose no further 
contact, no further access to their data or no further use of their data.415 As we noted in 
chapter 4, the broad consent model is not uncontroversial and these controversies 
have found a focus in relation to biobanks.416
Box 7.1: UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council and Framework 
 As we argue in chapter 5, however, 
consent, as a way of respecting morally relevant individual values and interests, is only 
ever part of the story – it is the relationship between norms of privacy, the way of 
respecting individual preferences (in this case, through broad consent), and mode of 
governance regulating the public and private interests in play, that determines whether 
a data initiative can find an ethically acceptable form. While broad consent has been a 
practical solution to the difficulties of obtaining informed prospective consent for a large 
number of diverse research projects from thousands of participants, the need for 
complementary governance structures is generally accepted. For many population 
studies, an ethics oversight committee is established, but for UK Biobank an 
independent Ethics and Governance Council (EGC) acts as the guardian of a 
dedicated and detailed Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF) (see Box 7.1.)  
The UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council (EGC) is an advisory body with 
members appointed by the funders independently of UK Biobank. It has no formal 
regulatory role but rather advises UK Biobank in the manner of a ‘critical friend’.417
The Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF) sets out the relationship between UK 
  
 
415 See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/faqs/can-i-withdraw-from-uk-biobank/. They are unable, however, to have their data 
expunged entirely from the biobank’s systems. In fact, in June 2007, UKBB was obliged to amend its advice regarding the 
'no further use' option offered as part of the right to withdraw as a consequence of a technical feature of the data archiving 
system, after some participants had been recruited. The advice was amended to indicate that while information would be 
made unavailable to researchers it would nevertheless be retained for archival and audit purposes. Furthermore, UK Biobank 
advises that while it would destroy all biological samples, ‘it may not be possible to trace all distributed sample remnants’ and 
data could not be removed from completed analyses. See: ‘No further use’ withdrawal option: February 2008’ at 
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/resources/. 
416 For criticism of broad consent as inadequately informed, see: Greely, HT (2007). The uneasy ethical and legal underpinnings 
of large-scale genomic biobanks Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 8(1): 343-364; for a defence of broad 
consent for larger-scale research infrastructure projects, see: Knoppers, BM (2005) Consent revisited: points to consider 
Health Law Review 13(2-3): 33-8; Hansson MG, Dillner J, Bartram CR, et al. (2006) Should donors be allowed to give broad 
consent to future biobank research? The Lancet Oncology 7(3): 266-9. See also: Corrigan O, McMillan J, Liddell K, et al. 
(Editors) (2009) The limits of consent (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
417 Laurie, G (2011) Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need to recognise the 
limits of law Human Genetics 130(3): 347-56. 
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Biobank and participants, research communities, individual researchers and society. 
This twenty page document was widely circulated and discussed in the research and 
bioethics communities, and at public meetings, before a version was agreed by the 
funders during the planning stage of the project. The EGF may be seen as an 
instrument, legitimised through wide discussion, which serves to align the public 
interests in research and the privacy and other interests of participants, as well as 
engendering trust. It is a ‘living’ document that is intended to be responsive to changing 
needs and circumstances. The EGC is charged with monitoring and reporting publicly on 
the conformity of UK Biobank with the EGF and to advise more generally on the 
interests of research participants and the general public in relation to UK Biobank. 
 
7.10 While participants cannot know in advance for exactly what purposes their data will be 
used, UK Biobank has attempted to keep them informed about the developments of the 
resource, the research being carried out using it and the results of that research. It 
does this via newsletters and information on the website, as has been the case with 
other biobanks.418 It is a way of encouraging the continued support and motivation of 
participants on which the long-term value of the resource depends.419 But it is also 
important in order to enable participants meaningfully to exercise the option to withdraw 
from the resource if they consider that morally salient features of its use, as approved 
under the governance system in place, depart from the scope of their expectations.420
7.11 The EGF states, among other things, that ‘further consent will be sought for any 
proposed activity that does not fall within the existing consent’. As circumstances 
change it may not be clear whether new proposals raise issues that fall outwith the 
scope envisaged by the initial broad consent. However, relying on renewed consent 
may limit activities that are in the interests of participants and in the public interest. This 
is because seeking renewed consent from the whole body of participants may be 
impractical, very expensive and likely to damage the resource as many participants, 
especially those who are hard to reach, might drop out by default. Thus activities 
beyond the obvious scope of initial consent are likely to be avoided. Possible examples 
here include data linking to other biobanks or to administrative data that are not directly 
health related.  
 
Aside from this, however, these means of communication are mainly one-way, an 
opportunity for the biobank to deliver information, rather than a deliberate opportunity to 
hear the views of participants or involve them in the development of the resource.  
7.12 Revising the EGF is one potential response to these changing circumstances and the 
changing horizons of public and private interests. However, revising the EGF simply by 
agreement with the Board of Directors falls short of the standard of engagement set by 
UK Biobank’s creation and legitimisation, which was characterised by wide-ranging and 
inclusive discussions, pursued through public meetings. Despite time and resource 
implications there is growing support for the view that long-term studies should attempt 
to involve participants in a meaningful way and some initiatives have moved in this 
 
418 McCarty CA, Garber A, Reeser JC, and Fost NC on behalf of ; the Personalized Medicine Research Project Community 
Advisory Group and Ethics and Security Advisory Board (2011) Study newsletters, community and ethics advisory boards, 
and focus group discussions provide ongoing feedback for a large biobank American Journal of Medical Genetics 155A(4): 
737-41. 
419 Gottweis H, Gaskell, and Starkbaum J (2011) Connecting the public with biobank research: reciprocity matters Nature 
Reviews Genetics 12(11): 738-9. 
420 Melham K, Briceno Moraia L, Mitchell C, et al. (2014) The evolution of withdrawal: negotiating research relationships in 
biobanking Life Sciences, Society and Policy 10:16, available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40504-014-0016-5.  
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direction.421 However, whereas the UK Biobank EGF proposes a representative 
participants’ panel, this has not been pursued to date.422 Given its central role in the 
regulation of the relationship between UK Biobank and its participants, there is a strong 
argument both that the process of revision and development of the EGF would benefit 
significantly from including participants’ views and interests, and, as we argue in 
chapter 5, there is a substantive moral reason for them to participate.423 Furthermore, 
the involvement of ‘publics’ (e.g. participants, policy makers, researchers, future 
beneficiaries and other publics) in open discussion, particularly in relation to issues 
where practical decisions are to be made, can help build, maintain and develop a 
trusted governance structure.424
Data security, access and linkage 
  
7.13 Permanently de-identified data (which the data controller cannot link back to the 
individual case) is little use in the context of continuing longitudinal research. Data and 
samples are therefore assigned a pseudonym or code (see chapter 4) so that they can 
be linked back to the same index case over time. The obvious personal identifiers 
(names, addresses, etc.) are separated and stored in a protected file store. Coded data 
are then made available to researchers, who are usually bound by undertakings to not 
try to re-identify participants. UK Biobank has an Access Committee (a subcommittee 
of the UK Biobank Board) that takes decisions about research access in the light of 
advice from UK Biobank managers and external ethics advisors. Access requirements 
for users focus on the three areas described below in order to protect the confidentiality 
of participant data, as well as to promote the trustworthiness of the project.  
7.14 First, researchers are checked to see if they are ‘bona fide’ (acting ‘with good faith’) 
and from recognised institutions (and so governed by ethical codes of practice). If there 
is a breach of use by a researcher, there are a number of ways in which penalties may 
be imposed.425 Although there may be no legal basis for UK Biobank to reprimand 
individuals, beyond refusing further access to the resource, there exist ways that those 
using data could be penalised by their institution and ways that some institutions can 
be penalised by funders if one of their staff breaks the rules, which may be given effect 
through contracts and legal agreements.426
 
421 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council (2009) Workshop report: involving publics in biobank research and governance, 
available at: http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/meetings/EGCper cent20workshopper cent20report.pdf. 
 Second, proposals must meet criteria set 
by the biobank for the use of the resources. Access committees need to review 
requests for samples to ensure that the research is scientifically valid and the use falls 
422 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf, at 
page 8. 
423 As it happens, some members of the EGC have also been participants. However, there is no requirement that there should 
be participants on the Council. 
424 Burgess MM (2014) From ‘trust us’ to participatory governance: deliberative publics and science policy Public Understanding 
of Science 23(1): 48-52. See also Armstrong V, Barnett J, Cooper H, et al. (2007) Public attitudes to research governance. 
On the Governance of biomedical research: a qualitative study in a deliberative context, available at: 
ghttp://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtx038443. 
pdf. 
425 Joly Y, Zeps N, and Knoppers BM (2011) Genomic databases access agreements: legal validity and possible sanctions. 
Human Genetics 130(3): 441-9. 
426 The 2008 Thomas and Walport Data Sharing Review Report points, with approval, to the application of legal penalties 
through the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007: “The Board may extend access to researchers from various 
organisations, including academic institutions, public bodies and nongovernmental organisations. These researchers are 
then bound by a strict code, which prevents disclosure of any personal identifying information. Any deliberate or negligent 
breach of data security by the approved researcher would entail criminal liability and the prospect of a custodial sentence up 
to a maximum of two years.” Thomas R and Walport M (2008) Data sharing review report, available at: 
http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/infogov/links/datasharingreview.pdf/view. See also our recommendation 5 above. 
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within the broad categories given in the participant consent. Third, researchers must 
agree to certain undertakings regarding the confidentiality of the data and handling of 
samples. Material and Data Transfer Agreements are used to bind researchers through 
their institutions.427 Researchers are required, for example, to provide a secure 
environment for the samples and data, to ensure that the data are not used other than 
for the agreed purposes and not to attempt to re-identify individuals from data. UK 
Biobank also asks researchers to return results of their work, which may be added to 
the resource, and for research results to be published, which promotes outcomes for 
public benefit and thereby demonstrates respect for the altruistic motivations of 
participants.428
7.15 One of the core aims of UK Biobank is to link data provided by participants with other 
health-related and administrative records in order to track the emergence and/or 
progression of disease and to collect data to support epidemiological research. The 
complex process of linking UK Biobank records to both NHS hospital and GP records is 
currently underway. A recent MRC strategy review of population cohort studies saw 
increasing opportunities for cohort studies not only to link to NHS records but to also to 
link more widely to cross-sector administrative and environmental information. It noted 
a number of initiatives that will improve secure access to data.
 
429 However, the 
resource could potentially have much broader uses, some of which may challenge the 
initial health-related purposes or address them in unusual and unanticipated ways. 
Examples already exist of biobanks seeking to link their data with criminal convictions 
and cautions, as well as financial benefits, earnings and employment data.430
7.16 There are also opportunities to use commercial data (such as geospatial location data 
from mobile phones) in research. It has been suggested that purchasing data from 
supermarkets might be used to infer the effects of diet on the health of research 
participants. With researchers’ growing interests in ‘deeper’ phenotyping (see chapter 
1) the appetite for data from a wider range of sources is likely to increase. As we noted 
at the outset, when these are linked in the context of health-related research, this data 
may be informatively ‘health-related’ but such linkages may well fall outside the 
expectations participants had when they signed up to participate.
  
431 To determine this, 
it may be necessary to reason in relation not only to the nature of the research 
proposal within the developing field of science and the initial expectations of 
participants but also the norms that apply at the time.432
 
427 Fortin I, Pathmasiri S, Grintuch R, and Deschênes M (2011) ‘Access arrangements’ for biobanks: a fine line between 
facilitating and hindering collaboration Public Health Genomics 14(2):104-14. 
 As further opportunities 
emerge, enhanced participation may prove to be an important way of demonstrating 
respect for subject participants and undertaking the moral reasoning necessary to 
relate the scope of reasonable expectations to the scope of potential uses. 
428 UK Biobank Return of Results Data: Guidance Note for Approved Projects, available at: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Return-of-Results_Guidance-Note_v2.pdf. Where research results may be seen as controversial, 
UK Biobank can ask for sight of papers before publication. 
429 Medical Research Council (2014) Maximising the value of UK population cohorts. MRC strategic review of the largest UK 
population cohort studies, available at: http://www.mrc.ac.uk/news-events/publications/maximising-the-value-of-uk-
population-cohorts/. 
430 See for example, the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children data linkage information. 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/resources-available/data-details/linkage/. 
431 See footnote 407 above. 
432 See Laurie, G (2009) Role of the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council The Lancet 374(9702): 1676, available at: 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736per cent2809per cent2961989-9/fulltext. Whether proposed 
activities fall within the scope of the original consent “depends on what is proposed scientifically, expectations of participants, 
and social mores at the time of an application.” 
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Overlap between research and medical care 
7.17 UK Biobank states clearly that participants are not likely to benefit directly from 
participation; the intention is instead that research discoveries will benefit future 
generations and be in the broad public interest. This appeal to altruistic participation 
mirrors appeals to participate in blood donation programmes or early phase clinical trial 
research. But despite no lack of clarity in the message from UK Biobank there remains 
some ambiguity at its reception. For example, follow-up research in relation to other 
biobanks has shown that participants may regard the initial assessment as a ‘health 
check’.433
7.18 This tension is particularly keen when looking at the potential to feed back health-
related findings that may have significant benefit for individuals. At the initial 
assessment, UK Biobank participants are given results from some of the 
measurements taken, such as their blood pressure and weight. If staff notices 
abnormalities, such as elevated blood pressure or a suspicious mole, they may advise 
the participants to see their GP.
  
434 However, participants are told at the time of 
recruitment that no further personal feedback would be offered either from analyses 
carried out by UK Biobank or by researchers using the resource. This blanket ‘no 
feedback’ policy was typical for many population and cohort studies that had been 
established prior to UK Biobank.435 Since then, however, such a policy has become 
more contentious in the light of discoveries that may come about through further data 
collection from participants or as a result of the analysis of data. It is now often argued 
that there is a moral obligation to consider feedback of health-related findings, including 
in the case of whole genome sequencing.436
Box 7.2: UK Biobank imaging study 
  
UK Biobank is seeking to enhance the resource through the addition of an imaging 
study. In the pilot study, launched in May 2014, existing participants are invited for an 
integrated series of imaging studies of the brain, heart, abdomen, bones and carotid 
arteries.437
In discussion with the EGC, the UK Biobank International Scientific Advisory Board, the 
project’s funders and others (though not subject participants), it was agreed that during 
the pilot phase participants and their GPs would receive feedback on any serious health-
related finding that might be observed during the collection of the imaging data.
 The aim is to use these data as part of an increasingly detailed (‘deep’) 
phenotyping of participants to enhance the potential to deliver research objectives of UK 
Biobank.  
438
 
433 Halverson CME and Ross LF (2012) Incidental findings of therapeutic misconception in biobank-based research Genetics in 
Medicine 14(6): 611-5, available at: http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/v14/n6/abs/gim201150a.html.  
 Those 
receiving this feedback will be followed up so the consequences of being offered such 
434 See UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf, at page 7. 
435 Wallace SE and Kent A (2011) Population biobanks and returning individual research results: mission impossible or new 
directions? Human Genetics 130(3): 393-401. 
436 Wolf SM, Crock BN, Van Ness B, et al. (2012) Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived datasets Genetics in Medicine 14(4): 361-84. See also Medical Research Council and 
Wellcome Trust (2014) Framework on the feedback of health-related findings in research, available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtp056059.pd
f.  
437 See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2014/05/uk-biobank-imaging-study-launched/. 
438 Some participants were invited to comment on the information materials for the imaging study but the direction of the study 
was set, effectively, by the groups mentioned. 
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feedback can be assessed. This will provide vital evidence of the implications and 
consequences of receiving feedback, an area that is remains very much debated 
worldwide.439
 
  
7.19  One of the assumptions behind offering findings to participants is that it is likely to 
prove of benefit through, for example, earlier diagnosis and therefore more effective 
treatment of a condition. There is also an acknowledgement that some people may be 
harmed, for example by anxiety caused by notification about a serious abnormality that 
may be revealed later to be of little or no consequence to their well-being. However, 
given the lack of evidence about the consequences of providing such feedback it is 
unclear what the benefits or disadvantages may be. Some have argued that it is not the 
right time for biobanks to institute such a policy.440 However, if a project considers 
revising a current, general ‘no feedback’ policy, this may be considered as outside the 
terms of the initial consent given by participants.441
Commercialisation 
  
7.20 One specific use of UK Biobank data that has stimulated discussion is the use by 
commercial entities. While research suggests that academic researchers are generally 
trusted by the public, industry is viewed with more suspicion owing to its supposedly 
more mixed motives (as we note in chapter 5).442 The debate focuses on whether the 
outcomes of the research will be shared and benefits returned to the public domain 
instead of boosting profits of commercial entities. There may also be fears that private 
interests will restrict the benefits available to the public, through, for example, 
commercial pricing of products.443
 An ethical framework  
 It is possible that public discussion about the 
commercial use of the resource may have led to some people choosing not to join the 
study and so depressing the uptake rate for the project.  
7.21 A review of the conditions under which UK Biobank has been established suggests that 
it does provide a secure moral basis for the proposed uses in most respects. There 
was initial consultation with the public and other stakeholders in the development of the 
plans for the project and its governance. In order to respect the range of interests 
involved while at the same time acknowledge uncertainty about the specific future uses 
of the resource it uses a model of broad consent, together with a governance 
framework for the use of data that includes a criterion of public interest to ensure 
conformity with the expectations of the stakeholders. The EGF provides an explicit 
 
439 See Johnson KJ and Gehlert S (2014) Return of results from genomic sequencing: A policy discussion of secondary findings 
for cancer predisposition Journal of Cancer Policy 2(3): 75-80; Hallowell N, Hall A, Alberg C and Zimmern R (2014) 
Revealing the results of whole-genome sequencing and whole-exome sequencing in research and clinical investigations: 
some ethical issues Journal of Medical Ethics (Online First), available at: 
http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2014/07/18/medethics-2013-101996.long#responses. 
440 Viberg J, Hansson MG, Langenskiold S and Segerdahl P (2014) Incidental findings: the time is not yet ripe for a policy for 
biobanks European Journal of Human Genetics 22(4): 437-41, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v22/n4/abs/ejhg2013217a.html.  
441 Trinidad SB, Fullerton SM, Ludman EJ et al. (2011) Research practice and participant preferences: the growing gulf Science 
331(6015): 287-8, available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3044500/; Stjernschantz Forsberg J, Hansson 
MG, and Eriksson S (2011) The risks and benefits of re-consent Science 332(6027): 306. 
442 Clemence M, Gilby N, Shah J, et al. (2013) Wellcome Trust monitor wave 2: tracking public views on science, research and 
science education, available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtp053113.pdf.  
443 Huzair F and Papaioannou T (2012) UK Biobank: consequences for commons and innovation Science and Public Policy 
39(4): 500-12; Caulfield T, Borry P, and Gottweis H (2014) Industry involvement in publicly funded biobanks Nature Reviews 
Genetics 15: 220. 
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correlative for the expectations of participants and, as a ‘living’ element of governance, 
provides a focus for reflective governance. The challenge to UK Biobank is to ensure 
that this ambition is realised in practice, in response to developments, such as 
developments in the potential uses of data we describe in this report. 
7.22 Because of the developments of the initiative (such as the introduction of imaging) and 
new possibilities for using the data, as well as increasing knowledge (for example, in 
human genetics), this process of reflection and engagement with participants, should 
be maintained throughout the life of the initiative. The norms and expectations, such as 
‘no feedback’, on which initial consents were premised, and corresponding views about 
the level of duty of care owed to participants, may alter in relation to new information. 
The EGC has responded to these but there is no embedded process through which 
others’ views can be engaged in relation to such matters as part of the revision of the 
ethics and governance framework and the development of practice and governance 
more generally.444
UK 10K  R are G enetic  V ariants  in Health and Dis eas e 
 There is scope for bringing the views of the subject participants, the 
research users of the resource and the greater research community into this reflection 
so that both the promotion of research in the public interest and the privacy and other 
interests of all participants in the process are enhanced.  
7.23 The UK10K project, established in 2010, was concerned with using genome 
sequencing to illuminate the genetic contribution to disease in a research culture where 
open access to data had been the norm. The premise of open access to genetic 
sequence data was established by the Human Genome Project (1999-2004) and the 
key principles were set out in a series of international agreements.445 This has been 
widely accepted and endorsed by the research community and open access with DNA 
sequence data deposited online became the accepted practice. This was based on the 
assumption that there would be no risk of re-identification of research participants who 
had given biological samples for sequencing. However, this assumption was 
overturned by a study showing that data from individuals could be distinguished in 
genome-wide association study (GWAS) data using only summary statistics.446 A later 
study demonstrated that male participants could be re-identified by linking individual 
mutations (single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs) on the Y chromosome with data 
found in publicly available datasets on the Internet (see chapter 4).447
 
444 See, for example, Bjugn R and Casati B (2012) Stakeholder Analysis: A Useful Tool for Biobank Planning Biopreservation 
and Biobanking 10(3): 239-44; Lemke AA, Wu JT, Waudby C et al. (2010) Community engagement in biobanking: 
experiences from the eMERGE Network Genomics, Society, and Policy 6(3): 35-52, available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3434453/.  
 Policies then 
changed: some datasets have been removed from the web, and models of managed or 
conditional access to data have developed, of which the UK10K project is one 
example. However, some initiatives in the spirit of citizen science, for example the 
Personal Genome Project, have continued to offer open access (see paragraph 7.41ff.)  
445 Muddyman D, Smee C, Griffin H, Kaye J, and UK 10K Project (2013) Implementing a successful data management 
framework: the UK10K managed access model Genome Medicine 5(11): 100, available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/gm504.  
446 Homer N, Szelinger S, Redman M et al. (2008) Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex 
Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays PLoS Genet 4(8): e1000167, available at: 
http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/infoper cent3Adoiper cent2F10.1371per cent2Fjournal.pgen.1000167#pgen-1000167-
g003. 
447 Gymrek M, McGuire A, Golan D, Halperin E and Erlich Y (2013) Identifying personal genomes by surname inference Science 
339(6117): 321-4. 
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7.24 The objectives of the UK10K project are to apply genome-wide sequencing to existing 
research collections of patients from the UK and abroad with specific diseases (some 
5,500 individuals) using comparisons with some 4,000 deeply phenotyped participants 
from the Twins UK and ALSPAC longitudinal cohort studies. This allows the 
identification of genetic sequence variants that may be associated with specific (and 
usually rare) diseases recorded in the phenotype data with the aim of characterising 
the genetic basis of diseases. In addition, a long-lasting research resource for UK and 
global genetic research is being established through rapid data release to the 
European Genome-phenome Archive, which is held by the European Bioinformatics 
Institute.448
7.25 The key instrument of governance for the initiative is, like UK Biobank, an Ethical 
Governance Framework (EGF),
  
449
7.26 The aim of the UK10K EGF is to enable the UK10K project to operate as a federated 
system. This means that the projects can work together under a common ethical 
framework, which can acknowledge the nuances of particular studies while still allowing 
them to be part of a common endeavour. At the same time, it strives to ensure that 
there can be sufficient harmonisation so that these very different studies can participate 
in an ethically-coherent project that maximises the research benefit, while 
acknowledging the responsibilities and obligations that are owed to research 
participants.  
 based on informed consent and approval from an 
appropriate ethics committee. This was drafted by the UK10K Ethical Advisory Board 
with independent advice and international (but not public) review. The Board includes 
members representing the interests of some patients through the patient interest group 
Genetic Alliance UK and cohort study participants.  
7.27 An important precept is acknowledging and respecting the role of the principal 
investigator (PI) of each collaborating study, the person (usually a senior researcher) 
who has management responsibility for each study. Many of the principal investigators 
have collected samples from research participants themselves and may have a 
continuing clinical and/or research relationship with research participants. This means 
that they may be in a good position to develop an understanding of the interests of 
research participants, through consultation with participants themselves and others.  
7.28 The EGF describes both policies, by which all project members agree to abide, and 
guidelines, which represent best practice as it is currently understood. It deals with 
aspects of the project including the feedback to patients of pertinent and incidental 
clinically significant findings, and management pathways. Feedback may take place 
when a clinician believes it to be appropriate, the patient has consented and the finding 
has been validated to clinical standards.450 There is a diagram illustrating the process 
of data flow through the project and the necessary approvals.451 Data access policy is 
described in a Data Sharing Policy Document.452
 
448 See https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ega/dataproviders/EGAO00000000079. 
 All this information is publicly 
available. Access for the research community to sequence data held in the European 
Genome-phenome Archive is overseen by an independent Access Committee, which 
449 See http://www.uk10k.org/ethics.html. 
450 Kaye J, Hurles M, Griffin H, et al. (2014) Managing clinically significant findings in research: the UK10K example European 
Journal of Human Genetics 22(9): 1100-4, available at: http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v22/n9/full/ejhg2013290a.html. 
451 Muddyman D, Smee C, Griffin H, Kaye J, and UK 10K Project (2013) Implementing a successful data management 
framework: the UK10K managed access model Genome Medicine 5(11): 100, available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/gm504, at page 3. 
452 See http://www.uk10k.org/data_access.html. 
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will only approve applications from ‘appropriately qualified’ researchers who sign a 
legally binding agreement, making a number of undertakings that include protecting 
data confidentiality, providing appropriate data security and not attempting to identify 
individual participants.  
7.29 The UK10K project is more modest in resources and limited in purposes and research 
methods than UK Biobank, and aims to leverage existing resources with genomic 
sequencing to generate new knowledge. Nevertheless it shares many of its 
governance principles with UK Biobank. Both make use of explicit Ethics and 
Governance Frameworks and place considerable reliance on institutional academic 
regulation to ensure the probity of individual researchers. Both foreground the role of 
consent and recognise the challenges of interpreting it in different and changing 
circumstances (UK Biobank through the EGC, UK10K placing significant emphasis on 
the role of the principal investigator to interpret the interests and expectations of 
participants). Reflecting on these different approaches we make a number of 
recommendations below with regard to governance that are relevant to biobanks. 
 
Recommendation 10 
We recommend that appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to allow 
governance arrangements to evolve during the life of an initiative, through 
deliberation with morally relevant stakeholders including participants, the public, 
funders and the research community. Arrangements may include, e.g., representation 
of relevant stakeholder groups in the governance of the biobank; regular review of a 
public ethics and governance framework document legitimated through deliberation with 
interested parties that sets out the relationships of a biobank with participants, the 
research community, individual researchers, funders and the wider society. This may 
serve as an instrument to maintain alignment of the public interest in research with the 
privacy and other interests of the participants. Governance arrangements should, among 
other matters, outline policies for maintaining data security, the feedback of health-
related findings to participants and for research access to the resource. In large scale 
and complex initiatives detailed diagrams of data flows should be available to support 
good governance. The responsibility to ensure appropriate governance arrangements 
are in place rests with funders. 
 
 
Recommendation 11  
Where broad consent is sought for the use of data additional, adaptive safeguards 
should be in place to secure the interests of participants over the life of a project. 
A possible model is provided by a publicly articulated, ‘living’ ethics and governance 
framework that reflects the expectations of participants and is subject to review and 
revision through mechanisms that involve representatives of the full range of interests of 
participants in the initiative.  
 
 
Recommendation 12 
We recommend that researchers should operate demonstrably within a local 
governance framework able to maintain reasonable surveillance in order to 
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identify inappropriate data use and administer sanctions for misuse. Researchers 
should be members of a recognised research environment with appropriate 
arrangements in place to ensure their research meets ethical standards. They should 
provide undertakings regarding the confidential and secure use of data and that they will 
refrain from any attempt to identify participants from whom data may have been derived.  
 
International collaborative research 
7.30 As noted earlier, science is becoming an increasingly global enterprise, and as the 
ease with which research groups can communicate, share knowledge and carry out 
research collectively increases, more international collaborations will be formed. 
International collaborative initiatives can allow the sharing of knowledge and best 
practice and spread research expertise and funding across both well- and less-well- 
supported countries.453 While the benefits can be great, there are significant difficulties 
to be faced. For example, scientists in one country cannot ‘police’ the activities of those 
in another country as there may be differing national laws and governance frameworks 
that may prevent single policies being imposed.454
Box 7.3: Examples of international collaborative research involving genetic data 
 This requires conducting science in 
a way that provides accountability both at the local and consortium level, while 
respecting local legal, ethical and cultural norms.  
International Cancer Genome Consortium 
The International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) coordinates large-scale cancer 
genome studies in tumours from 50 different cancer types and/or subtypes that are of 
clinical and societal importance across the globe.455 As of May 2014, 74 projects 
representing over 17 countries and jurisdictions had sequenced over 25,000 cancer 
tumour genomes. Samples are held by each member project, while data is deposited in 
a central repository located in Toronto, Ontario. The project distinguishes two ‘types’ of 
data. Open access data, which does not contain obvious personal identifiers, is available 
from the ICGC Data Portal.456 Controlled access data, which is more readily identifying, 
is available to authorised researchers for approved research through the ICGC Data 
Compliance Office.457
The Psychiatric Genomics Consortium 
 After approval the researcher is able to download the data onto 
their own system for analysis.  
The Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (PGC) is an international initiative with over 500 
investigators from over 80 institutions in 25 countries. Its purpose is to conduct mega-
analyses (individual-level data meta-studies) of genome-wide genetic data for 
 
453 For example, the Global Alliance for Health and Genomics has created a Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic 
and Health-Related Data, http://genomicsandhealth.org/; the Human Heredity and Health in Africa (H3Africa) Initiative is a 
cross-continental initiative to support African researchers and improve African health, http://h3africa.org/. 
454 Romeo-Casabona C, Nicolás P, Knoppers BM, et al. (2012) Legal aspects of genetic databases for international biomedical 
research: the example of the International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano/ 
Law and the Human Genome Review 37: 15-34. 
455 The International Cancer Genome Consortium (2010) International network of cancer genome projects Nature 464(7291): 
993-8. See: https://icgc.org/.  
456 Zhang J, Baran J, Cros A et al. (2011) International Cancer Genome Consortium Data Portal—a one-stop shop for cancer 
genomics data Database 2011: bar026, available at: http://database.oxfordjournals.org/content/2011/bar026.long. 
457 Joly Y, Dove ES, Knoppers BM, Bobrow M and Chalmers B (2012) Data sharing in the post-genomic world: the experience 
of the International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) Data Access Compliance Office (DACO) PLoS Computational 
Biology 8(7): e1002549, available at: http://www.ploscompbiol.org/article/infoper cent3Adoiper cent2F10.1371per 
cent2Fjournal.pcbi.1002549.  
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psychiatric disorders. It is the largest biological experiment in the history of psychiatry.458 
The PGC data repository is located in the Netherlands. All phenotype and genotype data 
is stored there and all analyses of the data are carried out on its Genetic Cluster 
Computer.459
 
 
7.31 Similarly to biobanks, because of the developing knowledge environment, flexible and 
continually reviewed governance mechanisms are needed to guide the science while 
protecting the interests of participants. However, because of the diversity of their 
membership such consortia have to rely on agreements among members, peer 
pressure and the limited sanctions that can be imposed at the local level, such as 
cessation of funding. In the early days, ICGC members agreed to a set of overarching 
policies, together with flexible guidance that could be followed if desired.460 It was 
agreed that projects, which must obtain participants’ consent for whole genome 
sequencing, could be flexible regarding the return of individual health-related 
findings.461
7.32 While ICGC was, for many, a prospective study, the PGC Schizophrenia Working 
Group uses existing data from a number of previous studies that were carried out in 
different counties to identify the genetic variants which may confer genetic risk for 
individuals.
 This contrasts with the more formal ethics and governance frameworks 
previously discussed and highlights the reluctance of researchers to impose a single 
governance structure over many different national and regional groups, a reluctance 
not shown in other sectors (finance, for example). 
462
7.33 It is especially difficult to elicit participants’ expectations, because deliberative 
engagement is extremely difficult at the international consortium level. Even if such 
procedures were undertaken for each local project, it would be very difficult to 
generalise results across sites. Yet it is important that participants and publics are able 
to obtain information about what is being done with the data they have provided. 
Specific investigations are therefore needed to assess the impact of cross-border 
research and how best to verify consent for extended uses, as well as how to 
disseminate the results of research in as transparent and accessible but secure a way 
as possible. Similarly, policy bodies and funding agencies need to be clear under what 
circumstances data can be re-used.  
 Retrospective studies such as this present an obvious challenge to 
conventional research governance arrangements because the data were originally 
collected from participants in a number of different countries, and in varying 
circumstances. Furthermore, the extensive repurposing, data linking and analysis are 
carried out by a research collective whose members are themselves based in 
institutions in a number of countries. Gaining consent for international extensions of 
data access, or even disclosure outside a single institution, is actually a relatively 
recent circumstance for researchers to consider, let alone subject participants, and it is 
unclear whether the original consents would have been informed by foresight of such 
extensive re-use.  
 
458 http://www.med.unc.edu/pgc. 
459 http://www.med.unc.edu/pgc/documents. 
460 See https://icgc.org/icgc/goals-structure-policies-guidelines. 
461 Wallace SE and Knoppers BM (2011) Harmonised consent in international research consortia: an impossible dream? 
Genomics, Society and Policy 7: 35-46, available at: http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/pdf/1746-5354-7-1-35.pdf.  
462 Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (2014) Biological insights from 108 schizophrenia- 
associated genetic loci Nature 511(7510): 421-7, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v511/n7510/full/nature13595.html.  
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7.34 Another concern is the security of data, as data protection regimes are not the same 
across all countries.463 Global commerce has been dealing with this issue for many 
years, and it has been suggested that the research and clinical communities can learn 
from their experience.464 For example, the adequacy test asks if the level of protection 
in the jurisdiction that receives the data is comparable to that of the origin of the data 
with the implication that if it is, personal data may be transferred with confidence.465
Cloud storage and computing 
  
7.35 As more and more data become available, larger data analysis projects are being 
undertaken. These use the Internet to access appropriate technologies and operating 
power to transfer files, provide storage and drive analyses. Although commonly used in 
corporate settings, cloud computing is still a relatively new and potentially confusing 
concept to many in the research setting. It raises fears of loss of privacy due, for 
example, to a lack of clarity about responsibilities for data protection. Cloud services 
can be layered, with one provider being responsible for software while another is 
responsible for infrastructure.466
7.36 The location of data repositories is now an issue of potential concern. This led, for 
example, to some countries declining to participate in the Type 1 Diabetes Genome 
Consortium, owing to study requirements for the processing of samples at network 
laboratories and/or final deposition of samples in US-based Central Repositories.
 With competing responsibilities there is a fear that 
adequate protections may not be in place for secure data processing. As already 
mentioned, if a provider is located in a different country, the data may be subject to a 
different data protection scheme, possibly one of lesser stringency. 
467
Box 7.4: International Cancer Genome Consortium PanCancer Analyses of Whole 
Genomes (ICGC PCAWG) 
 Of 
particular concern is that many companies offering cloud computing facilities are based 
in the USA and therefore all data is subject to the homeland security legislation that 
allows access to data by the NSA (see chapter 2 above). The use of cloud computing 
in research highlights the difficulties of balancing the desire to analyse large datasets 
from around the world to advance scientific discovery with the risks of the potential loss 
of the confidentiality of data.  
The ICGC PCAWG will study the whole genome sequence from tumours and matched 
samples (usually blood) from an estimated 2,000 patients internationally who have been 
recruited to ICGC member projects. Demographic, clinical and pathology data will be 
available for all 2,000 matched samples. The dataset on which the analyses will run is 
expected to exceed one petabyte of data. Examining and comparing data across 
cancers internationally is now possible due to the large number of cancer genome 
 
463 See, for example, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013) The OECD privacy framework, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 
464 Kosseim P, Dove E, Baggaley C et al. (2014) Building a data sharing model for global genomic research Genome Biology 
15(8): 430, available at: http://genomebiology.com/2014/15/8/430. 
465 For this purpose the US is deemed to be a ‘safe harbour’ by the EU as US organisations have voluntarily self-certified that 
they will comply with mutually agreed-upon data protection principles. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-faq1_en.htm. However, see chapters 2 and 4 regarding 
concerns and evolving case law about jurisdictional differences. 
466 Information Commissioner’s Office (2012) Guidance on the use of cloud computing, available at: 
http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/guidance_index/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_application/cloud_c
omputing_guidance_for_organisations.ashx. 
467 Hilner JE, Perdue LH, Sides EG et al. (2010) Designing and implementing sample and data collection for an international 
genetics study: the Type 1 Diabetes Genetics Consortium (T1DGC) Clinical Trials 7(1 suppl): S5-S32, available at: 
http://ctj.sagepub.com/content/7/1_suppl/S5.short.  
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tumours that have been sequenced and made available in accessible form. As no one 
site will have sufficient capacity to host the project, using a cloud environment is being 
explored, if it can be shown to be consistent with the ethical and legal requirements of 
the ICGC. 
Several cloud providers, rather than one, may be used, based in different countries in 
North America, Europe and Asia. Annai Systems, an academic cloud based in the US, 
was approved for use by the ICGC Executive in November 2014 and ICGC data is 
already being mirrored, so far for five projects in its cloud. Any provider’s Terms of 
Service will be reviewed and agreed by the ICGC. A small number of ICGC Portal staff 
and PCAWG working group members will align and annotate the data to create a 
uniform dataset. Only ICGC PCAWG team members who have received approval will be 
allowed access to the dataset. The dataset will be removed from the cloud providers 
after the analysis is completed and archived at the EGA. 
 
7.37 At least four benefits to using cloud services have been identified for international 
collaborative biomedical research: lower costs, as one ‘rents’ space rather than 
purchases it; better data security, as such providers have the money to invest in state-
of-the-art security mechanisms; increased data storage capacity; and lower 
environmental impact, as a resource is being reused rather than newly constructed.468 
However, the terms of service of many of these providers have not necessarily been 
developed with specific attention to the needs and sensitivities of biomedical 
research.469
7.38 Cross-border data access and transmission and the use of cloud services should 
provoke research studies to review the ethical and legal implications, particularly where 
they are introduced to existing projects. For example, using cloud providers was not 
considered at the beginning of the ICGC and is not included specifically in consent 
documents. Seeking specific consent for this use from the 2,000 participants from 
multiple countries would be unfeasible. Through its oversight committees, the ICGC 
has approached this problem by working with cloud suppliers who will design systems 
that will provide for the needs of the scientific community.  
 There may therefore be a gap to close through the research community 
(including participants) working with providers to agree control of the data, security 
measures (such as appropriate encryption), and access to the data.  
7.39 One US-based market intelligence firm has predicted that by 2020 80 per cent of all 
health care data will pass through a cloud provider at some point and that cloud-based 
products will increasingly be used to manage costs and enable the analysis of the 
increasing amounts of health-related data becoming available.470
7.40 Details of how data initiatives use cloud systems need to be disseminated and 
discussed in the public arena, allowing any misconceptions to be explored and facts 
 This could be simply 
one more standard technology that will be commonly used. However, it is not clear that 
there is a high level of understanding amongst the general public, and indeed 
researchers and health care administrators, of the implications and, therefore, the 
moral relevance of cloud technologies.  
 
468 Dove Es, Joly Y, Tassé A, et al. (2014) Genomic cloud computing: legal and ethical points to consider European Journal of 
Human Genetics (advance online publication), doi:10.1038/ejhg.2014.196. 
469 Ibid. 
470 http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS25262514. 
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explained so that this technology can be used transparently and with appropriate 
safeguards. Any research-based data initiative seeking to use such technologies 
should discuss this with study partners and, if possible, potential participants for 
acceptability. This would allow prospective initiatives to include details of cloud use in 
consent materials as well as the governance framework. Any agreements with 
providers will need to be tailored to ensure that data will be kept secure from breaches 
of privacy and reviewed regularly. As norms in research practice change, it may be that 
the use of cloud providers will no longer be seen as contentious. But this will only 
happen with detailed examination of the issues and public debate, which will help us 
recognise morally reasonable expectations and formulate appropriate governance and 
oversight mechanisms.  
Recommendation 13 
We recommend that all international collaborative data research initiatives should 
operate within an explicit, public ethics and governance framework that has 
agreement from the initiative’s constituent partners. International collaborators 
should be able to demonstrate that they can fulfil recommendation 12 by applying 
equivalently strong governance standards (using legal and other mechanisms available 
in their national jurisdiction).  
 
Recommendation 14 
We recommend that all partners in international collaborations integrate the 
provisions of the ethics and governance framework (EGF) agreed by the initiative 
as far as possible at their local research site. The partner should ensure that they 
adhere to the EGF, for example by ensuring participants have given appropriate consent 
for the use of data and samples in the initiative and that they are informed of potential 
transfer across borders.  
 
Recommendation 15 
We recommend that national bodies publish their policies on the use of cloud 
services in health data settings so that data initiatives can include this in their 
decision making and interactions with publics and participants. 
 
Open data 
7.41 There are a number of projects that involve uploading individual genomic data and 
other data to the world wide web so that it becomes freely available to anyone to use 
for any purpose. The best known such initiative is the Personal Genome Project. This 
was initiated by the prominent Harvard University genomics researcher, George M. 
Church in 2005.471
 
471 Church GM (2005) The Personal Genome Project Molecular Systems Biology 1: 2005.0030, available at: 
http://msb.embopress.org/content/1/1/2005.0030; Lunshof JE, Bobe J, Aach J, et al. (2010) Personal genomes in progress: 
from the Human Genome Project to the Personal Genome Project Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 12(1): 47-60, available 
at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3181947/. 
 The Personal Genome Project is a long-term cohort resource that 
aims to publish the genome sequence, medical records and various other measures 
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such as MRI images of 100,000 volunteers so that the data are freely available to 
anyone who chooses to use them and to enable citizen science. George Church 
himself, together with other prominent figures in the biotechnology industry, genome 
science, and science policy made up the initial 10 participants, the ‘PGP-10’. (The 
Harvard University Medical School Review Board that considered the project had 
requested that the first group of volunteers included Church himself and other 
stakeholders in genomic science.) Today more than 3,500 volunteers have joined the 
USA study and additional studies have been established in Canada (2012) and UK 
(2013), with others planned. There is a long waiting list of potential volunteers, with 
over 10,000 people registered in the UK within three months of the project launch, 
although there is a significant lag, due to funding constraints, in generating and 
uploading sequence data.  
7.42 Participants in the PGP go through a different recruitment process to many 
conventional research projects. Firstly, there is no promise that the identity of 
individuals will remain anonymous as the whole purpose of the project is to make 
sequence data freely available. To be accepted, volunteers must be over 21 and pass 
an examination to test whether they are aware of the potential risks to participation – 
including possible discrimination by insurers and employers. If accepted for inclusion in 
the study, participants are required to contribute a sample from which a genome 
sequence will be produced and encouraged to upload other kinds of medical 
information. Before the sequence information is deposited on the project website, they 
have thirty days to review the data and make a decision whether they want it to be 
made public. If they decide to withdraw from the project during this period their data will 
not be publicly released. However, if data are put on the web and participants later 
decide to withdraw from the study, already released information will remain publicly 
available and only future information will not be released. Participants are asked to 
report any discrimination or harm that they experience as a result of participation in the 
project. There is a continuing relationship and engagement between participants and 
the project. Participants in PGP (USA) were required initially to do this on a quarterly 
basis, but this was reduced to six-monthly as it was felt to be too onerous for 
participants who had nothing to report. Participants in the PGP may be viewed as 
‘information altruists’ who are prepared to allow their genome sequence to be made 
public.472
7.43 The open publication of data, as exemplified by the Personal Genome Project, is a limit 
case for the governance of data for research.  Nevertheless, it is not meaningless to 
ask what the morally reasonable expectations of participants may be. In terms of what 
they may expect the limits to data use to be, the answer will depend on public norms 
rather than those maintained in the context of a specific data initiative, and on 
governance by law and the conventions of public morality. But while the expectations 
may not be bounded (indeed, participants are urged to contemplate the worst that can 
reasonably be imagined) they may nevertheless have some positive content. Subject 
participants may expect, for example, that their supposedly altruistic gesture should be 
answered by a commitment on the part of the PGP organisation actively to secure the 
best use of the data to advance scientific knowledge (for example, by ensuring the 
 Although this level of openness is not for everyone, the positive response to 
the launch of the UK and the Canadian arms of the project suggests that such projects 
do have public appeal. 
 
472 See also Kohane IS and Altman RB (2005) Health-information altruists – a potentially critical resource New England Journal 
of Medicine 353: 2074-77. 
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quality, accessibility and interoperability of the data published). Beyond that, the PGP 
implicitly poses a challenge to societies to affirm as a norm that the relevant rights of 
altruistic subject participants will be protected. To do this is to abandon the 'arms race' 
of developing ever stronger data security measures and rely instead on regulating the 
conduct of data users, not purely within the context of ‘bona fide’ research, subject to 
institutional codes and penalties, but generally, under public morality and the rule of 
law.473
Citizen science and participant-driven research  
 
7.44 Increasing access to digital technologies and the rise of online social networks has 
facilitated the formation of communities of people engaged in establishing and 
conducting health research including self experimentation, self surveillance, analysis of 
genomic data and genome-wide association studies.474
Box 7.5: PatientsLikeMe 
  
Founded in 2004, the largest participant-driven research network, PatientsLikeMe (PLM) 
has more than a quarter of a million members representing over 2,000 health conditions. 
Through this company (‘Live better, together’) people connect with others who may have 
the same disease or condition, and track and share their own experiences. In doing so 
they generate data about the real world nature of disease that can help researchers, 
pharmaceutical companies, regulators and health providers develop more effective 
products, services and care. PLM allows members to contribute their own data about 
their conditions (treatment, history, side effects, hospital episodes, symptoms, function 
scores, weight, mood, quality of life, etc.) on a continuing basis. The resulting 
longitudinal record is organised into charts and graphs that allow members to identify 
patterns, gain insight and place their experiences in context, as well as to see what 
treatments may have helped other patients like themselves. The website also gives 
members lists of relevant clinical trials and they can search the site for trials for which 
they may be eligible. The company also offers a commercial service to actively message 
potential participants for specific clinical trials. 
PLM describe their four core values as follows475
■ Honour the trust patients put in us – patients trust the company to protect their health 
data and to use it to advance knowledge of their disease. 
: 
■ Transparency. The company aims for ‘no surprises’. It discloses its business 
partnerships, what it does with patient’s data and how the company makes money. 
■ Openness. The company believes that sharing health information openly has potential 
to benefit patients. 
■ Create ‘wow’. This is a goal for what patients should feel when they visit the website.  
The company has a team of in-house researchers who produce many (peer reviewed) 
papers and also a number of collaborative partnerships with academic research 
 
473 There are two routes to this: general data protection legislation and anti-discrimination legislation. A number of legal 
instruments give protection against discrimination and the existence of measures comprising the 'welfare state' offers some 
practical insurance against the effects of discrimination. Although the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on the 
ground of health status, it does not explicitly include genetic status as a 'protected characteristic’; in response to the green 
paper that foreshadowed the Act, many, including the UK Human Genetics Commission, argued that it should. See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100419143351/http://hgc.gov.uk/client/document.asp?DocId=134&CAtegoryId=
4. 
474 Vayena E and Tasioulas J (2013) Adapting standards: ethical oversight of participant-led health research PLoS Medicine 
10(3): e1001402, available at: http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001402. 
475 https://support.patientslikeme.com/hc/en-us/articles/201245710-What-are-the-company-s-core-values-. 
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groups.476
 
 It is run as a for-profit company that makes money by selling data uploaded 
by patients to other companies. 
7.45 An early and influential example of PLM’s research was their amyotropic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS) lithium study. ALS is a progressive and incurable disease. In 2008 a 
small Italian study suggested that lithium carbonate could slow the progression of ALS. 
In response to this, many members of PLM began taking the drug. Two members with 
advanced stage ALS (from Brazil and the USA) initiated a study using self-generated 
data from members on the platform to test these findings. (Both died before the study 
was completed). The nine-month study indicated that lithium did not slow the 
progression of the disease, a result that was later confirmed in four randomised 
controlled trials.477
7.46 Patient-led and participant-driven research (PLR and PDR) is gaining wider recognition 
as a potential source of generalisable health knowledge that benefits both participants 
and society more widely, and that can realise the values of solidarity among 
communities of patients suffering from a common disease. It can complement 
conventional research on conditions, or on aspects of them, that may have been 
neglected. The researchers involved have claimed that it can speed up clinical 
discovery, and could potentially maximise it, setting a stage for better trials with more 
engaged participants.
 
478
7.47 Like any clinical research, PDR can involve the risk of harms to participants or their 
relatives, including children. Self-experimentation can lead to participants taking 
excessive risks.  Furthermore, the existence of a strongly solidaristic patient community 
may create or allow undue peer pressure or even exploitation. Conventional research 
has both scientific and ethical oversight, which facilitates the production of 
generalisable health knowledge that can be used by participants and society more 
widely. Research conducted outside the conventional academic and commercial 
institutions may not be subject to such oversight and study reports may not meet the 
basic acceptance criteria for peer-reviewed journals. While some participant-driven 
research may involve collaborators within the conventional system, thus bringing it 
within its ambit, much does not. However, trying to force this research into the 
conventional mould may stifle the very features that could make it so valuable. 
 However, this may require new governance arrangements.  
7.48 While all forms of scientific research involving human participants should be subject to 
ethical as well as scientific appraisal, the appropriate standards for ethical oversight 
need to be adapted to the distinctive features of PDR. There have been calls for a 
broad dialogue to address the issues and to generate consensus on best practice as 
well as warnings that a failure to do this may pose threats of harms to participants, 
 
476 http://www.patientslikeme.com/research/publications. 
477 Wicks P, Vaughan TE, Massagli MP and Heywood J (2011) Accelerated clinical discovery using self-reported patient data 
collected online and a patient-matching algorithm Nature Biotechnology 29(5): 411-4, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n5/abs/nbt.1837.html; Wicks P, Vaughan TE, and Heywood J (2014) Subjects no 
more: what happens when trial participants realize they hold the power? British Medical Journal 348: g368, available at: 
http://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g368. 
478 Wicks P, Vaughan TE, and Heywood J (2014) Subjects no more: what happens when trial participants realize they hold the 
power? British Medical Journal 348: g368, available at: http://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g368, at page 2. 
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risks of undermining the credibility of PDR, and may provoke a backlash of over-
regulation.479
Recommendation 16 
 
We recommend that biomedical researchers give consideration to arrangements 
that will maximise the potential of participant-driven research to contribute to 
generalisable health knowledge and secure public benefits while providing 
adequate protection of those involved through continuing ethical and scientific 
appraisal. Key stakeholders are citizen patient researchers, biomedical research 
bodies, research funders and journal publishers. All stakeholders should encourage 
optimal use of human studies for improved health outcomes. 
Conclusion 
7.49 In view of the rapidly increasing importance to the research community of extending 
access to data, and the benefits that such research can bring to the public at large, 
developing best practice for the collection, governance and use, and extension of 
access to data in biological research and health care should be a very high priority 
across both research and clinical settings. Some work has been done and is continuing 
by international organisations such as the Public Population Project in Genomics and 
Society (P3G) which have brought together best practice regarding population research 
and the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health which has created a Framework for 
Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data.480
Recommendation 17 
 But more needs to be 
done at the level of individual patients and research participants and respect for their 
circumstances and protection of privacy must be at the centre of such systems. There 
are many stakeholders in the collective enterprise of health promotion and medical 
treatment but to marginalise those individuals who provide data for research will be to 
risk the trust of current and future generations.  
We recommend that the research community, including all academic and 
commercial partners, data controllers and custodians, public services and 
government agencies, actively foster opportunities to create a more explicit and 
reflective foundation for extending data access in the public interest. We urge all 
stakeholders in the medical research enterprise to continue to develop robust and 
comprehensive, yet efficient privacy protecting rules, guidelines and measures. Among 
other things these should aim at:  
■ Providing greater clarity for members of the public about ways that their biomedical 
data are, and may be used in the future, along with a realistic acknowledgement that 
no system can guarantee privacy and confidentiality in all circumstances. 
■ Securing commitments from data controllers to a responsible approach to the 
extension of data access as part of their core mission statement; they must publish 
information about their approach to data access, transparency and accountability, and 
whether, and on what terms, they will consider extending access to data.  
 
479 Vayena E and Tasioulas J (2013) Adapting standards: ethical oversight of participant-led health research PLoS Medicine 
10(3): e1001402, available at: http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001402. 
480 www.p3g.org; http://genomicsandhealth.org/about-the-global-alliance/key-documents/framework-responsible-sharing-
genomic-and-health-related-data.  
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■ Demonstrable and continual improvement of collection, storage and data access 
procedures against explicit standards for accuracy, reliability and security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 Chapter 8 
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Chapter 8 – Reflections and conclusions 
Chapter overview 
This chapter reviews the state and direction of travel of information technology, data 
science, research and governance described in the report before drawing together the 
elements of the ethical argument. It concludes by setting out some practical precepts for 
professionals involved in data initiatives.  
 
Introduction  
8.1 In this final chapter we briefly reflect on the issues we have identified, the ethical 
argument that runs through this report and some of the conclusions to which our 
deliberations have led. Our hope is that our approach will prove useful to those 
proposing to extend the use of data in biomedical research and health care. We 
therefore conclude by proposing a number of practical precepts for those involved in 
the establishment or governance of data initiatives.  
The state of the art 
8.2 We began by setting out a number of propositions, which describe the area of interest 
and ethical issues that arise within it. The first two of these propositions describe the 
conditions from which the subsequent propositions follow, namely the accumulation of 
data from people in health care and biomedical research, and advances in 
information technology and data science that allow those data to be put to use. We 
recognise that these underlying technical advances are not specific to the fields of 
health care and biomedical research, but their impact in healthcare and biomedical 
research is profound and raise issues of special ethical significance.  One reason for 
this is that the opportunities to which these advances give rise invite us to think about 
data as a resource with broadly exploitable potential rather than as an output bound 
to the intentions that motivated its original collection. This way of thinking is, in 
general terms, very different to the way in which information governance-conscious 
clinicians and researchers have, until now, been expected to think about data. 
8.3 The principal ways of realising this new potential involve reframing the data within a 
novel context, created by a novel ‘research question’ or by linking them with other 
data, either from a different source or collected especially for the purpose. This led us 
to observe that the moral significance of data is therefore related to the kinds of 
questions that the data can help to answer and when or by whom those questions are 
addressed.   
8.4 Data collected in health care and biomedical research contexts are not intrinsically 
more or less ‘sensitive’ than other data relating to individuals, but the medical context in 
which they are acquired (and in which they may be used) will often mean that they 
touch important personal interests. On the other hand, we draw attention to the fact 
that there is a strong public interest in the responsible use of data in research to 
support the development of knowledge and innovation intended to improve the well-
being of all by enabling advances in healthcare. In fact, the use of data can have both 
beneficial and harmful effects on individuals or groups. These effects may be 
distributed in different ways: benefits for one group may entail welfare restrictions for 
another. Furthermore, different people may value different consequences in different 
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ways: something that might be profoundly troubling for one person might be a matter of 
indifference for another. It is principally these features – the potential for both beneficial 
and harmful consequences of data use, the possibility that they may be distributed 
differently among people, and the diverse ways that different people may value them – 
that constitute the problematic moral terrain of this report. 
8.5 Negotiating this terrain is made difficult by the fact that so much about the personal and 
social consequences of data use is unknown, partly because there is a lack of existing 
evidence, but mainly because we have to consider an indefinite future in which these 
data will persist and in which the potential for data use and its impacts could be 
transformed in unanticipated ways. The digital world of data is growing rapidly and the 
ways in which datasets can be related and information from them derived are changing 
constantly. Making decisions about how data are best managed is complicated further 
by changing and powerful scientific, economic and political interests. In some cases 
this has led to the terms of publicly significant data initiatives being established the 
terms for many data initiatives prior to any wider public debate. These factors make it 
reasonable to expect that norms will shift in unpredictable ways over time. It is likely 
that well-established social norms of privacy and data access that apply today will no 
longer be applicable even in the near future as the actions of business, major 
institutions or government seek to impose new norms independently of social 
processes. A possible example is where using patient data offers opportunities 
meaningfully to inform health care service design, this becomes accepted as 
‘necessary’ or is then legally mandated.481
8.6 The morally relevant issues here are not merely to do with the re-identification of 
individuals: there also are social choices about the terms on which data are used that 
have moral consequences both because they determine how specific individuals might 
be treated (they may underwrite discrimination, for example) and because they may 
have a broader social impact (they may be used to inform political decisions). The 
challenge recognised in this report is for us as a broader society to get this right, to use 
data responsibly to promote the public interest, in a way that and best reconciles the 
morally relevant interests of individuals and groups, and respects their fundamental 
rights. 
  Meanwhile, the bulwarks that have hitherto 
protected a satisfactory and workable accommodation of interests, principally, the de-
identification of data and the ‘informed’ consent of data ‘subjects’, have been 
substantially weakened in a hyper-connected (or potentially hyper-connectable) ‘big 
data’ world.  
Ethical approach 
8.7 Our ethical approach takes the perspective that the collection and use of data, and the 
determination of the circumstances in which these take place, are social activities that 
involve and affect people, individually or as members of groups, through time. Our 
focus has not been on identifying particular kinds of data as being of special concern 
(as almost all data can be ‘sensitive’ or ‘personal’, depending on the context), but on 
the human relationships that variously facilitate or restrict the use of data, or which may 
be created or affected by particular uses of data, and which change through time. Our 
 
481  See, for example, the arguments about the ‘need’ to use patient data to support health care service design and resource 
allocation that was put forward by NHS England in support of its ‘care.data’ programme, and the legislative action to facilitate 
data sharing a range of health-related purposes through the Care Act 2014. 
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aim has been to identify from among the influences and drivers shaping these 
relationships the values and interests that are morally relevant and how they should be 
respected accordingly.  
8.8 Privacy is important to people for a number of reasons relating to their ability to 
maintain their identity, relationships and well-being. Respecting people’s privacy can be 
seen as an aspect of showing respect for them as persons. The public interest is an 
interest that people share as members of a society, e.g. the promotion of commonly 
valued conditions like security, physical and mental health and material prosperity. 
People are simultaneously both individuals and members of wider groups with shared 
values and interests: they thus have interests both in allowing other people to access 
data that relates to them and in guarding against this to preserve their privacy, just as 
they have interests both in access to data about others and in their privacy. Private and 
public interests are fundamentally entwined: there is both a private and public interest 
in maintaining acceptable levels of privacy, and a private and public interest in making 
responsible use of data compatible with this. Data initiatives therefore have to perform 
a ‘double articulation’ that seeks to reconcile the private and public interest in using 
data, and of the private and public interest in protecting privacy, rather than simply 
‘balancing’ privacy interests against public interest.   
8.9 Recognising the complex interrelation of morally relevant interests at stake leads to a 
more nuanced ethical approach than simply that of distinguishing the morally 
acceptable from the morally unacceptable. This is not to ignore that there might be 
unacceptable outcomes: those that do not respect persons or that violate their human 
rights are unacceptable, a point reinforced by our first two ‘substantive’ principles of 
respect for persons and human rights.  
■ Asserting the principle of respect for persons requires that the terms of a data 
initiative are set as a result of moral reasoning that takes the complex 
interrelationship of public and private interests into account. Enabling those with 
morally relevant interests to assert their own interests and offering them a reasoned 
account of decisions regarding data use that recognises those interests as being 
morally relevant are ways in which data initiatives may demonstrate respect for 
persons.   
■ Asserting the principle of respect for human rights entails that people should be free 
to exercise, and that others should respect, rights derived from people’s core, morally 
relevant interests (among which is the right to protection of private and family life and 
personal correspondence). It also entails that this freedom may only be restricted for 
weighty reasons, where is it necessary to achieve an end that the person is expected, 
through their membership of the society, to find reasonable and compelling, and in a 
way that is proportionate to achieving this aim.  
8.10 However, the ethical approach also recognises that that job of moral reasoning should 
not cease once the threshold of acceptability is passed but should continue throughout 
the process of establishing and governing a data initiative, and permeate it at every 
point. Opportunities for ethical reflection should therefore be built into data initiatives.  
Moral reasoning thereby assumes a constructive role: rather than that of the external 
conscience poised to say ‘no’ to certain practices that step over a notional line of 
acceptability, the recognition that there are ethical arguments on both sides of any 
question about data use allows them to be harnessed in the search of good and better 
solutions, not merely the delineation of acceptable ones. Hence the notion of what is 
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 
8
 
R
E
F
L
E
C
T
I
O
N
S
 
A
N
D
 
C
O
N
C
L
U
S
I
O
N
S
 
B i o l o g i c a l  a n d  h e a l t h  d a t a :  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  
 155 
morally reasonable is not merely about satisfying some formal standard of 
reasonableness but rather about the outcome of a process of moral reasoning in which 
values and interests confront and challenge each other in a concrete situation.482
■ Following the principle of participation of those with morally relevant interests in a 
deliberative procedure can optimise the relationship between public and private 
interests because it allows values and interests to be transformed and reconciled 
through dynamic interaction (rather than assuming that they are fixed and 
immutable).  This is in contrast to approaches that simply dictate terms of an initiative 
to fulfil particular interests and invite others to take part. Participation demonstrates 
respect for persons by involving them in the design of data initiatives (it enables them 
to engage in forming the conditions of a future in which they have a direct interest 
rather than merely responding to it) and is more likely to produce outcomes that 
secure their commitment and build trust.  
 In the 
report we offer two further principles to guide this positive search for a set of morally 
reasonable expectations.  
■ Following the principle of accounting for decisions is a necessary complement to the 
principle of participation, since not all interests can be represented through 
participation and not all interests may be satisfied with any outcome. This ensures not 
only that a decision can be ‘accounted for’ in a community, but also that there is an 
opportunity to challenge and even to re-evaluate the decisions, through formal 
structures (e.g. regulation or appeal to a legitimate authority) and broader social 
processes (e.g. open and continuing debate). It follows that the set of morally 
reasonable expectations must be a publicly statable in a way that allows an account 
to be given to all those with morally relevant interests of how their interests have been 
respected.  The principle recognises the necessarily provisional nature of decisions 
about data management and governance, since the horizon of possibilities – and the 
values and interests invested in them – are constantly changing as the social, 
political, technological and information environments evolve.   
8.11 Together, we believe that these principles offer the best chance of producing, for any 
particular data initiative, a morally reasonable set of expectations capable of being 
satisfied in practice. Such a set of expectations must incorporate the principles of 
respect for persons and human rights; it must include, in other words, expectations 
about how respect for diverse values and interests will be shown and about how moral 
conduct of others will be assured, while at the same time resolving the ‘double 
articulation’ of public and private interests through a process of moral reasoning. We 
found that there are always three essential elements to the set of morally reasonable 
expectations, and that the content of these expectations will be strongly interrelated in 
any data initiative. 
■ Identifying applicable norms: mere compliance with the law is inadequate to ensure 
that data use is morally reasonable. This is because law both stands in a broadly 
derivative relationship with respect to morality and because it provides only a minimal 
framework for action rather than full determination for moral action. It is therefore 
important to identify the moral norms of privacy and data access applicable in the use 
context.  
 
482  The central moral question facing data initiatives, as we formulate it in chapter 3 is: “How may we define a set of morally 
reasonable expectations about how data will be used in a data initiative...?”. 
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■ Respecting individual moral freedoms: similarly, consent is often relied upon as an 
important way of respecting individual moral agency but it is not sufficient on its own 
to resolve the morally relevant interests at stake, nor is it always necessary (for 
example, where the applicable privacy norms do not require it).  An appropriate way 
of respecting individual freedoms must be found in relation to the applicable norms 
and governance for any particular initiative, which may involve different forms of 
consent (broad, explicit, etc.) or legitimate authorisation. 
■ Assuring moral conduct by others: individuals are entitled to have expectations of 
others using data (particularly professionals involved in data initiatives), including 
expectations of who these others will be, and how their conduct will be governed.  
Furthermore, there is a public interest in ensuring that those involved in data 
initiatives discharge a moral duty of care owed to others, a duty that is not exhausted 
simply by complying with subjects’ consent.   
8.12 It is these three elements – the content of expectations, how they were defined and the 
way in which they relate to each other in the context of specific data initiatives – that we 
considered when we looked for examples of good practice in specific initiatives in 
chapters six and seven. 
Some practical precepts for data initiatives 
8.13 The key to acting ethically with personal health information in a world of Big Data will 
be to maintain the engagement of, and oversight by, patients and other affected people 
not just as a new initiative is being developed, but as it evolves over time. It is natural 
for the evolution of a system to be driven by its heaviest users, and so an initiative that 
was initially acceptable to both patients and researchers may within a few years have a 
quite different balance. The promoters and operators of data initiatives using health 
and biomedical data must therefore give careful thought not just to how they secure 
moral acceptability and provide adequate transparency at the beginning, but also how 
this is to be maintained as the system evolves.  Failure to maintain a workable 
reconciliation of moral, legal, social and professional norms, just as much as a failure to 
produce it in the first place, can lead to loss of public trust and compromise both the 
respect for private interests and the attainment of public benefits.   
8.14 How, then, does our ethical approach translate into practical actions?  What steps 
might someone approaching a data initiative take, perhaps as a principal investigator in 
a research project, a lead policy official or a commissioner of services?  Clearly, the 
appropriate measures that may be taken will vary according to a number of factors 
including with the nature and size of the initiative.  Nevertheless, from our examination 
of this area we might distil a number of useful precepts. 
■ Identify prospectively the morally relevant values and interests in any data 
initiative.  Some process of stakeholder mapping and reflection on this will be 
essential as an initial step to understand where these interests are located and what 
informs them.483
 
483  See recommendation 2 at paragraph 2.50 above (regarding mapping data flows) although the interests in a data initiative are 
not only those of people and groups at the terminal points of data flows. 
  These will include private interests but may also include economic 
and political interests, for example.  Explicating their moral content may allow them to 
be set in the same light as other moral interests. This critical reflection may very often 
reveal that what appear to be ‘hard constraints’ or 'strategic imperatives' rest on moral 
assumptions or prior value commitments that ought themselves to be brought into 
question. 
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■ Take special care to identify those interests that may be especially at risk or 
that arise from diverse values.  Identifying situational vulnerabilities (i.e. why the 
consequences of a particular data initiative might disproportionately affect certain 
individuals or groups) and understanding how different people value the potential 
benefits and hazards of data initiatives is essential to explore what forms of respect 
for individual freedoms (e.g. consent) and forms of governance may be required.   
■ Do not rely simply on compliance with the law to secure that data use is 
morally appropriate, particularly where it does not fully reflect moral norms.  The 
norms enshrined in legal instruments, while they determine how data may be used 
(and, in certain cases, how it must be used) are insufficient to determine how they 
should be used.  It should never be assumed that compliance with the requirements 
of law will be sufficient to ensure that a particular use of data is morally reasonable.   
■ Establish what existing privacy norms are engaged by the contemplated uses of 
data.  These will have a number of different sources, including social conventions, 
value and belief systems, and needs of individuals, groups and communities.  This 
might include, for example, norms of professional confidentiality, of data sharing 
within families or social groups, or of wider acceptance of data use.  Findings from 
consultation or public opinion research will be informative at this stage (but caution 
should be exercised when relying on existing research as the circumstances, values 
and interests may differ from one data initiative to another).  Resistance among the 
public to the involvement of profit-seeking commercial actors may be an important 
phenomenon in this context.  If private sector organisations are going to play a role in 
the delivery of public services and public goods, this must be engaged with in 
formulating reasonable expectations.  Attempts to shift norms or impose new norms 
without engagement risks undermining trust and therefore the objectives of the 
initiative.   
■ Involve a range of those with morally relevant interests in the design of data 
initiatives in order to arrive at a publicly statable set of expectations about how data 
will be used.484
■ State explicitly the set of morally reasonable expectations about the use of data 
in the initiative.  These are likely to include who will have access to data and for what 
purposes, the way in which disclosures will be authorised (including the form of any 
relevant consent procedures) and how the conduct of those with access to data will 
be regulated or accounted for.
  Participation helps to ensure both that different values and interests 
may be represented and that expectations are statable in a way that is intelligible 
from different perspectives.  It also helps ensure that an account is given of how 
morally relevant values and interests are respected.  Structured public dialogue or 
other forms of deliberative engagement, including direct participation of 
representatives in the initiative, will often be valuable.  
485
■ Involve a range of those with morally relevant interests in the continuing 
governance and review of data initiatives.  What constitutes morally reasonable 
expectations may alter over time as new opportunities and threats emerge and as 
norms shift.  Measures such as monitoring relevant social research, periodic 
consultation or a standing reference panel of participants are desirable.
  This statement might take the form, for example, of 
a written and published ethics and governance framework document that can be 
accessed easily, with explicit arrangements for it to be reviewed.  
486
 
484  See recommendations 6 and 7  (which are specifically relevant to the HSCIC) 
 
485  See recommendation 7 (which is specifically relevant to the HSCIC but covers the publication of data sharing agreements) 
and recommendations 11 and 13 (with regard to research using broad consent models). 
486  See recommendation 10 (with specific relevance to biobanks). 
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Appendix 1: Method of working 
Background  
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics established the Working Party on The collection, linking 
and use of data in biomedical research and health care: ethical issues in March 2013. The 
Working Party met ten times over a period of 18 months. In order to inform its deliberations, it 
held a public consultation and a series of 'fact-finding meetings' with external stakeholders 
and experts. It also commissioned two reports on topics relevant to the work of the project 
and received comments on a draft of the report from twelve external reviewers. Further 
details of each of these aspects of the Working Party’s work are given below and in Appendix 
2. The Working Party would like to express its gratitude to all those involved, and the 
invaluable contribution they made to the development of the final report. 
Consultation document 
The Working Party launched a consultation in October 2013. The consultation ran until 
January 2014. 51 responses were received, of which 22 were submitted by individuals and 
29 on behalf of organisations. Those responding to the consultation included researchers, 
interest groups and professional organisations. A full list of those responding (excluding 
those who asked not to be listed) is set out in Appendix 2. A summary of the responses is 
accessible on the Council’s website. Copies of individual responses will also be made 
available on the website in those instances where the Council has permission from 
respondents to do so. 
Fact-finding 
As part of its work, the Working Party held a series of 'fact-finding’ meetings. Invited guests 
gave brief presentations and then participated in discussion with Working Party members 
and other guests. 
Big data: 19 July 2013  
 
■ Francine Bennett, Mastodon C 
■ Fiona Cunningham, EBI 
■ Tim Hubbard, Sanger Centre 
■ Martin Landray, University of Oxford 
 
Patient/participant choices and privacy solutions: 12 September 2013 
■ John Bowman, Ministry of Justice 
■ Ian Brown, Professor of Information Security and Privacy and Associate Director 
(Cyber Security Centre), Oxford Internet Institute 
■ Toto Ann Gronlund , Head of Patient and Public Partnerships, NHS CFH 
■ Alastair Kent, Director, Genetic Alliance UK 
■ John Loder, Young Foundation 
■ Sam Smith, Privacy International 
■ David Townend, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy in Health, Medicine and Life 
Sciences, Maastricht University 
■ Effy Vayena, Senior Research Fellow, University of Zurich 
■ Tim Williams, Director of myClinicalOutcomes 
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Screening and risk profiling: 14 November 2013 
■ Kerry Bailey-Jones, Health Lead, We Predict 
■ Ramona Liberoff, Senior Vice President (Innovation Analytics, Nielsen UK 
■ Grigorios Loukides, Lecturer in Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University 
■ Monique Mackenzie, Consultant in DMP Stats and Statistics Lecturer, University of St 
Andrews 
■ Anne Mackie, Director, National Screening Committee 
■ Nora Pashayan, Senior Clinical Lecturer in Applied Health Research, UCL 
■ Matt Sperrin, Lecturer in Health Data Science, University of Manchester 
■ Paul Taylor, Reader in Health Informatics, UCL 
 
Biomedical data in research and clinical practice across jurisdictional boundaries: 8 
January 2014 
■ Ruth Boardman, Bird and Bird 
■ Marc Dautlich, Pinsent Masons 
■ Paul Flicek, EMBL-EBI  
■ Dennis Keho, AIMES Grid Services 
■ Katherine Littler, Wellcome Trust 
■ Ioannis Pandis, Imperial College London 
■ Becky Purvis, AMRC 
■ Judith Rauhofer, University of Edinburgh 
■ Jane Reichel, Uppsala University 
■ Jonathan Sellors, UK Biobank 
 
Evidence reviews 
In order to inform its deliberations, the Working Party commissioned two reports from 
external academics.487
The terms of the reviews are set out below. 
  
Review 1: Actual harms resulting from security breaches or infringements of privacy 
involving sensitive personal biomedical and health data. 
Purpose: to assist the Working Party in understanding: 
(a) The nature of the actual harms resulting from security breaches involving sensitive 
personal biomedical and health data (i.e. misuse of personal data in terms of both 
system security, breaches of confidentiality and the potential to re-identify individuals 
from anonymised data). This applies both to the research and healthcare domain, 
and translation between them; 
(b) the incidence and prevalence of such harms and the appropriate context in which to 
assess them; 
 
487  Review 1 was commissioned jointly with the Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (EAGDA). 
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(c) relevant definitions (e.g. meaning of ‘sensitive personal data’ in the regulatory 
context); 
(d) the effectiveness of mechanisms of redress in documented known cases; 
(e) possible alternative governance options for controlling data and their likely 
consequences; and 
(f) the nature and significance of any drivers or conditions favouring misuse of data (e.g. 
a ‘black market’ in personal data).  
The review was carried out by Professor Graeme Laurie, University of Edinburgh, Ms Leslie 
Stevens, University of Edinburgh, Dr Kerina H.Jones, Swansea University, and Dr Christine 
Dobbs, Swansea University. It is available at: www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-
health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
Review 2: Evidence relating to the history of the relationship between the private and 
public sector in the field of human genomics 
Purpose: to assist the Working Party in understanding: 
(a) The nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors in the 
development and execution of biological and health research; 
(b) whether there is an identifiable change in the nature of that relationship e.g. from 
competition (Human Genome Project; BRCA identification) to collaboration 
(Genomics England); 
(c) if such a change can be identified, what relationship, if any, does it have with the 
current conjunction of open data/open policy making?; and  
(d) if the nature of public sector involvement in research has changed. 
The review was carried out by Professor Paul Martin, University of Sheffield and Dr Greg 
Hollin, University of Nottingham and is available at: 
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/. 
External review 
An earlier version of the report was reviewed by twelve individuals with expertise in 
disciplines relevant to the project. These individuals were:  
■ Professor Carol Brayne 
■ Dr Deborah Peel 
■ Professor Douwe Korff 
■ Dr Eerke Boiten 
■ Dr Effy Vayena  
■ Harry Cayton OBE 
■ Leila El Hadjam 
■ Dr Mark Taylor          
■ Dr Neil Manson          
■ Professor Sheila M Bird OBE FRSE 
■ Professor Steve Yearley 
■ Dr Vitaly Shmatikov 
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The Working Party deeply appreciates the time and thought the reviewers brought to this 
investigation and thanks them for their helpful contributions. 
 
The views expressed within this Report are those of the Working Party and the Council and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of any participants in the various activities undertaken by 
the Working Party in connection with this Report. 
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Appendix 2: Wider consultation for the Report 
The aim of the consultation was to obtain views from as wide a range of organisations and 
individuals interested in the area as possible. The consultation document was published 
online (available in hard copy on request). Individuals and organisations known by the 
Working Party to be interested were also directly alerted by email and encouraged to 
respond. The document was divided into two parts, with the first one outlining three areas of 
development relevant to the topic of the report and the second asking for more detailed 
responses to the following questions, for each of which potentially relevant aspects were 
highlighted:  
■ Do biomedical data have special significance? 
■ What are the new privacy issues? 
■ What is the impact of developments in data science and information technology? 
■ What are the opportunities for, and the impacts of, the use of linked biomedical data 
in research? 
■ What are the opportunities for, and the impacts of, data kinking in medical practice? 
■ What are the opportunities for, and the impacts of, using biomedical data outside 
biomedical research and health care 
■ What legal and governance mechanisms might support the ethical linking of 
biomedical data?  
 
Respondents were encouraged to answer as many, or as few, as they wished. Fifty-one 
responses were received, 22 from individuals and 29 from organisations.  
All the responses were circulated to Working Party members and a summary of responses 
was considered in detail at a subsequent Working Party meeting. 
A summary of the responses received, together with the original consultation paper, is 
available on the Council's website. Individual responses will also be published in full on the 
website, where respondents have granted permission for the Council to do so. The 
responses received played an important role in shaping the Working Party's thinking, and the 
Working Party is grateful to all those who contributed. 
Anonymous  
Three respondents wished to remain unlisted in the report. 
Individuals 
■ Professor Sheila M Bird OBE FRSE 
■ Martin Bobrow 
■ Dr Jo Bowen 
■ Professor Carol Brayne 
■ Shawneequa Callier 
■ Patrick Finlay PhD 
■ Jane Halliday 
■ Ian Herbert 
■ Julian Hitchcock 
■ Atina Krajewska and Ruth Chadwick 
■ Professor Neil Lawrence, Department of Computer Science and Sheffield Institute for 
Translational Neuroscience, University of Sheffield 
■ Nadine Levin, University of Exeter 
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■ Pauline McCormack, Simon Woods and Jackie Leach-Scully, PEALS Research 
Centre, Newcastle University 
■ Sylwia Maria Olejarz 
■ Dr John Saunders, Chair of the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) 
■ Bettina Schmietow, European School of Molecular Medicine and University of Milan 
■ Professor Tim Spector, KCL 
■ Dr Mark J Taylor, The University of Sheffield 
■ Professor Martin Widschwendter and Dr Daniel Reisel, UCL Department of Women's 
Cancer's, Institute of Women's Health, University College London 
Organisations 
■ Association of Medical Research Charities (AMRC) 
■ British Dental Association 
■ British Medical Association 
■ Cancer Research UK 
■ CARE 
■ Centre for Longitudinal Studies (ESRC Resource Centre), Institute of Education, 
University of London 
■ Christian Medical Fellowship 
■ Clinical Trial Service Unit & Epidemiological Studies Unit (CTSU), Nuffield 
Department of Population Health, University of Oxford 
■ eHealth Research Group, University of Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
■ EMBL - European Bioinformatics Institute 
■ Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences (Egenis) 
■ Farr Institute @CIPHER, with input from the Innovative Governance Group of the Farr 
Institute for Health Informatics Research 
■ GeneWatch UK 
■ Information Commissioner's Office 
■ Medical Research Council (MRC) 
■ National Bioethics Commission of Mexico 
■ Nowgen 
■ PHG Foundation 
■ Privacy Advisory Committee, Northern Ireland 
■ Progress Educational Trust 
■ Royal Academy of Engineering 
■ The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
■ The Mason Institute for Medicine, Life Sciences and the Law, University of Edinburgh 
■ The Physiological Society 
■ The Wellcome Trust 
■ U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
■ UCL Centre for Health Informatics and Multiprofessional Education 
■ Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute 
■ World Medical Association (WMA) 
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Appendix 3: The Working Party 
Professor Martin Richards (Chair) 
 
Martin Richards is Emeritus Professor of Family Research at the University of Cambridge. 
Until his retirement (2005) he was Director of the Centre for Family Research where he 
continues to researched parent-child relationships, family life and genetic and reproductive 
technologies. He is a member of the Cambridge University United Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust Tissue Management Committee. Until recently he was Vice-Chair of the UK Biobank 
Ethics and Governance Council and he previously served on the Human Genetics 
Commission and the Ethics and Law Committee of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority. His books include, The Troubled Helix (edited with T. Marteau, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), The Limits of Consent (edited with O. Corrigan and others, Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Reproductive Donation: Practice, Policy and Bioethics (edited with J. 
Appleby and G. Pennings, Cambridge University Press, 2012), Relatedness in Assisted 
Reproduction (edited with T. Freeman, S. Graham and F. Ebtehaj, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). He is currently working on a history of assisted reproduction.  
 
Professor Ross Anderson 
 
Ross Anderson is Professor of Security Engineering at Cambridge University.  He is a Fellow 
of the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering, the IET and the IMA, and wrote the 
textbook Security Engineering – A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. He 
has a long-standing interest in health care IT, having advised the BMA on the safety and 
privacy of clinical information systems in the 1990s and more recently having been a special 
advisor to the House of Commons’ Health Committee. He was an author of Database State, 
the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust report which led to the cancellation of the ContactPoint 
children’s database. He also chairs the Foundation for Information Policy Research and is on 
the advisory council of the Electronic Privacy Information Centre.  
 
Stephen Hinde 
Stephen Hinde was the Head of Information Governance and Caldicott Guardian for the 
Bupa Group for eighteen years. He retired in December 2013 and now advises a number of 
Christian charities on data protection and confidentiality. He is a member of the UK Council 
of Caldicott Guardians, having served as its inaugural chairman. He also sits on the Wales 
Information Governance Board. He was Deputy Chairman of the National Information 
Governance Board for Health and Social Care (NIGB) and was a member of its Ethics and 
Confidentiality Committee, which advised on s251 requests. 
 
Professor Jane Kaye 
 
Jane Kaye is Professor of Health, Law and Policy and Director of the Centre for Law, Health 
and Emerging Technologies (HeLEX) at the University of Oxford. Her research involves 
investigating the relationships between law, ethics and practice in the area of emerging 
technologies in health. Her main focus is on genomics with an emphasis on biobanks, 
privacy, data-sharing frameworks, public engagement, global governance and translational 
research.  She is leading the ELSI 2.0 initiative and is on a number of Advisory Boards for 
large scientific projects, as well as journal editorial boards.  
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Professor Anneke Lucassen 
Anneke Lucassen is Professor of Clinical Genetics and Honorary Consultant Clinical 
Geneticist, University of Southampton Cancer Sciences Division and The Wessex Clinical 
Genetics Service. Her clinical expertise is in cancer and cardiac genetics and she leads the 
clinical ethics and law unit at Southampton faculty of medicine (CELS) which researchers the 
social, ethical and legal aspects of genomic developments in clinical practice. She is chair of 
the Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust Clinical Ethics Committee and of the British 
Society of Genetic medicine’s Ethics and Policy committee. She is cofounder and organiser 
of the UK Genethics Club. She is a former member of the human genetics commission and 
current member of the ethics advisory committee for Genomics England. 
 
Professor Paul Matthews 
 
Paul Matthews is the Edmond and Lily Safra Professor of Translational Neuroscience and 
Therapeutics and Head of the Division of Brain Sciences at Imperial College, London, where 
he serves as the Medicine representative on the Data Science Institute Research Board. He 
is also a Fellow by Special Election of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford and holds a number of other 
honorary academic appointments. He received his training in neurology at Oxford, Stanford 
and McGill. He chairs the Imaging Enhancement Working Group and sits on the Steering 
Committee of UK Biobank. He also chairs the Imaging Network and is an ad hoc Executive 
Team member of the Dementias Platform UK. His personal research focuses on the 
characterising relationships between microglial activation, adaptive plasticity and 
neuroaxonal loss in the progression of in people with multiple sclerosis.  
 
Professor Michael Parker  
 
Michael Parker is Professor of Bioethics and Director of the Ethox Centre at the University of 
Oxford. His main research interest is in the ethics of collaborative global health research. He 
leads the ethics programme of the Malaria Genomic Epidemiology Network (MalariaGEN) 
and, together with partners at the Wellcome Trust Major Overseas Programmes in Africa and 
South East Asia, he co-ordinates the Global Health Bioethics Network. Since 2001, he has 
been one of the co-ordinators of the Genethics Club, a national ethics forum for health 
professionals and researchers in the UK to discuss ethical issues arising in their practice. 
The forum’s work was published in the book Ethical Problems and Genetics Practice. 
Michael is currently Chair of the Ethics Advisory Committee of the 100,000 Genomes Project, 
Chair of the Data Access Committee of the Wellcome Trust Case-Control Consortium and a 
member of the Medical Research Council’s Ethics, Regulation and Public Involvement 
Committee.  
 
Margaret Shotter 
 
Margaret Shotter fulfils a number of advisory roles relating to ethics and governance issues 
for medical research following a career in biostatistics with a special interest in the research 
methodology of clinical trials and then as senior manager for research ethics at UBC, 
Vancouver. There she had overall responsibility for the ethical reviews of human subject 
research across the university, including its affiliated hospitals and research institutes. Since 
2008, she has been a member of the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council. She is a 
lay member of Expert Advisory Groups reporting to the Commission on Human Medicine, 
and serves on several other advisory panels relating to medical research. 
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Dr Geoff Watts 
 
Geoff Watts spent five years in research before becoming a science and medical writer and 
broadcaster. He presented BBC Radio 4’s Medicine Now and, more recently, its science 
programme Leading Edge. He was a founder member of, and served for six years on, the 
Human Genetics Commission. Geoff chaired the Council’s Working Group on mitochondrial 
donation.  
 
Dr Susan Wallace 
 
Susan E. Wallace is Lecturer of Population and Public Health Sciences, Department of 
Health Sciences, University of Leicester. Her research interests include the legal and policy 
implications of population-based and disease-based longitudinal cohort studies and 
biobanks, ethical issues in biomedical research, research ethics review, and public health 
genomics. Currently, she is a member of the International Cancer Genome Consortium 
(ICGC) Ethics and Policy Committee, the UK ICGC Prostate Project Oversight Group and the 
Canadian Partnership for Tomorrow Project ELSI Task Force. She conducts policy research 
in collaboration with the UK National Child Development Study (1958 Birth Cohort) and is 
involved in the BioSHaRE-eu (FP7) project which focuses on the development and 
evaluation of tools and methods for accessing and exploiting data from biobanks and cohort 
studies.  
 
 
John Wise 
 
John Wise is the Executive Director of the Pistoia Alliance and the Programme Co-ordinator 
for the PRISME Forum. The Pistoia Alliance is a not-for-profit, cross-company organisation 
committed to lowering the barriers to innovation in Life science R&D. The PRISME Forum is 
a not-for-profit Pharma R&D IT leadership group focussed on the identification and palliation 
of “hot topics”, and the sharing of industry best practices. John has worked in life science 
R&D informatics in a variety of organizations including academia, the pharmaceutical 
Industry, a cancer research charity as well as in the technology supply side of the industry. 
This has provided him with direct, hands-on experience of delivering computer-based 
services across the life science R&D value chain. John graduated in physiology before 
obtaining a post-graduate certificate in education. 
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Glossary 
Algorithm: an effective method for calculating a function, expressed as a finite list of well-
defined instructions. In the report, this term is used with particular reference to statistical 
data-mining. 
Anonymisation: the removal of the names, addresses and other identifying particulars of 
data subjects – in the report with particular reference to their medical records – with a view to 
making their re-identification more difficult.  
Article 29 Working Party: the European advisory body on data protection established under 
Article 29 of the European Data Protection Directive. It consists of all the DP Supervisors of 
EU member states, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and a representative of the 
European Commission. It publishes opinions which are influential, but which explain the law 
rather than having legal force of themselves. 
Ascertainment bias: (also sampling bias) a systematic distortion in measuring the true 
occurrence of a phenomenon resulting from the way in which data are collected, where all 
relevant instances were not equally likely to have been recorded.  
Barnardisation: a procedure of randomly altering data values prior to publication of statistics 
to make identification more difficult, named after mathematician George Alfred Barnard.  
Bespoke data linkage: a service designed for a customer linking one or more data sets to 
data supplied by that customer.  
Bespoke extract – pseudonymised: a one-off extract tailored to the customer’s 
requirements of specified data fields containing patient identifiable data, sensitive data items 
or both, and linked to an existing scheme of pseudonyms.  
Big data: a term used to describe large and rapidly growing datasets in all areas of life and 
accompanying technologies and developments to analyse and re-use these, especially with 
the ambition to release latent or unanticipated value. See also Knowledge discovery in 
databases; Data mining; Data science; Machine learning. 
Biobank: a repository which collects, processes, stores and distributes tissue and data for 
biomedical, genomic or other research purposes.  
Bioinformatics: an interdisciplinary field that develops methods and software tools for 
understanding biological data. 
Biomarker: a measurable characteristic that can indicate an underlying biological state or 
condition, such as a disease state or pharmacologic response.  
 
Biomedicine: medical research which applies principles of biology, biochemistry, etc., to 
medical research or practice. 
 
Biometrics: the use of metrics of unique human characteristics or traits for identification and 
surveillance purposes.  
Blagging: to obtain or disclose personal data or information by impersonation or other forms 
of deception and as such an offence under the UK Data Protection Act (1998). 
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Caldicott Guardian: a senior person responsible for protecting the confidentiality of patient 
and service-user information and enabling appropriate information-sharing at NHS and social 
care organisations as well as voluntary and independent sector organisations. The role was 
created following a recommendation in the “Report on the Review of Patient-Identifiable 
Information” (1997) chaired by Dame Fiona Caldicott. 
 
Citizen science: scientific work undertaken by members of the general public, often in 
collaboration with or under the direction of professional scientists and scientific institutions. In 
the report, mainly with reference to publics providing data about themselves for biomedical 
research. See Patient-driven research. 
Clinical care data: data collected about individuals in the context of a clinical intervention.  
Clinical trial: a study using human subjects to investigate the efficacy and/or safety of a 
medicine or other clinical intervention. Traditionally, ‘Phase I’ trials involve a small group of 
healthy volunteers or patients with the disease to evaluate the effect of a range of doses and 
identify potential side effects. In ‘Phase II’ trials the drug or invervention is given to a larger 
group of patients to evaluate effectiveness and assess safety. ‘Phase III’ trials investigate 
effectiveness and safety, normally in comparison to existing treatments, in preparation for 
wide-scale use.  
 
Cloud computing: a term for shared computing used to refer to the outsourcing of 
computation to centralised shared resources, typically in remote data centres.  
Coded data and samples: biological samples and associated data labelled with at least one 
specific code, which allows traceability to a given individual, the ability to perform clinical 
monitoring, subject follow-up, or addition of new data. 
Cohort study: a form of observational, longitudinal study in which a group (cohort) linked by 
some characteristic is followed over time to study the effects of, for example, particular risk 
factors.  
Confidentiality: a societal norm or legal duty relating to the disclosure of information 
obtained in contexts (often, but not exclusively, professional ones) where expectations 
underpinning such norms are reasonable i.e. ‘in confidence’. In specific professional 
contexts, there may be established codes of practice to safeguard confidentiality. See also 
Hippocratic oath.  
Consent: the voluntary, informed and competent agreement of an individual to any action 
that would otherwise constitute an infringement of fundamental personal interests or 
rights.Consent is an important ethical mechanism in medical treatment, research 
participation and processing of sensitive data. 
Correlation: a broad class of statistical relationships involving formal dependence between 
two random variables or two sets of data. 
Data: Literally ‘given things’, i.e. evidence from observation or measurement, or facts that 
are assumed as the basis for further analysis, calculation or reasoning. Cf. Information. 
Data abuse: in this report, a broad category of insecure, inadequate or unethical uses of 
data that have been empirically observed, including fabrication or falsification of data; data 
theft; unauthorised disclosure of or access to data; non-secure disposal of data; 
unauthorised retention of data; technical security failures and data loss. Cf. empirical 
typology of data abuses (box 2.2). 
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Data access committee: a governance infrastructure within (research) institutions or 
associated with research studies scrutinising or authorising data specific applications or for 
specific data collections. See also Appendix 3. 
Data breach: the wrongful release of personal or sensitive information, whether as a result 
of accident, negligence or malice. See also Data abuse 
Data initiatives: purposive activities in which data collected for one purpose are used for a 
new purpose, often involving linking with other data sources. 
Data mining: the computational process of discovering patterns in big data sets. See also 
Big data; KDD; Machine learning.  
Data science: the extraction of knowledge from data using techniques drawn from computer 
science, mathematics, and statistics. 
Data sharing: extending access to data to data users who were not intended users at the 
time of data collection, usually for the purpose of further research or analysis; the term is 
common in research and policy contexts and is suggestive of the social benefits of data re-
use.  
Deep phenotyping: comprehensive analysis of phenotypic characteristics or abnormalities 
in which the individual components of the Phenotype are observed and described, 
particularly in Precision medicine and using computational and imaging applications.  
De-identification: see Anonymisation. 
Digitisation: converting analogue signals such as images, sounds and documents into 
digital ones. 
DNA: deoxyribonucleic acid; the chemical that carries a person’s genetic information. Most 
cells of a person’s body contain a copy of that information. A DNA molecule consists of a 
long chain of nucleotides whose sequence codes for the production of proteins in cells. 
Dynamic consent: interfaces for patients or research participants that aim to enable them to 
give or withdraw consent for their information to be used in specific research projects, 
thereby it is argued overcoming the limitations of all-or-nothing consent regimes. 
Electronic health record: a computerised record of a patient’s medical history, such as 
medication, allergies, results of health tests, lifestyle and personal information that can be 
used in different health care settings. See Medical Record 
Epidemiology: a field of study investigating incidence, prevalence, causes and effects of 
disease in a defined population, as well as appropriate prevention or treatments. 
Epigenomics: a field of study investigating chemical tags on the genome that control the 
activities of genes in contrast to Genomics. 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM): the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. This involves  
integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from 
systematic research.  
Genome: the complete set of DNA within a single cell of an organism. 
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Genomics: a discipline in genetics that applies technologies such as genome sequencing 
methods and bioinformatics to the study of function and structure of genomes. 
Genome sequencing: techniques which allow researchers to read the genetic information in 
DNA.  
Genome-wide association studies (GWAS): studies involving large numbers of people 
with and without a particular disease, each of whom is genotyped at several hundred 
thousand markers throughout the genome. Comparisons are then made between these 
groups to identify genetic markers associated with the disease or its absence.  
Genotype: the genetic makeup of a cell, an organism, or an individual usually with reference 
to a specific characteristic under consideration.  
Guthrie cards: a paper card conserving blood from a baby’s heel prick, named after Robert 
Guthrie, who introduced these in Scotland in 1965. The cards are used for screening for a 
variety of metabolic disorders such as phenylketonuria, congenital hypothyroidism, blood 
disorders such as sickle cell disease and HIV infection in more than 20 countries.  
Health-related findings: Findings discovered during research with human participants that 
relate specifically to an individual participant’s health. 
Hippocratic oath: an oath historically taken by physicians to show their commitment to 
upholding ethical standards, including patient benefit, avoidance of harm and Confidentiality.  
Identifying information: information that relates to an individual (or individuals) and from 
which their identity can be determined either directly (as in the case of a proper name) or, 
deductively, in combination with other available information. See Personal data.  
Information: in this report, data that have gained informational value  and meaning in a 
particular context.  
Informational privacy: an interest or right in the disclosure and withholding of information, 
founded in respect for persons; an aspect of privacy provided for in legal instruments such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Knowledge discovery in databases (KDD): the process of extracting patterns and 
knowledge from data in large databases. See also Machine learning, Big data.  
Knowledge economy: an economy whose focus is information rather than physical 
products or processes (such as mining or manufacturing).  
Life logging: the process of tracking personal data generated by someone’s activities such 
as exercising, sleeping, and eating, in particular with the help of wearable technology and the 
supporting digital services and applications.  See for example the “Quantified Self” 
Movement.  
List cleaning: Validating demographic data to ensure it is accurate and improve linkage 
outcomes.  
Lloyd George record: the traditional paper (GP) medical records introduced in 1911 by then 
health Minister David Lloyd George. 
Machine learning: a branch of computer science that deals with the construction and study 
of algorithms that can learn from data.  
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Material Transfer Agreement (MTA): a contract that governs the transfer of tangible 
research materials between two organisations, when the recipient intends to use it for their 
own research purposes, but the provider typically retains right in the materials and any 
derivatives.  
Medical confidentiality: see Confidentiality and Hippocratic oath. 
Medical record: a record, whether paper or electronic, of medical history, such as 
medication, allergies, results of health tests, lifestyle and personal information, which is 
created in the context of clinical care and whose purpose is recording that care and 
facilitating the care of the patient in the future. 
Meta-analysis: a quantitative statistical analysis of several separate but similar clinical trials 
or biomedical studies in order to gain more precise estimates of treatment effects or to 
investigate factors which may explain heterogeneity of outcomes.  
Metadata: data that describe the contents of substantive records and the circumstances of 
their creation and processing, for example the size of data files, the time or location at which 
they were created, identity of the author, and technical characteristics of the data. 
Open data: data anyone is free to access, use, modify, and share, but which may have 
sharing conditions so that it is correctly attributed or that further use is not constrained (see 
2.32). 
Participant-driven research: see Citizen science. 
Patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs): in the NHS, “health gain in patients 
undergoing hip replacement, knee replacement, varicose vein and groin hernia surgery in 
England, based on responses to questionnaires before and after surgery”. (HSCIC) 
Personal confidential data (PCD): a term (used in Caldicott2) to describe personal 
information about identifiable individuals who are owed a duty of confidentiality, i.e. the 
information was given ‘in confidence’ and should be kept private unless there is a legal basis 
or overriding public interest for disclosure. PCD includes information about deceased as well 
as living individuals and is therefore different in scope from ‘personal data’ under DPA 1998. 
Personal data: identifiable or identifying information relating to living natural persons (data 
subjects). Data protection law applies to such data. See also Sensitive personal data. 
 
Personalised medicine: a concept in medicine and health care policy according to which 
diagnostic testing is employed for selecting appropriate and optimal therapies based on the 
context of a patient’s genetic content.  
Phenotype: the composite of an organism's observable characteristics or traits, such as its 
morphology, development, biochemical or physiological properties, and behaviour. A 
phenotype results from the expression of an organism's genes as well as the influence of 
environmental factors and the interactions between the two.  
Precision medicine: see Personalised medicine. 
Privacy: the interest and right people have in controlling access to themselves, their homes, 
or to information about them. What counts as private can change depending on social norms, 
the specific context, and the relationship between the person concerned and those who 
might enjoy access. Privacy is exercised by selectively withholding or allowing access by 
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others or through limits on acceptable behaviour in others. In the UK and the rest of Europe, 
privacy is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. See Informational 
privacy. 
Pseudonymisation: processes of de-identification which are reversible, for example by 
replacing names with patient numbers, used for example to enable further data about 
individuals to be added over time. 
Public-private partnerships: government services provided and financed by one or more 
private sector entities. 
Re-identification: the act of identifying data that have been de-identified to protect the data 
subject’s Privacy.  
Safe havens: initially medical record libraries in hospitals or health authorities, more recently 
used for data centres providing a pseudonymisation and linkage service, so that medical 
records whose names have been removed can be linked up with other records from other 
providers that refer to the same individual patients. See also Trusted third party.  
Sample bias: see Ascertainment bias. 
Secondary use: ‘reuse’, ‘secondary use’ or ‘repurposing’ of data: any data use that goes 
beyond the use intended at the time of data collection and for which the patient gave 
consent. It typically means the use of GP and hospital medical records for research and 
administrative purposes. In this report we are also concerned with unpredictable future uses, 
and uses for incompatible purposes.  
Sensitive personal data: in data protection law, personal data of specified kinds, including, 
for example, data on physical or mental health or condition, racial and ethnic origin, sexual 
life, political opinions, membership of a trade union, or lawbreaking. Additional data 
protection measures apply to sensitive personal data. 
Summary Care Record (SCR): nationwide system containing a GP record summary 
(initially, current prescriptions and allergies) that would facilitate out-of-hours care and could 
also enable patients to view their own records via a mechanism called Healthspace 
promoted by Connecting for Health. 
Stratified medicine: see Personalised Medicine.  
Tabulation: a statistical table of aggregate data (HSCIC). 
Trusted third party: a trusted organisation with secure facilities for linking data which is 
normally independent of institutions which hold data. See also Safe havens.  
Whole genome sequencing: see Genome sequencing.  
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List of abbreviations  
 
ALSPAC  Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children 
ARDC   Administrative Data Research Centre 
BMA   British Medical Association 
CAG   Confidentiality Advisory Group (of the HRA) 
CMO   Chief Medical Officer 
CPRD   Clinical Practice Research Datalink  
DAAG   Data Access Advisory Group (of the HSCIC) 
DH   Department of Health 
DPA   Data Protection Act 
EAGDA  Expert Advisory Group on Data Access  
EBM   evidence-based medicine 
ECC   Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (esp. of the NIGB) 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms  
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
EGC   Ethics and Governance Council (esp. of UK Biobank) 
EGF   Ethics and Governance Framework (esp. for biobanks) 
EHR   electronic health record 
EPR   electronic patient record  
ESRC   Economic and Social Research Council 
FDA   Food and Drug Administration (USA) 
FOI   Freedom of Information 
GCHQ   Government Communications Headquarters 
GDPR   General Data Protection Regulation (UK) 
GeL    Genomics England Limited 
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GMC   General Medical Council 
GP   general practitioner 
GPES   General Practice Extraction Service 
GWAS   Genome-Wide Association Studies  
HES   Hospital Episodes Statistics  
HRA   Health Research Authority 
HSCIC   Health and Social Care Information Centre 
ICO   Information Commissioner’s Office 
IIGOP   Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel  
KDD   knowledge discovery in databases 
MHRA   Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
MRC   Medical Research Council 
NHS   National Health Service 
NHSE   National Health Service England 
NIGB   National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care 
NIHR   National Institute for Health Research 
NPfIT   National Programme for IT 
NSA   National Security Agency (USA) 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS   Office for Life Sciences 
ONS   Office for National Statistics  
PDS   Personal Demographics Services  
PGP   Personal Genome Project 
PIAG   Patient Information Advisory Group  
PLM   PatientsLikeMe 
PLR   Patient-led research 
QOF   Quality and Outcomes Framework  
RCGP   Royal College of General Practitioners 
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RCT   randomised controlled trial 
REC   Research Ethics Committee 
SCR    Summary Care Record 
SHIP   Scottish Informatics Programme 
SPIRE   Scottish Primary Care Information Resource 
SUS   Secondary Uses Service 
UKBB   UK Biobank 
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 to revolutionise healthcare delivery  
2.6 
 UK policy involving  2.16–2.31 
data security see security of data 
data sharing  1.44, 2.1 
 Caldicott report and  2.43 
 'care.data' programme  6.29 
 HSCIC  6.33, 6.38 
 privacy and  3.7 
 Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP)  6.5 
 UK10K project  7.28 
data sharing agreements  4.49–4.51, 
6.38 
 enforcing  4.50, 4.51 
 formal agreements  4.49–4.51 
 HSCIC  6.33, 6.38 
 penalties for breaches  4.49 
data storage  1.6 
 observational studies limited by  
1.14 
data subjects  4.8 
 consent by see consent 
 identification prevention see 
identification of individuals; 
security of data 
 privacy see privacy 
data threats  2.32–2.50 
 cyber security  2.32–2.34 
 discrimination  2.38–2.42 
 misuse of data see misuse of data 
 personal profiling  2.38–2.42 
 Snowden's disclosures  2.35–2.37 
 state surveillance  2.35–2.37 
data use 
 formal agreements  4.49 
  breaches, penalties  4.49 
 IT infrastructure  6.2 
 limiting  4.49–4.51 
  open data  7.43 
 principle of respect for persons  
5.10–5.13 
 see also re-use of data 
databases 
 linking  7.1, 7.2 
 NHS  2.13 
datasets, massive  1.32, 1.33 
 cyber security  2.32–2.34 
 data mining  1.33 
 'noisy' (messy)  1.35 
 re-identification of individuals from  
2.44 
 value extraction from  1.32 
de-identification 
 '100,000 Genomes' Project  6.57 
 reasons for  4.17 
 reversible  4.17 
 Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP)  6.41 
 UK Biobank  7.13 
 weaknesses  4.21–4.29 
 see also identification of individuals, 
prevention; security of data 
decision-making process  5.7, 5.8 
 public opinion research  5.18–5.20 
  limitations  5.19 
 SHIP model  6.47–6.53 
dedaction of information/identifiers  
4.19 
'deep phenotyping'  1.26, 7.1, 7.16, 
7.18b (Box 7.2) 
deliberation  5.25 
 SHIP model and  6.49 
deliberative approach, interests of 
individuals, collective action 
and  5.21, 5.22 
Department of Health (DH)  6.18b (Box 
6.2) 
 electronic care records  2.7 
 National Information Board  2.19 
 'requirements for accreditation'  6.6 
 research in NHS  2.14, 2.15, 2.50 
 Strategy for UK Life Sciences  2.14 
differential pricing  2.41 
digital data 
 erasing  4.6 
 imaging  1.17 
digital revolution  2.1, 2.3 
digitisation  1.3–1.8 
 definition  1.5 
 limitations  2.18, 2.19 
direct-to-consumer genetic tests  1.16 
disclosure of information  3.8, 4.2 
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 benefits of medical confidentiality  
3.10 
 confidential health information  2.8 
 consent enabling  3.13 
 consent terms and  3.11, 3.12 
 deductive re-identification in 
anonymity set  4.25 
 formal agreements  4.49 
 HSCIC data  6.22 
 non-disclosure, enforcing  3.7 
 personal information, privacy and  
3.7, 3.8 
 uncontrolled  4.4 
discrimination  2.38–2.42, 7.43n 
 anti-discrimination legislation  7.43n 
disease classification/subtypes  1.23, 
1.26 
disease diagnosis  1.20, 1.22, 1.26 
disease susceptibilities, epigenomics 
and  1.24 
DNA 
 as data storage system  1.7 
 testing  1.16 
DNA sequence data  1.7, 1.8, 4.38, 
7.23 
 see also '100,000 Genomes' 
Project; gene sequencing; 
UK10K project 
Dr Foster  6.11 
'duty of care'  3.12, 6.47 
duty of medical confidentiality  4.11 
'dynamic consent'  4.34, 4.35 
 
E 
e-health 
 EU policy  2.6, 2.7 
 IT-intensive approach  2.19 
e-Health vision  2.6, 2.7 
economic issues 
 'big data' and knowledge economy  
2.30–2.31 
 data science exploitation and  2.30 
 growth from life sciences  2.13–2.15 
 public-private partnerships funding 
and  2.20–2.23 
effectiveness of treatment for patient  
2.11 
efficacy of treatment  2.11 
electronic care records  2.7 
electronic health record (EHR)  6.15 
electronic patient administration 
systems  6.7 
electronic patient records (EPRs)  
6.15, 6.16 
 Scotland  6.39 
empowerment  3.12 
encrypting of information  4.17, 4.19 
epigenomics  1.24 
Equality Act 2010  7.43n 
ethical concerns  1.39 
 personal information revealed  1.39 
ethical framework for data initiatives  
5.1–5.28 
 International Cancer Genome 
Consortium  7.31 
 morally reasonable expectations 
see morally reasonable 
expectations 
 morally relevant interests  5.3–5.6, 
5.11, 5.20, 5.28 
 principles, summary  5.28 
 UK Biobank  7.21–7.22 
ethics  1.45 
 data re-use  1.38 
ethics approval process  4.46 
ethics committees  4.44, 4.46, 6.56 
EU 
 2012 eHealth Task Force Report  
2.7 
 cloud computing  2.36 
 communications network  2.36 
EU Data Protection Directive  1.8, 
2.30, 2.37, 4.9n 
 effective anonymisation solution  
4.26 
 UK Government criticism under  
4.25n 
Europe, data protection law  4.8 
Europe 2020 growth strategy  2.30 
European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)  4.5 
European Genome-Phenome Archive  
7.24, 7.28 
evidence-based approach, SHIP and  
6.45 
evidence-based medicine (EBM)  2.12 
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 limitations, 'big data' approach to 
overcome  2.12 
evidence-based practice (EBP)  2.12n 
Expert Advisory Group on Data Access 
(EAGDA)  2.44 
 
F 
false-pretext calls  2.48 
family traits, identification from 
anonymous DNA sequences  
4.16b (Box 4.1) 
Farr Institute of Health Informatics 
Research  2.31, 6.39–6.53 
 public engagement commitment  
6.51 
Framingham Heart Study  1.12, 1.13 
'free riding'  5.12 
freedom 
 negative/positive aspects  3.5 
 from observation by others  3.6 
functional MRI (fMRI)  1.17 
funding, public-private partnerships 
and  2.20–2.23 
 
G 
GeL see Genomics England Ltd (GeL) 
gender, inferred by websites  2.39 
gene sequencing  1.2n, 1.22, 1.23 
 costs  1.22 
 UK10K project see UK10K project 
 see also DNA sequence data; 
genomic data 
General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)  4.9, 4.35 
General Practice Extraction Service 
(GPES)  6.24b (Box 6.5), 6.36, 
6.50 
genetic diseases, complex  2.21 
genetic profiling  1.15, 1.16 
genetic solidarity  3.15n 
genetic variants, rare see UK10K 
project 
Genetics White Paper  2.12, 2.14 
genome 
 germline, stability  1.24 
 identification of individual subject 
from  4.14 
 sequencing  1.22–1.23 
  see also gene sequencing; 
genomic data 
genome science, UK research policy  
2.13 
Genome Wide Association Studies 
(GWAS)  2.21, 4.16, 7.23 
'100,000 Genomes' Project see 
'100,000 Genomes' Project (at 
start of index) 
genomic data 
 consent, difficulties  4.38, 6.59 
 consent for '100,000 Genomes' 
Project  6.58–6.61 
 Personal Genome Project  7.41 
genomic datasets, concerns over 
identification of individuals  
4.16, 4.16b (Box 4.1) 
genomic testing  6.66 
Genomics and Society (P3G)  7.49 
Genomics England Clinical 
Interpretation Partnerships 
(GeCIP)  6.54 
Genomics England Ltd (GeL)  6.54b 
(Box 6.7) 
 access to data  6.57 
 consent and privacy concerns  
6.58–6.61 
 decision to involve in '100,000 
Genomes' Project  6.55 
 information governance  6.56–6.57 
 public interests and  6.64 
 responsibilities  6.55 
 traceable operations  6.57 
 see also '100,000 Genomes' Project 
(at start of index) 
genotypic data, phenotypic data 
linkage  2.12, 2.21, 7.24 
genotyping  1.26 
Global Alliance for Genomics and 
Health  4.35, 7.49 
'gold standard', clinical trials as  1.11, 
2.10 
González case  4.6 
'good governance framework'  6.43n 
good practice, third parties for data 
linking for pseudonymisation  
4.24 
Google  1.16n, 1.32n, 2.3, 2.29 
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 flu trends  1.14n, 2.39 
governance 
 '100,000 Genomes' Project  6.56–
6.57 
 data use in data initiative  3.29, 
4.43–4.51, 4.53, 5.1, 5.28 
  authorisation of data access  
4.44–4.46 
  limiting data access  4.47–4.48 
  limiting data use  4.49–4.51 
  participation by people with 
morally relevant interests  
5.24 
 international collaborative research  
7.31, 7.40 
 local framework, recommendation  
7.29 
 precautionary  6.45 
 proportionate  6.43–6.46 
 retrospective studies  7.32 
 Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP)  6.41–6.42 
  proportionate governance  6.43–
6.46 
 UK Biobank  7.9–7.12, 7.21 
  recommendations  7.29 
 UK10K project  7.25 
 see also ethical framework for data 
initiatives; legal framework 
Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ)  2.35 
GP Research Database  6.9 
GP system providers  6.9 
GPs and GP practice 
 conflict over HSCIC data access  
6.24 
 data used for research unless opt 
out  4.32 
 GP contract  6.6 
 IT systems and tracking patients  
6.6 
 responsibilities over 'care.data' 
programme  6.29 
 responsibilities under SHIP  6.42 
 SHIP data release authorisation  
6.50 
 SHIP data source  6.42 
 Summary Care Record  6.17, 6.17b 
(Box 6.1) 
 UK Biobank record linkage  7.15 
Group Insurance Commission (GIC)  
4.16b (Box 4.1) 
'Guthrie' cards  1.8 
 
H 
harm 
 by feedback, UK Biobank  7.19 
 misuse of data see misuse of data 
 to participants in participant-driven 
research  7.47 
 secondary uses of data and data 
sharing  2.43 
health and fitness 
 improvements through research  
6.12 
 improving by self-monitoring  1.16 
Health and Social Care Act 2012  2.29, 
4.42, 6.10, 6.22, 6.29, 6.37 
 need for moral guidance  6.37 
Health and Social Care Information 
Centre (HSCIC)  2.24, 2.25, 
2.29, 6.20–6.38, 6.68 
 access to data  6.22, 6.23, 6.28, 
6.32, 6.33 
  auditable record 
recommendation  6.38 
 care.data programme see 
'care.data' programme 
 cost recovery basis  6.23 
 Data Access Advisory Committee  
4.44 
 data available from  6.22, 6.22b 
(Box 6.4), 6.23 
 data disclosure to commercial firms  
6.32, 6.36 
 data sharing agreements  6.33, 6.38 
 description and aims  6.20b (Box 
6.3), 6.21 
 disclosure of information  6.22, 
6.23, 6.24 
 information release, levels  6.22 
 patients' opt out of central data 
collection  4.32 
 potential uses of data  6.36 
 presumed broad consent  6.36 
 privacy impact assessment  6.29n 
 public support and concerns over 
commercial use  6.36 
 recommendations involving  2.50 
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 solutions for, morally reasonable 
expectations  6.35–6.38 
  norm identification  6.36, 6.37 
  recommendations  6.38 
 see also 'care.data' programme 
health data  1.4, 1.42 
 public-private partnerships  2.20–
2.23 
 public sector, exploitation and value  
2.3, 2.4 
Health Episode Statistics  2.33 
health informatics  1.31 
health information  1.4 
health records see medical records 
Health Research Authority  2.50 
 Confidentiality Advisory Group  4.44 
health services 
 administrative data collected  1.27 
 delivery efficiency and 
transformation, value 
proposition and  2.4, 2.5–2.7 
 performance 
evaluation/improvement  
6.11–6.13 
 public administration and service 
delivery  6.14–6.17 
 regional  6.7 
health systems, data initiatives  6.1–
6.69 
 critical decisions, axes for  6.3 
 IT innovation and information 
requirements  6.5–6.19 
  observational research  6.9–6.10 
  performance 
evaluation/improvement  
6.11–6.13 
  public administration and service 
delivery  6.14–6.17 
  tracking patients  6.6–6.8 
  see also National Programme for 
IT (NPfIT) 
 in NHS, range  6.3 
 see also '100,000 Genomes' 
Project; Health and Social 
Care Information Centre 
(HSCIC); Scottish 
Informatics Programme 
(SHIP) 
HealthSpace  6.17, 6.18 
HealthUnlocked  4.35 
Hippocratic Oath  2.8n 
hoax calls  2.48 
'holding to account'  5.25 
hospital(s) 
 electronic patient administration 
systems  6.7 
 performance evaluation/monitoring  
6.11 
 UK Biobank record linkage  7.15 
Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) 
database  6.14, 6.20b (Box 
6.3), 6.24b (Box 6.5) 
'hospital ID'  6.7 
HRA Confidentiality Advisory Group  
6.37 
human errors  2.46b (Box 2.3), 2.47 
Human Genome Project  2.13b (Box 
2.1), 7.23 
human rights  3.26, 5.14–5.16, 5.28 
'100,000 Genomes' Project see 
'100,000 Genomes' Project (at 
start of index) 
hypothesis-guided inquiry, data mining 
vs  1.33, 1.35 
 
I 
Icelandic health service  4.18 
identification of individuals  2.44 
 in anonymity set  4.25 
 data as continuum  4.27, 4.28 
 prevention 
  by aggregation of data  4.13–
4.14 
  by anonymisation  4.15–4.16, 
4.19, 4.21 
  by pseudonymisation  4.17–4.20, 
4.23 
  see also de-identification 
 re-identification see re-identification 
of individuals 
 of relatives, from genomic data  
4.16, 6.59 
The Identity Theft Resource Center 
(US)  2.32 
'imagined community'  6.32 
imaging data  1.17–1.19 
 brain  1.18, 1.19 
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 digital  1.17 
 large datasets  1.19 
Independent Information Governance 
Oversight Panel  2.50 
industry (companies/commercial 
sector) 
 attitudes to '100,000 Genomes' 
Project and  6.64 
 HSCIC initiative, involvement  6.36 
 Internet companies  2.7, 2.29 
 public-private partnerships  2.20–
2.23, 5.18 
 public support for secondary use of 
data and  5.18, 6.36 
 SHIP model, expectations 
identification  6.52 
 UK Biobank data and  7.20 
 unpublished clinical trials  2.26 
influenza trends  1.14n, 2.39 
information 
 uncontrolled dissemination  4.4 
 withholding, privacy and  3.7, 3.8 
'information altruists'  7.42, 7.43 
Information Commissioner's Office 
(ICO)  2.32, 2.45, 4.45 
 Code of Practice on anonymisation  
4.28n 
 complaints over HSCIC information  
6.33n 
Information for Health (1998)  6.15, 
6.16 
Information Management and 
Technology (IM&T) Strategy  
6.15 
information sharing 
 privacy and  3.7 
 see also data sharing 
information technology (IT)  2.17–2.19 
 health, ownership  6.18b (Box 6.2) 
 innovation 
  effective use of data and  2.5 
  government ceding control to 
companies  2.7 
  health systems (UK) see health 
systems, data initiatives 
 intensity, UK policy and  2.17–2.19 
 privacy and breaches of privacy  3.8 
 'productivity paradox'  2.19 
 projects, NPfIT see National 
Programme for IT (NPfIT) 
 public sector projects, difficulties  
2.18, 6.18b (Box 6.3) 
 to revolutionise healthcare delivery  
2.6, 6.16 
 structure, uses of data influencing  
6.2 
informational privacy  3.6–3.8, 4.4, 4.5 
informational value, data  1.3, 1.4, 1.28 
informed consent  4.37 
InPractice Systems  6.9 
Integrated Care Records Service 
(ICRS)  2.14 
interests 
 aggregative vs deliberative 
approaches  5.21 
 in biomedical research data 
initiatives  5.3 
 conflicting  5.4, 5.6 
 definition  5.3 
 morally relevant see morally 
relevant interests 
 private see private interest(s) 
 private vs public see under public 
interest 
International Cancer Genome 
Consortium (ICGC)  7.30b (Box 
7.3), 7.31 
 cloud services and data access  
7.38 
 open or controlled access data  
7.30b (Box 7.3) 
 PanCancer Analyses of Whole 
Genomes (PCAWG)  7.36b 
(Box 7.4) 
international collaborative research  
7.30–7.40 
 agreements  7.31 
 cloud storage and computing  7.35–
7.40 
  data repository location  7.36 
 cross-border data 
access/transmission  7.38 
 difficulties associated  7.30 
 dissemination of results  7.33 
 Ethics and Governance Framework 
(EGF)  7.40 
 governance  7.31, 7.40 
 International Cancer Genome 
Consortium (ICGC)  7.30b 
(Box 7.3) 
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 Psychiatric Genomics Consortium 
(PGC)  7.30b (Box 7.3) 
 recommendations  7.40 
 security of data  7.34, 7.37 
International Medical Informatics 
Association (IMIA)  4.35 
internet 
 personal attribute inference  2.39 
 searching, recommendations and 
customer profiling  2.38 
 see also cloud computing, and 
cloud-based data services; 
information technology (IT) 
Internet companies  2.7, 2.29 
intimacy  3.4n, 3.6 
intrusion of the state  3.26 
 
K 
knowledge discovery in databases 
(KDD)  1.33 
knowledge networks  2.12 
Kömer Committee  6.14n 
 
L 
laboratory data  1.17–1.26 
 biomarkers  1.20–1.21, 1.42 
 genome sequencing  1.22–1.23 
 imaging  1.17–1.19 
 other 'omics'  1.24–1.26 
Laboratory Information Management 
System  1.20 
'learning health care system'  6.12, 
6.13 
legal framework  4.1–4.53 
 human rights and resolution of 
conflicts  5.15 
 privacy breaches and  5.14 
 for use of biological/health data  
4.2–4.12 
  common law  4.10–4.12 
  data protection law  4.7–4.9 
  HSCIC initiative and  6.37 
  legal right to privacy  4.3–4.6 
'legitimate expectation', concept  4.10 
libertarian paternalism  4.32n 
lie detector  1.18 
'life logging'  1.15 
life sciences, economic growth 
generation from  2.13–2.15 
Life Study (UK)  1.13 
lifestyle data  1.15–1.16 
 recording in healthcare systems  
1.10 
linking of data  1.40 
 biomedical, population research  
7.1, 7.2 
 databases  7.1, 7.2 
 opportunities  2.2–2.15 
  see also 'value proposition' (of 
data) 
 phenotypic and genotypic  2.12, 
2.21, 7.24 
 policy orientations influencing see 
UK policy orientations 
 pseudonymisation and  4.23, 4.25 
 re-identification of individual by  
4.14 
 in regulated safe haven  4.47 
 richness of, as identifying data  4.25 
 risk of deductive re-identification in 
anonymity set  4.25 
 Scottish Health system  6.39, 6.40b 
(Box 6.7) 
 Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP)  6.39, 6.41–6.42 
 by third parties  4.23, 4.24 
 UK Biobank  7.13–7.16 
lithium, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
research  7.45 
Lloyd George, David  1.6 
'Lloyd George' record  1.9 
 
M 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)  
1.17 
'maladministration', data abuse  2.46 
mandatory inclusion of individual data 
in dataset  5.12 
'master patient index'  6.8 
Material Transfer Agreements  4.49–
4.51 
McKinsey Global Institute, report  2.3 
medical confidentiality  1.43, 2.8, 3.10 
 duty of  4.11 
 see also confidentiality 
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medical records  1.5, 1.9–1.10 
 computerised  1.10 
 concerns over electronic health 
record privacy  6.15 
 consent for data use see consent 
 ownership  1.6 
 paper  1.5, 1.9, 1.10 
 paperless in GP practices  6.6 
 as raw material for data mining  
1.34 
 Scotland  6.39, 6.40b (Box 6.7) 
medical research charities  2.21, 2.22, 
2.23 
Medical Research Council (MRC)  
2.22, 2.31 
medical treatment 
 efficacy, trial evidence  2.11 
 improvements  2.8–2.12 
  clinical trials role  2.10–2.11 
  evidence-based medicine  2.12 
  'wider' and 'deeper' data role  2.9 
Mendelian disorders  1.23 
meta-analyses  2.11 
metabolomics  1.24 
metadata  1.27–1.30 
 data vs  1.30 
 types and recording  1.29 
 uses  1.30 
microbiomics  1.24 
Microsoft  2.3, 2.29 
Mill, John Stuart  3.22n, 4.4 
Million Women Study  1.13 
mind-reading  1.18 
MIQUEST  6.9 
mis-coding of records  2.46b (Box 2.3) 
misuse of data  2.43–2.50, 5.14 
 abuse by investigators/journalists  
2.48 
 Caldicott reports and  2.43 
 harm from  2.44, 2.44b (Box 2.2), 
5.14 
  identification, limitations  2.45, 
2.49 
  inadequacy of current measures  
2.49, 5.14 
  judicial process and  5.14 
  need for full research  2.49, 2.50 
  recommendations  2.50, 4.51 
 harm vs impact  2.46 
 human errors  2.46b (Box 2.3), 2.47 
 incorrect data and correction  2.46b 
(Box 2.3) 
 legal protection against  4.1 
 'maladministration'  2.46 
 privacy harms  2.45 
 of private information  4.10 
 redress, obstacles  2.45 
 research needed and 
recommendations  2.49, 
2.50 
 types, causes and harm resulting  
2.44b (Box 2.2) 
models 
 GeL see '100,000 Genomes' Project 
 HSCIC see Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC) 
 SHIIP see Scottish Informatics 
Programme (SHIP) 
monitoring, in observational studies  
1.14, 1.15 
Moore's Law  1.22 
'moral capital'  3.7 
moral deliberation  5.25 
moral duties, of data custodians  4.41 
moral justification, 'learning health care 
system'  6.12, 6.13 
moral requirement, high quality care  
6.13 
moral values  3.1–3.30 
 community and solidarity  3.14–3.17 
 confidentiality  3.9–3.13 
 consent  3.9–3.13 
 privacy  3.2–3.8 
 public interest  3.18–3.26 
 see also each individual moral value 
morally reasonable expectations  3.29, 
5.1, 5.7–5.26 
 accounting for decisions  5.25–5.26 
 HSCIC data collection/release  
6.35–6.38 
 moral reasonableness  5.8–5.16 
  human rights  5.14–5.16, 5.28 
  procedural approaches  5.9 
  respect for persons  5.10–5.13, 
5.28 
  summary of ethical principles  
5.28 
 moral reasoning  5.17–5.24, 5.27 
  participation  5.23–5.24 
 Personal Genome Project  7.43 
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morally relevant interests  5.3–5.6, 
5.11, 5.20, 5.28 
 participation of people in data 
initiatives  5.23–5.24, 5.28 
mortality statistics  6.10, 6.14n 
'motivated intruder' test  4.28n 
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging)  
1.17 
 
N 
National Child Development Study 
(NCDS), 1958 birth cohort  
1.13n 
National Data Guardian for health and 
care  6.37 
National Information Board (UK)  2.19 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT)  
4.35, 4.48, 6.16 
 criticisms and dismantling  6.18, 
6.18b (Box 6.2) 
 features  6.17 
 lessons from  6.19 
 opt-out/opt-in  6.17b (Box 6.2), 6.18 
National Safe Haven  6.40b (Box 6.6) 
National Security Agency (NSA) (USA)  
2.35 
National Strategic Tracing Service 
(NSTS)  6.8 
Next Generation Sequencing (NGS)  
1.22 
NHS (National Health Service) 
 central reporting lacking  2.45 
 as combined care and research 
system  2.15 
 confidentiality and Caldicott reports  
2.43 
 Constitution  2.14 
 cyber security  2.32 
 data abuse  2.48 
 data analytics, savings from  2.5n 
 data initiatives see health systems, 
data initiatives 
 data sharing, formal agreements  
4.49 
 databases  2.13 
 exploitation as data source  2.14 
 firewall, '100,000 Genomes' Project 
data  6.57 
 funding  6.31 
 human errors affecting data  2.46b 
(Box 2.3), 2.47 
 internal market  6.14 
 Personal Demographics Service 
(PDS)  2.48 
 purchaser/provider split  6.14 
 research capability  2.14, 2.15, 2.50 
 research policy, genome science 
and  2.13 
 resource constraints  2.5 
 UK Biobank record linkage  7.15 
NHS Act 2006  4.12 
NHS England 'care.data' programme 
see 'care.data' programme 
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